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ABSTRACT 
This study initially aimed to evaluate dynamic capability theory using a longitudinal 
empirical case of a highly successful FTSE-100 company operating within a volatile 
market.  Using a range of rich qualitative data to open the “black box”, dynamic 
capabilities theory is extended through a detailed account of the process through which the 
case firm reconfigures and deploys their so-called zero-order or operational capabilities.  
Although there is a burgeoning literature, research findings remain diverse, disparate and 
largely conceptual.  The limited examples of empirical work in the extant literature, tend to 
focus on what dynamic capabilities are with little attention in demonstrating how they 
actually operate. 
This study details several stages of significant change within the case firm as it moves 
from start up to its current MNE status. In-depth interviews with the senior team both past 
and present capture discussions of those factors underlying the success of this firm. 
Thematic development revealed examples of resource configurations and routines that 
matched dynamic capability as defined in literature.  However, attempts to use Winter’s 
(2003) hierarchy of capability to organize the data proved inadequate; far from being 
heterogeneous, the dynamic capability found looks like best practice; and whilst 
operational capability can be seen to evolve, the dynamic capability identified has not. 
Turning to the wider strategic management literature one can argue that the dynamic 
capability found in this firm fits better with a wider set of concepts such as knowledge 
management, absorptive learning, organizational change, leadership, HR practices, 
strategic decision making, team building, etc. Using a dynamic capability perspective, the 
findings might extend the under-developed notions of dynamic managerial capability and 
entrepreneurial fitness. Dynamic managerial capability, as described in the literature, can 
be articulated within the case firm. Managerial agency is key to competitive success in this 
firm and this study shows that the concept of agency is more encompassing than that of 
dynamic managerial capabilities and Teece’s (2007) vision of sensing, seizing and 
reconfiguring. There are cognitive aspects to creating the context for leadership action and 
the roles of sense-making and sense-giving to sustain the organizational culture and create 
the framework for innovation, learning and change.  
Yet, it is equally possible to account for competitive advantage within this case without 
recourse to dynamic capability theory. By linking the data gathered to the concept of 
  ii 
“dominant logic” (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986, 1995), it is argued that traits and attitudes of 
the founders and senior managers of the case firm contribute to the “logic” that drives 
action. Over time these traits have been expressed as a series of simple rules that, in turn, 
have been operationalized in an organizational culture providing the context for the 
development of both routines and ad-hoc action. The thesis then demonstrates analytically 
how rules and their underlying traits act as a mechanism for the creation, sustenance and 
adaptation of operational capabilities traceable directly to actions taken in response to or in 
anticipation of environmental changes as well as actions taken in the context of an 
organizational culture which reflects these rules and underlying traits. It is through 
managerial agency that rules are created, the culture sustained and “entrepreneurial fitness” 
is achieved. As such, the research presented here contributes to the resource-based theory 
of the firm without recourse to the dynamic capabilities construct.  
Keywords 
strategy; resource-based; dynamic capability; dynamic managerial capability; heuristics; 
cognition; organizational culture; grounded theory; qualitative research; 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Setting the Scene – A Practitioners Perspective 
I have spent the last 20 years working in various senior management roles in a company I 
helped found: Admiral Group Plc (AGP or Admiral). In my job, my working day consisted 
of what Johnson et. al. (2007) calls strategizing activities around three core tasks for the 
firm:  devising strategy, implementing strategy and reviewing strategy.  All my activities 
revolved around three key questions that continue to occupy my senior colleagues and 
myself, namely: (1) are we still growing our profits? (2) what can I do to improve our 
profits? And (3) do we have enough initiatives in the pipeline from which new profits may 
arise? 
In essence, this focus reflects the fundamental question in the field of strategic 
management which is ‘how firms achieve and sustain competitive advantage’ (Teece, 
Pisano, & Shuen, 1997: 509). Porter (1985) in his seminal book on the subject says that 
“The fundamental basis of above-average performance in the long term is sustainable 
competitive advantage” (p. 11). In addition, Porter argues that “competitive advantage 
grows fundamentally out of value a firm is able to create for its buyers that exceeds the 
firm’s cost of creating it.” (p. 3). In a vocabulary more akin to a practitioner’s, Barney and 
Clark (2007: 3) succinctly pose the question as ‘why do some firms persistently outperform 
others?’ 
So whilst my colleagues ponder these questions in the pursuit of a vision that our CEO 
shares with every new employee namely that: “We want Admiral to be not the biggest but 
the most profitable insurer in the UK”1, I have become more interested in Barney and 
Clark’s question from an academic viewpoint. 
1.2 Positioning My Research in the Context of the Academic Literature 
From the previous discussion we can see that my research will be positioned within the 
field of Strategic Management. From my initial reading I could see that the dominant 
paradigm during the 1980s was rooted in a principally economics-influenced literature and 
                                                 
1  This is a quote taken from the CEO’s speech he gives to all new employees in a meeting during their 
induction training. This quote was taken from the version written in 1999. 
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that the seminal work was Michael Porter’s competitive forces approach (Porter, 1980).  
This itself was rooted in ideas developed through the 40s, 50s and 60s: notably Chandler’s 
focus on how firms organized themselves in Strategy and Structure (1962) and in terms of 
firms shaping their markets this was embedded in the structure-conduct-performance 
paradigm of the Mason-Bain Berkeley-Harvard industrial organization literature (Bain, 
1959; Mason, 1949b).  
In essence, Porter’s pioneering competitive forces approach viewed the development of 
strategy through understanding a company in its environmental context in the belief that 
industry structure was the strongest influence on competitive advantage. Porter’s ‘5-forces’ 
framework still provides us with a systematic way of thinking about how competitive 
forces work within an industry and how they can drive profitability (or otherwise). 
However, there was a growing feeling amongst some economists that industry structure 
was not the only determinant of firm’s performance.  Edith Penrose in 1959 argued that ‘a 
firm is more than an administrative unit; it is a collection of productive resources’ 
(Penrose, 1959: 21). Later, Demsetz (1973) put forward an argument that persistent 
competitive advantage may be due, in some cases, to luck or because a firm was better 
placed to satisfy customer requirements than its rivals. Wernerfelt (1984) in his influential 
paper sought to ‘develop some simple economic tools for analysing a firm's resource 
position’ (Wernerfelt, 1984: 171) and in an attempt to complement  the industry structure 
and firm’s positioning of Porter’s (1980) theory, coined the term ‘resource-based view’ 
(RBV).  
Rumelt (1984), Barney (1986a) and Dierickx and Cool (1989b) amongst others contributed 
to the early development of RBV but it was with Barney’s highly influential paper in 1991 
that the RBV was formalised and his framework which outlined the ‘relationship between 
resource heterogeneity and immobility; value, rareness, imitability, and substitutability; 
and sustained competitive advantage’ (Barney, 1991a: 112) subsequently ‘supplied the 
footing for many RBV studies’ (Priem & Butler, 2001a: 23). 
By 1991, Michael Porter was calling for a better understanding ‘of the dynamic processes 
by which firms perceive and ultimately attain superior market positions’ (Porter, 1991: 95). 
And in 1994, there were calls for research into an ‘intellectual framework to help us better 
understand the differential performance of firms in fast changing global markets’ (Dosi & 
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Teece, 1994: iii). We also saw the first mention of a new concept referred to as ‘dynamic 
capabilities’ in an essay by Teece and Pisano (1994) who argued that to understand 
competitive advantage in face of the challenges provided in current economies the concept 
of RBV needed to be extended. A seminal paper on dynamic capabilities by Teece, Pisano 
and Shuen (1997) signaled a start to a period of intensive research2 in this new concept in 
an attempt to understand competitive advantage in today’s markets, described as ‘high-
velocity’ (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988).  
This brief overview places my nascent research question, about the ability of some firms to 
persistently outperform their peers, within a theoretical context. Could the opportunity and 
limitations presented by my insider perspective explicate the theoretical relationship 
between dynamic capabilities and competitive advantage?  As a founder of a business that 
has persistently outperformed its peers, could I use my experience, access and industry 
knowledge to develop a robust, doctoral level study of dynamic capabilities? 
1.3 Making the Argument That a Study of My Firm Represents an 
Opportunity to Contribute to the Dynamic Capabilities Literature 
In order to argue that Admiral may be an interesting company to study in the context of 
dynamic capabilities it is worth understanding the market in which it operates. 
1.3.1 The competitive landscape 
The UK motor insurance industry provides the context against which Admiral was created 
in 1993 and in which it currently operates. The industry is well understood.  It is an 
example of a ‘near perfect market’ (Channon, 1996: 57). Motor insurance is a compulsory 
purchase in the UK and this large market of 27m customers generates premiums (income) 
of £15.6 billion in 2012 (EY, 2013).   
Let us start with some definitions.  In this industry, anyone who sells car insurance is 
considered to be a competitor but this is a simplification. In fact we can divide the 
competition into: 
                                                 
2 G. Di Stefano et al. (2010) report that since 2006, articles on dynamic capabilities have been published at a 
rate of more than 100 per year. 
  CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
 Page  1-4 
1. Direct Insurers: Companies marketing insurance directly to customers.  The main 
players now are Direct Line (which include Churchill and Privilege as separately 
marketed brands), Admiral (and its myriad brands), the Esure stable of brands and 
Swiftcover. 50% of all policies are sold through the direct channel (Datamonitor, 
2011). 
2. Traditional Composites: companies who sell car insurance as part of a diversified 
financial services portfolio, often as a loss leader. Examples would be Aviva and 
Royal Sun Alliance. This sector underwent significant consolidation in the 90’s. 
3. Brokers: the high street face-to-face broker became a rarity as the brokers responded 
to the threat of direct insurers by consolidation and liquidation in the late 90’s.  The 
larger companies were able to invest in ‘tele-broking’ where the broker advertises a 
brand and deals direct with the public over the telephone. Examples are The AA, 
Swinton, Budget plus a raft of lesser known brands with variations on the larger 
successful broker business models. The brokers market products from the traditional 
composites and from syndicates based at Lloyds of London (such as Highway, 
Equity, Service).  Some brokers also white-label a broking service for other brands.  
For example, Budget offers broker services as Marks and Spencer, Yes, Post Office 
and tele-markets its own brand Budget and also operates a chain of high street 
brokers who deal face-to-face with the public.  
4. Aggregators: new players in the market who utilise the technology of the internet to 
provide a search service for customers seeking to compare prices from all the 
different brands in the market.  There are four price comparison sites: Confused.com, 
Moneysupermarket.com, GoCompare.com and ComparetheMarket.com.  They 
follow the same marketing strategies as the insurers/brokers and compete heavily for 
market share. In 2010 through 2013 they outspent both the direct players and the 
composites combined on TV.3 From the launch of Confused.com in 2002, 
                                                 
3  According to figures provided by Nielsen Media Reporting 
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aggregators in 2013 accounted for 67% of all car insurance policies sold and 36% of 
home insurance policies4. 
5. White-labelled brands: are established non-insurance brands looking for brand 
extension. They will form a partnership with an established player in the market (any 
of the first four categories) to offer branded services: direct insurance i.e. Tesco, 
Sainsburys; broker services i.e. Post Office; or now aggregator services i.e. 
Autotrader, Motley Fool.  They have no underwriting risk and generally pay for the 
marketing in return for a payment per policy from the actual underwriter/broker. 
6. Syndicates: based at Lloyds of London and offer products through brokers.  Some 
syndicates (Admiral was the first) offer their products direct to the public in addition 
to the broker distribution channel with varying degrees of success.   
The motor insurance market can be analyzed using Porter’s 5-forces model as summarized 
in Figure 1-1.  
 
Figure 1-1:  Pictorial representation of Porters 5-Forces model as applied to the UK 
motor insurance industry. Sources: (Datamonitor, 2011, 2012; Deloitte, 
2013; eBenchmarkers, 2013) 
                                                 
4  Figures taken from Investor Presentation 2013 Full Year results: Slide 17. Available at: 
http://www.admiralgroup.co.uk/investor/presentations/docs/FY_2013.pdf. Accessed 05/10/14; 11:57am 
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The key buyers are the individual consumers, and, for this analysis, technology providers 
and media outlets can be seen as the key suppliers. 
1. Barriers to entry: Companies entering the market need to seek regulatory approval 
from the UK Financial Services Authority, which places significant restrictions on 
the entrance of new players. Companies must also pay a levy to the Motor Insurers’ 
Bureau, an organization responsible for compensating the victims of uninsured and 
untraced motorists. All motor insurance companies in the UK have to pay these 
levies, although the increased costs are passed on to consumers by higher premiums. 
Furthermore, insurance is a fairly complex financial service, encompassing a large 
degree of specialized knowledge for risk analysis. Companies require a large 
customer base in order to distribute risk directly, and companies entering the market 
without diversified insurance activities incur significant reinsurance costs. Despite 
these barriers to entry, the motor insurance market is highly commoditized, and so 
companies can enter the market through innovative differentiation strategies as well 
as price competition and with the increasing dependence on the Internet for sales 
provides an easy way for new entrants to access cost effective distribution channels. 
Datamonitor (2010) rated the threat of new entrants with respect to the UK motor 
insurance market as moderate. 
2. Threat of substitutes: Motor insurance is a legal requirement in the UK and as such 
the threat of substitutes is very weak when viewed in this way. However if a 
company offers either direct from the company or through a broker or through a 
price comparison site it is important to remember that each of these distribution 
channels has different acquisition costs and different loyalty profiles. There is a 
threat to providers in the current climate as consumers are embracing aggregators as 
a means to locate the cheapest insurance but subsequently demonstrating lower levels 
of loyalty (Datamonitor, 2011; eBenchmarkers, 2011) which has implications for 
expense control and thus profits. This is a substantial threat to insurance providers 
who are now dependent on aggregators to provide the bulk of their volume. 
3. Buyer power: Motor insurance is a ‘highly commoditized product where levels of 
provider switching are high and customer loyalty low’ (Datamonitor, 2010b: 13). 
Customer switching behavior has increased considerably since the launch of Direct 
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Line in 1985 (Channon, 1998). Advertising encouraging consumers to shop around at 
renewal has seen a rise in the number of consumers buying direct from the insurers 
from 10% in 1990 to 54% of consumers in 2001 reaching a peak of 61% in 2007 
falling to 50% in 2011 (Datamonitor, 2011). This has been aided by the adoption of 
the internet as a purchasing mechanism by the consumer where in 2008, 24% of 
consumers purchased their insurance direct from the internet rising to 53.3% in 2012 
(Datamonitor, 2012). This switching trend has been further encouraged in the last 
five years due to the emergence of the aggregators. Buyer power in the UK market is 
very strong. 
4. Supplier power: Suppliers of IT services, of back-office services, of media are few 
in number and have multiple clients so the prospect of negotiation to control 
expenses by the insurer is weakened. Many brokers invest significantly in IT, 
typically outsourced to a large technology provider. Switching to a new provider is 
costly. Similarly, in order to reduce costs and increase operational efficiency, many 
insurance companies are outsourcing back-office services, some of which are now 
offshore. The nature of outsourcing is such that switching could interrupt operations, 
therefore incurring significant costs. Again, suppliers have the power in these 
relationships. 
5. Threat of rivalry: During the 90’s there was significant consolidation amongst the 
traditional composites and amongst the brokers but competition remains intense 
within the market both in terms of price and in service or product innovation.  
Providing a new entrant can satisfy the regulatory requirements, the only barrier is 
access to buyers which the aggregators provide cost-effectively as described above. 
At the same time, this industry does demonstrate quite clear barriers to profitability. 
Industry profitability exhibits a strong cyclical pattern where consistently 
unprofitable results are punctuated by short periods of near profitability ameliorated 
by addition of investment income or release of money reserved in previous years to 
pay out claims. This pattern is demonstrated overleaf: 
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Figure 1-2: Historic net combined ratios (NCR) in the UK Motor Market 1982-2012. 
NCR is a measure of profitability as it represents the ratio of pure income to 
operating expenses. Income is ‘pure’ in that it is in the form of gross written 
premium before claims reserves are released or investment income is added 
which can result in companies at 105% breaking even or recording marginal 
profits. Sources: Deloitte (2011), EY (2013). Market excludes Admiral Figure 
1-2 shows that in the period 1982 to 2012 the market (excluding Admiral) was 
only profitable in 1993 to 1995 and depending on investment returns between 
2001 and 2007/8.  
The reason postulated for these cycles concerns the battle for market share. Whilst 
not an inherently attractive market, many companies see their motor portfolio as an 
opportunity to cross-sell their more profitable products. There are also advantages to 
being large in terms of scale efficiencies and risk profiling.  Hence they will fight for 
market share using unsustainable pricing strategies where prices do not cover the 
underwriting losses.  However the spread of individual companies in any given year 
can be quite wide as shown in Figure 1-3 overleaf. 
Eventually, the pressure for profitability returns and prices rise until they worry again 
about losing market share to their competitors. However other factors are at play: for 
example: in 1994, the Government introduced an insurance premium tax. This 
combined with various legal decisions for claims plaintiffs against insurance 
companies plus the Woolf report (Woolf, 1996) into long term injury cases and 
recommendations favouring the claimant rather than the insurance company and the 
adoption of the Ogden tables meant that claims inflation moved sharply upwards at a 
time when premiums were falling.  This exaggerated and deepened the downturn in 
the market from 1997 to 2001. 
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Figure 1-3: Benchmark of individual insurers in 2011. Each mark represents an 
insurer’s position as measured by gross market share against NCR. You can see 
that the company with the largest market share is reporting a NCR of 118% i.e 
for every pound taken in as income £1.18 is paid out and yet there are a couple 
of highly profitable players with NCR of between 40 and 60% who have 
practically no market share. Source: Deloitte (2011). 
Earlier in 1985, Direct Line launched at a time in the cycle where premiums were 
rising and this combined with a lower expense model resulted in early profits for 
the start-up. This encouraged others to come into the market or to change their 
existing business model and this created an intense battle for market share leading 
to an unprofitable cycle in the early 1990’s.  
There is a lag: for example in 2010 when gross written premiums increased by 
more than 7%, the market delivered a £1.6 billion loss (Mintel, 2012) and in mid 
2012, rates softened again as insurers sought market share as the price rises in 2009 
through 2011 brought the market almost to profitability - see Figure 1-2. 
In summary, Porter’s framework (1980) can be used to analyse the industry and taken as a 
whole, the analysis shows that the UK motor industry is unattractive although 
opportunities for competitive advantage do exist. Datamonitor (2010a) report the UK 
motor market as ‘highly competitive’. 
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In 1994, Teece and Pisano noted that: 
‘winners in the global marketplace have been firms demonstrating timely 
responsiveness and rapid and flexible product innovation, along with the 
management capability to effectively coordinate and redeploy internal and 
external competences’ (p. 538). 
In order to demonstrate that Admiral could be a useful empirical study in the dynamic 
capabilities research domain it needs to satisfy the criteria in Teece and Pisano’s 
observation above i.e. that it is a ‘winner’ and that it has a track record of innovation in a 
timely fashion.  If this can be established, along with the assertion that it operates within a 
‘high velocity’: turbulent and competitive environment, which is the condition that key 
writers, amongst others, postulate that dynamic capabilities operate (Eisenhardt & Martin, 
2000; Helfat et al., 2007; Teece et al., 1997), then a study of Admiral should contribute to 
the research domain. 
1.3.2 Can the UK motor insurance industry be described as ‘high 
velocity’? 
In his review of the dynamic capabilities research domain, Barreto (2010) describes the 
challenges of today’s markets being ‘associated with the increasingly frequent occurrence 
of major, discrete environmental shifts in competitive, technological, social, and 
regulatory domains’ (p. 257). This type of environment was first described as ‘high 
velocity’ by Bourgeois and Eisenhardt who defined a ‘high velocity environment’ as one 
where ‘there is rapid and discontinuous change in demand, competitors, technology and/or 
regulation, such that information is often inaccurate, unavailable, or obsolete’ (Bourgeois 
& Eisenhardt, 1988: 816). 
Can we demonstrate that the UK motor insurance industry meets the criteria of ‘high 
velocity’ from the literature? 
There is evidence to show that the industry is subject to intensive regulatory influence, see 
Table 1-1overleaf.   
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Table 1-1:  Illustrates the major regulatory influences on the UK motor Insurance 
industry.
There industry is also an early adopter of new technologies to improve efficiency or to 
provide a new basis to compete which can yields competitive advantage until the 
competitors catch up. This is illustrated in Table 1-2. 
 
Table 1-2:  Shows how major new technologies have been utilised within the UK motor 
insurance industry. 
Regulation Year Description Effect
Insurance Premium Tax (IPT) 1994
The Finance Act 1994 established the principle of the 
IPT: all types of insurance risk located in the UK are 
taxable. Rate was set in 1994 at 2.5%, 1997 at 4%, 
1999 to 5% and 2011 6%
Insurance premiums all rose by amount of IPT. System 
changes to add and account for and explain the tax all 
have to be done.
Woolf Report 1996
Lord Woolf report included long term injury cases and 
recommendations favouring the claimant rather than 
the insurance company.
Claims costs rose automatically with adoption of 
report.
Ogden Tables 1998
Acturial tables developed by Lord Ogden were adopted 
in the UK for personal injury (PI) claims.
PI claims costs rose automatically with adoption of 
tables by the courts. Bacon and Woodrow were 
reported (Howard, 1999) to estimate that costs rose by 
£450m that year.
EU Directive for Data 
Protection
1998 Came into law with Data Protection Act 1998. 
Protected the individuals right to privacy.
Systems changes and staff training had to be rolled out 
before law came into force.
EU Directive for Distance 
Selling
2002 Came into law in 2002 and effected all telesales and 
internet sales.
Systems changes and staff training had to be rolled out 
before law came into force.
Financial Services Authority 
(FSA)
2005
Granted power of regulation over general insurance 
industry.
Huge changes in industry to systems and practices and 
to allow reporting required under a regulated regime.  
This added layers of back-office cost plus substantial 
fees and changes to working capital in a previously 
unregulated industry.
EU Gender Directive 2011
In March 2011, EU Judges ruled  to scrap the insurance 
industry's opt-out from the EU's 2004 Gender 
Directive. This had been granted as both life and motor 
insurers had been able to demonstrate that rating by 
gender was an acturially valid rating tool. Politicians in 
EU lobbied successfully to scrap the opt-out. It will 
come into force in 2012.
All underwriters will need to alter their rating systems 
so gender is no longer used to rate underwriting risk. It 
spells th end of 'woman only brands' such as Admiral's 
Diamond and Esure's Sheilas Wheels. Women in the 
past have received lower premiums as the risk to insure 
them is less. 
Motor Insurance Regulation 
Bill
2012 To be introduced into parliament to stop referral fees 
in claims.
Removes a source of income to offset losses in claims.
OFT Call for Evidence 2012
In response to rising insurance premiums the 
Government has called for evidence to be reported 
early in 2012.
Who knows as yet?
Technology Adopted Description Effect
Inbound Call distribution 
systems
From 1985 Enables direct selling of insurance over the telephone. The rise of the direct insurer Direct Line and its clones 
(of which Admiral is one).
Outbound diallers Early 90's
Predicitive dialling technology made outbound calling 
for various applications cost effective.
Several insurers and brokers adopted predictive dialling 
for servicing, upselling and sales completion tasks 
improving conversion and thus income generated.
Remote viewing of claims 
damage
From 1994 Cameras feeding live images from one site to another
Enables costs to be reduced as engineer can remain in 
office and view damage to vehicles remotely at the 
garage speeding up claims process.
Internet From 1995 A new distribution and communication mechanism Business acquisition has moved primarily to the 
internet.
Ability to outsource calls From 2001
Technology to allow calls to be transferred and 
answered anywhere in the world.
Admiral was the first insurer to set up a centre in India 
in 2001. Most insurers (and other service providers) 
have followed suit with varying degrees of success.
Hunter Fraud Prevention 
Technology
From 2006 Uses technology and rules based systems to detect 
lies.
Helps reduce claims costs by tackling fraudulent claims.
Telematics From 2007
Integration of GPS, telecommunications and 
computers for application in vehicles.
Ability to offer pay as you go motoring, specially 
designed products to reduce risk for young drivers - all 
are under development in 2011.
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Additionally the industry can be demonstrated to be innovative. It demonstrates an 
example of Schumpterian swarming (Schumpter, 1943) where each innovation is met with 
a rush of imitations which soon erode any competitive advantage gained. This is also 
described by Porter (2003) as ‘running a different race (innovation) or running the same 
race (copy-cat)’.  Table 1-3 overleaf illustrates some of the major innovations in the 
industry, who had first mover advantage and how quickly that advantage has been eroded. 
Data from these three tables provides evidence for the assertion that the UK motor 
insurance industry is ‘high velocity’ using the criteria drawn from the literature.  This is the 
first step to indicate why Admiral may be a useful case study to look at dynamic 
capabilities as it functions in an environment where competitive advantage may be gained 
through the operation of dynamic capability. 
Next, referring back to Teece and Pisano’s (1994) observation on page 1-10, Admiral 
needs to be both a ‘winner’ and ‘innovative’ to match the criteria. 
  
 
Table 1-3:  Showing major innovations in the UK motor insurance industry with first and a description of the dissipation of that innovation over time. 
Innovation Comment 1st Mover Date Followed by:
Traditional intermediary 
distribution method bypassed in 
favour of direct marketing. 
Direct Line pioneered a move to market to customers directly using phone number as 
response mechanism. Paradigm change in industry (Porter 2003).
Direct Line 1985
Launch of Churchill in 1989, The Insurance Service 1992, Admiral 1993, Touchline 1993. Direct Line leveraged their advantage to maximise upturns in the cyclical 
market in the late 1980’s and again in the early 1990’s to create a dominant brand and to drive down expense ratios.  The latter is a feat still unparalleled within 
the industry with very few exceptions: Admiral being one of them plus some syndicates at Lloyds have matched their expense ratios without the brand through 
different business models).
Technology to support rating 
and back office functions.
The founder of Direct Line was an IT specialist and the second prong to Direct Line 
Launch was its use of technology. (Channon, 1996)
Direct Line 1985
Pricing strategies are highly sophisticated from all the direct players thanks to technological advances.  This was originally a source of competitive advantage for 
this category but now technology is available to all underwriters.
Products for non-standard risks 
offered direct to consumers
Most companies offer competitive pricing for 'standard' (aka safe) risks leaving 30% 
of market called 'non standard' to specialist brokers. This represented a differentiated 
strategy for an entrant to market.
Admiral 1993 Launch of Privilege Insurance (by Direct Line) in 1994, specialist brokers developed telebroking capability during late 90's (e.g Adrian Flux, Allen and Allen Group)
Direct insurance launches in 
Europe
Linea Directa was launched by Direct Line in Spain. By 1999 they claim it is Spain's 
largest direct insurer.
Direct Line 1995
This was followed by launch in Germany and Italy in 2002. Traditionals who had direct UK arms also rolled out direct insurance in the intervening period to most 
European countries.  Admiral launched Balumba (Spain), Admiral Direkt (Germany), Conte (italy), L'Olivier (France) and Elephant Auto (US) between 2006 and 
2011.
Launch 10 month policy 'Bonus 
Accelerator'
In 1995, Admiral launched a Bonus Accelerator policy designed for young drivers and 
other zero no claims bonus (NCB) which offered a years bonus earned in 10 months 
for a premium slightly more than prorata 12 month policy.
Admiral 1995
Companies can still offer introductory bonuses but these are normally for named drivers/company car drivers on cars who drive regularly but have no NCBin 
their own name.  Admiral designed this product for its target market. Some specialist brokers offer this now. Direct Line advertise 12 months for the price of 10 
which isnt the same product but has helped differentiate them in 2010/11.  
Proliferation of brands offered 
by the same underwriter
Admiral's key competencies in running call centres and in marketing and pricing 
allowed the launch of two additional direct brands Bell Direct and Diamond in 1997.  
The strategy was in response to the question of how to gain market share as Admiral 
in two key profitable areas of our portfolio namely affluent customers and women 
without the expense of less efficient forms of advertising which was becoming 
increasingly expensive to buy.  Some of our critics said we were going into 
competition with ourselves but we were able to target more profitable customers 
with low market spend by leveraging the much higher spend from our Admiral brand.
Admiral 1997
The practice of launching 'direct' brands to compete with Direct Line was common in late 80's and early 90's as traditional insurers responded to the impact 
Direct Line was having. These brands were in direct competition to the same brand offered through brokers and brokers often insisted on having same pricing 
structure which destroyed the expense benefits of direct distribution.  Privilege became a brand rather than a separate company in 2000 but the launch of Bell 
Direct and Diamond were an innovation for marketing and underwriting strategies. This innovation was rapidly copied by other insurers and brokers but became 
very common as the internet as a distribution mechanism gained in strength and the advent of aggregators. Most underwriters or brokers operate today under 
more than one brand.
The internet as a distribution 
channel
In 1996, most insurers were using the internet as a 'brochure' mechanism. Admiral 
launched the first quote form which were inefficient to process (manually) but early 
adopters of the internet were Admiral's target market.  However Eagle Star launched 
first online quote in 1997.
Eagle Star 1997
Eagle Star were eclipsed in 2000 when Direct Line launched truly integrated internet quote engine followed closely by Admiral with its brands.  Certainly Admiral 
had been planning interactive quoting since 1998 but the technology was not easy.  Most colleagues at the time felt the same.  Admiral launched elephant.co.uk 
the first 'internet brand' in Aug 2000.  By 2002 all companies offering quotes did so online with the exception of a few very small bespoke brokers.
Launch of price comparison for 
motor insurance
Admiral launched confused.com in beta mode in March 2002 and followed by a full 
launch in 2003.  This revolutionised distribution for underlying providers of insurance 
as consumers have embraced it and it's proved to be cost effective for acquisition 
costs (eBenchmarkers, 2011).
Admiral 2002
Moneysupermarket launched motor price comparison in late 2003, Go Compare in 2006 and CompareTheMarket in 2007.  These four brands constitute 95% of 
the motor price comparison business in 2011 (eBenchmarkers, 2011).
White labelling brands
This was a natural extension of consolidation where two companies merged and kept 
both brands going. However Direct Line/RBS deal to provide Tesco with Financial 
Services; Esure/Halifax to Sainsbury's; Budget to Post Office, Marks and Spencers, 
Yes; Aviva wrote RAC insurance business, etc were next step where internet 
technology enabled cost effective implementation and distribution.
Various but 
Budget is main 
competitor
2002
Many movers into the same space between 2002 and 2005.  White labelled business periodically put their white label opportunity out to tender every few years 
but the main company involved is Budget Insurance services Limited (who also run an aggregator ComparetheMarket.com which drives very cost effective 
volume to all their brands).
Multicar
Admiral launched Multicar in response to developing a product outside aggregator 
expertise and in response to rising number of multi-car households in Britain.  Again - 
an example of a differentiated strategy albeit that most companies when asked will 
offer 2nd car discounts.
Admiral 2005
It is a niche market althpough valuable so movement into this space is limited. Direct Line recently launched its version in 2011, Adrian Flux offers Family Fleet 
and multivehiclecover.com also write this as a spearate product. A good proportion of Admirals growth since 2005 has been down to th emulticar product (the 
rest is due to aggregator growth generating volume for the Admiral brands). 
Pay as You Go
Aviva was first mover but withdrew product in 2008. It is a product enabled by 
telematics technology which is in turn enabled by GPS systems.  It is a box that sits in 
your car and collects data about how far you drive and also how you drive.
Aviva 2007
A few specialist companies are offering telematics products and Admiral is developing a couple of products which have been tested since 2009 but rolling out to 
a larger audience in 2012.  This is an area of current development in the industry.
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1.3.3 Is Admiral a successful company? 
Internally Admiral describes itself as ‘a direct-marketing company selling car insurance’5 
but on the contents page of its 2010 Annual report it describes itself as ‘first and foremost 
a successful car insurer’ and in its 2012 Report refers to ‘The Groups core UK car 
insurance business launched in 1993 and the Group has grown every year since’ and in 
2013 the Group a 7% increase in profit on 20126. That growth achievement every year is in 
both customers and revenue. Admiral has 11% market share in the UK (Deloitte, 2013; 
EY, 2013) sold through four brands: Admiral, Bell Direct, Diamond and Elephant.com; it 
also sells commercial vehicle insurance from a wholly-owned broker Gladiator; and owns 
one of the key players in the price comparison industry: Confused.com.  In 2013 Admiral 
reported a turnover of £2.03 billion and a profit of £370 million. In line with its strategy to 
be strongly cash generative, it returned 95% of the post-tax earnings as dividends giving it 
an EPS of 95.5p.  These reasons and a belief in the company’s strategy and management 
mean that the ‘stock is still trading at a premium to the sector – at 14x FY12e earnings 
(versus non-life peers at ~9x) and a PEG ratio of 1.3x’7. 
Since floating on the London Stock Exchange in September 2004, Admiral has seen its 
market capitalisation rise from £711 million to over £3.2 billion in Dec 2012. It’s strategy 
was stated by Alastair Lyons, Chairman in the 2010 Annual Report as: 
• ‘Grow our share of the UK private insurance market 
• Exploit the knowledge, skills and resources attaching to our established UK 
businesses to promote our expansion overseas in both private motor and price 
comparison’ 
It remains Admirals strategy with 2013 Annual Report and Accounts telling investors that 
the strategy is ‘to continue to progress in the UK car insurance market whilst taking what 
we do well to new products and markets’ (front matter). 
                                                 
5  This is another quote taken from the CEO’s speech given to all new employees in a meeting during their 
induction training. This quote was taken from the version written in 1999. 
6  All the Annual Reports are available on the website www.admiralgroup.co.uk. 
7  As reported by a Morgan Stanley analysts report on Admiral Group Plc dated August 25, 2011 
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 Success against the stated strategy can be seen in a growth of market share in a very 
competitive market from 3.6% in 2004 to 11% in 2012.  It has also expanded its operations 
internationally by launching insurance companies in Spain (2006 Balumba), Germany 
(2007 Admiral Direkt, withdrew from German market in 2011), Italy (2008 Conte), the 
USA (2009 Elephant.com), France (2010 L’Olivier) and launching comparison sites in 
Spain (2009 Rastrator.com), Italy (2010 Chiarezza.it, withdrew from Italian market in 
2012), France (2010 LeLynx.fr) and USA (2013 Comparenow.com). The turnover in 2013 
from the non-UK businesses was £188m (up 15% from 2012) with Balumba, Le Lynx and 
Rastreator recording profits and all non-UK companies recording growth in turnover and 
customers. 
Success can also be measured in relation to market performance.  Admiral stock trades at a 
premium to its sector and this is partially explained by Admiral’s performance against its 
competitors. 
 
Figure 1-4:  Demonstrates the combined ratio advantage Admiral enjoys over the market. 
Source: Towers Watson analysis of FSA returns8. 
In Figure 1-4 the graph shows the net combined ratio9 (NCR) for the market excluding 
Admiral compared with Admiral’s performance in the same period. Remember for each £1 
of premium taken in, the NCR represents the % of that £1 paid out in expenses. So for 
example in 2009, the market was paying out £1.19 in every pound in expenses whilst 
                                                 
8  As reported in ‘2013 Interim Results Presentation’ on www.admiralgroup.co.uk/investor 
9  See Figure 1-2 for a description of NCR. 
  CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 Page  1-16 
Admiral paid out 85p. Admiral operates at a distinct advantage to the market- a measure of 
success. 
One final measure of success can be found in Admiral’s people. The Annual Reports 
always pay tribute to the people in the business. In fact, in 2010 the Chairman commented 
on his belief that the key to Admiral’s success is its people10. In their own words11, 
Admiral feel that “people who like what they do, do it better.”  Hence, the firm places a 
heavy emphasis on staff engagement.  The 2013 Annual Report (p. 15) states that 88% of 
staff say “I am happy at Admiral”. Regular staff surveys allow senior management to get a 
sense of whether people enjoy working for the business and they are very proud of the fact 
Admiral has always ranked in the “best places to work” lists generated by both the Sunday 
Times and the Financial Times. In 2014, Admiral ranked 2nd in the Sunday Times Best 
Big Companies to Work For survey, was the 2nd best Large UK Workplace and 2nd best 
European Workplace in the Great Places to Work survey . This is another indication that 
Admiral can be viewed as a ‘winner’ in the sense of Teece and Pisano’s (1994) quote. 
To conclude the line of reasoning that Admiral is a company likely to display dynamic 
capability we must now demonstrate that the company is innovative and then it will have 
met all the criteria laid out at the end of section 1.3.1. 
1.3.4 Is Admiral a strategically innovative company? 
Admiral’s mission at launch in 1993 was ‘to be the most profitable insurer in the UK 
within 10 years’12 and the philosophy was that ‘there is no such thing as a bad risk - only a 
bad premium’.  The founders felt that by utilising technology and advanced statistical 
analysis the correct premium for a given risk could be calculated and this combined with 
strict expense control13 could be a winning formula. At launch the strategy was simple and 
innovative. Admiral decided to offer direct insurance to a segment of the non-standard 
                                                 
10  Taken from the 2010 Annual Report available on the website www.admiralgroup.co.uk. 
11  Quoted on the website www.admiralgroup.co.uk/culture/index.php accessed 10 Sep 2013 
12  This is another quote taken from the CEO’s speech given to all new employees in a meeting during their 
induction training. This quote was taken from the version written in 1999.  
13  Operating expenses rather than claims which is never totally within the underwriters control – obviously 
claims costs need to be managed but systems, staff and marketing are totally within a company’s ambit. 
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risks in the UK clearly aimed at an unoccupied, viable strategic space with the two-
pronged approach of superior pricing and expense control.  This followed a differentiated 
strategy (using Porter’s nomenclature, 1980) in a very unattractive market in order to try 
and gain competitive advantage and hence profits.  
In simple terms the pricing and marketing strategy was, and remains to this day, to insure 
 higher premium (aka non-standard) customers: younger, bigger cars, city dwellers and 
combinations thereof.  Admiral is still the only direct writer to specialise in this area of 
non-standard risk and it competes, in underwriting terms, only against specialised brokers 
offering non-standard rates. 
So apart from innovative strategy, if you refer back to Table 1-3 which demonstrates the 
innovation in the industry by listing the major strategic innovations, who were the first 
movers and how fast the innovation was copied: in 45% of cases listed, Admiral is the 
innovator and in 27% of cases it is Direct Line who is the innovator. Judged by this 
evidence, Admiral is an innovative company. 
Other than these industry innovations, Admiral has innovated in a number of areas 
contributing to its continued success. These are outlined in the next table. 
 
Table 1-4:  Examples of other innovative activity from Admiral not covered by Table 1.3. 
Innovation Year Description Effect
Launch capital 1992-1995
Launching the new business as a syndicate in Lloyd's of 
London with an innovative ameliorisation of the start-
up spend over 3 years of account.
Allowed syndicate which is backed by individuals to 
minimise risk in a new company by spreading the 
launch costs into three years of account at Lloyds - 
made it more attractive to those individual investors.
Ancillary Sales from 1993
Admiral has pioneered selling of ancillary products in 
the insurance market apart from Legal Expenses which 
was the only offer prior to 1993.
As reported to investors in 2011, Admiral receives 
almost as much value from underwriting profit as from 
ancillary profit which is attractive to investors.
Launch of non standard 
broker: Gladiator Motor
1994-2000
In order to deal with leads that didn't convert (not 
Admiral's target market) Admiral started up a new 
wholly owned broker.
Gladiator was launched to maximise efficiency of 
Admiral's advertising spend to try and convert leads 
not in Admiral's target market via a non-standard 
broker and receive commission on that sale.
Limiting Underwriting Risk from 1998
Through novel reinsurance arrangements Admiral 
spreads its underwriting risks.
When the company did a management buyout in 1998 
and then floated on the stock exchange in 2004, 
reducing Admirals exposure to underwriting risk at 
times of market downturn proved to be very attractive 
to new investors. 
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Insurance market analysts often point to innovation as one of Admiral’s key success 
factors. It was recognised externally in the Float Prospectus in 2004 (AGP, 2004) and 
reading subsequent analysts reports14, Admiral’s unusual financing model where by 
underwriting risk is reinsured is innovative in the industry. 
In this section it has been demonstrated that Admiral meets the criteria of a “winner” as 
defined by Teece and Pisano (1994). It operates in a high velocity environment and yet is 
successful, on a number of measures. Therefore it has established and maintained a 
competitive advantage since launch in 1993. It is innovative both internally and 
strategically.  So according to the literature (Helfat et al., 2007; Teece et al., 1997) it is 
likely that dynamic capabilities are at play within this organization and this suggests that a 
study of Admiral may contribute to the research domain. 
1.4 Research Aims 
As stated in Section 1.1, Barney and Clarke’s question (2007:3) ‘why do some firms 
persistently outperform others?’ forms the nascent expression of the research aim of this 
doctoral thesis with specific reference to a single firm.  Expressions of this fundamental 
question at the heart of strategic management underlie the current, very active research 
domain of dynamic capabilities that looks to be a useful theoretical lens through which to 
view my firm. Through an inductive case study of Admiral Group, I will explore how 
dynamic capabilities contribute to the sustained performance of this firm having first 
identified that such capabilities do in fact exist within the organization. 
At the outset, I was unclear whether this study would fill a particular gap in the literature 
and the next chapter reviews the dynamic capability literature and its resource-based view 
antecedents with the aim of identifying where the gaps in the literature exist to help frame 
the research question this case study should address. 
 
 
                                                 
14  Analyst reports have been made available from Admiral Investor Relations team. 
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CHAPTER 2:  LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction  
In Chapter 1, the idea that a case study of Admiral Plc may contribute to further 
understanding of the relationship between dynamic capabilities and sustained performance 
was introduced. 
This chapter provides a review of the relevant literature in the dynamic capabilities domain 
with the aim of better understanding the theoretical underpinning for the research aims and 
to shape a research question for the thesis that will allow the business case study to 
contribute to understanding how dynamic capabilities contribute to successful firm 
performance. 
This chapter is organized into three main sections: The first places dynamic capabilities in 
its historical context within the field of strategic management research: specifically as it 
pertains to the development of the resource-based view of strategy (RBV), itself the 
precursor to the emergence of the dynamic capability construct. In the second section the 
RBV literature is briefly reviewed and the third main section deals with the development 
of the dynamic capabilities construct itself.  
RBV and hence the dynamic capabilities construct are firmly rooted in the history of 
strategic management field as the following section demonstrates. 
2.2 Background: Strategic Management Research 
The field reflects a tradition of theoretical pluralism borrowing as it does from other 
disciplines: economics, behavioural sciences, psychology to name a few, and in its 
evolution of constructs and frameworks. The different views of strategy that have arisen 
have all contributed to understanding in the field but this background review focuses on 
the developments that have specific links with the evolution of the RBV within the 
domain. 
Kuhn, in his treatise on how scientific fields progress postulated that research fields 
develop whereby periods of “normal science” are punctuated by paradigm shifts followed 
by research where the new ways of thinking are explored and tested until consensus is 
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reached whereby follows another period of “normal science” (Kuhn, 2012). In Kuhnian 
terms then, strategic management is best described as “pre-paradigmatic”. Certainly no 
consensus exists around many key definitions and constructs and Rumelt, Schendel, and 
Teece (1994) offer the opinion that the field will always contain differing perspectives also 
noting (p. 9) that ‘strategic management as a field of enquiry is firmly grounded in 
practice and exists because of the importance of its subject’. 
From the contributions of the early thinkers in organizational behaviour we get the 
beginnings of the humanist tradition and ideas of values and culture which influenced the 
field of strategic management specifically in the area of interest in this thesis: resources 
and capabilities (Barnard, 1938, 1948; Follet, 1926, 1927; Mayo, 1933, 1945). Barnard is 
not typically thought of as key writer in strategic management as he stressed coordination 
as the essence of organization (Barnard, 1948)  but apart from the contribution on values 
and culture that he makes to the field, he also is the first to distinguish between managerial 
work that makes a firm more efficient and that which makes it effective, an emphasis on 
what later became called ‘internal competitive resources’ (Nelson & Teece, 2010: 358).   
At the same time we see a number of writers exploring what Fredrick Taylor (1947) called 
the “science of work”. Specifically, Weber (1947) looked at bureaucratic structures and 
control mechanisms through authority and Simon (1945/1976) proposed a first framework 
for analysing administration. 
Economics too, has produced some significant ideas that helped shape the field.  
One concept was the notion that firms shaped their markets.  This was embedded in the 
structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm of the Mason-Bain Berkeley-Harvard 
industrial organization literature (Bain, 1959; Mason, 1949a) and Porter’s work on 
competitive strategy was rooted in this SCP paradigm (Porter, 1980). This work was highly 
influential in the rise of industrial organization (IO) economics and it’s explanatory power 
to explain abnormal returns. This was a swing from the firm itself towards the eternal 
orientations of the industry structure in which it operates and allowed deductive, large-
scale statistical studies to test hypotheses on models abstracted from the SCP: a viewpoint 
that dominated the research agenda for the next two decades and shifted the research focus 
from the firm to market structure (Hoskisson, Hitt, Wan, & Yiu, 1999: 425). From an IO 
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perspective, once an attractive industry has been selected it is a rational process to develop 
or acquire assets needed to compete in that market but some assets are not tradable or 
cannot be utilized fully (Teece, 1976, 1980) however it was in response to perceived 
shortcomings in the IO dominant view that led to Barney’s seminal paper outlining the 
resource-based view (RBV) in 1991 (Barney, 1991a). 
Another influential economist was Ronald Coase whose classic article in 1937 (Coase, 
1937) asked “why do firms exist”? In answer he concluded that (as paraphrased by Grant, 
2002: 84) ‘the firm can organize certain transactions at lower cost than can markets’ 
thereby introducing the concept of transaction costs to explain the nature and limits 
of firms. This idea was operationalized by Oliver Williamson (1975, 1979, 1981) in his 
hypothesis that organizational forms are (or should be) chosen to economize on transaction 
costs and this vertical integration has formed a key role in the development of strategic 
management as a field but more importantly as an antecedent of dynamic capabilities 
theory (Augier & Teece, 2009: 414) which sought to improve on the explanatory power of 
Williamson’s transaction cost economics (TCE).  
Another significant contribution, with regards to this thesis because of its influence in the 
later development of the RBV and dynamic capabilities, was the publication of Edith 
Penrose’s book ‘The Theory of the Growth of the Firm’ (TGF) in 1959. It was seminal in 
its view of the drivers of growth being through the generation and utilization of firm-level 
resources. She also made an important distinction between resources and the services 
(capabilities) that flow from those resources (Foss, 1997a: 9). The Penrosean firm is a 
collection ‘of productive resources for the purpose of supplying goods and services to the 
economy in accordance with plans developed and put into effect within the firm’(Penrose, 
1959: 13). Of the resources within the firm, Penrose considers human resource, particularly 
managerial resource to be paramount and in her TGF, unused but productive resources are 
‘a selective force in determining the direction of expansion’ (p.77) offering as they do a 
challenge to innovate and to expand and hence competitive advantage. She also noted 
(Pitelis, 2009: xx) that it is the heterogeneity of services created from resources that give a 
firm its unique character. As an economist her work has failed to influence mainstream 
economics but her contribution as a seminal text to the RBV, the dynamic capabilities 
approach and the knowledge management arena is undeniable (Pitelis, 2009, 2011). 
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The birth of the strategic management field ‘can be traced to three works of the 1960’s: 
Alfred Chandler’s Strategy and Structure (1962); Igor Ansoff’s Corporate Strategy (1965); 
and the Harvard textbook, Business Policy: Text and Cases (Learned, Christensen, 
Andrews, & Guth, 1965)’ (Rumelt et al., 1994: 16) and the influence of these theorists is 
well established (Bowman, Singh, & Thomas, 2002; Hoskisson et al., 1999; MacIntosh & 
MacLean, 2014; Pettigrew, Thomas, & Whittington, 2002). These early writings had an 
“inside” perspective of strategy and Hoskisson et al. (1999: 421) comment that ‘it is likely 
that the early development of strategic management thinking has been influenced, at least 
to a certain extent, by these early classics’ detailed expositions of organizations’ internal 
processes’. So these writers not only directly influenced the field in the 60’s and 70’s but 
they influenced the development of the notion that dynamic capabilities are embedded in 
processes within an organization (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece et al., 1997; Winter, 
2003) thus having direct relevance to the research aims. 
With these writers we see the first introduction of the concept of “strategy”. It melds ideas 
of coordination and integration with selection of arenas in which to compete and how to 
compete. Andrews in his text for Business Policy (Learned et al., 1965) combined the idea 
of Chandler’s concept of “strategy” (Chandler, 1962) with Selznick’s early “distinctive 
competence” (Selznick, 1957) and added the notion of “uncertainty” and the idea that 
firms must adapt using their strengths and weaknesses to the opportunities and threats of 
their environment. Andrews (Andrews, 1971: 15) defined strategy as ‘the pattern of 
objectives, purposes, or goals and major policies and plans for achieving these goals, 
stated in such a way as to define what business the company is in or is to be in and the kind 
of company it is or is to be’. His notion that strategy involves an understanding of the 
internal phenomena alongside an external analysis of the environment was key to the later 
notions of evolutionary economics (where key impetus was provided by Nelson & Winter, 
1982) which in turn were foundations for the RBV thinking as epitomized by Barney 
(1991a) in his seminal paper. Andrews’ idea, which came to be called “fit” or “alignment”, 
formed an important tenet of Helfat et al.’s (2007) definitions of the dynamic capability 
construct and Teece’s later work on the construct (Teece, 2007). For Ansoff, strategy was 
more about providing a connection amongst a firm’s activities and their product markets 
through five components of strategic choice and was influenced by earlier work with a 
behavioural perspective (R. M. Cyert & March, 1963; Simon, 1945/1976). Ansoff’s  
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(1965) thoughts around competencies and capabilities, form a fundamental component of 
the RBV.  
Given that this research hopes to contribute to the dynamic capabilities area, it is 
interesting that David Teece, one of the chief architects of the construct, has noted the 
relevance of Chandler in commenting ‘he [Chandler] did implicitly say that firms choose 
different paths and top leadership plays a critical role in deciding where to deploy the firm 
resources and in that sense he’s consistent with a dynamic capabilities perspective’ 
(Nelson & Teece, 2010: 358). In Chandler’s ‘Strategy and Structure’ (1962) knowledge 
management was a central theme (Mowery, 2010) whose ideas essentially form the 
precursor to a large body of research on knowledge management which is noted by Helfat 
et al (2007) to be a dynamic capability.  He revisited the ideas from his 1962 work on the 
centrality of knowledge (Chandler, 2005: 9) and argued that success was dependent upon 
what he called “an integrated learning base’, again, consistent with the dynamic 
capabilities literature reviewed later.   
The Carnegie School led by an influential group of academics led by James March, 
Herbert Simon and Richard Cyert were also influential, apart from Ansoff’s contribution. 
In 1958, March and Simon  had published a work in which organizations were viewed as 
hierarchical structures within which the abilities, motivations and cognitive processes of 
the individuals are constrained. Such individuals challenged the notion of the rational agent 
of neoclassical economics, and although the book is largely conceptual, it served to 
establish a vocabulary by which the Carnegie School and others could further develop 
organization theory (Gavetti, Levinthal, & Ocasio, 2007). Oppositions such as “bounded” 
versus “perfect” rationality, of “satisficing” versus “maximizing”, or of “procedural” 
versus “substantive” rationality, are still widely used. 
The Carnegie School produced another hugely influential work in the evolution of 
organizational thought when Cyert and March (1963) laid out a behavioural theory of the 
firm. This was a seminal work looking ”inside” the firm to develop new theoretical ideas 
about economic behaviour. It has been argued (Pitelis, 2007) that although Cyert and 
March (1992) in their second edition of their 1963 book do not specifically reference the 
earlier work of Penrose or the subsequent development of the RBV there is a synergy 
between their Behavioural Theory of the Firm and Penrose’s Theory of the Growth of the 
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Firm (1959). Both focus explicitly inside the firm and note that firms interpret their 
external environment through an organizational filter.  
Their ideas built on the contributions of Selznick (1957) who had hypothesised that 
individuals within organizations can hold different goals, which makes it difficult for 
organizations and employees to have the same implicit, rational objectives. Interestingly, 
Selznick’s 1957 book with his view that firms have “distinctive competences” (p. 42) is a 
theoretical precursor to both RBV and dynamic capabilities. Distinctive competences in a 
firm enable it to pursue strategies better than other firms (Hitt & Ireland, 1985; Learned et 
al., 1965; Selznick, 1957). Selznick recognized (1957) that distinctive competencies 
include not just general management skills but also visionary skills (Collins & Porras, 
1994) and leaders will organize and structure a firm to reflect this purpose and then protect 
this vision from internal and external threats (Selznick, 1957).  Christensen and Andrews 
were also some of the first to talk about companies in terms of distinctive competencies 
(Cruickshank, 2012) and Barney and Clarke (2007) include the literature on distinctive 
competences when expounding the theoretical antecedents of the RBV. 
Despite the dominance of the SCP paradigm in the field, one important strand for the 
development of the RBV and dynamic capabilities that looked into the firm to unravel its 
inner structural logic and workings was in the discipline of organizational economics. With 
its primary interest in the “firm” it established a more neutral position than the internal 
“inside-out” perspectives of the Carnegie “behavioural” school versus the “outside-in” 
SCP paradigm (see Hoskisson et al., 1999 for a fuller description of how these two 
perspectives have changed over time). One key theory in organizational economics 
relevant to this thesis was touched upon earlier in this section: Oliver Williamson’s 
publication of his influential papers (1975, 1979) that with a focus on boundary 
relationships, built on Coase’s work (1937) and took March and Simon’s (1958) concept of 
“bounded rationality” that emphasized transaction cost economics (TCE).  The TCE 
framework allowed exploration of economic activity in the boundaries of both markets and 
firms. Underlying TCE is a contractual scheme focused on existing resources although it 
says nothing about resource or capability development and Argyres (1996) argued that 
relative strengths in capabilities offered as valid an explanation of vertical integration 
decisions as the TCE. These two ideas came together in Teece et al.’s (1997) seminal paper 
on dynamic capabilities. 
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2.3 Background: The Resource-Based Perspective 
The literature review thus far has mapped an evolution of ideas and theorising that led to 
the articulation of resource-based theory in Barney’s foundational article in 1991 ‘Firm 
resources and sustained competitive advantage’. However the development and definitions 
of resource-based concepts occurred during the 1980’s, when a coterie of researchers 
recognizing the limitations of the IO paradigm in explaining sustained economic 
performance returned to exploring explanations within firms.  
2.3.1 Developing a resource-based view: the canonical texts 
Despite IO economics dominating the 80’s a number of important, almost canonical, 
papers were published that were fundamental to the development of the resource-based 
perspective (Barney & Clarke, 2007; Foss, 1997a; Peteraf, 1993). 
First, the Lippman and Rumelt (1982) paper introduced the RBV foundation concept of 
“uncertain imitability” to explain ‘the origin and persistence of interfirm differences in 
efficiency’ (p. 436) arguing that the causal ambiguity surrounding the means by which a 
firm has established above normal returns may limit imitative activity.  
Another key concept in the RBV is that of “isolating mechanisms” a term first coined by 
Rumelt (1984). Barney and Clarke (2007: 16) note that Rumelt's paper demonstrated 
'attributes that will later be associated with resource-based theory'. Rumelt described 
firms as bundles of productive resources and his contention was that the economic value of 
those resources depended on the context to which they were applied. Rumelt’s “isolating 
mechanisms” were phenomena protecting these resources from imitation. Firms may start 
out homogeneous (Rumelt, 1984) but, ex-post, they have become heterogeneous and 
imitation is reduced thanks to “uncertain imitability”.  
The term “resource-based view” appears first in an influential paper published by 
(Wernerfelt, 1984).  This paper gained in importance during the 90’s as the RBV became 
imbedded in the intellectual structure of strategic management research (Ramos-Rodriguez 
& Ruiz-Navarro, 2004).  It was a slow start – Wernerfelt himself in a review of the impact 
of his 1984 paper notes wryly that ‘in 1984-1987 the paper had a grand total of three 
citations’ (Wernerfelt, 1995: 171) but between 1980 and 2000 a total of 95 citations in the 
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Strategic Management Journal alone (Ramos-Rodriguez & Ruiz-Navarro, 2004) highlight 
its growing influence.  
Wernerfelt explains his motivations in writing his paper ‘as my attempt to satisfy myself 
that one could build a consistent foundation for the classic theory of business policy’ 
(Wernerfelt, 1995: 172) or as Barney and Clarke (2007) summarize it: ‘he [Wernerfelt] 
was simply viewing the same competitive problem described by Porter (1980) from the 
perspective of the resources a firm controls’ (p. 14).  
Wernerfelt defined a resource as ‘anything which could be thought of as a strength or 
weakness of a given firm’ (p. 172) and his paper essentially examined the relationship 
between resources and profitability with his main contribution being the ‘articulation of 
the conditions under which a firm’s resources could be used to generate rents’ (Bowman 
et al., 2002: 43) and demonstrating through this perspective that ‘the optimal growth of the 
firm involves a balance between exploitation of existing resources and the development of 
new ones’ (Wernerfelt, 1984: 178), an idea first posited by Penrose in 1959. 
Wernerfelt acknowledges (1995: 172) the work of Teece (1982) in clarifying the 
governance structure through which a firm leverages its resources. An idea that Wernerfelt 
felt was missing from his seminal paper (his 1984 work assumes that resources are 
leveraged by diversification). Teece’s 1982 paper focused on innovation and resource 
value creation drawing on Penrose’s view that unused productive resources are a challenge 
to innovate and grow (Penrose, 1959) and applying Williamson’s (1975, 1979) TCE. This 
paper in turn built on his 1980 paper where he integrated a resource perspective of 
transaction-specific or firm-specific investments as being resources likely to generate rents 
with the TCE view that transaction-specific investments create opportunities that can be 
resolved by governance (Teece, 1980). Together these Teece papers formed a theory of 
corporate diversification that has become an integral part of the RBV (Wernerfelt, 1995). 
Another important building block to Barney’s pivotal paper in 1991 was his earlier paper 
(Barney, 1986b) in which he extended Wernerfelt’s idea of building a theory based around 
a firm’s resources introducing the concept of strategic factor markets where firms acquire 
or develop the resources they need. Barney suggested that firm resources differ in their 
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“tradeability” where a tradeable factor can be identified and valued within the strategic 
factor market: an important concept in the RBV. 
Dierickx and Cool (1989a) extended Barney’s argument (Barney, 1986b) by focusing on 
the factors that can render a resource imperfectly imitable because they tend to be tacit 
and/or socially complex and thus less likely to be subject to strategic factor market 
competition. They suggested that the non-tradeable assets developing and accumulating 
within a firm are path-dependent: contingent on organizational learning. These resources 
are imperfectly immobile and this is a key (but not sufficient) requirement for “sustained 
competitive advantage” (Peteraf, 1993: 185). 
As well as these papers, Nelson and Winter’s 1982 book provided a strong stimulus to the 
idea that firms actually do matter in the pursuit for understanding competitive advantage. 
The book incorporates insights from earlier writers in organizational behaviour (including 
R. M. Cyert & March, 1963; March & Simon, 1958; Mintzberg, Raisinghani, & Theoret, 
1976; J A Schumpeter, 1934; Simon, 1955) to ‘build upon concepts of emergent decision 
making and bounded rationality to examine the path dependent and evolutionary nature of 
strategy processes’ (Bowman et al., 2002: 36). This book introduced evolutionary firms 
who, in the process of seeking above-normal returns will build and exploit ‘valuable 
knowledge assets’ (Katkalo, Pitelis, & Teece, 2010: 415). Additionally it highlighted the 
importance of routines and heuristics in pursuing organizational strategy, constructs which 
have played an important role in the analysis of competitive heterogeneity as well as in the 
knowledge-based view of the firm (Felin, Foss, Heimeriks, & Madsen, 2012) as well as 
providing a theoretical base for the dynamic capabilities approach. 
Mahoney and Pandian (1992: 369) analysed the RBV in the evolutionary context by 
highlighting that the rules and routines of a firm that have evolved through past decisions 
and actions can be a source of competitive advantage, concluding that ‘sustainable 
advantage is thus a history (path) dependent process’. Path dependency is an idea that 
forms a foundational element of dynamic capabilities in Teece et al. (1997) foundational 
work. It also added insight to the notion of the “unfolding process” of the Penrosean firm 
(Penrose, 1959: 1): a process based on the endogenous change of the firms resources and 
capabilities, a process that is evolutionary by definition. 
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Barney’s 1991 article, can be considered as a foundation stone in the development of 
resource-based theory, with over 30,000 citations15 and as one of the most influential 
contributions to the development of theory in the strategic management field (Ramos-
Rodriguez & Ruiz-Navarro, 2004). His 1991 article appeared in a Journal of Management 
Special Theory Forum and included two other important contributions to the development 
of a resource-based theory (according to Peteraf, 1993). This Special Theory Forum hoped 
to ‘address many of the key problems raised by the resource-based view of the firm’ 
(Barney, 1991b) – problems raised at a number of conferences around the subject in 1990.  
Certainly the theory that emerged has been heralded as “one of the most important 
redirections of the (content of) strategy research in this decade” (Zajac, 1995: 169).  
Section 2.3.2 deals more fully with Barney’s contribution given its influence but the same 
publication featured two contributions highlighted by Peteraf (1993)  as key to the RBV. 
These were: (1) the application of a RBV in analyzing the role of top management in 
creating sustained competitive advantage (SCA) (Castanias & Helfat, 1991) which may 
have implications for this thesis with its participant focus at top management level. 
Castanias and Helfat argue that superior managerial skills may produce Ricardian rents, 
sustained because they inherently have what Rumelt (1984) calls “isolating mechanisms”, 
notably: causal ambiguity, acting on assets with firm-specialization and they are unique to 
that firm. They also talk about the relationship between top managers and their 
shareholders and note that the ability for managers to be incentivized through their earned 
rents aligns their actions with the desires of the shareholders.  This has been achieved by 
the wide dispersion of share-holding amongst the top management (and beyond) at 
Admiral which is discussed later in Chapter 5; the second contribution was (2) an analysis 
of a resource-based view of competitive advantage compared with the view from IO 
economics (Conner, 1991). Conner’s important conclusion is that the RBV may form the 
basis for a new theory of the firm. Mahoney and Pandian (1992), in their analysis of the 
RBV within the conversation of strategic management, concurred with Conner’s 
assessment. 
                                                 
15  according to Google Scholar accessed 14 Oct 2013: 11:27 am 
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2.3.2 From a perspective to a theory 
Jay Barney whose 1991 paper formed the corner-stone for the development of a resource-
based theory of the firm (RBT) says he was/is interested in the same question of “what 
drives superior performance” as Porter and other writers in the IO perspective but ‘whilst 
not denying the importance of understanding the role of market power in explaining the 
existence of sustained superior firm performance’ (Barney & Clarke, 2007: 4) he offered 
an alternative focusing more on the competences and capabilities of the firm rather than its 
positioning in chosen markets. His focus on value appropriation and capture formed the 
basis for ongoing research in RBT although there was a parallel stream based on the 
insights from Teece (1982) focusing on innovation and resource creation that eventually 
led to the development of the dynamic capabilities construct (Katkalo et al., 2010: 1175).  
Competitive advantage in RBT was defined by Peteraf and Barney (2003) as: 
‘An enterprise has a Competitive Advantage if it is able to create more 
economic value than the marginal (break even) competitor in its product 
market’ (p. 314). 
Typically in early RBV texts, researchers are using the vocabulary of “rents” rather than 
“sustained competitive advantage” (SCA). This brings us to another key aspect of 
resource-based theory: Ricardian rents. “Ricardian rents” derive from scarcity relative to 
demand and in RBT are tied to resource superiority. ‘Almost by definition, superior 
resources have a limited supply relative to less superior and more widely available 
resources and therefore yield Ricardian rents’ (Castanias & Helfat, 1991: 161). Peteraf 
(1993: 180-182) reminds us that the key is that the superior resources are limited in supply 
and hence efficient firms, in terms of lower costs, can sustain this type of advantage 
providing that the resources are imperfectly imitable or rare. See Rumelt (1987) and 
Peteraf (1993) for a more detailed discussion of Ricardian rents. 
In developing the RBT, Barney (1991a) essentially argued that SCA derives from a firm’s 
resources and capabilities that are VRIN: 
• valuable – enabling a firm to conceive and implement strategies to improve 
efficiency  and effectiveness (p. 105),  
• rare amongst the firms current and potential competition (p. 105),  
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• imperfectly imitable as discussed in Section 2.3.1 and 
• not substitutable in that ‘there must be no strategically equivalent valuable 
resources that are of themselves either not rare or imitable’ (p. 111).  
A major assumption made is that the resources and capabilities are heterogeneous across 
firms implying that firms of varying capabilities can compete although firms with superior 
resources will earn rents (Peteraf, 1993: 180).  RBT also assumes that the resources and 
capabilities are imperfectly mobile (Barney, 1991a). 
These two assumptions have been imported largely into all subsequent research and from 
there into dynamic capabilities approach. They allow for ‘differences in firm resource 
endowments to both exist and persist over time, thereby allowing for a resource-based 
competitive advantage’ (Newbert, 2007: 123). 
Whilst Barney’s work is more widely cited, Foss (1997a: 9) maintains that the ‘most 
systematic exposition of a resource-based perspective on the conditions for sustained 
competitive advantage’ is contained in “the Cornerstones of Competitive Advantage; A 
Resource-Based View” authored by Peteraf (1993). She contends that for resources to 
yield competitive advantage they must meet four criteria: 
1. heterogeneity as firms with resources of superior efficiency are better able to 
satisfy customers and thus earn rents (p.180), 
2. ex post limits to competition defined as ‘subsequent to  firm’s gaining a superior 
position and earning rents, there must be forces which limit competition for those 
rents’ (p. 182) thanks to imperfect imitability and imperfect substitutability, 
3. imperfect immobility of resources that are tradeable but more valuable to the firm 
deploying them because of firm-specific specialization (p.183) and 
4. ex ante limits to competition whereby before a firm establishes a superior resource 
position there must be limited competition for that position (p. 185). A good 
example of this is Admiral’s initial strategy to offer insurance to non-standard 
customers, a segment of customers unwanted by most of it’s competitors.  Those 
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active in this area were not employing the newest technology to distribute their 
services. This enabled Admiral to create superior returns  
Peteraf concludes by stating that all four conditions must be met for competitive advantage 
although there have been arguments that only uncertain imitability and imperfect 
immobility are necessary, all other conditions are additional (Foss & Knudsen, 2003) and 
Hoopes, Madsen, and Walker (2003) note that of Barney’s VRIN categorization only value 
and inimitability are ultimately important. 
Barney and Peterafs’ two papers laid out a framework for a resource-based theory of the 
firm and over the last 20 years the literature has burgeoned to the point where there is ‘not 
one clear-cut resource based approach, but rather a somewhat heterogeneous literature 
with a few shared organizing themes’ (Foss, 1997b: 353). Both Barney and Peteraf, writing 
separately, acknowledge a large body of work that has contributed to RBT being one of the 
most influential theories in strategic management (Barney et al., 2011; Maritan & Peteraf, 
2011) and Leiblein (2011: 910) notes that a ‘large community of scholars continues to 
apply these concepts [of RBV]’. Additionally, contributions have been made by many 
scholars extending the theory into other realms of scholarship building large domains of 
research using the explanatory framework of the RBV. 
Professor Barney has identified the key contributions in his ten and twenty year reviews of 
the RBV for the Journal of Management (Barney et al., 2011; Barney, Wright, & Ketchen, 
2001) forming the basis for  
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Table 2-1: Key contributions to the RBV based on a table in Barney et al. (2011: 1301-
1302). 
At this juncture of the review, two observations from this wealth of literature that have 
particular relevance to this case study are made because they introduced concepts that 
influenced management practice. The first is that the knowledge-based view (KBV), whose 
antecedents are mentioned in the table above, has been a fruitful extension of the RBV but 
the publishing of Senge’s book in 1990 The fifth discipline: The art and practice of the 
learning organization introduced the vocabulary of “learning organizations” to 
practitioners16 and specifically to the way in which practitioners perceived their roles in a 
learning organization.  
                                                 
16  The ideas in this book were taught on MBA courses and certainly was a topic of conversation amongst 
the founder members of Admiral in 1993. 
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Second, Prahalad and Hamel’s Harvard Business Review article in 1990 similarly 
introduced the phrase “core competence” into the lexicon of practitioners (Wright, 
Dunford, & Snell, 2001). Although this article postulated that SCA could be due to a 
specific type of resource namely “core competence” it was not cast in the language of the 
RBV and although later Prahalad work (Conner & Prahalad, 1996) does use the language 
of RBV, Barney reports that “conversations with Prahalad suggest that he does not see 
this work as an example of resource-based logic’ (Barney & Clarke, 2007: 30) perhaps 
explaining their omission from Barney et al.’s summary of key RBV texts in Table 2.2. 
Prahalad and Hamel defined core competence as ‘the collective learning in the 
organization’ and as ‘communication, involvement, and a deep commitment to working 
across organizational boundaries’ (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990: 82). This focus on the 
economic value of the intangible is common both to Prahalad’s work and RBT. While the 
distinctions between the core competency construct and the capability construct seem hazy 
‘one can hardly conceptualize a firm capability or competency absent the people who 
comprise them nor the systems that maintain them’ (Wright et al., 2001: 711). 
Foss (1997a: 15) warns that although the RBV is integrative and hence can align different, 
but complementary strands within the strategic management field there is a danger that the 
RBV may become fragmented. Consequently there have been periodic calls for the RBV to 
return to its roots: ‘RBT is a prime example of a theory that integrates a management 
perspective with an economics perspective. As such, its challenge is to keep its arguments 
logically consistent and clear, despite the risk of their becoming entangled, due to 
competing and possibly conflicting theoretical influences.’ (Peteraf & Barney, 2003: 309). 
There is no doubt that the literature falls into two camps: one primarily motivated by 
economics; the other inspired by organizational behaviour and organizational learning. 
2.3.3 Criticisms of the resource-based theory 
One cannot deny the centrality of RBT to strategic management research since the 1990’s 
((Barney et al., 2011; Hoopes et al., 2003; Hoskisson et al., 1999; Kraaijenbrink, Spender, 
& Groen, 2010) however it has been subjected to a number of criticisms not the least of 
which is the problem in operationalizing the concepts across firms (Hoopes et al., 2003). 
Key is the fact that the core assertions of RBT are too broad, even ambiguous (Cool, Costa, 
& Dierickx, 2013; Lippman & Rumelt, 2003; Pacheco-de-Almeida & Zemsky, 2007; 
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Priem & Butler, 2001a) and as Barney and Clarke (2007: 256) comment: ‘as the limits of 
our language are reached, it becomes important to restate our theories, including 
resource-based theory, in rigorous mathematical terms’. This is restating an point Barney 
made in a previous paper that: ‘recent developments in the resource-based view of the firm 
reaffirm the importance of studying the strategic consequences of behavioural and social 
phenomena within a firm, but suggest that separating this work from the content of 
strategy, or from the competitive context of a firm, is inappropriate’ (Barney & Zajac, 
1994: 5). However Foss (1997b) makes the argument that a more rigorous economic 
modelling of the theory puts a deeper understanding of the more informal literature around 
core competences at risk but despite attention to this problem it remains a criticism today 
(Cool et al., 2013; Kraaijenbrink et al., 2010). 
Another criticism is that insufficient attention has been paid to the deployment of resources 
in actual markets which in RBT operate under the assumption ‘that there are no frictions 
in that realm’ (Peteraf & Barney, 2003: 313). These competitive implications are only just 
been addressed within the literature (Cool, Costa, & Dierickx, 2002; Cool et al., 2013; 
Henderson & Mitchell, 1997). 
However there are other concerns. 
Despite Porter’s claim (Porter, 1991: 109) that the RBV is overly introspective there exists 
a duality between markets and resources, a duality accepted by RBV scholars at least (Cool 
et al., 2002; Foss, 1997b; Montgomery, 1982; Wernerfelt, 1984 amongst others). Although 
Penrose’s classic work on The Theory of the Firm (1959) maintained a distinction between 
the firm and the market with her focus very much within the firm, she never ignored the 
external environment claiming in her published case study of The Hercules Powder 
company that ‘growth is governed by a creative and dynamic interaction between a firm’s 
productive resources and its market opportunities’ (Penrose, 1960: 1). Wernerfelt (1984: 
71) said similarly that product markets and resource markets are ‘two sides of the same 
coin’. There is no doubt that researchers in the IO tradition have produced evidence of 
firms that have competitive advantage due to industry structure (see Cool et al., 2002 for a 
fuller discussion) but there is also evidence that resource-based explanations for 
competitive advantage are equally as valid in some circumstances (Barney et al., 2011; 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
  Page  2-36 
Barney et al., 2001; Conner, 1991; Crook, Ketchen, Combs, & Todd, 2008; Foss, 1997b; 
Mahoney & Pandian, 1992). 
The first really comprehensive, critical review of the RBV was made by Priem and Butler 
(2001a) who concluded that at that time not enough had been done to build a resource-
based theory although they accepted that the RBV has been a useful perspective to 
‘contribute to our understanding of strategic management’(p. 31). Their main criticisms, 
other than the clack of clarity in conceptual frameworks already reviewed in this section, 
not insignificant. 
Namely, that although the RBV began as a dynamic approach emphasizing change over 
time, acknowledging the role the firm’s history place in resource development (Dierickx & 
Cool, 1989a; Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984), the foundational RBV research was 
primarily static. Tackling this was one of the motivations for the development of the 
dynamic capability construct; 
They also noted that thus far (in 2001) the RBV failed to answer the ‘how’ questions: How 
are resources created? How do they interact with other resources? How and in which 
context to resources contribute to SCA? These issues remain an issue for the RBV being a 
theory of SCA: the VRIN criteria are not sufficient for SCA (Kraaijenbrink et al., 2010: 
365) and for understanding how resources are created and developed (Kraaijenbrink et al., 
2010; Priem, Butler, & Li, 2013). The implication in Wernerfelt (2011) for attempting to 
solve the problem of how firms acquire resources is that ‘firms should expand their 
resource portfolios by building on their existing resources; different firms will then 
acquire different new resources, and small initial heterogeneities will amplify over time’ 
(p. 1369) but this is a relatively new direction for RBV research. The microfoundations 
project is still calling for this to be addressed (Felin et al., 2012). 
That RBV is a tautology that fails to meet the criteria for a true theory was another 
criticism. Essentially it stands on analytic statements that are tautological by definition i.e. 
true by definition but unable to be tested namely that value and uniqueness are both 
‘explanans and explanandum’ (Kraaijenbrink et al., 2010: 356). Priem and Butler (2001b) 
refuted, in follow-up comments to their paper, Barney’s claim (Barney, 2001) that all 
strategic management theories are tautological at a high level by offering counter 
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examples. It remains a problem and has been absorbed onto the dynamic capability 
construct where Zahra et al. (2006) point to the literature around dynamic and operational 
capabilities as “implicitly tautological” (p. 921). However there is a view that the 
paradoxes implicit in the RBV can be ‘tolerated as long as there this theoretical 
perspective continues to produce interesting insights’ (Lado, Boyd, Wright, & Kroll, 2006: 
125). 
Another of Priem and Butler’s criticisms was that in 2001, there was insufficient empirical 
content required of a ”theory” and this was reiterated in 2003, in an introduction to as 
special issue of the Strategic Management Journal Hoopes et al.  note the burgeoning 
interest in RBT but note that empirical research ‘has not evolved in a similar accretive 
way’ (p. 889). Arend (2006: 409) went further by stating categorically that ‘there are no 
satisfactory empirical tests of the RBV’. Hoskisson et al. (1999: 442) noted that ‘because 
the RBV emphasizes the idiosyncratic nature of a firm’s resources and capabilities, 
empirical testing of the resource-based theory faces great challenges’: less than 4% of 
empirical articles that reference RBT, published in six key journals from 1990-2002, 
include a research design that tests two or more of the core propositions from RBT 
(Hoopes et al., 2003: 889). It is worth noting though that these criticisms around empirical 
support rely on quantitative modeling around independent variables with the dependent 
variable usually competitive advantage or firm performance and ignores the wealth of 
qualitative research using a resource-based perspective. 
The difficulties in quantitative modeling to support the RBT continue. Newbert (2007) 
compared the degree of identifying statistically significant results by the various theoretical 
approaches in order to identify the manner in which the RBV had been tested empirically 
in the literature and to gauge the level of empirical support. Newbert found only 53% of 
tests were empirically supported. Another interesting finding from his work appears to be 
‘that while capabilities and core competencies do indeed contribute significantly to a 
firm’s competitive advantage and/or performance, resources do not’ (p. 136) whilst 
making the point that capabilities are not easily quantified or assessed quantitatively. 
However it begs the question whether the resource/capability combinations chosen depend 
on the context in which a firm operates (Huesch, 2013). Writing in the same year, C. E. 
Armstrong and Shimizu (2007) urged researchers to explore non-significant findings and 
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negative effects in light of context requiring clarification of boundary conditions 
advocating that this might extend RBV research (p. 978). 
So despite two decades of work and a wealth of literature, some areas remain less 
developed and offer potential for the value of the proposed case study in this thesis, 
namely: the problem of how resources are created/acquired still exercises researchers 
(Maritan & Peteraf, 2011; Sirmon, Hitt, Ireland, & Gilbert, 2011; Wernerfelt, 2011) and 
the characteristics of resources that create value and the logic used to link these 
characteristics with performance outcomes (Foss & Knudsen, 2003; Kraaijenbrink et al., 
2010; Leiblein, 2011). And, given Newbert’s finding (Newbert, 2007) re capabilities 
versus resources then the dynamic capability perspective should have promise for the 
contribution this thesis will make. 
2.3.4 Variation on the RBT theme: dynamic capabilities 
Cool, Costa and Dierickx argued (2002: 66) ‘our understanding about the … deployment 
of specific resources is still limited’ and this combined with the lack of dynamic factors 
(Foss, 1997a) such as resource accumulation and deployment, innovation, learning, the 
role of top management and the implications of competitive markets (Danneels, 2012) led 
to a branching in the resource-based literature. This has become known as “the dynamic 
capabilities approach” and a distinction in the RBV literature between resources and 
capabilities has emerged. In Makadok’s (2001) view: resources are observable but don’t 
have to be tangible (for example the reputation Admiral holds as an employer of note in its 
recruiting areas as described in Chapter 5) and capabilities which are both unobservable 
and intangible (for example Admiral has a recognised pricing capability which allows it to 
produce claims costs lower than the market average year after year again described in 
Chapter 5). 
2.4 The Dynamic Capabilities Literature 
2.4.1 Why a new approach? 
Writing in their seminal paper, Teece et al. (1997) give their motivations in developing the 
dynamic capability framework to aid ‘understanding of how and why certain firms build 
competitive advantage in regimes of rapid change’ (p. 509). This literature review has laid 
out the clear theoretical foundations for this framework: evolutionary economics with its 
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own grounding in organizational behaviour and the RBV with its foundation in Ricardian 
economics.  
Since the late 90’s, in an attempt to deal with the dynamism associated with rapidly 
changing environments, attention within RBV has focused in particular on the concept of 
dynamic capabilities (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Helfat et al., 2007; Teece, 2007; Teece 
et al., 1997; Winter, 2003). Di Stefano et al. (2010) report that since 2006, papers relating 
to dynamic capabilities have been published at a rate of more than 100 per year. Similarly 
Baretto (2010), in his review of the research, reports since Teece et al. seminal paper in 
1997 at least 1,534 articles were published from 1997 to 2007. And writing in 2013: 
Peteraf, Di Stefano, and Verona (2013) note that over 1,000 articles have been published in 
the dynamic capability arena in the last decade (according to the ISI Web of Science 
database). 
The dynamic capability construct not only addresses the criticisms of the RBV as too static 
and equilibrium-based but also overcomes Leonard-Barton’s observation that core 
competences can turn into core rigidities when conditions change for a firm (Leonard-
Barton, 1992) and this has encouraged scholars to embrace the construct and the remainder 
of this section looks at the dynamic capabilities literature. 
2.4.2 Dynamic Capabilities: The Canonical Texts 
It is generally accepted that it was after the publication of Teece et al.’s seminal article in 
1997 that generated the tide of research into dynamic capabilities (Barreto, 2010: 258), 
however a number of other influential authors helped to further define and extend the 
construct first proposed by Teece et al. and these form the canonical texts for the dynamic 
capabilities approach. Their definitions can be found in Table 5.1 on page 5-108 but a 
summary of their theorizing follows. 
“Dynamic capabilities and strategic management” was published in 1997 in the Strategic 
Management Journal. In it, Teece, Pisano and Shuen offered the dynamic capabilities 
framework as an extension to the RBV, plugging the gap in RBV criticized as being 
essentially static and ill-equipped to explain SCA in rapidly changing environments (Priem 
& Butler, 2001a). Their treatise took a more entrepreneurial perspective (J A Schumpeter, 
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1934) and recognized the role of strategic management17 in creating and developing the 
capabilities to “integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competences to 
address rapidly changing environments” (Teece et al., 1997: 516). They built on 
evolutionary economics by explicating the role of organizational paths of dependence on 
the evolution of these capabilities and the role of routines and organizational learning and 
emphasized the heterogeneity of dynamic capabilities because they rest on firm-dependent 
paths, difficult-to-trade asset positions and distinctive processes (p. 509). The article also 
foreshadowed Teece’s later interests in entrepreneurial firms (see page 2-42). 
Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) argued that dynamic capabilities were ‘the antecedent 
organizational and strategic routines by which firms achieve new resource 
reconfigurations’ (p. 1107) and stressed that dynamic capabilities were ‘processes’. Key 
contributions they made were (1) their contention that there was a commonality i.e. best 
practice and that heterogeneity relied on “idiosyncratic details” (p. 1111); and (2) 
introducing claims that dynamic capabilities were of more importance in not only “high-
velocity markets” (see Chapter 1 for a definition) but also in “moderately dynamic 
markets”, postulating that different kinds of dynamic capability would develop in the 
context of market dynamism. 
Zollo and Winter (2002) linked learning mechanisms to the evolution of dynamic 
capabilities maintaining that dynamic capabilities “arise from learning: they constitute the 
firm’s systematic methods for modifying operating routines’ (p. 340). They addressed the 
role of tacit accumulation of past experience, knowledge articulation and codification 
processes in the evolution of dynamic capabilities.  They made the point that dynamic 
capability may prove costly to create and maintain in static environments but are essential 
to rapidly changing environments. 
Winter’s primary contribution in his 2003 paper was to introduce the notion that a 
hierarchy of capability exists. As early as 1994, Collis when writing about organizational 
capabilities as sources of competitive advantage, noted their vulnerability to erosion or 
substitution and proposed the existence of ‘meta-capabilities’ (p. 148) which he described 
as higher-order capabilities of the ‘learning to learn’ variety. This idea was further 
developed in relation to dynamic capabilities by Winter, who adopted the terminology and 
                                                 
17  Without expounding on that role: this was to be subject of Teece’s later work in 2007 and 2009. 
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defined  ‘zero-level’ capabilities as a ‘’how we earn our living now’ capabilities’ (Winter, 
2003: 992) also noting (p.991) that “ad hoc problem solving” is not a capability. Nearly 
eight years later he uses this definition to describe “operational capabilities” (Helfat & 
Winter, 2011).  
Winter develops the idea of first-order dynamic capability as involving change and then 
observes: ‘if exogenous change is ‘competence destroying’ at the level of first-order 
dynamic capabilities, those who invest in routinizing the response to familiar types of 
change may find themselves disadvantaged relative to more flexible players who have 
invested in higher-order capabilities.’ (p. 994) reflecting earlier views in Zollo and Winter 
(2002) paper. 
Wang and Ahmed (2007) develop a slightly different view of a hierarchy with dynamic 
capabilities a third-order construct above second-order core capabilities, first-order 
operational capabilities and zero-order resources. They contend that ‘that dynamic 
capabilities are the ‘ultimate’ organizational capabilities’. (Catherine L Wang & Ahmed, 
2007: 36) but Collis (1994) and Winter (2003) both argue for potentially infinite levels of 
higher order capabilities, although Winter notes they may not necessarily exist.  
Heimeriks, Schijven, and Gates (2012) in studying post-acquisition integration found zero-
order codified routines being adjusted by higher-order routines in the integration process 
which lends some empirical support to this notion of a capability hierarchy.  
Like Winter, Zahra et al. (2006) also distinguished between dynamic capability versus 
“substantive capability” (aka operating capabilities) where the ‘dynamic ability to change 
or reconfigure existing substantive capabilities’ (p. 921) forms the firm’s dynamic 
capabilities. They argued that the extant literature was vague about this difference and felt 
that the confusion was compounded where definitions included reference to effectiveness 
as ‘implicitly tautological’ (p. 921). ‘The result is that dynamic capabilities have been 
conceptualized and assessed in ways that make it difficult or even impossible to separate 
their existence from their effects’ (p. 923). This paper also conceptualized a model of 
capability formation and performance giving a first attempt at mapping dynamic 
capabilities longitudinally in the life of a firm.  This paper is cited in subsequent empirical 
studies (Ambrosini, Bowman, & Collier, 2009; Arend, 2013; Evers, Andersson, & 
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Hannibal, 2012; Maes & Sel, 2014; Mahnke, Venzin, & Zahra, 2007; Teece, 2014 amongst 
others) particularly of innovative or entrepreneurial SME’s. However the core ideas of a 
capability hierarchy and the longitudinal evolution of capability are much less evident in 
the literature (Danneels, 2008; G. George, Kotha, & Zheng, 2008; Laamanen & Wallin, 
2009; Macher & Mowery, 2009; McKelvie & Davidsson, 2009; Newey & Zahra, 2009 are 
examples). 
Helfat et al.’s 2007 book was an attempt to draw together and synthesize the thinking 
around dynamic capabilities and their definition (2007:4) used the word ‘capacity’ 
allowing them to look at dynamic capabilities in many forms: as managerial abilities or as 
routines and processes although they make the point that ‘it is difficult to observe a 
dynamic capability … unless it is put into use and the processes are the mechanism that 
make it happen’ (p. 31). 
One of their key contributions was the introduction of performance metrics: namely 
“technical fit” defined as ‘how effectively a capability performs its intended function when 
normalized (divided) by its cost’ (p. 7); and “evolutionary fit” defined as ‘how well a 
dynamic capability enables an organization to make a living by creating, extending, or 
modifying its resource base’ (p. 7). 
Finally, Teece (2007) introduced a classification for dynamic capabilities in a definition 
that replaced his earlier definitions and reflected his interest in the role of dynamic 
capabilities in innovative and entrepreneurial firms and the sources of those capabilities. 
Dynamic capabilities are categorized by whether they support sensing, seizing or 
transforming activities by the firm. 
Teece argued that the firm’s leadership senses new opportunities, and can even shape the 
market to capitalize on an opportunity, then seizes the opportunity and creates the vision 
and commitment for the rest of the organization to implement the necessary changes to 
transform or reconfigure the firm. These roles are not recognized by economic theory but 
are the essence of dynamic capabilities, or what Teece describes as “entrepreneurial 
fitness” (p. 1321) and puts it on a par with Helfat et al.’s (2007) “evolutionary fitness”. 
This paper also was a call to the dynamic capabilities community to embrace the 
microfoundations project from the RBV so that scholars can better understand the 
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management task needed ‘to sustain the evolutionary and entrepreneurial fitness of the 
business enterprise’ (p. 1322). 
The seminal papers on dynamic capabilities are amongst the highest cited in the key 
journals on strategic management research (Furrer, Thomas, & Goussevskaia, 2008) and 
the field has been described as ‘the new touchstone firm-based performance-focused 
theory’ (Arend & Bromiley, 2009: 75). 
2.4.3 The dynamic capabilities literature 
Recent reviews of the field (Barreto, 2010; Di Stefano et al., 2010; Vogel & Guttel, 2013; 
Catherine L Wang & Ahmed, 2007; Zahra et al., 2006) chart the substantial theorising on 
the subject and the steps towards establishing empirical support for dynamic capabilities. 
In addition to the canonical texts identified in Section 2.4.2, using a co-citation analysis to 
assess the structure of the field of research, Di Stefano et al. (2010)  identified an 
intellectual core of 40 papers contributing to the dynamic capabilities framework.  
87% of the papers in their panel are predominantly theoretical papers tightly focused on 
foundational issues ‘defining the construct, articulating the processes by which it evolves 
and is deployed, and exploring its application as well as its effects’ (p. 1195).  
42% of the core papers in the field linked dynamic capabilities to other theoretical 
perspectives. The acknowledgement of links to the RBV and the link to knowledge and 
learning is well established. Easterby-Smith, Lyles, and Peteraf (2009) mapped the 
relationship between the dynamic capability literature and change management and from 
there its links to innovation and organizational learning (Fiol & Lyles, 1985) and from 
there to broader research domain of knowledge management (see Table 2-1 for broader 
exposition). However di Stefano et al.’s analysis also linked TCE, growth, adapation, 
learning theory, social theory and social psychology in the central core of dynamic 
capability research. Only 2 of the 40 papers dealt with issues of governance so central to 
the IO and OE economic paradigms where by the central issue is how economic activity is 
organized within the firm’s boundaries and only a further 2 papers explored the key issues 
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from Teece’s 2007 paper (too recent for inclusion in di Stefano’s et al.’s analysis) that of 
entrepreneurial activity and the issue of strategic transformation18. 
Barreto (2010) built a critical assessment of dynamic capabilities research looking at 
papers published between 1997 and 2008.  He identified 37 key papers of interest to the 
development of the field (not just the intellectual underpinnings as per Di Stefano et al.’s 
analysis). From Table 2 in Barreto’s paper (p. 265-269) he identifies 40% of his key papers 
as being conceptual and 51% of the papers being important empirical contributions with a 
quarter of those being field studies and the remaining 75% being quantitative studies. 
Empirically there appears to be support for the main tenets of dynamic capabilities: links to 
performance (26%), sources of capability (26%), characteristics of a dynamic capability 
(37%) and less so for the role of management (11%).  
In a more recent study, the extant literature published between 1994 and 2011 was 
analysed, using bibliometric methods (Vogel & Guttel, 2013: 426) noted that ‘The core 
cluster of the current DCV, which visualizes this research field's nascent but fragile 
identity, focuses on learning and change capabilities and relates them to firm 
performance, thus merging aspects of organization theory and strategic management’.  
There has been a widespread adoption of a ‘dynamic capabilities perspective’ to examine 
(or re-examine) a wide range of strategic phenomena from organizational routines (e.g. M. 
J. Benner, 2009; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Felin & Foss, 2009; Winter, 2013; Zollo & 
Winter, 2002; Zott, 2003), knowledge and organizational learning (e.g.Felin & Hesterly, 
2007; Turvani, 2001; Zollo & Winter, 2002), innovation (e.g.M. J. Benner, 2009; L. Foss, 
Iakovleva, Kickul, Oftedal, & Solheim, 2011; Lawson & Samson, 2001; O'Connor, 2008; 
O'Connor, Paulson, & DeMartino, 2008; Rothaermel & Hess, 2007; A. Taylor & Helfat, 
2009; Teece, 2007), the psychological foundations of strategic management (e.g.Gavetti, 
2005; Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011; Hodgkinson, Sadler-Smith, Burke, Claxton, & 
Sparrow, 2009) and management practices (e.g.Adner & Helfat, 2003; Hmieleski & 
Ensley, 2007; Rosenbloom, 2000) amongst others. All of this work seeks to find an 
explanation of dynamic capabilities as enablers of the corporate change, innovation, 
                                                 
18  And although I don’t wish to repeat di Stefano et al.’s masterly analysis of the domain, a quick check in 
EBSCO Host Business and Management databases shows 317 articles citing Teece’s 2007 work. 
Accessed 13/11/13: 15:12 pm. 
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learning and transformation which the theory claims lie at the heart of sustained 
competitive advantage (Teece et al., 1997). 
Apart from the conceptual work in this field, there exists a body of empirical work that is 
focused very much on the existence and sources of dynamic capability and how it 
contributes and links to a diverse strategic management literature without explaining or 
demonstrating actual links to competitive advantage in the firms studied (see Wang and 
Ahmed, 2007 and Baretto, 2010 for comprehensive list of authors). 
The remainder of this section of the review reviews briefly the intersection between the 
research on dynamic capabilities and knowledge management and concentrates on two 
areas within dynamic capability to which a case study of Admiral may contribute: firstly 
given the access to the key decision makers: the top management team (TMT) and those 
responsible for implementing those decisions (hereafter referred to as “General Managers” 
or GM)19 this may contribute to an understanding of what the literature is calling dynamic 
managerial capabilities (Adner & Helfat, 2003; Augier & Teece, 2009; Helfat et al., 2007; 
Teece, 2007); secondly an in-depth look ‘inside the black box’ may reveal the 
microfoundations of dynamic capability within this firm. 
2.4.3.1 Dynamic capabilities as a foundation for the knowledge-based view 
Much of the work on dynamic capabilities relates directly to RBV and the closely 
associated knowledge-based view of the firm: a broader perspective termed the ‘dynamic 
resource-based view’ (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003). This review has touched briefly on the 
knowledge-based view as an offshoot of the resource based view (see the entries for Kogut 
and Zander, 1992, Grant, 1996 and Conner and Prahalad, 1996 in Table 2-1 and the impact 
of Senge, 1990 on page 2-33).  Knowledge in this context is based on the distinction 
between explicit and tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1962) and the early approach identified 
tacit knowledge as the most strategic resource of firms (Grant, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 
1992). More recent studies focus more on the process of knowing as socially constructed 
influenced by the social and cultural settings where it occurs. See Eisenhardt and Santos 
(2002: 140-141) for more discussion. 
                                                 
19  Within Admiral, they refer to themselves as “Coffee Morning Managers” – see Chapter 5. 
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Organizational learning is one foundation that underlies knowledge-based thinking. Senge 
(1990: 4) quotes the head of planning at Royal Dutch Shell as saying ‘the ability to learn 
faster than your competitors may be the only sustainable competitive advantage’.  
Leonard-Barton argued that knowledge based firms (1992) are continually learning and 
using that to improve their business and Tannenbaum (1997: 437) also states that 
‘organizational learning is one of the few sustainable competitive advantages’. In a more 
recent paper, Antonacopoulou and Chiva (2007: 278) wrote that learning helps to keep an 
organization ‘agile, flexible and able to change in the context of an uncertain 
environment’. Learning processes are an important aspect of a Penrosean firm (Penrose, 
1959) and organizational routines formed the basis for collective learning and 
organizational memory in R. M. Cyert and March (1963) and learning is perceived as an 
adaptive change process, influenced by path dependencies (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). W. 
M. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) related organizational learning and innovation to the 
evolving knowledge base of the firm. The authors define the construct “absorptive 
capacity” as ‘the ability of a firm to recognize the value of new, external information, 
assimilate it and apply it to commercial ends’ (p. 128) and further emphasize its path-
dependency. You can see a link here between this construct of knowledge management 
and dynamic capability as defined by Teece (Teece, 2007; Teece et al., 1997). Thus 
dynamic capabilities is a foundation for knowledge-based thinking (Eisenhardt & Santos, 
2002: 142). 
Many papers have addressed this connection particularly as to where the locus of 
knowledge lies within an organization (Bateson, 1958; Cohendet & Llerena, 2003; Kofman 
& Senge, 1993; Macher & Mowery, 2009; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 2011; Romme, Zollo, & 
Berends, 2010; Swan, Scarbrough, & Newell, 2010; von Krogh, Nonaka, & Rechsteiner, 
2012: to name just a few) and that the capacities of management to collect, disseminate, act 
on knowledge is key but how that comes about is less clear although some recent literature 
links these capacities to dynamic managerial capabilities as demonstrated in the next 
section. 
2.4.3.2 Dynamic managerial capabilities 
Di Stefano et al.’s analysis of the theoretical underpinnings for dynamic capabilities 
identified (2010: 1195) a ‘pivotal role for managers’ reflecting a much earlier influential 
paper which postulated the key role of managers to create and renew organizational 
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context (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1994). Recent dynamic capability empirical studies have 
demonstrated the importance of leadership in the development and revitalization of 
dynamic capabilities (Adner & Helfat, 2003; Aragon-Correa, Garcia-Morales, & Cordon-
Pozo, 2007; J. A. Martin, 2011; Rosenbloom, 2000; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). 
In 1991, Castanias and Helfat articulated the importance of the role of top managers to the 
resource-based view and writing in 2003, Adner and Helfat demonstrated empirically that 
the corporate effects of managerial decisions were statistically significant. They coined the 
concept of dynamic management capabilities to underpin their findings defined as ‘the 
capabilities with which managers build, integrate, and reconfigure organizational 
resources and competences’ (p. 1020). They proposed that these capabilities are rooted in 
(1) managerial human capital: the learned skills both generic industry- specific and firm-
specific (Castanias & Helfat, 1991) and also the skills that are transferable to other 
industries (Castanias & Helfat, 2001); (2) managerial social capital: the external ties and 
relationships that managers bring to their jobs (Gelatkanycz, Boyd, & Finkelstein, 2001); 
and (3) managerial cognition: where values systems and an individuals cognitive base 
shaped by experience contribute to decision making (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; D. R. 
Johnson & Hoopes, 2003). 
Helfat et al. (2007) noted however that dynamic managerial capability ‘can have low 
rather than high evolutionary fitness if employed in inappropriate contexts’ (p.117) and 
also stated one of the major goals of their book was to ‘encourage further research on the 
role of executives in strategic and organizational change’ (p. 48) arguing that the “how” of 
dynamic capabilities matters as much as the “what” which is where much of the research 
up to 2007 was focused. They hypothesized that it is not just the skills and capabilities that 
an individual possesses that are key to understanding dynamic capabilities but it is the 
behaviour of the people tasked with initiating strategic change that result in 
reconfiguration. They acknowledge the immense volume of literature within the 
Organizational Behaviour domain (and see Helfat et al. Chapter 4 for an exposition of this 
work) but argue it is the link between leadership and strategy that must be clarified and the 
dynamic capability framework can help with this understanding. A similar argument is 
made for more strategic approaches to understanding strategic change “of which dynamic 
capabilities are one’ (Helfat & Peteraf, 2009: 99). 
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Dynamic managerial capabilities embrace the notion that that managerial intent influences 
outcomes (Augier & Teece, 2009) and together with the belief that firms must match the 
exploration of new opportunities with the exploitation of existing ones (Augier & Teece, 
2008) we start to see a literature emerging in locating the manager within economic theory 
based around Teece’s thesis that ‘in both large and small enterprises, entrepreneurial 
(managerial) capitalism is required to establish and sustain superior financial 
performance’ (Teece, 2012: 1395) building on his re-envisioning of dynamic capabilities 
in 2007 as management capabilities to sense, seize and reconfigure: the essence of 
entrepreneurial fitness. Augier and Teece (2009: 418) argue that the role of the manager in 
the dynamic capability framework is ‘in part Schumpterian (the entrepreneur introduces 
novelty and seeks new combinations) and in part evolutionary (the entrepreneur 
endeavours to promote and shape learning)’ and the skills needed such articulating vision, 
setting culture, building trust, employing intuition to sense how current knowledge can 
create new opportunities are the essence of dynamic managerial capabilities. 
Recently, other scholars have looked at what may constitute dynamic managerial 
capability other than simply the ability to achieve internal fit for the firm under changing 
environmental conditions (Peteraf & Reed, 2007).  
It can be seen as the ability to reconfigure structural resources “architectural innovation” 
in multi-business firms (Galunic & Eisenhardt, 2001). Essentially, in Galunic and 
Eisenhardt’s paper, top management act as entrepreneurs as well as guardians of culture20 
in firms that are “dynamic communities” where corporate resources exhibit modularity. 
The role of the TMT/GM is to facilitate a social community where dynamic capabilities 
are ‘based on communal imperatives’ (p. 1230) and those dynamic capabilities are guided 
by ‘simple rules that embody both economic and social logics’  (p. 1243); 
Again, in links to the knowledge management domain, we see the importance of managing 
knowledge within a firm as dynamic managerial capability. Pandza and Thorpe (2009) 
argue that it is managerial capability in purposefully and creatively improving knowledge 
within a firm over and above experiential learning and that creative search and strategic 
                                                 
20  And this is of interest to this case as data collected see (Chapter 5) showed clear signs that Admiral’s 
TMT and their GM operate in this fashion and additionally make the comments how structurally flexible 
the business is both within the UK and in it’s nascent international operations. 
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sense making are dynamic capabilities. Connections between successful capability 
development and managers in how those individuals encode, process and use information 
have also been made (Corbett, Neck, & Laverty, 2011) as has the willingness to improvise 
when needed (Hmieleski & Corbett, 2006).  
J. A. Martin (2011: 128) talks about “recombinative group processes” as dynamic 
capability. These are the regular patterns of GM behaviour that facilitate collective sensing 
and seizing of opportunities to reconfigure their resources (p. 128). Martin says that 
exploring the social, political and cognitive mechanisms of these groups will lead to better 
understanding the contribution these groups make and of how the dynamic managerial 
capability is wielded.  
What we do see in this emerging literature is an interest in the underlying traits and 
cognition of managers. This thinking is in accordance with those key authors who have 
identified dynamic capability as an ability (Helfat et al., 2007; Teece, 2009; Teece et al., 
1997; Zahra et al., 2006). For example: high levels of dispositional optimism in 
opportunity evaluation can be helpful (Baron, Hmieleski, & Henry, 2012), an ability to 
handle complex, contradictory architectures seems a crucial determinant of a firm’s ability 
to exploit in the short-term and explore long-term (Tushman, Smith, Wood, Westerman, & 
O'Reilly, 2010: 1331), the importance of emotional intelligence has also been explored 
(Goleman & Boyatzis, 2008; Grichnik, Smeja, & Welpe, 2010; Nguyen Huy, 2009; 
Walter, Cole, & Humphrey, 2011). This latter is also an example of a concept that has 
crossed into the practitioner realm (Richard E Boyatzis, 2004; Goffee, 2004; Goldberg, 
2004; Goleman, 1998; Goleman & Boyatzis, 2008; Mayer, 2004). 
We now see an overlap with the next area of interest from the literature: the 
microfoundations of dynamic capability. 
2.4.3.3 The microfoundation project 
‘Reduction is at the heart of scientific progress’(Elster, 1989: 74) and herein lies the notion 
of microfoundations. A theoretical definition of microfoundations can be found in Felin et 
al. (2012: 1353) but for the purpose of this review, they identified from the extant research 
‘three primary categories of micro-level components underlying routines and capabilities: 
individuals, social processes, and structure’ (p. 1351). There is heterogeneity to be found 
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at the level of the individual (Felin & Hesterly, 2007) and this variance contributes to 
differences in behaviour and performance amongst firms (D. R. Johnson & Hoopes, 2003). 
As early as 2003, Foss argued ‘that the absence in Nelson and Winter of a clear 
methodological individualist foundation for notions such as routines, capabilities, 
competencies, etc., has resulted in certain explanatory difficulties in the modern 
organizational capabilities approach that has taken so much inspiration from their work’ 
(2003: 185). This was an argument and call to scholars that he has been making ever since 
in his own work, for example: Felin and Foss (2005, 2006, 2009); Felin et al. (2012); 
(Foss, 2011; Foss, Heimeriks, Winter and Zollo, 2012; Foss and Knudsen, 2003; Foss & 
Lindenberg, 2013). Specifically with regard to dynamic capabilities, a case made for just 
such a project in a paper authored by Abell et. al. (2008) who argued that the emphasis on 
firm-level constructs in the capabilities research agenda might be masking the links to 
firm-level phenomena including, amongst others, competitive advantage. The development 
of such microfoundations that successfully deal with the detailed processes of managerial 
agency in corporate change was seen as an important way of responding to current 
criticisms and moving the subject forward (Abell et al., 2008; Augier & Teece, 2009; 
Barney et al., 2011; Felin & Foss, 2006; Gavetti, 2005; Gavetti & Rivkin, 2007; 
Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011; Laamanen & Wallin, 2009; Teece, 2007; Turvani, 2001). 
Despite progress being made in this period, questions remain (Abell et al., 2008; Gavetti, 
2005; Salvato & Rerup, 2011; Teece, 2007). Quite simply the question of how individual-
level factors (such as traits, abilities or emotions) aggregate to create collective capabilities 
remains. 
The Academy of Management Perspectives journal has been the most recent to devote an 
issue to understanding microfoundational thinking. In his introduction Devinney (2013) 
summarizes five papers representing views along a spectrum of thinking as to whether 
microfoundations are useful in the SCA conversation or ‘ultimately a reductionist exercise’ 
(p. 81). Winter (2013) acknowledges that routines and capabilities can be built up from 
lower-level building blocks, continuing a thought process articulated in Winter (2012). 
Barney and Felin (2013) are advocates of the usefulness of microfoundational thinking but 
argue that any analysis should ‘meaningfully address the central issue of social 
aggregation’  (p. 138) and conjecture that on that basis many papers oft-quoted in the 
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microfoundational literature (Eisenhardt, Furr, & Bingham, 2010; Gavetti, 2005; 
Hodgkinson & Healey, 2009 for example) do not in fact provide microfoundations until 
the emergent interactional and collective interactions of these concepts at the individual 
level are considered (p. 141).  Barney and Felin similarly argue (2013: 142) that borrowing 
concepts from other research domains such as psychology, organizational identity and 
organizational learning can only be considered microfoundational if there is a ‘meta-theory 
of how the concept itself needs to change or evolve given aggregation and interaction in 
the context of an organization’. However many of the key writers in this area calling for 
more work want to resolve issues around empirical measurement and statistical 
implementation (Foss & Pedersen, 2014) typically associated with a positivistic 
ontological position favoured by the strategic ‘content’ scholars and this ignores the 
extremely useful insights into the role of the individual in firm performance (and Foss 
himself recognized this, as discussed on page 2-34). 
Despite the debates in the microfoundation project, there is recognition that there are 
‘limits to the explanatory leverage of standard economics’ (Foss & Lindenberg, 2013: 86). 
Strategic management scholars have long drawn on psychology research, particularly on 
cognition, a foundational element of the Carnegie school (Gavetti et al., 2007; March & 
Simon, 1958; Simon, 1991) and in learning which is key to evolutionary economics view 
that organizational behaviour rests on rules (March, Schultz, & Zhou, 2000) and routines 
(Nelson & Winter, 1982). We have seen that Adner and Helfat (2003) and Helfat and 
Peteraf (2003) amongst others have maintained the importance of managerial cognition. 
Gavetti (2005) demonstrated that manager’s cognitive maps of their decision making 
fundamentally drives organizational search and that such decisions varied as to where the 
manager was situated in the organizational hierarchy and this influenced capability 
development and organizational performance. Foss & Lindenberg (2013) argue that 
strategic goals influence value capture and this is rooted in employee motivations which 
must be recognized in microfoundational thinking. Hodgkinson and Healey (2011) draw 
on developments in neuroscience to demonstrate how dynamic capabilities harness the 
“warm” cognition and emotional capacities of individuals to blend rational analytic 
thought with more intuitive thinking. 
This is a very current subject area for dynamic capability scholars. 
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2.4.4 The key debates 
Despite the burgeoning literature on the subject of dynamic capabilities, the dynamic 
capabilities approach has been subject to sustained criticism: research findings remain 
diverse and as yet unconnected (Barreto, 2010; Catherine L Wang & Ahmed, 2007), 
definitional issues remain (Barreto, 2010). Zahra et al. (2006) also point to the literature 
around dynamic and operational capabilities as “implicitly tautological” (p. 921), the same 
criticism as the resource based view (RBV) from which dynamic capabilities evolved 
(Priem & Butler, 2001a; Williamson, 1999). However, Peteraf et al. (2013) note that the 
issue of tautology have been resolved. See Helfat and Peteraf (2009) for the discussion. 
After a review of the literature I would offer the additional criticism that much of the work 
in the field of dynamic capabilities remains largely at the conceptual level (a claim first 
aired by Helfat et al., 2010). There is a ‘log jam’ of research in this field, which has, and 
continues to, advance but where empirical work by and large is focused on what dynamic 
capabilities are. There has been little work in demonstrating how they actually operate and 
contribute to competitive advantage other than at the conceptual level. So despite the 
progress made, there is still relevance in the observation made by Kraatz and Zajac more 
than a decade ago that: 
“while the concept of dynamic capabilities is appealing, it is a rather vague 
and elusive one which has thus far proven largely resistant to observation and 
measurement” (2001: 653). 
With such rapid growth over a relatively short period of time there is, not unnaturally, a 
diverse body of research which Barreto (2010: 257) points out ‘shows the dynamism 
generated by the topic and is justified by the youth of its approach’. He goes on to say, 
along with other recent reviewers of the dynamic capabilities area (Di Stefano et al., 2010), 
that competing ideas exist and in order for the field to progress: consolidation and focus 
are needed. Helfat and Winter (2011: 1243) comment that: ‘Despite more than a decade of 
strategic management research on dynamic capabilities, important conceptual issues 
remain’. (p. 1243). For all that, as Kuhn (2012) notes, early versions of new theoretical 
fields of endeavour tend to be a bit rough around the edges. 
One main debate in the area is down to the variety in definitions of the construct. There 
exists commonality present in the definitions from the leading authors around competences 
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and resources, but there is some debate as to whether dynamic capabilities are routines 
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Winter, 2003; Zahra et al., 2006; Zollo & Winter, 2002) 
rather than abilities (Helfat et al., 2007; Teece et al., 1997; Zahra et al., 2006). As an 
example of the debate consider that Helfat et al. (2007: 5) assert that routine behaviour is 
not purposeful and thus by their definition change achieved by routines would not 
comprise dynamic capability. Arend and Bromiley (2009: 80) wryly note ‘if routines do 
not contain purposeful behaviour, then little of what firms do is purposeful’. The fact that 
there is no convergence on a common definition may be down to the ‘variations within the 
community that contributed to the development of this concept’ (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2009: S2).  
Many writers work on the assumption that dynamic capabilities are heterogeneous, the 
corner-stone of the RBV and yet that is challenged in Eisenhardt and Martin who assert 
that dynamic capabilities can exhibit commonalities: “best practice” but that this doesn’t 
preclude differential performance. Zott (2003) also accepts that firms may have the same 
dynamic capabilities but may bundle resources differently thus producing differentiated 
firm performance. 
There are also competing ideas around how dynamic capabilities evolve. Research 
suggests that dynamic capabilities are actually “stable phenomena” (Ambrosini & 
Bowman, 2009: 34) interacting upon another stable phenomenon – the resource base of the 
firm so that “dynamism” relates to “how the resource base is changed in a dynamic 
environment by the use of dynamic capabilities” (Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009: 34). This 
is at odds a body of literature that envisages dynamic capabilities to be routines (the 
conceptual authors of this view are mentioned in the previous paragraph) and as such 
evolve over time the key tenet of evolutionary economics (Nelson & Winter, 1982) or if 
they are path-dependent as Teece et al. (1997) theorize then this too is taken as evidence by 
subsequent scholars in the field that dynamic capabilities evolve. 
Despite the motivation for developing the dynamic capability perspective (Teece et al., 
1997), Williamson (1999) also points to the lack of operational implications and says there 
is insufficient concern for competition. It appears to still be a concern for the research 
domain (Arend & Bromiley, 2009). Danneels (2012) argues that in fact work to date in the 
research domain of dynamic capability lacks the essential element to explain SCA: that of 
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a theory of rent. He acknowledges (p. 45) that the classic articles ‘do recognise that rents 
flow not just from the resources of a firm, but also from its ”ability to reconfigure and 
transform”’ but fail to discuss further in their exposition of the construct. However many 
writers do directly link superior performance and dynamic capability (e.g. Makadok, 2001; 
Pitelis & Teece, 2009; Teece, 2007; Teece et al., 1997; Zollo & Winter, 2002). In contrast 
Eisenhardt and Martin (2000: 1106) state: ‘dynamic capabilities are necessary but not 
sufficient, conditions for competitive advantage’. In their view advantage is to be obtained 
in how quickly and astutely dynamic capabilities are deployed. Zott (2003) also decouples 
the link between dynamic capability and performance by suggesting that dynamic 
capabilities may influence performance by modifying the firm’s resource bundle and 
Helfat et al. (2007) also call for this decoupling emphasizing the link between dynamic 
capabilities and the creation, extension and modification of the firm’s resource base. 
Zahra et al. (2006) commented on the dearth of studies specifically in SMEs and new 
ventures with regards to the evolution and operation of dynamic capabilities.  This was 
addressed to some extent by Teece’s later interest in entrepreneurial firms (e.g. Pitelis & 
Teece, 2009; Teece, 2007, 2012) and there has been some exploration of the subject (for 
example Aramand & Valliere, 2012; Arend, 2013; Augier & Teece, 2007; J. A. Martin, 
2011). Admiral Plc is an entrepreneurial company that has grown from being a new 
venture through being an SME and is in the early stages of becoming a multi-national 
enterprise. A longitudinal study of dynamic capability in this company may contribute to 
this aspect of the literature. 
Katkalo et al. (2010) in their review of the research domain in 2010 acknowledged these 
debates but argued that the area can ‘benefit from a better integration with the nature, 
objectives and essence of the firm, so that [dynamic capabilities] are derived from first 
principles’ (p. 1181), advice that I intend to follow in this thesis.  
Vogel and Guttel (2013: 426) note that the dynamic capability research domain still lacks 
consensual concepts that allow comparisons of empirical studies to advance the theoretical 
understanding of dynamic capabilities. Not only that, but the bulk of the publishing to date 
is still heavily theoretical (Barreto, 2010; Di Stefano et al., 2010) with the first empirical 
paper only published in 2001 (Newbert, 2007). 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
  Page  2-55 
In their analysis of empirical data, Arend and Bromiley (2009: 84) note that the dynamic 
capability perspective presents substantial empirical challenges. Points to note from their 
analysis that are pertinent to the proposed case study in this thesis are that 70% of the 
studies used survey or case-based methodology with authors noting that a balance of 
primary and secondary data would be useful; 20% of the studies were longitudinal, a 
problem in studying the sources, evolution and operationalization of dynamic capabilities; 
18% of studies used contexts that the authors question were “high velocity”; and 1% of 
studies addressed ex ante costs and addressing this could form part of this case study. 
Additionally there are problems in the positive bias (95%) of the empirical studies 
analysed. 
Many of these debates and inconsistencies in the field are down to the fact that the two 
most influential papers (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece et al., 1997)21 in the 
development of the dynamic capability perspective represent ‘not only differing but 
contradictory views of dynamic capabilities’ (Peteraf et al., 2013: 1389). The papers come 
from quite different research traditions and frame dynamic capabilities with internally 
consistent logic from different theoretical underpinnings (Easterby-Smith et al., 2009; 
Peteraf et al., 2013). This literature review has tracked Teece’s key writings prior to the 
publication of his seminal paper on dynamic capabilities (1997). The development from his 
theory of diversification (Teece, 1980, 1982) to looking at routines versus entrepreneurial 
action (Teece, 2012) reveals an evolution of logical thought development around dynamic 
capabilities. Eisenhardt’s previous body of work is diverse but recurring themes appear in 
Eisenhardt and Martin (2000): namely the importance of simple rules in the strategy 
making process (Eisenhardt & Sull, 2001) in high velocity environments (Brown & 
Eisenhardt, 1998; Eisenhardt, 1989b). Findings from the Peteraf et al. (2013) cocitation 
analysis are that Eisenhardt’s work selectively admits ‘ideas from the Teecian side of the 
divide’  then with her theoretical lens she will view and shape those ideas ‘to more closely 
match the worldview represented by the community of scholarship more closely tied’  to 
her work (p. 1390).  
                                                 
21  The most cited papers in the dynamic capability research domain are Teece et al. (Di Stefano et al. quote 
1,193 times cited in the Thomson-ISI Web of Science database up to 2007 and then Peteraf et al. quote 
1,721 citations from 1990-2008) and Eisenhardt and Martin (with 470 and 671 citations respectively). 
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This literature review has already highlighted the differences in the theorizing of the two 
papers. Namely: differences over boundary conditions, sustainability and competitive 
advantage essentially uncertainties on the “content” side. However the authors propose to 
reconcile these two seminal framings by viewing dynamic capabilities a best practice in 
moderately dynamic markets and as simple rules and processes in high-velocity markets. 
2.5 Formulating a Research Question 
2.5.1 Summarizing the literature review 
From this literature review it can be seen that strategy can be viewed as a search for a 
‘continuing source of rent’ (Bowman, 1974: 47) and rent can be defined as the excess 
return after a resource owner’s opportunity costs (Tollison, 1995). The RBV incorporated 
early management writers who considered the resource position of the firm (Andrews, 
1971; Ansoff, 1965) in order to explain how firms generate above-normal returns.   Firms 
will select a strategy to generate rents based on its resource capabilities (Andrews, 1971) 
but basing strategy upon a distinctive competence may enable the firm to generate SCA i.e. 
above-normal returns (Hitt & Ireland, 1985; Selznick, 1957). 
After criticism that the RBV presented too static a view a dynamic capabilities framework 
was proposed and this has absorbed much of the attention in the RBV literature in the last 
15 years (Barreto, 2010).  The resultant research domain is diverse and at times 
contradictory and basic issues still lie at the heart of the definition of the foundational 
construct. However this theoretical perspective offers a useful lens by which to view the 
sustained performance of Admiral Plc as it has at its heart the same question that drives 
this thesis and there is scope for this thesis to make a contribution to this literature. 
2.5.2 The research question and potential contribution 
Theorists argue that dynamic capabilities deliver SCA as set out in this literature review 
but the foundational elements of dynamic capabilities are unclear and there is a recent 
focus on tacit dimensions that cannot be directly observed.  
In Chapter 1, a case was made for Admiral being a company that operates in a high 
velocity environment driven primarily by technological advancements in telephony and 
computer hardware, doing business on the internet – now delivered via mobile platforms, 
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database technology, GPS technology etc. The case was also made that it is a high 
performing firm. From the access to the founders and TMT and the GM plus the 
availability of secondary data from pre-launch in 1992 to 2013 this inductive longitudinal 
case study should contribute to the empirical literature on dynamic capability specifically 
addressing many of the issues found with the empirical body of work as identified by 
Arend and Bromiley (2009). 
Can a study of Admiral Plc further open the “black box” and help evaluate dynamic 
capability theory? Specifically: 
1. Are dynamic capabilities, as defined in the literature, observable in this firm?  
2. What are the sources of dynamic capability in this firm? 
3. Can this case shed light on how dynamic capability is operationalized and how that 
contributes to the firm’s success? 
4.  Has dynamic capability evolved as the company moved from an entrepreneurial 
start-up to an MNE? 
5. What can be learned about managerial dynamic capability and its contribution to 
“entrepreneurial fit”? 
6. Can this case-study contribute to some of the debates in the literature such as the 
existence of a capability hierarchy, the nature of dynamic capability, its 
heterogeneity or otherwise? 
The research objectives are: 
1. Using the definitions in the literature identify the elements of dynamic capability 
within this firm. 
2. Use historical data and interviews with the founders to examine the sources of 
dynamic capability within this firm and evidence it’s evolution from 1992 through to 
2013. 
3. Use the data to investigate some of the debates in the literature around dynamic 
capability. 
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4. Expand existing dynamic capability theory to explain the findings. 
Apart from a contribution as a longitudinal study of how dynamic capability works in a 
successful firm operating in a high velocity environment to the empirical literature this 
study might contribute to some of the key debates as laid out in Section 2.4.4 as follows: 
1. Questions around heterogeneity and where it resides.  Will the study identify 
examples of “best practice” (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000) or will any dynamic 
capabilities identified be heterogeneous? 
2. Are dynamic capabilities “stable phenomena” (Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009) or do 
they evolve in response to changing conditions (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Winter, 
2003; Zahra et al., 2006; Zollo & Winter, 2002)? 
3. Is there an observable link between Admiral’s performance and its dynamic 
capability (Makadok, 2001; Teece et al., 1997; Zollo & Winter, 2002)?  
4. Does a hierarchy of capability exist within this firm and does this offer an 
explanatory device for how capability works in firms to bring about sustained 
performance? 
5. Zahra et al. (2006) commented that there are few studies of the evolution and 
operation of dynamic capability within new ventures and SME’s. As this is a 
longitudinal study looking at Admiral from pre-launch through the new venture 
stages to the entrepreneurial firm on the verge of being classified an MNE that it is 
today, this thesis should contribute in that area. 
Additionally, from this forensic examination of capabilities within this firm there may be 
opportunities through Question 3 to contribute in understanding how the capacities of 
management to collect, disseminate and act on knowledge are linked (or not) to dynamic 
managerial capability as discussed in Section 2.4.3.1 and potentially to the call in Helfat et 
al. (2007) that more work needs to be done to link leadership and strategy (see Section 
2.4.3.2). There may be opportunities too for contribution to the microfoundation project as 
outlined in Section 2.4.3.3 given question 4 above. 
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CHAPTER 3:  RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY 
3.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter presented an overview of the strategic management research field 
with regards to the development of the dynamic capability construct and it’s antecedents in 
the resource-based view. This review of the relevant literature highlighted several gaps in 
the literature as it stands, not least of which is the problem in the construct itself arising 
from two very different conceptualizations (Peteraf et al., 2013) and the confusion around 
the decoupling of the construct as a direct influence on the SCA question (Helfat et al., 
2007). There has been a wealth of theorizing around dynamic capabilities (Barreto, 2010; 
Di Stefano et al., 2010) but there are few empirical studies around how the construct is 
operationalized. 
So, having established a research question, this chapter explores the implications for the 
underlying research philosophy with Miles and Huberman (1994: 4) arguing that 
researchers must lay out their ontological and epistemological starting points: ‘it is good 
medicine, we think, for researchers to make their preferences clear’ in order to clarify how 
the ‘researcher construes the shape of the social world and aims to give us a credible 
account of it’. More importantly, ontological paradigms have real consequences for the 
ways in which research problems are conceived and articulated. 
The aim of this chapter is to expound upon the philosophical positioning for this research. 
It begins with some contextual definitions to introduce the vocabulary for this chapter and 
then describes the three paradigms most commonly found in strategic management 
research. From there it reviews how these paradigms play out in the field.  The chapter 
then looks at the ontological and epistemological implications for this research and situates 
this study clearly within a philosophical paradigm. Methodological implications are then 
considered prior to the next chapter on research design. 
3.2 Research Paradigms 
3.2.1 Definitions 
Research norms vary across contexts and within the particular sub-domain of strategy 
research, philosophical underpinnings have been derived from the philosophy of science 
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that refers to the ‘conceptual roots undergirding the quest for knowledge’ (Ponterotto, 
2005: 127). This includes the: 
‘beliefs and assumptions regarding ontology (the reality and nature of 
being), epistemology (the study of knowledge, the acquisition of 
knowledge, and the relationship between the knower [research 
participant] and would-be knower [the researcher]), axiology (the role 
and place of values in the research process), rhetorical structure (the 
language and presentation of the research), and the methodology (the 
process and procedures of research)’ (Ponterotto, 2005: 127). 
Before their chapter in Denzin and Lincoln’s influential handbook on qualitative research 
was substantially revised in 2000 and 2011, Lincoln and Guba (1994: 107) discussed the 
nature of research paradigms defining a paradigm as: 
‘a set of basic beliefs (or metaphysics) that deals with ultimate or first 
principles. It represents a worldview that defines for its holder the nature 
of the “world”, the individual’s place in it and the range of possible 
relationships to that world and its parts’. 
They also note that ultimately paradigms are human constructions and must rely on 
persuasiveness and utility rather than proof in arguing their position (p. 108) although this 
is said from an avowedly constructionist perspective (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011: 10). They 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1994; Lincoln, Lynham, & Guba, 2011)  go onto to describe the basic 
beliefs of various research paradigms summarised for this thesis in Table 3-1.  This table 
shows only three of the alternatives given by Lincoln and Guba. They have been selected 
here for their relevance to research in the strategic management domain. Each of these 
three paradigms is discussed in the rest of this section. 
3.2.2 Positivism  
The dominant research paradigm in the strategic management field has been positivism 
(Lincoln et al., 2011; Montgomery, Wernerfelt, & Balakrishnan, 1989; Tsoukas & 
Knudsen, 2002). It has dominated the published discourse in the physical and social 
sciences for 400 years (Lincoln & Guba, 1994: 109) and the management field is 
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characterized by empiricism where knowledge is acquired through observation and 
experience (Bendixen & Berger, 1998). Who first coined the phrase “positivism” is 
unknown, although Francis Bacon (1561-1626) used the term but Comte (1798-1857) 
certainly popularized its use (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Lowe, 2002). 
Positivism is a form of philosophical realism adhering closely to the hypothetico-deductive 
method (McGrath & Johnson, 2003) and focuses on efforts to verify a priori hypotheses 
mostly stated in a quantitative form (McGrath & Johnson, 2003; Schwandt, 2000). 
Although it has its roots in ancient Greek philosophy (Russell, 1946/2004) It reached a 
zenith in the Age of Enlightenment, an intellectual movement in the 17th and 18th 
centuries where thinkers moved away from unquestioning acceptance of the force of royal 
or religious decree to the idea of the centrality of the individual and the world as 
objectively knowable (Ponterotto, 2005). Although a debate within the epistemology arose 
around the fundamental issue about empiricism: for example Hume’s or Locke’s position 
that all knowledge starts with the senses, and rationalism based on Descartes’ view that all 
knowledge starts with the mind (Russell, 1946/2004), ultimately, however knowledge is 
acquired, these writers represented a broad position in the philosophy of science denoted as 
“classical empiricism” where ‘the ultimate objects of knowledge are atomistic events’ 
(Bhaskar, 1978/2008: 14). 
Lincoln and Guba (1985: 20) suggest that positivism began ‘with the publication of John 
Stuart Mill’s A System of Logic in 1843’ which laid out the fundamentals we recognize as 
positivism today: that laws of nature can be derived from large data samples and 
generalizations using hypothetico-deductive methods, all within the idea of the existence 
of the true, identifiable reality of classical philosophy. However, there is also the 
Newtonian world-view antecedents of Mill. In the Newtonian world-view, observation and 
experiment yield knowledge of universal laws (Russell, 1946/2004). Most importantly, 
coming from the ontological position where objects in the world have meaning prior to, 
and independently of, any consciousness of them, it is important to realize that it is not the 
everyday world we live in – it is ‘an abstraction from the “lived” world’ (Husserl, 1970), it 
is an observable distillation, being a highly systematic and well-organised world that 
Donaldson (2003) frequently points out is beyond ‘common sense’. 
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This paradigm contrasts with the constructivism paradigm. Some writers (Easterby-Smith 
et al., 2002; J. K. Smith, 1983) present the two philosophical traditions as ends of a bi-
polar continuum. However earlier scholars heatedly debated these two opposing paradigms 
(and everything in-between) in what have been described as ‘the paradigm wars’ (Gage, 
1989). In our research arena, the fundamental discussions on philosophical issues on 
theory pluralism and incommensurability are more prevalent in organizational theory 
(prompted by both Maanen, 1995; Pfeffer, 1993) than they are in strategic management 
with Scherer (1998: 148) noting that ‘in strategic management there are relatively few 
contributions that deal with these issues seriously’. 
3.2.3 Constructivism 
Table 3-1 describes the key features of this paradigm. It has also been described as 
interpretivism. 
This paradigm is often seen as a more recent development during the 20th century as 
rejection of the application of positivism to the social sciences (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2002), but it too has its antecedents from the Enlightenment in another philosopher, 
Immanuel Kant whose position of “transcendental idealism” has been another 
foundational tenet of the philosophy of science (Bhaskar, 1978/2008). According to 
Bhaskar (1998b: 19), Kant’s position was that: 
‘objects of scientific knowledge are models, ideals of natural order etc. 
Such objects are artificial constructs and though they may be independent 
of particular men, they are not independent of men or human activity in 
general’. 
This highlights the central tenet of the constructivist position that meaning is not 
discovered but constructed.   
In his primer on research paradigms and the philosophy of science, Ponterotto (2005) 
additionally marks the influence of Dilthey, who being Influenced by Kant, articulated the 
next tenet of a social constructionism epistemology that looks for the understanding of the 
meaning of social phenomena. Advocates of this paradigm aim for understanding lived 
experiences from the viewpoint of the participant (Schwandt, 2000) and Dilthey believed 
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that every lived experience ‘occurs within a historical social reality’ (Ponterotto, 2005: 
129). 
As a philosophical standpoint, this paradigm doesn’t feature heavily in the scientific arena 
where positivism is the dominant paradigm. However with the rise of the social sciences in 
the latter part of the twentieth century, interpretive approaches ‘arose out of criticisms of 
positivism’s approach to reduce complex social phenomena to single measurable units’ (J. 
Gill & Johnson, 1997: 34). One of the key proponents for a new approach was Anthony 
Giddens (1976) who postulated that while mankind does not create the natural world, they 
do have to make sense of it.  This distinction between the natural world and the social 
world allowed Giddens to introduce the double hermeneutic of social constructionism 
whereby social scientists must firstly find a way of ‘entering and grasping the frames of 
meaning involved in the social life of lay actors’ and next, ‘reconstituting these within the 
new frames of meaning involved in technical conceptual schemes’ (Giddens, 1976, 79). 
In summary, the constructivism paradigm takes a relativist ontology which assumes 
multiple, apprehendable and equally valid realities (Schwandt, 1997). Crotty (2003: 42) 
defines it as: 
 ‘all knowledge, and therefore all meaningful reality as such, is contingent 
upon human practices, being constructed in and out of interaction between 
human beings and their world, and developed and transmitted within an 
essentially social context’.  
A constructivist position ‘espouses a hermeneutical approach’ (Ponterotto, 2005: 129) 
where meaning is not discovered but constructed often after reflection on interactive 
researcher-participant dialogue (Crotty, 2003; Schwandt, 2000). 
3.2.4 Post-positivism 
Post-positivism arose from dissatisfaction with some aspects of the positivist paradigm 
with which it shares some aspects (see Table 3-1). As a paradigm, its ontology accepts that 
there is a “real” reality but that “reality” can only be imperfectly and probabilistically 
apprehendable (Lincoln et al., 2011). Furthermore, post-positivists believe that ‘human 
phenomena can best be explained in terms of causal relationships. But this causality is 
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assumed to be complex, multiplistic, and interactive’ (Guba, 1990: 230). Like positivism, 
post-positivism ‘maintains as a goal of empirical research the development of 
generalizable theoretical propositions, yet views such generalizations as attainable only 
tentatively and probabilistically’ (Guba, 1990: 232). 
Both paradigms are etic: referring to the search for universal law; and both are nomothetic: 
focusing on the generalizable collective rather than the individual and proffer an objective, 
detached researcher role (Ponterotto, 2005). However Sayer, in his introduction to his book 
on “Realism and Social Science”, notes that for realists, social science is neither 
nomothetic or idiographic (Sayer, 2000), a view which has been instrumental in adopting a 
philosophical position for this thesis. 
Whatever their similarities, a key distinction exists in that positivism highlights “theory 
verification” but post-positivism is more critical and this notion of a critical tradition is 
derived from Karl Popper. The thrust of Popper’s argument was that scientific law goes 
beyond what can be experienced so it can never be absolutely true and can only be 
accepted on a provisional basis until such time as it can be falsified (Bhaskar, 1978/2008) 
and thus ‘the objectivity of science is not a matter of the individual scientists but rather the 
social result of their mutual criticism’ (Popper quoted in Guba (1990: 231)). 
The ontology is “critical realism” in that ‘so long as ultimate truth is not accessible, the 
process of assigning validity is social and partly dependent upon a consensus achieved in 
debate’ (T. D. Cook, 1983: 89). Sayer (2000: 6) notes that critical realists argue ‘that while 
interpretative understanding was an important and necessary feature of any social science. 
It did not mean that there was no scope for causal explanation’. 
Critical realism is a movement in philosophy most closely associated with the work of Roy 
Bhaskar (Bhaskar, 1998a: ix). He makes the fundamental distinction between the 
“intransitive” and “transitive” dimensions of knowledge. The word ”critical” refers to a 
transcendental realism: a philosophical tradition that rejects methodological individualism 
and universal claims to the truth: agreeing with the positivists that there is a world that is 
observable and independent of human consciousness but that knowledge about that world 
is socially constructed (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011: 11).  
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY 
  Page  3-65 
Realist thought accentuates the separateness of mind from an external reality – an ontology 
of “invariance” where we can make explicit assumptions about what is real giving us the 
conceptual foundation needed for theory building. Bakshar’s stratified ontology 
(1978/2008) gives us “the empirical” (what we see and can record), the “actual” (events 
that occur) and the “real” (generative mechanisms and causal powers often tacit and 
unactualized). Critical realism argues that ‘the world is characterized by emergence’ 
(Sayer, 2000: 12) a notion falling outside the ontology of positivism. In open systems i.e. 
the real world (Thompson, 1967) the same causal power produces different outcomes in 
different contexts (Bhaskar, 1978/2008). Those contexts can be socially constructed and 
critical realism acknowledges this so there is an interpretive dimension to critical realist 
research.  Critical realist explanations of reality are never conclusive but progress over 
time (Fay, 1996) and reality is formalized through successive observations (Mir & Watson, 
2001; Montgomery et al., 1989). 
3.2.5 Paradigms summarized 
 
Table 3-1: Basic beliefs of three research paradigms summarised. Adapted from Tables 6.1 
- 6.5 in Lincoln et al. (2011: 98-115) and from Table 2.2 in Creswell (2013: 21). 
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Table 3-1 on the previous page summarises the key points from each of the research 
paradigms discussed thus far in this chapter.  It draws heavily from the influential work in 
this field by Lincoln and Guba. 
3.3 Review of paradigms within the strategic management research 
domain 
As has been noted in Section 3.2, positivism is the dominant paradigm in strategic 
management, and Lincoln et al. (2011) note that positivists seldom attempt to make 
explicit and critique the assumptions made by adopting the positivist paradigm and 
although some explication of underlying philosophical issues have been attempted (Calori, 
1998; Scherer & Dowling, 1995; Singer, 1994), the “paradigm wars” common to other 
fields of management research endeavor have not inspired much reflection within the 
strategic management community. 
The literature review noted the preponderance of economists in the strategy management 
field influencing the adoption of the positivist paradigm. Hitt (2005: 372) make the 
comment: ‘the field [of strategic management] has been transformed from one based 
largely on normative case-based research into one emphasizing theory and empirical 
research using valuable data and rigorous analytical tools’.  
Does this transformation imply an ontological variation to match the methodological? It’s 
not an area that was discussed by those early writers and many of todays leading theorists 
in the strategic management field are avowedly positivistic, particularly in the area of 
content research (see Montgomery et al., 1989 for a review of strategy content research). 
The RBV and dynamic capabilities literature review in Chapter 2 was largely of this 
paradigm. In Section 2.3.3 on page 2-34, Barney and Clarke (2007: 256) were quoted as 
advocating: ‘as the limits of our language are reached, it becomes important to restate our 
theories, including resource-based theory, in rigorous mathematical terms’. Similarly, a 
theme of the most recent SMS conference in 2014 on microfoundations talks about 
empirical research issues that need ‘to grapple with important questions of theory 
development, operationalization, aggregation, empirical measurement, data collection, 
and statistical implementation’ (N. J. Foss & Pedersen, 2014: 1). These are just two 
examples from key scholars of interest to my research calling for a positivistic, quantitative 
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orientation to strategic management research. Furthermore, the published empirical work 
on dynamic capabilities is 75% quantitative (Barreto, 2010).  
There are clues to the ontological orientation of the early writers in the field that should 
answer the question whether there has been an ontological shift in the field. The principal 
goal of these key authors was ‘to impart knowledge to practitioners, rather than to pursue 
knowledge for scientific advancement’ (Hoskisson et al., 1999: 423) and their case-study 
methodology reveals a different epistemology to their successors in strategic management 
research. However they still seemed to believe in an observable reality although felt that it 
was impossible to ‘make useful generalizations about the nature of these variables or to 
classify their possible combinations in all situations’, and that it was possible to ‘combine 
these variables into a pattern valid for one organization’ (Learned et al., 1965: 5). This 
language suggests a positivist ontological position even though it is not expressly stated. 
Godfrey and Hill (1995: 524) argue that most economists (and quantum physicists) ‘have 
moved away from a strict interpretation of the verificationist theory of meaning’ adopting 
an instrumental position in the positivist paradigm in order to justify the use of 
unobservable economic constructs. They further explain (p. 524) that ‘the instrumental 
position asserts that the ultimate truth or falsity of a scientific theory is irrelevant; it is the 
ability of a theory to explain empirical reality that is the proof of its value’ which, they 
explain, has shifted the criteria on which science should be judged, away from truth to that 
of adequate explanation, however this is still within the positivist paradigm. 
Godfrey and Hill also argue that ‘unobservable constructs are to be found at the core of a 
number of theories that underpin strategic management research’ (p. 527) and in 
reviewing the debate between positivism and realism conclude that ‘realism is more 
defensible than positivism’ (p. 527). 
The Strategic Management Journal (SMJ) has become ‘the preeminent journal publishing 
scholarly work in the field of scientific management and is often rated in the top five of 
academic journals in the broader field of management’ (Pettigrew et al., 2002: 5). As such 
it has set the tone for the field but there has been criticism of the ‘narrowness of the 
epistemological, methodological and theoretical base of writing in the strategic 
management field’ (Pettigrew et al., 2002: 6). Remember too, that much of the literature 
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review in this thesis has been about the antecedents of dynamic capabilities and therefore 
is drawn from a body of strategy content research with a heavy orientation towards 
positivist research. 
The content/process divide was touched on in the literature review. However it has a 
bearing in this discussion of ontological and epistemological issues because of the split 
between the epistemology of the bulk of empirical research in strategy content vis-a-vis the 
approach taken by the leading process scholars.  
In his introduction to the SMJ special issue on process research, Schendel (1992: 2) 
explains that ‘in teaching, the content/process distinction was characterized by the 
difference between strategy formulation and strategy implementation’ and furthermore 
stated that process scholars dispute this dichotomy because ‘strategy process itself is an 
integral part of content: the two cannot be separated’. Schendel comes from a positivist 
paradigm, indeed his work with Hatten (1972) was instrumental in quantifying the field 
and helped to shift ‘the attention externally toward industry structure and competitive 
position in the industry’ (Hoskisson et al., 1999: 419).  
However, the guest editor for whom Schendel was writing his introduction was Andrew 
Pettigrew, a notable scholar and proponent of strategy process research. Pettigrew’s 
scholarly Guest Editors Introduction (Pettigrew, 1992) laid out some of the philosophical 
distinctions that characterize process research. Back in 1992, he noted that ‘strategy 
process research is diverse and cannot be contained with any single paradigm’ (Pettigrew, 
1992: 7). Writing a decade later he notes that: ‘unlike earlier characterizations of the 
natural sciences, where the stereotype is of knowledge accumulating progressively and 
linearly like some clear edged and tidy ribbon, in the social sciences knowledge seems to 
accumulate more as a mosaic’ (Pettigrew et al., 2002: 6). Writing in 2013 he clearly states 
his position as a “mediativist” which ‘contends that social circumstances intervene by 
mediating between nature and accounts of nature, but do not eliminate the effects of 
nature’ (Pettigrew, 2013: 124). 
Pettigrew notes in his essay on “The Character and Significance of Strategy Process 
Research” laid out five principles guiding strategic process research (for full discussion see 
Pettigrew, 1992: 9). He was building on Van de Ven’s (1992) observations on studying 
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strategy process and on Sztompka’s (1991) ontological assumptions in process analysis. 
Van de Ven defined the meaning of process: ‘Process is often used in three ways in the 
literature: (1) a logic used to explain a causal relationship in a variance theory, (2) a 
category of concepts that refer to actions of individuals or organizations, and (3) a 
sequence of events that describe how things change over time’ (p. 169). Pettigrew’s 
principles fit more with a constructivist paradigm in the requirement for “embeddedness” 
in order to study different levels of analysis and different contexts and to search for holistic 
explanations, albeit he has described his own ontology differently (Pettigrew, 2013). 
Langley, Smallman, Tsoukas, and Van de Ven (2013) discuss a process ontology based in 
process metaphysics, a philosophy espoused by Whitehead (1929). In this ontology, ‘our 
knowledge of nature is experience of activity’ (Whitehead, 1920: 185), where every real-
life object can only be understood as a series of processes. Whitehead rejected the notion 
that each physical object has a simple spatial or temporal location. We see here the idea 
that context over time is an important facet of knowledge. Thus in this ontology there are 
two types of existence of entity: that of the actual entity and that of its abstraction. In this 
view ‘entities (such as organizations and structures) are no more that temporary 
instantiations of ongoing processes, continually in a state of becoming’ (Langley et al., 
2013: 5). They further note (p.6) that ‘one reason why so many process studies retain, to 
some degree, the language and ontology of substance even as they explore activity, event 
sequences, the unfolding of practices, enactment and the dynamics of change’ is that 
language is ‘dominated by nouns with verbs associated with action and change taking a 
secondary role’. 
So both Pettigrew in 1992 and Langley et al in 2013 argue that the study of contexts both 
in time and location are crucial in process analysis. ‘The search is to catch reality in flight’ 
(Pettigrew, 1992: 11) and thus process scholars tend towards a different ontology from 
their positivist content counterparts, being focused on an open-world ontology where the 
interest is in ‘the process that produces an outcome’ (Tsoukas & Knudsen, 2002: 414). In 
this world-view, the simple causal relationship of the positivist paradigm is replaced with a 
more complex cumulative causal model. Simplistically, in strategy process research we see 
an ontological turn from the realist to a socially constructed ontology (Fleetwood, 2005).  
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It’s not just in process research we see the case been made for longitudinal research, as 
long ago as 1990, similar arguments were been made for longitudinal research in studying 
organizational change (Leonard-Barton, 1990; Pettigrew, 1990b; Van de Ven & Huber, 
1990; Van de Ven & Poole, 1990) and given that dynamic capabilities are bound to 
strategic change within organizations, this study should contribute to the literature by 
virtue of the fact that it is a longitudinal study. 
Since 1980, the bulk of published research in North America has been in the positivist 
tradition (Bluhm, Harman, Lee, & Mitchell, 2011; Pratt, 2008; Tsoukas & Knudsen, 2002), 
but John Van Maanen noted in 1979 a ‘quiet reconstruction going on in the social 
sciences’ (Maanen, 1979: 522). In fact by 2011, Bluhm et al. (2011: 1867) note that more 
qualitative work has been published by in top American journals in the past ten years than 
the previous twenty. They also argue that the positivist ontological position and 
quantitative rigour embedded in North American institutions is ‘challenged and even 
dismissed by European scholars and institutions, which more readily embrace and teach a 
variety of qualitative approaches to studying organizational phenomena’ (p. 1867). Barry 
and Hansen (2008: 9) discussed this divide in management research between North 
American and European scholars noting that ‘they [Europeans] are taking a different path 
entirely’. However, Weick (1999: 804) notes that the ‘image of paradigm ”wars” has the 
unfortunate connotation that it suggests the path to victory and truth lies in monologues 
that overwhelm rather than in dialogues that reconcile’ and writing later, Pettigrew’s view 
(2013: 123) is that researchers should focus on ‘framing qualitative and quantitative 
research as a duality rather than a dichotomy’.  
If paradigmatic discussion has not been a hallmark of within the field, it should come as no 
surprise that the field has also been short on reflexivity (Whipp, 1996). Pettigrew et al. 
(2002) note that the key reviews of the field (Hitt, Gimeno, & Hoskisson, 1998; Hoskisson 
et al., 1999; Schwenk & Dalton, 1991) are very North American-centric and marked by a 
lack of reflection and ‘a reluctance to cite authors who have pointed to the limitations of 
theory and research in strategic management’ (Pettigrew et al., 2002: 8). Furthermore 
strategic management ‘is a field unendowed with a developed critical tradition’ (p. 11). 
Pettigrew et al. (2002: 12) argue that the European tradition of research on strategy process 
has ‘bought a new epistemological and methodological tradition into the field of strategic 
management’ as scholars explore inside the “black-box” outside the positivist paradigm. 
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Having reviewed the ontological and hence epistemological positions within the strategic 
management field, the implications for this specific study are now explored. 
3.4 Ontological and epistemological implications for this research 
The literature review dealt mainly with the strategy content development of the dynamic 
capability construct. This thesis is attempting to evaluate whether the dynamic capability 
construct can explain sustained competitive advantage in Admiral Plc. Such interest in 
strategic outcome effectively can be viewed a ‘content’ question. However, implicit here is 
that this research is attempting to answer how dynamic capabilities work within this firm: 
addressing a notable gap in the literature. This focus, not only on the outcomes ‘but also of 
why and how outcomes are differentially shaped by processes’ (Pettigrew, 1992: 11), is 
more generally associated with the strategy process tradition. Thus, there is an opportunity 
for the content/process divide to inform each other with this study.   
Despite the interest in the dynamic capabilities framework from content scholars there is a 
growing recognition that the strategic management field generally has some limitations in 
the research methods employed: dynamic capabilities, routines, resources and capabilities 
all employ constructs that are themselves subject to contested definition or partial 
interpretation (Barreto, 2010; Felin & Foss, 2009; Salvato & Rerup, 2011). When leading 
theorists from the dynamic capability arena talk about the lack of progress in developing 
dynamic capabilities from the initial theorizing (Helfat et al., 2010), could such a lack  be 
the result of poorly defined constructs: many of which are “unobservable” (see Godfrey & 
Hill, 1995 for a fuller discussion)? So how do we get better constructs, that can be directly 
measured rather than using proxies that can lead to erroneous findings? Debate is 
recognized as being part of the process to advance a field of research (Kuhn, 2012), 
however, ‘debate that is spurred by measurement problems may actually limit the 
discipline’s ability to advance’ (Boyd, Gove, & Hitt, 2005: 243).  
Not only that, the theoretical focus on such constructs has resulted in a gap between 
academic research and the relevance placed on that research by practitioners ((Boyd et al., 
2005; Jarzabkowski, 2005; G. Johnson et al., 2007). Although Jarzabkowski and Johnson, 
Langley, Malin and Whittington come from a “strategy as practice” (SaP) perspective, 
focused on micro-activities of people in relation to strategy, their initial premise, that 
human action should be central to strategy theorizing, has resonance and it is also a central 
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tenet of the strategy process tradition. ‘In point of fact, the field is unlikely to make 
substantial progress without such attention’ (Boyd et al., 2005: 253) and these authors 
express a hope that such attention will yield better constructs for modeling (for those of a 
positivist inclination) although Foss (1997b) was quoted in the literature review as making 
the argument that a more rigorous economic modelling of the theory puts a deeper 
understanding of the more informal literature around core competences at risk. This 
concern of a “relevance gap” between academics and practising managers is not just a 
concern of SaP practitioners. The theory pluralism that has developed in strategic 
management is ‘generally advocated as a fruitful expansion’ (Scherer, 1998: 151) and yet 
this is a source of confusion for executives (Gilbert, Hartman Jr, Mauriel, & Freeman, 
1988; Scherer, 1998) and the ensuing incommensurability has meant that research has had 
little impact on managerial practice (Spender, 1998). 
Perhaps a problem with progress on dynamic capabilities is a result of the search for single 
dimensional answers whilst neglecting the reality of organizational complexity, an 
argument made by Bouchikhi (1998) to explain fragmentation in the research field more 
generally. Writing in the same journal, Spender (1998) explains the shortcomings of 
positivist research with reference to the distinction between the subject and the object 
arguing that it is inappropriate for an analysis of managerial actions. Firms, he argues, are 
essentially emergent, self-organizing and self-regulating and managers intervene and 
husband the system that emerges and thus positivist ontologies cannot cope with the 
complex realities. 
Having argued the shortcomings of positivist philosophies for this research, despite it 
being the dominant paradigm in strategic content research, and having outlined the likely 
benefits of marrying the study of how dynamic capability is operationalized through 
strategic process in this firm to the strategy content area: I am signaling a different 
ontology for this study.  
Using a constructivism paradigm, the more prevalent paradigm in process research, could 
create problems for research of this particular company.  As has been intimated in Chapter 
1 and will be shown in Chapter 5, this is a highly quantified company. It measures 
everything – even the softer elements of human resource management and its culture.  It 
has a fixed view of reality and believes you can find a measure for everything. The fact 
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that the firm’s understanding of reality may be socially constructed points me in the 
direction of a critical realist position.  
A realist philosophy ‘states that we cannot reject theories just because they contain key 
constructs that are unobservable’ (Godfrey & Hill, 1995: 527) and having unobservable 
constructs at the heart of this research question helps to support taking a realist position, 
especially as I am motivated ultimately by trying to find ‘new and better instrumentation 
that can observe the formally unobservable’ (Godfrey & Hill, 1995: 531). Additionally, 
there is a critical realist tradition within strategic management as outlined earlier in this 
section, particularly in the British tradition representing ‘a response to the idea that the 
reality of social institutions depended on the beliefs of agents’ (Turner, 2006: 417).  
This thesis uses the critical realist approached ascribed to Sayer (2000). The key features 
are described in Table 3-2. 
 
Table 3-2  Key features of Critical Realism in practice. Adapted from Sayer (2000: 10-
27)  
For the purposes of this research that is essentially concerned with SCA in a particular 
firm, an SaP perspective, where there is less concern with firm performance than in the 
interaction of people in the development of strategy (G. Johnson et al., 2007), was deemed 
inappropriate. This firm offers the opportunity to offer detailed insights into strategic 
decision making and implementation process from thought to outcome over time as it 
grows from a small entrepreneurial venture to a firm verging on MNE status today. Such 
insights should shed light on the dynamic capability construct as it is currently theorized in 
the literature. 
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One explanation for lack of empirical support for dynamic capabilities (Ambrosini & 
Bowman, 2009; Newbert, 2007), other than the time elapsed since the theory was first 
developed and poor specification (Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009: 37) may be linked to the 
“unobservables” problem discussed earlier in this section. Dynamic capabilities are a 
concept ‘which has thus far proven largely resistant to observation and measurement’ 
(Kraatz & Zajac, 2001: 653). 
Ambrosini and Bowman (2009: 37) note that ‘quantitative methods often involve proxy 
variables which may only capture tangible and visible aspects of a phenomenon’, 
furthermore, Lockett & Thompson (2001:743) argue that ‘it may be necessary to sacrifice 
some of the generality of quantitative investigation for a more qualitative attention to 
detail’ and make a case for using a plurality of methods. Kay (2010) claims that looking at 
phenomena from both a system and a process perspective, can better illuminate many 
important organizational issues. 
For the researcher who uses participants as key informants, they face ‘the problems of 
identifying the best informants and ensuring that they correctly understand the 
investigator’s queries and that they provide veridical answers’ (Van de Ven & Huber, 
1990: 216). This is complicated in this study by the researcher’s involvement with the firm 
and the shared history and meaning with the participants.  
However there is advantage to be had using the cognitive capacity of the researcher, 
especially where there is a shared cognition with participants (Mantere & Ketokivi, 2013). 
Sayer, in his book on critical realism, makes the point that ‘language is not about bits of 
matter or whatever but about the sense the world makes to us’ (Sayer, 2000: 38). It stands 
to reason that a shared cognition allows participant meaning to be more fully realized 
although a researcher without a shared cognition may ascribe different meaning. Critical 
realism allows for this provided there is an account of reference given: for example the fact 
that the researcher here is a founder of the firm being studied. 
Michael Polanyi (1962) the distinguished physical chemist and philosopher, demonstrated 
that the scientist's personal participation in his knowledge, in both its discovery and its 
validation, is an indispensable part of science itself. Even in the exact sciences, "knowing" 
is an art, of which the skill of the knower, guided by his personal commitment and his 
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passionate sense of increasing contact with reality, is a logically necessary part. Cook & 
Brown (1999) argue that knowledge is a tool of knowing and that ‘knowing is an aspect of 
our interaction with the social and physical world’ (p. 381). In the biological and social 
sciences this becomes even more evident. Polanyi argued that the tendency to make 
knowledge impersonal in our culture has split fact from value, science from humanity. He 
wished to substitute for the objective, impersonal ideal of scientific detachment an 
alternative ideal giving attention to the personal involvement of the knower in all acts of 
understanding. This is reflected in the research here. However Sayer’s views on the critical 
realist understanding of objectivity and subjectivity should be reviewed at this point to 
understand the epistemological stance taken in this research. 
For the full discussion on the critical realist distinction between objectivity and subjectivity 
see Sayer’s book (2000: 58-62). However, in summary, Sayer gives three definitions of 
objectivity: being value-free1, being focused on truth and falsity2 and as pertaining to 
objects3. He argues that the first two definitions 1 and 2 are ‘often conflated and confused so 
that it is assumed that in order to arrive at objective2 (true) statements about the world, 
those statements must be value-free’ (Sayer, 2000: 58). He warns, of course, of the danger 
of believing what we want to believe and so must employ reflexivity22 to ensure ‘we are 
not engaging in wishful thinking’ (p. 59) but argues that there is worth in understanding 
that objective2 research can be subjective. Our consciousness of objects (i.e. objectivity3) 
should be recognised only as our truth (objectivity2) as properties of things belong to the 
transitive dimension of knowledge and hence are fallible (Bhaskar, 1978/2008). 
So, using the logic presented here, it is clear that reflexivity is vital to claims of a critical 
realist objectivity despite the criticism levelled at it that ‘reflexivity is not a strong suit for 
critical realists’ (Contu & Willmott, 2005: 1659). Reflexivity is defined as ‘a turning back 
on oneself, a process of self reference’ (Davies, 2008: 4). There is a possibility that this can 
become self-absorption, which although in the definition given, will negate the value of the 
research being conducted. Woolgar (1988) contends that no process of knowing is fully 
reflexive until it is explicitly turned on the knower, who becomes self-conscious even of 
                                                 
22  Reflexivity in Bhaskar’s and Sayer’s articulation of critical realism is at odds with Table 3-1 where 
reflexivity is not identified as a characteristic of the post-positivist paradigm however Sayer makes a 
good argument, summarized here, for the inclusion of a reflexive element to research. 
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the reflexive process of knowing however this should stop short of ‘reflection in an 
infinitude of self-reflexive iterations’ (Gergen & Gergen, 1991: 77). 
3.5 Methodological implications for this research 
The critical realism ontology is agnostic as to research method but ‘it implies that the 
particular choices should depend on the nature of the object of study and what one wants 
to learn about it’ (Sayer, 2000: 19). With a critical realist perspective, both the human 
actors and the firm are given ontological reality. Hence this research can explore the 
phenomenological reality of the participants’ understandings and interpretations of the 
firm’s success whilst recognising these interpretations will not be fully constitutive of the 
firm. Furthermore, these interpretations are made by a researcher who is a founder of the 
firm and responsible for some of the decision-making and for much of the implementation 
of said strategic change.  
Critical realism’s ‘assumption of a deeper level where the structures and power of things 
may or may not be observable is not only a point of theoretical distinction but also has 
important methodological implications’ (Zachariadis, Scott, & Barrett, 2013: 857). 
Causality is about understanding the process and conditions under which “A” causes “B” 
(see Sayer, 2000 for full discussion) the main objective of the research is to ‘use 
perceptions of empirical events [those that can be observed or experienced] to identify the 
mechanisms that give rise to those events’ (Volkoff, Strong, & Elmes, 2007: 835). The 
inference made by the researcher is called “retroduction” (Bhaskar, 1978/2008) and allows 
the researcher to move between the knowledge of phenomena observed through events to 
the ‘creation of explanations (or hypothesizing) in ways that hold “ontological depth” and 
can potentially give some indications on the existence of unobservable entities’ 
(Zachariadis et al., 2013: 858). Retroduction ‘seeks to identify the generative mechanisms 
that generalize beyond the immediate instance of the phenomenon and are critical to its 
occurrence’ (K. D. Miller & Tsang, 2011: 147). It can be seen as a tool in theorizing 
generative mechanisms and ideal for studying events ‘where actors mobilize the resources 
at their disposal in a given context … to shape change’ (Hodgkinson, 2013: 150) and is a 
mode of reasoning beyond deduction and induction (K. D. Miller & Tsang, 2011: 147). 
However critical realism is not without its critics who argue that if all knowledge is 
contested and revisitable ‘how do we know the world is the way you say it is; and why 
should we believe you’ (Contu & Willmott, 2005: 1650). 
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Critical realists ‘distinguish between extensive and intensive designs’ (K. D. Miller & 
Tsang, 2011: 151) where extensive research tests for empirical generalities across cases 
(typically quantitative) and intensive research looks to uncover specific causal mechanisms 
in a particular context (typically qualitative). Methodologically, this thesis is an intensive 
study and will contribute to the qualitative studies of dynamic capabilities using the 
interpretative framework of post positivism and the assumptions associated with that (see 
Creswell, 2013: 35). The access offered at a senior level within Admiral Plc at an 
epistemological level informs the decision to make this a qualitative study. Advocating the 
power of qualitative research to observe everyday life, Maanen (1979: 520) differentiated 
qualitative and quantitative research as ‘qualitative investigators tend also to describe the 
unfolding of social processes rather than the social structures that are often the focus of 
quantitative researchers’. However the research is hoping to contribute to a primarily 
quantitative field and so must be conducted rigorously enough to constitute “good 
science”.  
In terms of theory advancement, qualitative research seeks to generate, elaborate or test 
management theories (Bluhm et al., 2011; Pratt, 2008). This thesis should elaborate 
existing theory on dynamic capability in addition to providing empirical data on dynamic 
capabilities in action within this firm.  
Lee (1999) defined the characteristics of interpretative qualitative research as: (1) 
occurring in the natural setting of the organization; (2) data originates from the 
participant’s viewpoint of their experience; (3) It is “reflexive” in that design of data 
gathering and analysis can change as the research situation unfolds; and (4) the methods 
are not standardized and are chosen with the research aims in mind. 
Bluhm et al. (2011: 1871) add to this by acknowledging the generally accepted researcher 
bias and the necessary reduction of a rich data set as necessary to produce meaning. 
It is the lack of standardization around data collection and analysis tools, alongside the 
researcher’s bias contravening the objectivity mantra that most troubles scholars of a 
positivist bent (Bluhm et al., 2011: 1872). That and the paucity of guidelines to assess the 
soundness of qualitative research (Maanen, 1979) lessen the contribution qualitative 
research has made in the strategic management field given its ontological and 
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epistemological orientation (Amis & Silk, 2008). Pratt (2008: 491) reported that qualitative 
researchers seeking publication complain about lack of a “boilerplate” for gauging the 
quality of qualitative research and that positivist standards for “good science” are often 
applied. There is little methodological guidance in the critical realist literature and current 
efforts to address this are ‘primarily for the purposes of theory generation and verification’ 
(K. D. Miller & Tsang, 2011: 146). 
However the “quality” of qualitative research must be addressed by this thesis. Various 
scholars have recently discussed this (Easterby-Smith, Golden-Biddle, & Locke, 2008; 
Kempster & Parry, 2011; Pratt, 2008) but Gibbert and Ruigrok (2010:710) note that one of 
the problems is that qualitative research rarely explicitly label the rigor criteria in terms of 
the concepts commonly used in the positivist tradition (construct, internal, and external 
validity, as well as reliability).  
As a piece of post positivist work, this study needs to demonstrate validity, reliability, 
objectivity (see discussion earlier from Sayer, 2000), generalizability, and 
communicability of results where it is important to present well-supported research claims 
and to make transparent as far as possible the researcher’s perspectives: the retroduction 
process and the analytical methods used. Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) recommend locating 
the research clearly in a philosophical paradigm, that has been the purpose of this chapter, 
and to be specific in writing about the method and analytical processes being careful to 
present the process clearly but logically as the open-ended and iterative process it will be.  
Linear representations of the reductive process misrepresent the research however there 
should be a close fit between the research claims and the data that inspired them in order to 
meet the reliability test for the research. 
3.6 To recap 
This research will follow Sayer’s (2000) critical realist philosophical positioning so that 
reality is recognized but our views of it are constructed and thus there is a myriad of 
meaning that can be ascribed to the phenomena observed. It will be a piece of qualitative 
research where Denzin and Lincoln (2011: 3) give the following definition: as ‘a situated 
activity that locates the observer in the world. Qualitative research consists of a set of 
interpretive, material practices that make the world visible. These practices transform the 
world ..[turning the world into]… a series of representations…. This means that 
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qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of 
or interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them’. 
Having situated this research within a clear ontological, epistemological and 
methodological frame, the next chapter will explore the research design for this study
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CHAPTER 4:  RESEARCH DESIGN, DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYTICAL 
METHODS 
4.1 Introduction  
‘I held as a conscious axiom throughout my career: reality first. This is what 
Rand calls “the primacy of existence”. Its opposite is the primacy of 
consciousness (e.g., feelings, wishes first). Basing self-esteem on adherence to 
reality is the best route to scientific progress – and to real self-esteem’ (Locke, 
2007: 887). 
The previous chapter reviewed the three pertinent research paradigms at play in the field of 
strategic management research and a case was made to situate this research in a post 
positivist paradigm using the critical realism ontology as espoused by Andrew Sayer 
(Sayer, 2000), which in turn is based on Roy Bhakasar’s philosophical works (Bhaskar, 
1978/2008, 1998b).  
A critical realist philosophical positioning means that reality is recognized but our views of 
it are constructed and thus there is a myriad of meaning that can be ascribed to the 
phenomena observed.  
Methodologically, this study will use qualitative research techniques to inform the strategy 
content/process divide discussed in the previous chapter in an attempt to advance the 
theory of dynamic capability as outlined in Chapter 2.  
As discussed in Chapter 3, the “received” research design in the bulk of North American 
published work in strategic management is quantitative (Bluhm et al., 2011) using large 
data samples, secondary data sources, econometric analyses (Hoskisson et al., 1999: 420). 
However also reviewed in Chapter 3 were the reported major methodological problems 
such research designs were giving the field in terms of advancing theory (see Hitt et al., 
1998 amongst others). Specifically the development of the RBV and dynamic capabilities 
require ‘a multiplicity of methods to identify, measure and understand firm resources, 
purported to reside within the boundary of the firm’ (Hoskisson et al., 1999: 420). 
With qualitative research not having an agreed set of evaluation criteria for research 
quality (Venkatesh, Brown, & Bala, 2013), this chapter firstly considers rigour in the 
qualitative context and signals the techniques that will be used to ensure rigour in this 
research. It will then explore the options for research design within the clear ontological, 
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epistemological and methodological framework already outlined. Both case-study and 
grounded theory methods are examined from the literature to justify their use in this study. 
Next, applicable methodological frameworks from the literature are reviewed individually 
as they form the infrastructure of the research design. Lastly the data collection and data 
analysis techniques are explicitly discussed both from the theoretical perspective and in 
their application to this study. 
4.2 Considerations for Rigour 
Before considering the elements of this research design, we need to consider what 
constitutes a rigorous study in this context. The discussion in Chapter 3 sat this research 
within a philosophical paradigm that is not the dominant paradigm within the field and 
spoke of a desire to speak to that extant literature. Thus, the challenge for this qualitative 
study is how to maintain epistemological rigour and validity but at the same time 
recognizing the critical realist arguments that the deepest level of influence may be 
unobservable per se and rely on the researcher’s interpretation of the data.  
Yin (2003: 33) cites the criteria for judging the quality of research designs in any empirical 
social research are: construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability and 
his strategies for achieving this in case study research are reproduced here in Table 4-1. 
Some qualitative researchers would argue Yin’s criteria, if not positivistic by strategy (see 
Table 4-1), have labels more associated with positivist, quantitative research (see Lincoln 
et al., 2011 amongst others). 
Kempster and Parry (2011: 109) remind us that ‘good science commonly requires the 
satisfaction of three tests: validity, reliability and generalizability’ and note that ‘for 
positivists and critical realists these three tests are equally applicable …[but] differ in 
terms of definition’. However ‘qualitative research does not have guidelines or evaluation 
criteria that are generally accepted’ (Venkatesh et al., 2013: 33). The issue is ambiguous, 
even contentious (Maxwell, 1992; Ridenour & Newman, 2008) with positivists (Maxwell, 
1992) arguing the same criteria should be used and constructivists (Lincoln et al., 2011) 
who  suggest different criteria should apply. Most constructionists accept that validation is 
important for qualitative research (Kvale, 1989; Maxwell, 1992). However, many argue 
that it should be distinguished from the quantitative concept (Denzin, 2011; Lincoln et al., 
2011). 
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Table 4-1: Case Study Tactics for Four Design Tests (Adapted from Yin, 2003: 34) 
In an earlier book, Lincoln and Guba (1985) contend that consistency and dependability of 
data collection and analysis are ‘conceptually similar to reliability in quantitative 
research’ so that validity can be defined as the extent to which ‘data are plausible, 
credible and trustworthy’ (both quotes from Venkatesh et al., 2013: 34) to which Wolcott 
(1990: 146) adds ‘understanding is a more fundamental concept for qualitative research 
than validity’.   
In an attempt to synthesize the literature on validity in qualitative research, Venkatesh et 
al. (2013) propose discussing validity explicitly using a framework that covers rigour in 
the application of methods (design validity) and rigour in the interpretation of data 
(analytical and inferential validities). Their framework fuses Maxwell’s (1992) typology 
with the Denzin and Lincoln (2011) criteria to create a framework that is consistent with a 
critical realist ontological position. The framework can be found in Table 4-2. 
Maxwell (1992), in attempting to bring the issue of validity in qualitative research to the 
fore and writing with a critical realist perspective, proposed a typology of validity for 
qualitative researchers which included: (1) descriptive validity: factual accuracy of what 
is being reported; (2) interpretive validity grounded in the language and cultural 
framework of the participants and Maxwell includes this construction of meaning to 
recognize ‘that a key part of the realm external to an account is the perspective of those 
actors whom the account is about’ (p. 290); and (3) theoretical validity: ‘the extent to 
which the theoretical explanation developed fits the data and, therefore, is credible and 
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defensible’ (Venkatesh et al., 2013: 34). Maxwell’s typology also included 
“generalizability” analogous to Yin’s (2003) notion of “analytic generalization” but 
extends it to include the critical realist notion that context is important so any theory 
‘makes sense of the particular persons or situations studied, but also shows how the same 
process, in different situations, can lead to different results’ (Maxwell, 1992: 293). 
Maxwell’s typology also included “evaluative validity”, similar to Denzin and Lincoln’s 
(2011)  “confirmability” criteria.  
 
Table 4-2: Validity criteria to be used in this research (Adapted from Venkatesh et al. 
(2013: 33)). 
Denzin and Lincoln (2011) have developed criteria for judging the criteria of qualitative 
research over the various incarnations of their seminal text on the subject The Handbook of 
Qualitative Research. These are: (1) credibility of the research reflecting the data in which 
it is rooted and participants should be the judges of the believability of the claims; (2) 
transferability of the research to other contexts; and (3) confirmability is the degree to 
which results can be confirmed or corroborated by others. Like Maxwell’s “evaluative 
validity” it requires making explicit the evaluative framework used by the researcher to 
understand – creating meaning from - their research. This is vital for critical realist 
research as it describes the process of retroduction and allows readers to evaluate that 
foundational thinking. 
The criteria to ensure rigour for this research (as seen in Table 4-2) were synthesized from 
the literature by Venkatesh et al. (2013) who categorized different types of validity as: (1)  
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design validity incorporating Maxwell’s notions of design validity and Denzin and 
Lincoln’s views of credibility and transferability. It ‘refers to how well a studies has been 
designed and executed so that the findings are credible and transferable’ (Venkatesh et al., 
2013: 34); (2) analytical validity incorporating the concepts of theoretical validity 
referring to ‘how well qualitative data were collected and analysed so that the findings are 
dependable, consistent, and plausible’ (p. 34); (3) inferential validity combining the ideas 
of interpretative validity and confirmability so the quality of the interpretation can be 
evaluated by others. 
So whilst this research will use the vocabulary developed by Venkatesh et al. (2013), Yin’s 
(2003) criteria and general discourse reflects the rigour criteria for the “natural science 
model” (see also T. D. Cook & Campbell, 1979; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Gibbert & 
Ruigrok, 2010). Understanding Yin’s terminology in the context of his subject: case study 
research, allows the mapping of his more positivist terms to the Venkatesh et al. criteria.  
For example Yin’s “construct validity” will be an element of consideration in the overall 
“design validity” where the research design must demonstrate robust, theoretical sampling 
explicitly in the write-up. In addition to Yin, many writers (e.g. Creswell, 2013; Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2011; Pettigrew, 1990b; Stake, 1995) suggest triangulation: finding alternative 
sources of data for different perspectives of the same phenomenon, to ensure “construct 
validity” or what we are now calling “design validity”.   
The concept of “internal validity” becomes an issue of the “analytical validity” of the 
research and is a critical step in the process of retroduction from the case. It is of concern 
to this exploratory case study whose goal is to explore any causal relationship between 
dynamic and operational capabilities in this firm. The inference involved in this case will 
require establishing if the evidence indeed converges and that alternatives have been 
considered. A technique recommended by Yin (p. 116) is pattern matching where an 
empirically based pattern gathered over accounts of strategic change and compare with a 
predicted pattern: for example dynamic capability theory predicts that dynamic capabilities 
play a role in the development of new or evolving operational capabilities (Helfat & 
Winter, 2011; Teece et al., 1997; Winter, 2003). By specifying this prediction prior to data 
collection, pattern matching is a relevant method for strengthening this case study’s 
internal validity. Silverman (2006) in his authoritative text on interpreting qualitative data 
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reminds us of the guiding principle of grounded theory which is the constant comparative 
method and whilst this thesis won’t be multiple case the principle of constantly testing 
your coding against new data points applies. As does Silverman’s admonition ‘one should 
not be satisfied until your generalization is able to apply to every single gobbet of relevant 
data you have collected’ (Silverman, 2006: 298). 
External validity establishes whether a study’s findings are generalizable beyond the 
immediate case study and can be dealt with by using a research design that hopes to use 
replication logic in a multiple-case study. Evidence thus obtained is seen as more robust 
(Herriott and Firestone, 1983, as quoted by Yin, 2003: 46). However this study revolves 
around a single case and Yin states for single case studies replication logic is replaces by 
“analytic generalization” where ‘the investigator is striving to generalize a particular set 
of results’ (p. 37). This is of particular relevance to a critical realist perspective. A key 
critical realist principle is that ‘empirical events are particular manifestations of the 
mechanisms that caused them’ (Zachariadis et al., 2013: 861). Sayer (2000: 14-15) 
explains that generalizations are valid only in closed systems or where one has the 
expectation that similar context and generative mechanisms may apply: in open systems 
the same causal power can produce different outcomes or different causal powers can 
cause the same outcome. Hence, predictions and the creation of causal laws are highly 
problematic (Ackroyd, 2000). 
For critical realists, ‘all social constructions of knowledge are fallible and as such 
knowledge of the social world is limited to providing epistemic gain’ (Kempster & Parry, 
2011: 122). Sayer (2000: 43) argues that truth is better understood as “practical adequacy”, 
‘that is in terms of the extent to which it generates expectations about the world and about 
results of our actions which are realized’. So a goal for a piece of critical realist research, 
such as this, is to yield epistemic gain and to develop theory that is ‘practically adequate to 
the context’ (Kempster & Parry, 2011: 112). Validity is about building a plausible 
explanation of reality. 
Lastly, let’s look at Yin’s criterion of reliability. Hammersley (1992: 67) defines reliability 
as the ‘degree of consistency with which instances are assigned to the same category by 
different observers or by the same observer on different occasions’. Kirk and Miller (1986: 
72) argue that qualitative researchers cannot ignore the issue of reliability and argue that 
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for ‘reliability to be calculated, it is incumbent on the scientific investigator to document 
his or her procedure’. Given these opinions, one can draw a relationship between the 
notion of “reliability” and that of “analytical validity” by improving the dependability and 
consistency of the research. Yin suggests use of a protocol whereas in this study I used the 
Venkatesh et al. validity criteria in Table 4.2 to focus the research and analysis. Yin also 
suggests creating a database, achieved in this study by using the Xcel software to structure 
and organise the data.  
Whilst there is epistemological disagreement as to what labels to use when reporting 
rigour, there is partial agreement when it comes to reporting research actions (Gibbert & 
Ruigrok, 2010: 711). Researchers are encouraged to establish a ‘clear chain of evidence’ 
(Yin, 2003: 105) to allow the reader to reconstruct how the researcher moves from the 
initial research questions to the final conclusions. Gibbert and Ruigrok (2010) examined 
the rigour of case studies by content analysing all case studies published in top 
management journals 1995-2000. Given that these journals are all based in North America 
and their paper is designed to speak to that audience, they use the positivist vocabulary 
discussed here. Gibbert and Ruigrok found commonality in the reporting of research 
action. These commonalities are summarised overleaf in Table 4-3.  
Gibbert and Ruigrok (2010) also observed that very few case studies explicitly label the 
rigour criteria in the positivist tradition. They also noted that the case studies that do 
address rigour consider the hierarchical relationship (T. D. Cook & Campbell, 1979) 
between the criteria giving priority to internal and construct validity. 
Table 4-3 also highlights those techniques reported by Gibbert and Ruigrok (2010) that 
will be used in this case study and are embedded both into the structure of the thesis: for 
example Chapter 1 makes the case for the rationale behind the case selection and gives 
details of the case setting; Appendix A contain examples of the database coding; the next 
Section 4.3 shows how the research design is derived from the literature and Sections 4.4 
and 4.5 detail the data collection and analysis methods to be used; so the reader can be 
persuaded of the rigour of the research presented here. 
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Table 4-3:  Common methods for ensuring rigour through reporting how case study 
research is actually performed. Adapted from Gibbert and Ruigrok (2010: 
717). Techniques used in this study have been highlighted. 
4.3 Research Design 
Yin (2003: 19) defines research design as ’the logic that links the data to be collected (and 
the conclusions to be drawn) to the initial questions of study’. He is also very clears that 
any design needs to maximize design quality and in Section 4.2 the criteria for rigour was 
discussed albeit some qualitative researchers highlight better “telling of the story” as the 
goal for qualitative analysis (Dyer Jr & Wilkins, 1991). In Chapter 3 the argument was 
made for a more rigorous qualitative approach if the study is to contribute meaningfully to 
the dominant philosophical discourse in the strategic management field.  
Part of the decision for a research design reflects the decision to undertake this research in 
the first place i.e. the access to appropriate potential participants and secondary data within 
a company that is likely to demonstrate dynamic capability. This indicates a case study 
design. However data collection methods and the approach have been tailored to the type 
of research question this study is posing. Although it is seeking to enhance existing theory, 
given the paucity of knowledge about how dynamic capabilities are deployed, it may mean 
this study contributes to extending existing theory on dynamic capabilities. So in addition 
to being a case study, it will be conducted within the framework of grounded theory 
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development. Both approaches are signalled as separate research approaches by Creswell 
(2013) and yet the terms are used almost synonymously by Eisenhardt (1989a) who sees 
grounded theory as a key building block for building theory from case study research. 
However a comprehensive research design will need to incorporate and combine elements 
of both research approaches. Using recognized approaches to research ‘enhances the rigor 
and sophistication of the research design’ (Creswell, 2013: 53) and given that in grounded 
theory ‘issues of validity thus become difficult – someone else examining the data may 
generate an alternate explanation’ (Kempster & Parry, 2011: 109) explicitly laying out the 
methods for data collection and data analysis should meet the design and analytic validity 
criteria discussed at length in the pervious section. 
4.3.1 Evaluating case study as a methodology for this research 
As discussed in the previous Chapter, within the critical realist ontology for this thesis, this 
study of a single case will be an intensive design emphasizing ‘the collection of detailed 
data’ within the case and furthermore, the ‘established methods for case study, 
ethnographic, grounded theory, and action research guide intensive designs’ where the 
‘distinctive feature of critical realist deployment of these methods is the emphasis on 
retroduction’ (both quotes from K. D. Miller & Tsang, 2011: 152).  
The design draws on the systematic, rigorous approaches to case studies espoused by 
Eisenhardt (1989a) and Yin (2003).  
‘A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple 
sources of evidence are used’ (Yin, 2003: 23). 
 
Eisenhardt (1989a) recommends the case study method for explorative, descriptive, and 
explanatory questions as is the object of this inquiry albeit her epistemological position is 
quite different from this study (Langley & Abdallah, 2011). 
Stake (1995) takes a different view of case studies, not as a methodology but as a choice of 
what is to be studied and notes that ‘it is not unusual for the choice of case to be no 
“choice” at all’ (p. 3). He advocates the case study researcher maintains “vigorous 
interpretation” which underlies the conclusion one draws from observations made. 
Furthermore, these conclusions are drawn ‘from understandings deep within us, 
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understandings whose derivation may be some hidden mix of personal experience, 
scholarship’ (p.12) and yet must be loosely determined so that the researcher is open to the 
multiple realities that exist. Stake refers to these conclusions as “assertions” and Yin as 
“patterns’ or “explanations”, Creswell (2013:99) on the other hand refers to them as 
‘general lessons learned from studying the case’. 
Ultimately though, these conclusions are assimilated as the researcher seeks explanation. 
Whilst the findings are particular to this context i.e. Admiral Plc, a more generalized 
explanation is possible (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Leonard-Barton, 1990) using a technique 
described as “analytic generalization” (Yin, 2003: 32) which Yin advocated for 
generalizing from case study to theory. He describes this as where a ’previously developed 
theory is used as a template with which to compare the empirical results of the case study’ 
(p. 33). Stake (1995: 7) notes that generalizing from case studies rarely results in entirely 
new theory but can modify and refine understanding. This is consistent with the idea that 
the goal of a critical realist study is to yield epistemic gain. 
This case study is categorized as a “single instrumental case study” (Stake, 1995) and as 
“exploratory” by Yin (2003). Even in a single case study, data collection is typically 
extensive (Creswell, 2013) and Yin (2003) recommends six types of information to collect: 
documents, archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant observation, and 
physical artifacts. In this particular case the researcher has been an active participant in 
founding the business, managing functions within the business and driving through 
strategic change so the interviews are based on that shared history with the interviewees 
and the interviews refer to both direct observations from the interviewer’s perspective and 
the recollections and perceptions of the interviewees. There are no physical artifacts of 
relevance in this case that don’t come under the category “documents”. 
However the value of theory (or insights) generated from single case studies has been 
debated: notably between Eisenhardt (1989a) and Dyer Jr and Wilkins (1991) articulating 
competing views on the tradeoff between “better constructs” and “better stories”. Dyer Jr 
and Wilkins (1991) criticized Eisenhardt’s (1989a) multiple case-study approach as 
sacrificing context and deep structure in favour of building constructs. Eisenhardt’s (1991) 
riposte was that the two views were a ‘false dichotomy’ (Eisenhardt, 1991: 625) and argued 
that rigour and comparative logic were fundamental to ‘creating precise and measurable 
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constructs ... because such constructs are the foundation of powerful theory’ (Eisenhardt, 
1991: 620). Suddaby (2010: 354) characterized the difference between them, not as 
opposing epistemological positions, but as representing ‘different assumptions regarding 
the role of constructs in the research process’. Both see constructs as necessary building-
blocks for theory but the Eisenhardt (1989a) view of constructs ‘as lenses through which 
data can be analyzed in the theory-building process’ (Suddaby, 2010: 354) contrasts with 
Dyer Jr and Wilkins (1991) view as of constructs emerging from the data. Furthermore 
Suddaby (2010) argues that the two views represent a broad and a narrow view of 
constructs with Hirsch and Levin (1999: 209) contending that such tension is necessary 
enabling ‘the field as a whole to balance its competing needs to be both scientific and 
relevant’.  
However singles case studies do contribute to knowledge within field of strategic 
management. For example Danneels (2011) study of Smith Corona opened up 
understanding of dynamic capability in a rich portrait of the firm struggling to respond to 
the obsolescence of its core product. The extended case method is not considered 
methodologically distinct from grounded theory although it can be argued that there are 
important epistemological differences (Wadham & Warren, 2014) but for the purposes of 
this study ‘the importance of the single case lies in what it tells us about society as a whole 
rather than a population of similar cases’ (Burawoy et al., 1991: 281). 
This study is longitudinal, albeit retrospective. Leonard-Barton (1990: 250) notes that a 
‘limitation of wholly retrospective research is the difficulty of determining cause and effect 
from reconstructed events. Moreover, although studies have shown that the participants in 
organizational processes do not forget key events in these processes as readily as one 
might suppose, the participant/informant in a wholly retrospective study may not have 
recognized an event as important when it occurred and thus may not recall it afterwards’. 
She goes on to recommend multiple case studies to increase external validity and 
conducting a longitudinal real-time study to increase internal validity. These are not 
options available for this study. 
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4.3.2 Evaluating grounded theory as a methodology for this research 
A grounded theory approach is useful here because it allows focus on the ‘contextual and 
processual elements as well as the action of key players associated with organizational 
change’ (Orlikowski, 1993: 310).  
Grounded theory is advocated as ‘developing theories from research grounded in data 
rather than deducing testable hypotheses from existing theories’ (Charmaz, 2006: 4). It 
was first articulated by Glaser and Strauss (1967) whose key idea was that theory 
development is generated or “grounded” in data collected from participants.  
A tension exists in the literature (Charmaz, 2000; Heath & Cowley, 2004) in the more 
recent formulations of grounded theory espoused by Glaser (Glaser, 1978, 1992, 1998) and 
by Strauss (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Strauss, 1987; Strauss & Corbin, 1994). Glaser (1992, 
1998) ‘imbued grounded theory with dispassionate empiricism, rigorous codified methods, 
emphasis on emergent discoveries, and its somewhat ambiguous specialized language that 
echoes quantitative methods’ (Charmaz, 2006: 7). He extended grounded theory to more 
formalization of the method: detailing concepts such as theoretical sampling, theoretical 
coding and use of theoretical memos whilst criticizing Strauss’s approach as too prescribed 
and yet Strauss (1994) and Corbin and Strauss (2008) explain that their focus is more on 
‘teaching persons how to think more self-consciously and systematically about data’ 
(Corbin & Strauss, 2008: 9). Strauss ‘brought notions of human agency, emergent 
processes, social and subjective meanings, problem-solving practices, and the open-ended 
study of action to grounded theory’ (Charmaz, 2006: 7) and moved the method towards 
verification.  
They also differed ultimately in the role of a literature review in research. Sticking to the 
original articulation of grounded theory, Glaser (1978) argued prior understanding should 
be based on very broad reading to sensitize the researcher to possibilities whereas Strauss 
(1987) believed that deeper understanding of the literature might stimulate theoretical 
sensitivity from the data and indeed advocated in his co-authored work with Corbin 
‘identifying a phenomenon to be studied and what is known about the subject’ (Heath & 
Cowley, 2004: 143).  
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Both versions of grounded theory stress the iterative comparison of data coding with 
emergent theory. Glaser talked of this constant refitting (Glaser, 1978) and the dangers of 
forcing data to meet the researchers preconceptions (Glaser, 1992). However Strauss 
(1990, 1994) indicated that ideas could be dropped if ‘their importance fails to materialise 
in the data’ (Heath & Cowley, 2004: 144) talking of deduction followed by verification 
followed by elaboration to ensure emergence. In fact, Corbin and Strauss (2008) do not 
advocate a rigid prescriptive following of their process arguing that, for example, the 
distinction made between the initial open coding and the subsequent axial coding is 
artificial to show how in grounded theory ‘though we break data apart, and identify 
concepts to stand for the data, we also have to put it back together again by relating those 
concepts’ (Corbin & Strauss, 2008: 198). 
 The orthodox version of grounded theory as per Glaser and Strauss is ‘recommended for 
application primarily where complex social interaction is insufficiently understood and 
little or no theory exists’ (Fendt & Sachs, 2008: 431). However other writers (Charmaz, 
2006; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Creswell, 2013; Easterby-Smith et al., 2002; Eisenhardt, 
1989a) allow for a literature review as in this study: Chapter 2 outlines what is currently 
understood about dynamic capabilities and sets it within the wider strategic management 
context. 
This study will use the Corbin and Strauss approach to grounded theory as a basic 
framework but introduce elements of Charmaz’s (2006) constructivist guidelines for 
following leads in the data. This approach fits within the critical realist positioning of the 
research because Corbin and Strauss have been described as ‘two leaders of the grounded 
theory approach to qualitative research attempted to modify the usual canons of good 
(positivistic) science to fit their own postpositivistic conception of rigorous research’ 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2011: 9). Corbin in the Preface to the latest edition of her co-authored 
book with Strauss (Corbin & Strauss, 2008: vii) talks of this label and explains her position 
on qualitative research has become more interpretative and their structured approach 
should be interpreted accordingly. This concept of flexibility with the method laid down by 
the classic Glaser and Strauss grounded theory is echoed by Charmaz (2006), who pursues 
a constructivist approach to grounded theory. However both critical realism and 
constructivist viewpoints recognise that the researcher is ‘part of the world we study and 
the data we collect’ (Charmaz, 2006: 10). 
CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
  Page  4-93 
Sensitivity is key to Glaser and Strauss’s vision of grounded theory. Corbin and Strauss 
(2008: 32) explain that it stands in contrast to objectivity and requires ‘having insight, 
being tuned into, being able to pick up on relevant issues, events, and happenings in data’.  
However in the previous chapter, Section 3.5 on page 3-76 the critical realist view of 
objectivity was discussed at length and we can see Corbin and Strauss’s definition is 
consistent with Sayer’s exposition on objectivity (Sayer, 2000: 58-62). There is a 
recognition in research that ‘there is a difference between an open mind and an empty 
head. To analyse data researchers draw upon accumulated knowledge. They don’t 
dispense with it. The issue is not whether to use existing knowledge but how’ (Dey, 1993: 
63). Also in Section 3.5 I argued that the shared cognition between researcher and 
participant could be an advantage but that the disadvantages of being too subjective must 
be dealt with by constant reflexivity. So as a researcher, I must be both sensitive but 
reflexive ensuring that concepts from the interview data can be supported by secondary 
data to limit bias whilst taking advantage of my shared cognition. 
It is interesting that many published articles on grounded theory offer very wide 
interpretations of the principles of the methodology as reviewed here.  Bluhm et al. (2011: 
1871) note that the ‘abuse of the term “grounded theory” in the literature has weakened its 
legitimization and its influence, even when done correctly’. However Suddaby (2006) 
argues that where reflexive data collection and analysis are employed as part of the 
grounded theory process then valuable insights ensue. Moreover, grounded theory is valid 
empirically because ‘the theory-building process is so intimately tied with evidence that it 
is very likely that the resultant theory will be consistent with empirical observation’ 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a: 547). A reflexive approach to research has two advantages: ‘(1) 
avoidance of naivety associated with a belief that "data" simply reveal reality and (2) 
creativity following from an appreciation of the potential richness of meaning in complex 
empirical material’ (Alvesson, 2003: 14). 
The important aspects to remember are that the method relies on reducing the data into 
meaningful factors – “codes” that through the analytic process recombine into emerging 
themes that are further tested against more data collection to the point where theory 
emerges from the data and this requires a continuous comparison of data and theory. 
Reflexivity is an important part of the process (Charmaz, 2006), stimulating ‘an interplay 
between producing interpretations and challenging them’ (Alvesson, 2003: 14)and as 
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Suddaby (2006: 635) reminds us, we ‘are only human and that what[we] observe is a 
function of both who [ we] are and what [we] hope to see’.  
4.3.3 Actual Methodology Employed: Combining a Case Study Approach 
with Grounded Theory 
Following Corbin’s admonition in the 2008 edition that their grounded theory process is 
more descriptive than prescriptive, this research also draws on ideas from Charmaz (2006); 
Eisenhardt (1989a); Miles and Huberman (1994); B. T. Pentland (1999); Saldana (2013); 
Van de Ven and Huber (1990); Yin (2003) for the actual research design and the data 
collection and analytical methods. Creswell (2013: 53) has already been quoted in this 
chapter as advocating the use of recognized approaches to research to enhance ‘the rigor 
and sophistication of the research design’ but this study will use a combination of those 
recognized methodologies described above. Gibbert and Ruigrok (2010: 710) have written 
that ‘rigor – often seen as one of the key weaknesses of case studies – often seems to lie in 
the eye of the beholder and may even involve persuading readers and reviewers of the 
credibility of methodological procedures’ and ‘without rigor, relevance in management 
research cannot be claimed’ (Scandura & Williams, 2000: 1263). 
4.3.4 Methodological Frameworks from the Literature 
There are a number of frameworks from the methodological literature that have a bearing 
on this research and will need to be synthesized into the actual research design. 
4.3.4.1 Eisenhardt (1989) 
In her influential paper Building theories from case study research Eisenhardt details the 
process for conducting case research. She presents a series of steps (see Table 1 in 
Eisenhardt (1989a: 533)) and expands and argues for each step through her paper. Her 
steps are reproduced here in Table 4-4. She states herself that her work ‘synthesizes 
previous work on qualitative methods (e.g., Miles & Huberman, 1984), the design of case 
study research (e.g., Yin, 1981,1984), and ground theory building (e.g., Glaser & Strauss, 
1976)’ (Eisenhardt, 1989a: 532). Her roadmap for executing this type of research has over 
2,500 citations to the end of 2008 (Ravenswood, 2011) and remains one of the most 
influential works on methodology in the field and indeed is categorised as one of the 
templates for qualitative research by Langley & Abdallah (2011). 
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Not all the activities she proposes are relevant to this single case study and those that are, 
are highlighted in Table 4-4. Chapters 1 and 2 in this thesis cover the first two steps. This 
Chapter is about the third step: crafting the instruments and protocols that will be used to 
conduct and analyse the research. The remaining steps she advocates in her process for 
building theory need to consider the other methodological lenses for this thesis as well as 
the critical realist ontological and epistemological positioning.  
Although Eisenhardt uses grounded theory in her roadmap, the actual detail of how to do 
grounded theory yields important elements of understanding to this research design. 
 
Table 4-4: The process of building theory from case study research. Adapted from Table 
1 in Eisenhardt (1989: 533). The activities relevant to this research are 
highlighted. 
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4.3.4.2 Corbin and Strauss (2008) 
As argued earlier, the Corbin and Strauss take on grounded theory will inform the 
methodology employed in this research. Silverman (2006: 402) succinctly summarises the 
methods in three stages: (1) develop categories from initial data; (2) saturate these 
categories with more data; and (3) develop these categories into more general analytic 
frameworks. It is important to remember that these three steps are recursive. The initial 
open coding breaks the data into manageable pieces and named either by the researcher or 
using an “in-vivo code”. Some of these codes will be more abstract than others, some will 
be subsumed into later coding, some will not be relevant. Each piece of data collected is 
examined to verify and build understanding of the initial codes and the list of codes will 
grow until the coding is saturated from the data. Data collection should be theoretically 
sampled so that it is chosen as it appears to be relevant to the evolving storyline.  
At this point any relationships between the codes should be examined (in previous versions 
of their 2008 book and in the original Glaser and Strauss (1967) text this step was called 
“axial coding”) and relevant themes that emerge will start to suggest theoretical 
propositions. These can be tested against the extant literature for credibility and retested 
against additional data until theory grounded in the data emerges. Researchers experienced 
in this type of grounded case research ‘all emphasize the iterative and at times untidy 
character of the research process’ (Pettigrew, 1990b: 279). 
4.3.4.3 Van de Ven and Poole (1990), Abbott (1990) and Pentland (1999) 
The a priori construct under consideration in this study is dynamic capability.  
Dynamic capability is theorised to facilitate strategic change within a firm (Eisenhardt & 
Martin, 2000). There is a large body of literature devoted to strategic change within firms 
and an array of models to describe change processes (e.g. Beech & MacIntosh, 2012a; 
Burnes, 2004; Lewin, 1947). See By (2005) for a recent review of the field. There is a 
substantial literature extolling the benefits of qualitative longitudinal research (Perks & 
Roberts, 2013) but there is a dearth of literature offering ‘guidance on its design and 
conduct and how to demonstrate longitudinality’ (Perks & Roberts, 2013: 1101). 
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This issue with longitudinal process research seems to have first come to the fore with an 
issue dedicated to the subject in the first volume of Organization Science. This case study 
will include retrospective accounts of strategic change within Admiral Plc. Writing in that 
issue, Van de Ven and Huber (1990: 213) talk of the ‘bias in retrospective stories’ and the 
advantages and disadvantages were expounded upon by Glick, Huber, Miller, Doty, and 
Sutcliffe (1990) who recommend to minimize any problems by focusing on important 
changes that tend to be recalled more reliably and interview the decision makers who were 
more likely to be involved (p. 302). Pettigrew (1990b: 269) tells us to look for ‘continuity 
and change, patterns and idiosyncrasies, the actions of individuals and groups, the role of 
contexts and structures, and the process of structuring’ and leans heavily on methods 
described by Miles and Huberman (1984) and Strauss (1987) but it is in Van de Ven and 
Poole’s paper (1990: 319) that we find a seven step method for analysing episodes of 
strategic change. Their steps are: (1) defining the incidents of interest from the data and at 
this stage those incidents looking at the decision making process, the implementation, and 
the post-change environment; (2) evaluating the reliability and validity of those incidents 
by using multiple viewpoints and secondary data available; (3) code incidents; (4) evaluate 
the reliability and validity of coded events; their step (5) where the qualitative codes are 
transformed into quantitative data is not applicable to this case; (6) analyse temporal 
relationships in the event sequence data and (7) analyse temporal patterns in the event 
sequence data. 
Sequence theory forms the backbone of this process and Abbott’s (1990) paper in the 
subsequent issue of that journal dealt with this. Whilst Abbott’s primer is about 
quantifying sequences from narrative in an approach he calls “narrative positivism” 
(Abbott, 1992), he does raise three categories of questions (p. 377) about sequence data 
which are of relevance to this study where we are not just looking for evidence of how 
dynamic capability is operationalized and whether that has changed over time but also at 
the antecedents of this dynamic capability within the organization. The categories are: (1) 
questions around the pattern of sequences; (2) the antecedents (independent variables) of 
these patterns and (3) the consequences (dependent variables) of these patterns. 
B. T. Pentland (1999) published a paper on building theory from narrative that is helpful in 
considering the retroduction process required in critical realism. Critical realism portrays 
reality as stratified (Bhaskar, 1978/2008; K. D. Miller & Tsang, 2011; Sayer, 2000) – see 
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Figure 4-1. Any emergent properties must be treated as dependent upon other levels (K. D. 
Miller & Tsang, 2011:145).  
 
Figure 4-1: The stratified ontology of critical realism (adapted from Bhaskar 
(1978/2008) 
The aim of retroduction is to ensure that the abstract research in terms of analysing 
phenomena in terms of their constitutive structures and causal powers is informed by the 
empirical research of the phenomena and events in their contexts (Zachariadis et al., 2013). 
The data we collect is limited to the phenomena and events with the generative 
mechanisms often unobservable and/or existing in a tacit dimension (Sayer, 2000). B. T. 
Pentland (1999: 712) argues that ‘narrative does much more than just mirror the social 
world. It is a kind of cognitive and cultural ether that permeates and energizes’ and goes 
further to note that ‘process explanations that draw on narrative data are particularly 
close to the phenomena they purport to explain’.  He contends (p. 713) that event sequence 
is the core of narrative structures but takes Abbott’s (1990, 1992) analysis further, arguing 
that the Abbott’s “narrative positivism” abstracts away from the actors and contexts. 
Furthermore, these aspects are part of the deep structures and without understanding their 
identities and relationships, we lose overall understanding of the process. But narrative can 
give clues to the values of the group and ‘allows us to examine the ways in which culture 
guides action, among other things’ (B. T. Pentland, 1999: 715). So, it is not enough to 
describe patterns of events. Explanation requires insight – retroduction to find the 
generating mechanism that drives the process. In critical realism this would involve 
explanatory regress, continuing to look deeper to the point where the critical realist 
“generating mechanism” is discovered. Pentland notes (p. 720) that this level is outside the 
scope of standard narrative theory and although his terminology of “generating 
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mechanisms” and “causation” is different from that in critical realism, it is the process of 
using the narrative data to look under the surface that is if interest here. He proposes 
modifying Abbot’s questions (Abbott, 1990) to create explanations: ‘why are there 
patterns? Why do we observe these antecedents and consequences?’ (B. T. Pentland, 1999: 
717). 
4.3.4.4 Zachariadis, Scott & Barrett (2013) 
This paper (Zachariadis et al., 2013) gives us a retroductive methodology whose main 
objective is ‘to link the structures and causal powers of the objects under study to the 
events we want to explain through the notion of causal mechanisms’ (p. 866). Based on 
Mingers (2001: 246) questions for critical realist research, Zachariadis et. al. (p. 866) have 
identified four main phases for their retroductive methodology as follows: (1) Description 
of the research context, the data collected and the shared cognition that motivates deeper 
and deeper examination of the generating mechanisms (what is happening here? - Mingers, 
2001); (2) retroductive analysis of the data: analysing, abstracting and hypothesizing 
possible mechanisms and looking for evidence supporting those insights, testing directly if 
possible (recommended by Sayer, 2000) instead of testing their observable implications 
(why is it happening? - Mingers, 2001); (3) assessment and elimination of alternative 
explanations generated to explain how different mechanisms interact within their context 
to produce the events and phenomena (how could the explanations be different? - Mingers, 
2001); (4) action analogous to the last table entry in Table 4-3 “Review of transcript and 
draft by key informants” the last stage in ensuring rigour in a case study (Gibbert & 
Ruigrok, 2010). This essentially checks that the causal explanations uncovered are 
satisfactory to my colleagues (the "so what" question -Mingers, 2001). 
4.3.4.5 Miller and Tsang (2013) 
Lastly, K. D. Miller and Tsang (2011) give us guidelines for producing testable 
management theory. Their four-step critical realist approach to theory testing will form 
part of the data analysis of this study: (1) identify the causal mechanisms as a 
‘contextualized specification of the explanatory properties and processes that underlie 
hypothesized causal relations’ (p. 147); (2) test for the presence of the mechanism, ideally 
directly but the ‘more observable effects that logically are attributable to the mechanism, 
the more compelling is the case for its presence’ (p. 148); (3) test for causal effects 
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providing that ‘available evidence affirms the presence of the theorized mechanisms’ 
(p.149); (4) test the entire theoretical system by examining the implications of its 
mechanisms jointly. Their guidelines are expressed in positivist language and apply to 
mixed designs both extensive and intensive and this will be an intensive research design of 
a single case and as such not really testing theory but adding to existing theory of how 
dynamic capability is operationalized. Steps 1-3 are feasible within this study but testing 
the entire theoretical system lies beyond the scope of this thesis. 
4.3.5 Research Design summarized 
‘Case research which would wish to lay claim to a realist philosophy 
should be carried out in a different way: to be inquisitive, to look for the 
roots of things, to disentangle complexities and to conceptualise and re-
conceptualise, test and retest, to be both rigorous and creative and above 
all to seek for the underlying reality through the thick veil which hides it.’ 
(Easton, 2000: 212) 
So having reviewed the tools available from the literature we have developed an 
intellectual context to draw upon and implicitly guide the data collection and analysis.  
The literature provides definitions for the dynamic capability construct being explored in 
this study. The data collection is designed to show that in accounts of the firm’s continued 
success, from the perspective of its senior management team, themes will emerge that meet 
the criteria for dynamic capability, as provided by the literature (Eisenhardt & Martin, 
2000; Helfat et al., 2007; Teece, 2007; Teece et al., 1997; Winter, 2003). Having 
confirmed that this firm uses dynamic capability, these accounts will be analysed to see 
how dynamic capability is deployed and operationalized. Additionally, during this stage, 
the process of how dynamic capability is wielded and its generative mechanisms will be 
explored. 
As the methodology relies heavily on researcher inference the goal is to use triangulation 
of inference from primary data to similarly expressed themes in secondary data and actual 
report or survey data where applicable.  
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Inferred mechanisms where possible will be tested for presence and then their explanatory 
power confirmed or otherwise with the participants. Finally any contribution to theory will 
be explicitly affirmed. 
4.4 Data Collection Methods 
To increase validity and reliability, a range of different data sources will be used 
(Creswell, 2013; Van de Ven & Poole, 1990; Yin, 2003).  
The initial goal of the research is to determine if dynamic capability exists in this business 
using primary data collected around conversations about the company’s success. 
The primary data will be gathered via two email focus groups: one with the UK based 
managers and the other consisting of their non-UK based colleagues; and via open-ended 
interviews with a number of the senior management team: past and present. In the email 
forum I will be acting as a facilitator and the groups have been split between the UK and 
non-UK, because for the most part (and looking at Table 4-5) the UK group have been 
with the business since the early days and provide insight from the early days and the non-
UK group were all recruited post-IPO and provide insight as newcomers to the business as 
a much bigger operation. In addition the non-UK group are all MBA graduates and would 
be expected to bring a theoretical versus actual discussion around competitive advantage, 
as they are more familiar with that terminology thanks to their education.  
Email focus groups or “time-extended” focus groups are becoming more common, 
particularly in marketing research (Bern, 2009) although it has been noted that the medium 
is problematical in that there is a loss of the role of the moderator and the ability to feel the 
atmosphere and understand the group dynamics (Greenbaum, 2003). However this is a 
group of people who know each other very well and as a colleague I understand the group 
dynamic quite well. As a consequence and keeping in mind Bern’s observation that 
dominant personalities can overpower a group (p. 166), I excluded the CEO from the email 
groups to try and get representative views of the group without any “power influence”.  
The executive team both past and present were scheduled for interviews and the remaining 
interviews were chosen in that they offered a particular perspective that I considered might 
be useful given the a priori work in identifying dynamic capability as the area of interest. 
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This is an example of purposive sampling as described by Miles and Huberman (1994). 
Purposive sampling helps to ‘create a frame to help you uncover, confirm, or qualify the 
basic processes or constructs that undergird your study’ (p. 27). In choosing a mix of 
tenure I hope to get a longitudinal view of the evolution of dynamic capability within the 
business. 
For the email focus groups I have modified a focus-group interviewing technique from 
both Easterby-Smith et al. (2002) and Bern (2009). It will take the form of a ‘steered 
conversation’ (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002: 105) and my role as moderator or facilitator is 
to draw out information from the participants once the initial question has been posed. In 
face-to-face groups, discussion is guided by what Easterby-Smith et. al. call a “topic 
guide”. In this situation it is the dialogue raised by the initial question that will be 
important. My role is to prevent any domination of the group and to continue to explore the 
subject until the conversation reaches a natural conclusion. In typical focus groups the 
participants generally do not know each other and in this situation they are colleagues but I 
am hoping that I get a larger range of ideas than would be possible from a few in-depth 
interviews and that group dynamism will stimulate conversation and ideas (Bern, 2009: 
163). 
For the interviews, I will be using an open-ended interview technique as described by 
Silverman (2006: 109-113). As the interviewer, I allow ‘the interviewee the freedom to talk 
and ascribe meanings’ (Noaks & Wincup, 2004: 80). Silverman ascribes flexibility, 
rapport with the interviewee and active listening as key skills for this type of interview. 
Bern (2009: 105) describes these type of interviews as “unstandardized” and in his 
continuum of formality these type of interviews lie at the unstructured end of the scale: 
there is no set order or wording to questions, the questions can vary between interviews; 
the interview can be more conversation-like and this best suited the research context where 
I am a longstanding colleague of my participants. Initially in the submission to the Ethics 
Committee at Glasgow University I had planned on semi-structured interviews but after 
the first two interviews it became clear that my colleagues whilst willing to be 
“interviewed” wanted, indeed expected, a more conversational, informal style. Kvale and 
Brinkmann (2009) point out that in open-ended interviews interpretation occurs during the 
interview when the researcher is summarizing or reflecting during the interview.  All 
interviews will be recorded and transcribed and reportage memos will be written after each 
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interview recording initial interpretations and thoughts as recommended as part of this 
grounded theory method (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Creswell, 2013; Miles & Huberman, 
1994; Saldana, 2013). 
Below is a table representing the details of the interviewees/participants in this first phase 
of the research. For the purposes of clarity it is important to note that I am both a founding 
member of the firm and am currently employed as a non-executive director of the 
aggregator businesses. 
 
Table 4-5:   A list of the interviewees/participants in this research along with basic 
contextual data.  
Secondary data will be used to support (or dismiss) emergent themes from the interview 
data offering triangulation value. Data available is listed in the next table. 
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Table 4-6: Details sources of secondary data available classified by author and whether 
it is intended for internal or external audiences. 
4.5 Data Analysis Methods  
Coding is the primary process for developing themes from the raw data. Miles and 
Huberman (1994: 56) define codes as ‘tags of labels for assigning meaning to the 
descriptive or inferential information compiled during a study’ because ‘its not the words 
themselves but their meaning that matters’. Saldana (2013: 4) notes that “coding is not a 
precise science: it is primarily an interpretative act”.  
The initial schema of codes will include both descriptive codes, directly taken from the text 
(called in vivo codes by others - notably Saldana (2013)) and interpretative codes as 
defined by a Miles and Huberman typology (p.57). The creation of these codes is through 
an inductive coding technique (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Strauss, 1987) where the data is 
reviewed line by line generating the codes inspired by initial thoughts. Some lines 
generated multiple, different ideas. These codes are reviewed again, often in context of the 
other data that had been collected later in the research and becomes more abstract as 
‘themes’ emerge. The interpretative focus will be emergent rather than pre-figured 
(Creswell, 2013). 
At this stage, tables can be collated from the analysed text showing the development of 
these themes to help preserve the specificity in their development for helping to focus 
subsequent analysis. These can be found in Appendix A although a worked example is 
included in Chapter 5.5.1. Corbin and Strauss (2008: 52) recommend keeping the initial 
schema (which they call lower-level concepts) in any explanation of the resultant themes 
(the higher-level concepts) so that ‘we are never too far removed from the data’, warning 
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that ‘the broader and more explanatory the concepts become …. begin to lose some of 
their specificity’.  
In order to answer the research question looking at the source and evolution of dynamic 
capability, the retroductive process will require seeking answers to Pentland’s (1999) 
questions: : ‘why are there patterns? Why do we observe these antecedents and 
consequences?’. 
Thematic analysis and the classic content analysis of grounded theory are 
methodologically similar frameworks (Van de Ven & Huber, 1990). They both attempt to 
represent a view of reality via systematically working through text to identify topics that 
are progressively integrated into higher order themes, via processes contextualization, 
where ‘meaningful patterns, stances and concerns were considered more important than 
more elemental units of information’ (Yakhlef & Essén, 2013: 889). Descriptions of 
themes include the words or phrases such as “tacitly understood”, “implied”, “captures the 
essence” and “a pattern” as featured in a review of the literature by DeSantis and Ugarizza 
(2000). Moreover they note (p. 355) the “uniform agreement in the literature [is] that 
themes emerge from the data”. 
There are differences between the two analytical techniques of thematic and content 
analysis whereby thematic analysis pays greater attention to the qualitative aspects of the 
material analysed (Strauss, 1987). In contrast, content analysis employs predefined 
mutually exclusive categories to count the frequency of a theme and is more appropriately 
used to statistically test any hypotheses. Most content analysis results in a numerical 
description of features of a given text, or series of images (Miles & Huberman, 1994: 183-
184). This study will employ a thematic analysis technique. 
However the processes by which themes, concepts and categories are managed varies and 
is not well described in the strategic management literature, even amongst grounded theory 
studies – it seems to be implicitly understood. It is far more commonly discussed in 
nursing (e.g. P. Benner, 1985) and in psychology (e.g. Giorgi, 1997) as part of 
phenomenological studies. We see examples in the strategic management field as part of 
the SaP branch of research (e.g. Chia & Holt, 2006; Küpers, Mantere, & Statler, 2013; 
Yanow & Tsoukas, 2009) and recently Yakhlef and Essén (2013) utilized Benner’s (1985) 
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approach to organizational studies although it is the only paper in our field to do so (M. J. 
Gill, 2014). P. Benner (1985) in the nursing context, advocates a thematic analysis of texts 
whereby common themes are identified with supporting evidence. An overview of her 
method is provided by Crist and Tanner (2003) who describe (p. 204) developing 
“paradigm cases” describing a vivid pattern of meaning that helps the researcher recognize 
similar patterns and “exemplars” where ‘salient excerpts that characterize specific 
common themes or meanings across informants’ (p. 204). These two concepts are valuable 
in deciding how to draw out themes from a text for a novice researcher in these techniques. 
Themes are present at what Boyatzis (1998: vii) describes as the manifest level (directly 
observable in the data). At the manifest level, a theme serves to categorize data into “an 
implicit topic that organises a group of repeating ideas” (Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003: 
38) 
This analytic process is defined by Braun and Clarke (2006:79) as: 
“identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data. It minimally 
organises and describes your data set in (rich) detail.  However, frequently it goes 
further than this, and interprets various aspects of the research topic.”  
Additionally, prior to writing up the analysis, they recommend (along with Auerbach & 
Silverstein, 2003; Leininger, 1985; Rubin & Rubin, 2012 amongst others) a number of 
steps in the process of thematic analysis, notably: 
1. Becoming familiar with the data. In this case through transcription of the 
interviews, listening to the interviews, reading and rereading the transcripts each 
time themes were reviewed. 
2. Generating an initial coding schema which was achieved by coding first the email 
data-set, applying this and extending it through the richer interview data-set. 
3. Searching for themes by beginning to categorise the codes. 
4. Reviewing the ‘proto-themes’ thus identified by reviewing the data-sets and coding 
and categorisation in place and also looking at patterns and possible relationships 
between the themes evidenced from the data-set. 
5. Defining and naming the themes using wherever possible actual words from the 
participants. 
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In practice, these are an iterative set of steps which include memo-writing (as 
recommended by Saldana (2013)) that documents meaning and a rationale for the 
groupings of emergent themes. The end result should be a list of themes that gives 
expression to the commonality across the participants and assertions must be supported by 
the data, fundamental to developing grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Packer 
(2011) cautions that themes don’t emerge fully-fledged from the data but rather are the 
product of interpretation (p. 70) so I also will keep a log, as recommended by Auerbach 
and Silverstein (2003) to record any concerns with the main research goals or issues that 
arise and this includes possible “insider” interpretations of the data that occurs to me.  
These notes can be used in the last step of the thematic analysis: to ”create a theoretical 
narrative” (Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003: 42).  
My goals were to develop the themes found into an overarching account about their 
relationship to the dynamic capability construct in the literature subsequently analysing 
those accounts of success in order to answer the research questions, ultimately with a view 
to develop a contribution to the dynamic capability theory. 
4.6 In Summary 
So in summary, we have an inductive (or “retroductive” to use the language of critical 
realism) longitudinal, exploratory single case study using grounded theory principles for 
coding and generating analytic theory that may either enhance existing theory or modify 
theory on dynamic capability based on empirical data. Although not purely grounded 
theory work where the method relies on the continuous comparison between data and 
theory predicated on initial data collection (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), the a priori 
identification of the constructs associated with a study of dynamic capabilities allows a 
firmer empirical grounding for any emerging theory (Eisenhardt, 1989a)
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CHAPTER 5:  EVIDENCE OF DYNAMIC CAPABILITY WITHIN ADMIRAL 
PLC 
5.1 Introduction  
The aim of this study in essence is to explore how dynamic capabilities (if they exist) are 
operationalized within this firm and on the basis of that analysis critique the dynamic 
capability framework. From the literature review in Chapter 2, the main definitions used to 
define dynamic capability were discussed in Chapter 2.4.2 and are summarised here: 
 
Table 5-1:  Primary definitions of dynamic capability taken from the literature and used 
in this study 
As Barreto (2010: 259), in his review of dynamic capabilities research, notes: these 
definitions ‘vary significantly in terms of the nature, specific role, relevant context, 
creation and evolution mechanisms, types of outcomes, heterogeneity assumptions, and 
purposes of dynamic capabilities.’  However given one of the aims of this study is to 
contribute to an understanding of the construct, an understanding of all the primary source 
alternative conceptualizations helps to examine the construct in this case from first 
principles. 
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5.2 Overview of the Collection and Analysis 
Chapters 3 and 4 laid out the reasoning behind the research philosophy and the research 
design for this study. The case protocol, found in Appendix B, was used to focus the data 
collection and subsequent analysis. This chapter represents analysis of that data collection 
seeking to establish if Admiral Plc. demonstrates dynamic capability as defined in the 
literature. In Chapters 6 the extant literature is examined in light of the analysis here and 
then in Chapter 7 I discuss the nature of dynamic capability in this firm and attempt to 
confirm or repudiate some of the theoretical discussion around dynamic capability as 
outlined in the research question. 
As explained in the previous chapter, the data collection exercise consisted of exploratory 
discussions around key elements of the firm that underlie the company’s continued success  
from the participants perspective.  
The primary data was gathered via two email focus groups: one with the UK based 
managers and the other consisting of their non-UK based colleagues, and via open-ended 
interviews with a number of the senior management team: past and present. Justification 
for this sampling and a list of participants and secondary data sources can be found in 
Chapter 4.4 on page 4-101.  
The data was coded as described in Chapter 4.5 on page 4-104with each line of data 
collected generating in-vivo (Saldana, 2013) and interpretative codes (Miles & Huberman, 
1994) in the open-coding process of grounded theory (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). These 
codes were then incorporated into emerging proto-themes as connections between codes 
were made (called axial coding by Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Subsequent coding and 
thematic development through the interviews culminated in looking at the relationships 
between the proto-themes that had emerged from the data and a final round of selective 
coding on the basis of those relationships (again, a step in grounded theory articulated by 
Glaser & Strauss, 1967) to create a final list of relevant themes from the data.  
The next figure shows an example of how codes were generated from the transcript. Each 
code in the example is a different colour representing the ultimate themes to which they 
were coded. See the figure text for details. 
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Figure 5-1: An example of how the transcript was coded. Each code ultimately was 
merged into a theme: the blue coding became ‘attention to detail’, red 
became ‘numbers matter’, green became ‘culture enables’, purple formed 
part of ‘people matter’ and orange was absorbed into ‘management style’. 
This thematic analysis of the transcripts generated a number of common themes about 
what the participants believe are the sources of the firm’s competitive advantage and how 
that may have changed over time. When the themes are mapped, in the last sub-section of 
this chapter, to the definitions of dynamic capability summarised in Table 5-1, elements of 
the dynamic capability construct are revealed to be present in the business and are 
subsequently grounded in the extant literature in Chapter 6. 
Although the process was iterative, gradually three interpretations of the data emerged as 
part of the axial and selective coding stages of the grounded theory method. These are 
represented by three drawings presented here to set the scene for the data analysis section. 
In Figure 5-2 the underlying frequency of coding is represented. The size of each theme is 
represented by how many underlying codes were grouped up into the theme. For example 
the smaller proto-themes have 5-20 initial codes. Although frequency of underlying codes 
is not important in thematic analysis (Joffe & Yardley, 2004), I felt it would be useful from 
data to see the relative importance the participants (for the most part unprompted) placed 
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on the emerging themes. The mid-size proto-themes have between 30-60 initial codes and 
the largest proto-themes over 100 underlying codes.  
 
Figure 5-2:  Detailing the emergent proto-themes from the data showing the relative 
importance of proto-themes to participants as measured by number of 
underlying initial codes incorporated into the proto-theme. 
The next figure shows how these themes relate to each other using evidence from the data 
collected. It is a very complicated diagram but its purpose here is to show how the final 
themes were arrived at. For example some of the themes were incorporated into others 
when the relationships were examined and these relationships are shown in orange on the 
diagram. Some of the emergent proto-themes, were revealed as traits or behaviours 
specifically looked for in recruitment and/or indoctrination. These are shown in green and 
helped develop theory expounded later in Chapter 7. The red connections can be read as a 
representation of a relationship between themes and can be read as a simple sentence using 
the text in red associated with any given connector.  For example: ‘Attention to detail 
underlies intuition driving Strategic Decision Making. The black italic text is evidence 
from the data of that relationship. And lastly there were a few foundational relationships 
that were very strong in the data and these are shown in blue. 
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Figure 5-3: Mapping some of the relationships between proto-themes in the axial and 
selective coding stages of the analysis. 
So using this mapping the proto-themes merged to produce the final themes shown in 
Figure 5-4. The development of these themes from the data-sets collected is outlined in 
Section 5.5 starting on page 5-123.  
In addition to these drawings, a tabular representation of the relationship between all the 
themes that met the dynamic capability criteria was constructed for the retroductive phase 
and is reproduced in Table 7.3 on page 7-281 
Although the work done to produce the drawings in Figures 5-2, 5-3 and 5-4 was during 
the later analytical stages, they are reproduced here to guide the reader through the 15 
themes that emerged from the data.  The rest of this chapter will firstly set the context for 
the data collection. Section 5.4 will look specifically at the email data-set which has a large 
proportion of the senior managers in the firm contributing and formed the basis for the 
emergent proto-themes and codes used in the interview data set. Section 5.5 details the 
development of the themes represented in Figure 5-3 from both email and interview data-
sets.  
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Figure 5-4: Detailing the final themes to emerge from analysis of the data collected at 
Admiral Plc. 
All the data tables constructed can be found in Appendix A but for the purposes of 
illustration, a fully worked example of how a theme developed is presented in Section 
5.5.1 which includes the full data table. The remaining sub-sections don’t include these 
tables but they all follow a similar structure: looking at the development of the theme from 
the primary data, triangulation from secondary data sources and a summary. Once all the 
themes have been developed, Section 5.6 looks at differences that have emerged over time 
in the firm from the point of view of the participants, analysis of which in Chapter 7 will 
contribute to the theoretical discussion of evolution of dynamic capability in firms. Lastly, 
in Section 5.7, the themes found are compared against the definitions of dynamic 
capability from the literature setting up a discussion around the research question in the 
Chapter 7 after an exercise in grounding the findings in the existing literature in Chapter 6. 
5.3 Setting the Context 
5.3.1 Context for the Non-UK Managers Email Data-Set 
In early June 2010, I recruited volunteers from the non-UK management team who run or 
play a key role in our international businesses.  All report directly to the CEO or to a Head 
of Country and all form part of the wider top management team for the Group.  They meet 
regularly both with the CEO and each other and once a year join the UK management 
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team, referred to as the ‘Coffee Morning Group’23 (UK-CMG) for a week of meetings and 
events discussing strategy and sharing ideas and ‘having fun’24. The format varies from 
year to year and, internally, these are referred to as MAD (Management Away Days even 
though they are a week long) and this appellation is used in the rest of this thesis as the 
MAD have provided contributions to the secondary data used to triangulate findings from 
the primary data. 
Of the 10 invitees, 7 volunteered to participate in this phase of the research and all 
contributed to the discussion.  
For the details of the membership of this group refer to those participants who have an ‘N’ 
in the ‘member of UK-CMG?’ column in Table 4.5 on page 4-103. Unlike the UK-CMG, 
on the criteria shown in that table, this is a very homogenous group.  They were all 
employed post-IPO as New Business Development Managers, mostly directly on 
completion of an MBA and they were hired to support Admiral’s expansion of its 
insurance and aggregator businesses into other markets from 2005 to 2010. One has since 
left the company (FG) as the Italian aggregator business La Chiarezza he led was sold in 
2012. It is their homogeneity and the fact they all work outside the UK that led me to 
separate them from their UK colleagues, as I was interested in seeing how their ideas 
compared to their UK counterparts. 
The format of the discussion group was in the form of a response to an email chain 
amongst the group. I set off the discussion with an initial email on the 2 June 2010. All 
participants had responded by 4 June and I closed the conversation on 08 June after 
summing up the discussion and garnering no further response on the 4th. 
The coding was left until I had completed gathering the data from the UK-CMG. 
5.3.2 Context for the UK Managers Email Data-Set 
Also, in early June 2010, I recruited volunteers from the UK management team who form 
the UK-CMG. All report directly to the CEO, the COO or the CFO and are responsible for 
                                                 
23 The name came about because the original management team met for coffee every morning during the 
launch phase in 1992 and became know in the company as the Coffee Morning Group. 
24  According to Jackie Miles, a former Head of People Services, now responsible for organising this week 
in September/October each year. 
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running the UK business on a day-to-day basis. The UK-CMG meets monthly under the 
auspices of the COO to discuss strategy, make plans and report on implementation projects 
and discuss business performance. Of the 18 members of this group, 13 volunteered to 
participate in this phase of the research and with the exception of the COO, all contributed 
to the discussion. The COO, emailed me privately a week into the discussion saying that he 
would pick up the conversation in our scheduled interview. 
For the details of the membership of this group refer to the ‘member of UK-CMG?’ 
column in Table 4.5 on page 4-103. This table reveals that the group is heterogeneous with 
respect to length of tenure, educational attainment and promoted to current position from 
within the company. However only three of the group were employed post-IPO (2004) and 
another two have since left the company (CH and NWK). It is also worth noting that a 
number of the participants in this forum changed role in a reorganization of the UK 
business in March 2013 and Table 4.5 reflects their positions as at June 2010. 
The format of the discussion group was in the form of a response to an email chain 
amongst the group. I set off the discussion with an initial email on the 7 June 2010. After 
six responses in the ensuing 3 days, I prompted a reminder on the 10 June and on the 14 
June prompted a discussion on the factors the group thought allowed the ideas they 
expressed to be spread within the organization. On 22 June, I summed up the discussion 
thus far and prompted another question on how Admiral configured for success some of 
the elements they had been discussing which elicited less response and I closed the 
conversation on 30 June. 
5.3.3 Context for the Interview Data-Set 
There were 9 unstructured interviews conducted including all of the executive directors 
past and present.   
In addition, there were three semi-structured interviews exploring specific issues around 
ideas that were emerging from the other interviews and the email forums. These are good 
examples of what Corbin and Strauss (2008: 65) call “theoretical sampling”: ‘sampling on 
the basis of concepts derived from the data’. These three interviews did yield unprompted 
contributions to thematic development but in the first of these interviews the transcript 
centred on questions relating to tensions between competing priorities a theme emerging 
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from both the email forum data-set and the early interviews (interview with AP, date: 
11/11/10). I also wanted to explore recruitment and training practices within the business 
at middle-management level which answered questions about how the culture formed, 
evolved and was propagated throughout the company (interview with GR, date 24/06/10) 
as cultural themes were emerging from early interviews. The third interview in this 
category was the opportunity to interview a member of the Merril Lynch team who had 
formed a relationship with the company during its IPO in 2004 and could give an external 
perspective on the company that could be later contrasted (allowing triangulation) with the 
views of city analysts writing about the firm after each half-yearly reporting by the 
Directors of the company to the Stock Exchange. 
5.3.4 Context for the secondary data-set 
The purpose of using secondary data sources was to allow triangulation of the emergent 
themes from the primary data. All secondary data was theoretically sampled, ‘a process of 
letting the research guide the data collection … it is through theoretical sampling that 
concepts are elaborated’ (Corbin & Strauss, 2008: 157) whilst providing a means by 
which concepts arising could be triangulated. This process too can also identify a “negative 
case” (Corbin & Strauss, 2008: 84) from which alternatives can emerge: a key part of 
critical realism (Sayer, 2000). However the secondary data found only supported the 
emergent themes. 
5.3.5 Reflection on this Data Collection in Practice 
Initially, with a view to the research question and given my inexperience with conducting 
qualitative research, I had planned more structured interviews with a specific set of 
questions.  However, given my well-established working relationship with all the 
interviewees and their expectations of me: as a long-standing colleague and friend, a more 
formal approach proved impossible. After the first two interviews25, I viewed the 
subsequent interviews as “conversations between colleagues” (Cunliffe, 2002) whilst being 
careful to use the conversation to access the participants reality consistent with my stated 
ontological position rather than conversation used to construct shared experience. There 
was some structure in that I asked all of them about the strengths of the company and how 
that may have contributed to it’s success. I asked specifically about processes of 
                                                 
25  And the transcripts reveal some awkwardness and listening to the audio you can hear the tension that this 
sort of ‘fake persona’ I assumed as an objective researcher caused. 
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recruitment and induction training for senior managers to all of them as initially I thought 
that clues to the source of any managerial dynamic capability may lie here. The remainder 
of the conversation was directed by participant responses i.e. as in an unstructured 
interview. This removed any awkwardness in either party that had been apparent in the 
first two interviews. However I was aware of a pressure not to lead the conversation 
although many of the questions are phrased using our shared cognition: the innate 
knowledge and vocabulary of the business. There are also some shared assumptions 
namely that Admiral is a successful business and outperforms its competitors. An 
argument for these assumptions was made in Chapter 1 using external market data. 
Rereading the transcripts there are three types of occasion where leading questions were 
asked: 
1. Inadvertently: representing 2.3% of my interactions during the interview. In 30% 
of these cases, my comment/question was ignored and the flow of conversation 
from the interviewee continued, in 12% of cases I expressed my own opinion first, 
and in 29% of cases I pre-empted with a phrase that described the topic I wanted 
them to talk about. The remainder were just inexperience but given the support 
found in the secondary data this did not affect the development of the proto-themes.   
2. Sharing: with one participant what another has said, which is against the orthodoxy 
of qualitative interviewing.  This occurred in 2.5% of my interactions. But, with 
one exception, I know that the thought being shared is one that has been shared in 
other forums between the participants in the work environment in my presence so I 
did not feel that I was violating privacy. Listening to the interviews would confirm 
that the participant didn’t find this sharing ‘newsworthy’ with the implication being 
they have heard this before. 
3. Posterity: I asked leading questions in 2.0% of cases to get the participant to 
articulate for the record something I have heard them say in a previous 
conversation or meeting and I think it is a useful phrase or summary of a theme that 
seems to be emerging. In each case the participant responds positively both in tone 
of voice and verbally. This affirmation implies that I have fed back a previously 
stated position or idea to them. 
Lastly, a brief word about using the email forums as a technique. By its nature, email 
communication is more succinct than face-to-face communication and my role was less as 
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a colleague and more that of an orthodox facilitator. There was not the depth of discussion 
as in the interviews but the forums fulfilled their purpose in identifying most of the themes 
that emerged overall just from this more limited data-set.  Another note about the coding: 
in some of the emails, the participant would explicitly agree with the earlier conversation 
and where this occurred, I ignored it for coding purposes as the actual counts have little 
meaning with this analysis which was more about thematic development however I 
wondered if a comparison between the UK group and the non-UK group would be 
revealing given that the latter group has all been recruited post-IPO. 
5.3.6 The Data-sets 
The data collected exists as word documents.  A word document was created from the 
emails sent in the email forums and the recorded interviews were transcribed into word 
documents. 
The interview data is a much richer dataset than that yielded by the email discussion 
forums however all the existing themes identified at the email forum stage were echoed in 
the interviews and a much richer understanding of the nuances of each theme emerged 
from the interview transcripts. In addition, a number of new potential themes emerged.  
The email dataset was re-evaluated in light of these new themes (again a standard practice 
of grounded theory as espoused by Glaser and Strauss (1967) and Corbin and Strauss 
(2008)) with some support being found in a different interpretation of the email data. By 
the time the last interview was coded, no new ideas were emerging and I turned to finding 
supporting evidence from the secondary data at my disposal. After it seemed as if I had 
attained a point of “conceptual saturation”: where there was ‘sufficient data to develop 
each category/theme fully in terms of its properties and dimensions to account for 
variation’ (Corbin & Strauss, 2008: 195).  I certainly felt at this point that thematic 
development included ‘every single gobbet of relevant data’ (Silverman, 2006: 298). 
5.4 Data-set Analysis: Coding and Emerging Themes from the Email Forum 
Data-set 
The detail of the data analysis has been included in the Section 5.5 and in Appendix A 
looking at how the themes emerged from both data sets but the email data set was analysed 
first and some interesting observations from the process arose that informed the analysis of 
the interview data. 
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All the data was coded mostly using descriptive codes (Saldana, 2013) rather than an ‘in 
vivo coding’ given the paucity in language because of the email medium. Eleven recurring 
ideas emerged as “proto-themes” from the email coding. The next table is an example of 
how the initial codes (schema) for the ‘recruitment and indoctrination’ theme were 
tabulated and ultimately ended up in the overall theme table that appears in Appendix A.2. 
 
Table 5-2: Raw data codes for the ‘recruitment and indoctrination’ theme. 
These codes can be seen in Table 5-3 which shows all the codes generated from the email 
data-set grouped into the proto-themes that emerged at this stage of the analysis. It was 
very interesting to see the same themes emerge from each email group and note the 
homogeneity of the whole management team in thinking about the factors that contribute 
to Admiral’s continued success. The replies from the non-UK group were couched in more 
formal language that could be explained by their training in business concepts and theory 
during their MBA programmes but their underlying thoughts marry very well with the UK-
CMG responses.  
Table 5-3 summarises the proto-themes at this juncture although the names of the themes 
at this stage are consistent with the naming that actually occurred at the end of the thematic 
analysis rather than the temporary names that emerged from this stage. 
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Table 5-3: The emergent themes from the email discussion data were developed from 
initial coding schema. See text for discussion on red asterisked proto-themes.  
Just a note, that even at this stage I did contemplate combining the ‘management style’ and 
‘culture enables’ themes together and the ‘attention to detail’ and ‘numbers matter’ themes 
together. Many of the underlying ideas overlapped the analytical, numerate and logical 
elements of ‘numbers matter’ but this idea of attention to detail morphed during the 
subsequent interviews into ‘staying close to the business; which captures the ideas 
expressed by the UK-CMG and the interviews better. Similarly the interviewees separated 
out quite clearly in their own minds the ideas around the management style and those of 
the culture so at this stage I left them as separate proto-themes. 
In thematic analysis, coding frequencies are not important (Joffe & Yardley, 2004) 
however, as I noted earlier, the homogeneity of response was remarkable. If you express 
each separate code that contributes to the proto-theme as identified in Table 5-3 as a 
percentage of the total codes identified in this data set for each group it is easier to see the 
commonality of thought. This is demonstrated in Figure 5-5 overleaf. 
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Figure 5-5: Comparing the emerging proto themes in terms of frequency of mentions 
between the UK and non-UK managers during the email forums. 
Just looking at the chart some questions arise: 
• The contrast in ideas between the UK and non-UK managers around people matter 
is marked (theme 3 in the graph). But this is where frequencies in this type of 
analysis can be misleading. There are more people in the UK group than the non-
UK group. Some participants mention people in the story of Admiral’s success 
more than others. For example, it isn’t surprising that the Head of People Services 
in the UK (CA) came up with 6 separate ideas all revolving around people.  What is 
important is that almost everyone mentioned people or aspects thereof as elements 
of what underlies Admiral’s success. 
• The non-UK team talk more about the ‘balance’ between opposing pressures 
(theme 8 in the graph).  For example the balance between the freedom and 
autonomy given to them as new managers and the controls in place. One wonders if 
they found this balancing act unusual or difficult to maintain but I didn’t deem this 
line of questioning relevant specifically although the idea of balance between what 
at first glance appear to be opposite positions was the subject of an interview with 
Andrew Probert on 11/11/10. 
• The non-UK group talk a lot more about numbers and their use in the business. Is 
this because they are all MBA’s and as part of the recruitment they needed to pass a 
GMAT mathematical and verbal reasoning test or they wouldn’t be hired: ‘I know 
when Henry has been recruiting if the GMAT scores are bad he wouldn’t take it to 
the next stage (JM 22/06/10)’. There may also be the possibility that in 2010 none 
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of the non-UK operations were making profits and so there was/is senior 
management attention focussed on these businesses. This is explained in an email 
from AR (04/06/10): ‘with all the measures always visible, no one spends time 
trying to hide their performance.  Instead they focus on fixing or improving.  
Knowing the senior leadership has access and looks at the numbers constantly 
means you must as well.’   The non-UK respondents may well be at a stage where 
numbers are far more important to their work-day lives than their UK counterparts 
or even that the UK participants take the numbers they deal with on a daily basis 
for granted. On the basis of the subsequent interviews it would appear that it’s 
probably the latter, as measuring everything and how those measures are used 
became stronger contributions to the “Numbers Matter” proto-theme during the 
interview phase.  
Although, code frequencies are not the purpose of thematic analysis, they revealed some 
interesting questions. What perhaps is more important to this case is the homogeneity of 
the thematic development from the participants and that is shown in the next graph (see 
Figure 5-6) where the number of respondents in each group who contributed at least one 
code to the nascent theme is a percentage of the group.  
Again, looking at this chart, some of the same questions arise around the balancing act and 
numbers, both discussed previously. However more of the non-UK group appreciated the 
stability of the founders and the senior management team in the company.  As the Head of 
the US operation puts it: 'Still having more than 20% of the original starting staff means a 
history and legacy that is held onto.  Having the same, effective leadership eliminates a lot 
of unneeded effort during transitions (AR 04/06/10)’. During the interviews this stability 
emerged stronger implying perhaps like the numbers issue, it was taken more for granted 
in the UK email respondents (as they are, for the most part, long-standing employees of the 
company). 
There were also more contributors from the non-UK group on numbers mattering than 
their UK counterparts. Again, I think this is explained by many of the non-UK contributors 
working in businesses that are not yet in profit so there is a concentrated executive 
management focus on numbers perhaps to the extent that the UK group take for granted 
because every set of minutes from meetings of the UK group assumes that everyone has 
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seen the business numbers, they all have access to their departments down to individual 
performance on a daily basis, and they all conduct tests whose results are measured 
numerically. 
. 
 
Figure 5-6: Comparing the number of respondents in each group that contributed to the 
proto-theme development during the email forums. 
Using the coding and emerging proto-themes from the email data forum, I had an analytic 
framework relevant for the analysis of the interview (a template of sorts as per King, 
2004). 
5.5 Data-set Analysis: Coding and Emergence of Themes 
The proto-themes that emerged from both the primary interview data and the email 
discussion forums are summarised in Figure 5-2 on page 5-111 and the final themes that 
emerged in Figure 5-4 on page 5-113. This section looks at how the final themes 
developed through the analytic process. 
This process was inductive, using the shared cognition and knowledge I have of this 
company. Each interview underwent “comparative analysis”: where ‘incidents found to be 
conceptually similar to previously coded incidents were given the same conceptual label 
and put under the same code’ (Corbin & Strauss, 2008: 195). By examining the individual 
codes, shared meanings, albeit with nuances of degree, emerged and became the proto-
themes. As explained in Section 5.2 relationships between the proto themes were 
evidenced from the data (see Figure 5-3 on page 5-112) to arrive at these final themes. 
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My primary purpose at this point is to demonstrate the coding and analytical process in 
detail by using one fully worked example. All other coding tables were generated using the 
same approach and can be found in Appendix A. 
5.5.1  Fully worked example of the development of ‘recruitment and 
indoctrination’ theme 
Since the data-set is large, what follows is a worked example of how the ‘recruitment and 
indoctrination’ was developed from the text where initial coding for each line of text is 
gathered into an over-arching, more abstract theme. This will display the analytical process 
and further details of each subsequent theme can be found in the Appendix A. It includes 
both the email forum and interview data for completeness. A reader will note that some 
quotes from the text can be interpreted under one theme and appear as an illustration of 
another as well, however this is common in thematic analysis (Auerbach & Silverstein, 
2003). Supporting secondary data is included to provide triangulation of the data 
demonstrating the validity of the emerging theme of ‘Recruitment and indoctrination’ in 
this case study. 
The name of this theme came from an early version of the research question looking at 
whether recruitment, induction and indoctrination processes were a source of dynamic 
capability within the firm.  Newer members of the senior team (KC and NWK) shared their 
experiences and recruitment and training was discussed more generally within the 
company with a senior member (GR) of the People Services department responsible for 
management recruitment and training at middle management level. Specific questions 
around recruitment and training were asked of the remaining interviewees. However, of 
more interest, were the unprompted offerings in the data coded as ‘fit’ or ‘traits’ and 
‘values’ rather than recruitment processes per se as the idea of traits particularly has been 
the focus in recent literature in the micro-foundations of dynamic capability as discussed in 
Chapter 2 and the rest of this section focuses more on this micro-foundational aspect then 
the processual aspect of the data. 
5.5.1.1 Evidence from the primary data 
Unlike the other themes, recruitment and training had originally been a focus for this 
research. Yet without prompting, codes emerged from the email data set around hiring for 
fit, intellectual capacity and brainwashing. A chance conversation with one of the original 
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employees, who is now Head of Marketing, summed up Admiral’s approach succinctly, 
‘we hire people who fit and the rest of it – we can teach them’26. This observation was 
strengthened during the interviews where the idea of ‘fit’ emerged as a combination of 
traits and values and attitude. If the concept of dynamic capability was rooted here then the 
recruitment and indoctrination process may well enable dynamic capability in the firm but 
the source was rooted at a deeper level within the individuals themselves (Gavetti, 2005; 
Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011; Teece, 2007). This reflection resulted in the reframing of the 
research with an emphasis on the micro-foundation level: the generative levels of 
explanation (Sayer, 2000), supported by the literature, rather than simply at the processual 
level as originally envisaged.  
What follows is a tabulated version of the coding for this theme from the email and 
interview data-sets.  
 
                                                 
26  Comment made in passing by PJ, Head of Marketing, 23/06/2010. 
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Table 5-4:  Data from the email discussion groups and interviews as initially coded from 
which the proto-theme ‘Recruitment and Indoctrination’ developed. 
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The development of the theme with this ‘trait’ focus can be summarised by the CEO in the 
comment: ‘ hiring people who have the culture already in them is very important (HE 
22/06/10)’. The codes that made up this theme can be seen in Table 5-4. I have omitted 
coding originating from prompted questioning on this theme. If you include these 
responses, this theme generated 128 separate coded elements but excluding them there 
were still over 95 elements.  
Although this is not an organization that has formally articulated its values, all the 
interviewees express the idea that recruitment is about finding people who “fit”: ‘the 
common thread is understanding of our principles and values (CA 11/11/10)’, about 
‘bringing people into the organization that share the basic values (HE 22/06/10)’. Another 
attempt to define fit was ‘it’s bright people, enthusiastic, committed, attention to detail, 
people who will try new things, be flexible, will change and that’s a lot to ask of people (LS 
12/11/10)’.  When the transcripts were analysed as to what the interviewees mean by “fit”, 
a number of words or ideas emerged. One simple way to visualize the groupings, their 
relative importance and frequence is to use a word cloud. Whilst this is a helpful way to 
engage with the data analysis, it is merely an aide to the underlying process of coding and 
theme development set out in the earlier methodology chapter. 
 
Figure 5-7: Word cloud constructed from interview and email data-sets using 
explanations of “fit” as provided by participants. The larger and bolder the 
text the more participants used that phrase. The colours refer to groups as 
outlined in the text. 
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The words can be grouped into: intelligence, willingness to engender or embrace change, 
sharing the same values, having a sense of humour, having a desire for personal 
development and personality descriptors. On this basis “fit” would appear to revolve 
around an applicant’s intelligence, values, ability to laugh and humility27. The colours refer 
to groupings of words in Figure 5-8. 
A number of interviewees were at pains to note that despite hiring people for “fit” they 
don’t believe the company hires clones: ‘I think we’ve tended to recruit people with like 
values but within that there is this huge range of personalities (AP 23/06/10)’ or as the 
COO explains ‘the organization as a culture it sorts of pulls different people into a degree 
of homogeneity which I think is much healthier than the same people (DS 24/06/10)’. 
This idea of being an “Admiral person” but not a clone also resonates in the concept of 
“tribalism” a word used by several of the participants. The CEO explains it as: ‘rather than 
trying to mould every individual to be a clone of each other it’s letting people express their 
own personalities but at the core they all have the same, fundamental, beliefs.... there is 
that core set of values that ties everybody together but then beyond that it does express 
itself differently (HE 22/06/10)’. As a concept, “tribalism” also was coded as an element of 
the theme around culture as described in sub-section 5.5.15. But it seems clear that 
although recruitment tries to hire “like minds” the company accepts and expects differing 
personalities and experiences to enrich its culture and improve its idea generation.  
A number of the participants talk about “brain washing” and the induction training and 
subsequent training processes all seem to be designed not just to teach skills but also to 
reinforce cultural norms of the business: ‘I think it’s reinforced pretty much by the trainers 
right at the beginning (JM 22/06/10)’. This and a hands-on management style28 are 
designed so that new recruits to the firm or for the newly promoted ‘by a process of 
osmosis they take on the culture (LS 12/11/10)’.  For example, externally recruited 
members of the senior management team since IPO not only have to understand their new 
jobs but they all have to undergo entry level training in the UK with whatever department 
is currently training new recruits to the phones. Rationalising this induction training the 
CEO explains: ‘I think that [entry level training] was a very good way to get them into the 
                                                 
27  Lack of ego was an emergent theme during the analysis. See Section 5.5.15. 
28  See Section 5.5.5 on the development of the theme around management style. 
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culture. It did other things as well, though, it taught them a lot about the business because 
they learn just like any entry-level person…. I wanted them to have that contact with the 
customer. I wanted them always to be able to say, “hey, I started by going on the phone 
just like you (HE 22/06/10)’. Speaking as someone who underwent that regime, NWK’s 
view is ‘what we are doing is we’re putting everything into context and when you look at 
the job of a CCR [entry level person] after that you think of it in a different way, you don't 
just say “oh, he’s somebody taking calls and he should be available” and you have 
personal things that might happen, too, why isn’t he doing it? So, we get a softer view on 
the job of an agent and the difficulties of the job of an agent (NWK 03/02/11)’.  
So the proto-theme of ‘recruitment and indoctrination’ developed beyond the initial 
questions around how these processes may contribute to dynamic capability to more 
fundamental questions around the micro-foundations of dynamic capability from the 
primary data.  
5.5.1.2 Supporting evidence from the secondary data  
There are a number of pieces of secondary data that support the codes used to develop this 
theme helping to triangulate the primary data findings. 
Firstly let’s deal with recruiting for intelligence: the firm claim that intellect can be tested 
using a GMAT29 type test. Only the quantitative test and verbal reasoning are used from 
the GMAT in recruitment. From Table 4.5 on page 4-103 we can see that all the executive 
team hold MBA’s and that all the senior managers recruited since 2004 have an MBA and 
also have sat a GMAT administered by Admiral. Of the senior managers in place before 
2004 all are educated to a minimum of A-level augmented by professional qualifications or 
hold a Bachelors level degree. These people have not sat a GMAT, as it was only 
introduced as a recruitment requirement in 2004. In the internally administered GMAT, 
there are 25 quantitative questions and 30 verbal questions and a score is determined by 
subtracting the number of incorrect answers from the number correctly answered. A 
maximum score is 55.  Looking at the senior appointments in and out of the UK since 
                                                 
29  Graduate Management Admission Test (GMAT) is a computer adaptive test commonly used for admission 
to MBA programmes. 
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2004: the highest score is 51 – the lowest 25. The average for the 20 people employed in a 
senior role between 2004-2013 is 38.3530. 
There is a belief emerging from the primary data that recruitment is for “fit” although the 
interviewees believe that the firm doesn’t recruit clones. There is some supporting data for 
this if we use the results of a team-building day held in 2007. All 299 senior and middle 
managers were asked before the day to complete a Myers-Briggs personality test and the 
results were used during the day’s activities. The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) is a 
93-item instrument and one of the most widely used personality instruments worldwide 
(Carr, Curd, Dent, Davda, & Piper, 2011) and has been subjected to many tests of 
reliability and validity (Myers & McCaulley, 1985). There are 16 types made up of four 
dichotomies: 
1. Extroversion – Introversion dichotomy offers insights as to from where an 
individual gets their energy. 
2. Sensing – INtuition dichotomy assists in understanding how an individual takes in 
information. 
3. Thinking – Feeling dichotomy helps an individual understand how they make 
decisions. 
4. Judgement – Perception dichotomy offers insights as the way an individual prefers 
to live their life. 
The MBTI spread of Admiral management is represented below where Adm S (red) 
represents the UK and non-UK senior managers including the UK operations managers 
and Adm All (blue) represents all of this group plus the middle managers: 
 
                                                 
30  Source of GMAT results is from a spreadsheet held by the CEO to which he gave me access. 
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Figure 5-8: The percentage of the 16 MBTI represented by the Admiral management 
team as at 2007 (ADM All n=299, Adm S n=32). 
From this we can see that 28% of the management at Admiral are ENFJ, with 17% ESFJ 
and 15% ENTJ. So 60% of the Admiral management are represented by only 3 types and 
that represents evidence of homogeneity in psychological type. This is further pronounced 
when breaking down by the dichotomous pairs (as shown in Table 5-5) we see that there is 
stronger degree of homogeneity about the types Extroverts, iNtuitives, Feeling and 
Judgement. In the senior team this homogeneity is even more pronounced with the 
Sensing-iNtuitive pair at 15.6%: 84.3% and less homogenous with regards to the 
Thinking–Feeling pair that are represented roughly equally. 
 
Table 5-5: The ratios of dichotomous pairs for the Admiral management team. 
This appears to be evidence for the idea that the management team are hired for “fit”. This 
begged the obvious question ”what does it mean?” and the data from Admiral was 
compared both against the data held by Ashridge Business School on the MBTI of 
participants in management development programmes from 2000 to 2010 (n=22,783) (Carr 
et al., 2011) and against the UK population as a whole, selected by the Office of National 
Statistics to be representative of the UK general population in 1996 (n=1,634) (OPPLtd, 
2011) and shown in Table 5-6. 
 
Table 5-6:  The ratios of dichotomous pairs comparing the Admiral management team 
against Ashridge MBTI data for managers (Carr et al., 2011) and the UK 
general population (OPPLtd, 2011). 
From the data in Table 5-6 we can deduce that as a whole Ashridge managers seems to be 
more Extrovert and Thinking orientated and slightly more Judgement orientated than the 
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UK population as a whole and more balanced between the Sensing and iNtuition aspects. 
However it is striking how the “fit” of the typical Admiral manager and senior manager 
differs from the Ashridge data being over represented in Extroversion, iNtuition, Feeling 
and Judgement. I parked more questions at this time, not sure of their relevance to the aim 
of identifying dynamic capability within the business, but interested that it supported the 
idea of homogeneity in the Admiral management team and yet is different from the 
management population as a whole. 
Lastly, although the idea of “fit” is not formally articulated for hiring within the business, 
there is data available from the Admiral Staff Survey in a question that asks the 
respondents to describe in their view what are the traits of an “Admiral person” from a list 
presented to them. The survey is conducted annually in December amongst all staff in the 
company.  It has over 85% completion rates from all available staff each year and is used 
by the management to monitor trends overall and by department of key elements of the 
softer elements of people management: for example views on communication, leadership, 
fairness and trust etc. The data in Figure 5-9 represents the results from 2006-2012. 
 
Figure 5-9: Results from the Admiral Staff Survey 2006-2012 where respondents select 
the traits they think best describes an “Admiral Person”. An average of 85% 
of all staff respond to this question each year (from 1789 people in 2006 to 
4309 in 2012) 
Note that with regards to the description of the Admiral person, the question changed in 
2006 from being an open-ended question to selection of traits from a list constructed from 
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previous years results. Over 50% of the staff believe that the typical Admiral person is 
ambitious, caring, competent, confident, friendly, fun-loving, happy and helpful. Compare 
the similarities in this list with the word cloud data produced from the primary data shown 
in Figure 5-7 on page 5-131. The survey data represents the views of the whole staff, the 
word cloud data from selected senior managers. The similarities indicate that despite the 
fact that “fit” is not explicitly articulated for recruitment and hiring, the tacit understanding 
throughout all levels of the company are consistent. 
5.5.1.3 Summarising evidence for the ‘Recruitment and indoctrination’ theme 
The theme ‘recruitment and indoctrination’ emerged as a theme unprompted from the 
interview data, ignoring those interviews that specifically focused on this area. There is a 
strong link between this theme and the theme of ‘culture’ (see Section 5.5.15) in that many 
of the respondents linked the two concepts essentially expressing the idea that ‘hiring 
people who have the culture already in them is very important (HE 22/06/10)’ and many of 
the traits of an “Admiral Person” chime with descriptions of the culture. The evidence for 
this theme from the primary data is well supported by the secondary data aiding the claim 
that the development of this theme has analytical validity (Venkatesh et al., 2013). 
5.5.2 Development of  ‘embrace change’ theme 
The name of this theme came from an interview with David Stevens, the COO. He said: 
‘making us, everyone, open to change that people believe will take us in a positive 
direction, willing to embrace change (DS 24/06/10)’.   
5.5.2.1 Evidence from the primary data 
See Appendix A.3 on page A-324 for the details of the email and interview data set coding. 
From the email data-set, the idea of continuous change: both adaptive and innovative (a 
distinction first coined by Kirton, 1976) emerged. The initial codes here were around 
innovation, change being constant and the pace of that change fast, and that this speed was 
tempered by what I coded as ‘Test and Control’ which is ‘a strong culture of test and learn 
(KC 08/06/10)’ later explained as ‘we do it in a small way, as small a way as we think we 
can get away with, basically, to do enough to see if it’s going to work but not gamble too 
much (KC 03/02/11)’.  These initial codes were then nuanced during the interviews as 
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shown in Table 5-7 and at this stage I separated out the ideas around change from speed 
feeling that the difference may be important. 
 
Table 5-7: Codes from the email and interview data that encompass the ‘Embrace 
Change’ theme. See Appendix A.3 for details. The code ‘speed’ is on bold as 
it was a proto-theme absorbed into this theme in the final stage of analysis. 
Every participant was coded at least once for signalling that change through both 
innovation and adaptation is key to its success. There is a definite belief that innovation is 
driven primarily from the very top of the organisation as epitomised by the former CFO 
who told me: ‘where is the next hunch from? ... It’s from a very small group of people, 
again, it goes back to a small number who have some trust amongst each other that they 
can throw out odd ideas (AP 11/11/10)’. However several participants also talked about 
how the change to improve the business can come from anywhere in the organisation 
because: ‘small changes they happen all the time (CA 11/11/10)’. The data paints a picture 
of a company that senses and seizes opportunities31 and is structured in such a way that 
people embrace change and with ‘test and control’ processes that everyone understands, 
change can be made quickly but mitigate the risk. And as for really big strategic 
innovations that can’t be tested against a control there is still a culture of risk mitigation: 
‘It may be a crazy idea, we don’t really know, we haven’t got the data of whether it works 
but let’s do it in a smaller way in a controlled investment but measure it to see if it works. 
If it doesn’t work then we throw a great hunch but it didn’t work, throw it away and move 
on (AP 11/11/10)’. 
It isn’t surprising that constant change and the culture required to make that happen has 
emerged as a theme when participants are asked about key success factors. That the 
                                                 
31  This is a deliberate use of language first used by Teece (2007: 1319) when he was making the argument 
that the dynamic capabilities needed to shape the environment include seizing opportunities and from the 
Admiral data it is clear that they do seize opportunities as described by Teece (2007: 1326 – 1334). This 
literature was reviewed in Chapter 2. 
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industry is an early adopter of technology and that Admiral is innovator within the industry 
was argued in Chapter 1 (specifically refer to Tables 1.3 and 1.4).  In 45% of the cases of 
strategic innovation within the industry reported in Table 1.3, Admiral was the instigator. 
Also reported in Chapter 1 was the recognition of innovation as a key success factor by 
external insurance market analysts in their 2005 and 2006 quarterly updates on Admiral as 
well as in the Initial Public Offering (IPO) prospectus in 2004.32 It is a successful company 
(again, argued in Chapter 1) on a number of measures so must have maintained a 
competitive advantage since it’s launch in 1993.  
5.5.2.2 Supporting evidence from the secondary data 
There is also evidence from the secondary data that change is still a success factor since 
flotation in 2004. Between 2005 and 2013, Admiral has launched direct insurance 
companies and aggregators in Italy, Germany, Spain, France and the US. Although not 
innovations per se in these markets (with the exception of the US aggregator launched to 
the public in January 2014) they have required substantial internal changes to the 
organization to cope with new reporting structures to include the managers from the 
international companies and to maximise learning opportunities. New groups that meet 
several times a year have been inaugurated: for example all the pricing managers or 
marketing managers or claims managers meet in Cardiff or on the phone to discuss issues 
and solutions regularly.  The format of these meetings have ‘changed’ over time as the 
groups get larger and as their foci change from launch issues to running their nascent 
businesses.  
Another internal strategic change occurred in 2008 when the company restructured its call 
centre staff previously organised by brand to a functional structure so all sales staff from 
the four brands became a single sales department. Ditto for customer services, renewals 
and claims staff. This change was alluded to in a number of the interviews that reveal a 
number of the key players anticipated a major upheaval culturally and a difficult change to 
implement supported by evidence from staff surveys showing that staff identified strongly 
with their brand. This change had been mooted since 2006 at meetings I attended with the 
key players and a decision was made between them in 2007 to move ahead.  After planning 
                                                 
32  Admiral Group Plc, Global Offer Listing Particulars, Global Co-ordinator, Sole Bookrunner and 
Sponsor Merrill Lynch International, Joint Lead Manager Citigroup. Published 2004. Available from 
Admiral archive. 
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in the early months of 2008, NWK announced the move to the Operations Meeting in 
April. By early June, 2008 the change had occurred. This change represented a major 
change in the way Admiral structures itself. 
In the last two years Admiral has also been working on the launch of two new products.  
The household product represents a major move for the firm who up until 18 December 
2012 focussed exclusively on motor insurance highlighted in GJ’s response in the email 
discussion: ‘Many years of keen focus (largely) on one (compulsory) product (GJ 
08/06/10)’.  The main argument for launching home insurance was down to cost effective 
acquisition costs becoming available thanks to price comparison sites and a ‘near doubling 
of policy base over 2010-12 creates a more material cross-selling opportunity’ (DS 
07/05/13)33.  The product was launched slowly i.e. marketing only on one aggregator site 
in December, rolling out to the others in Q1 2013. Cross-selling to the database started 
with test emails in January, the idea being to ramp up in time for Spring which is a peak 
renewal period in the UK. Results are reviewed closely daily by the household team but 
are circulated monthly every month by email34 and are a focus for discussion by the UK-
CMG35 to ensure numbers are where they should be. In April 2014, 10,000 household 
policies were sold in a single month. 
The second product, beta launched in June 2012, is a telematics motor product. It is a good 
example of how Admiral introduces change to the business. Although the technology has 
been around for a decade and Aviva first committed to the technology in the industry, 
finding a way for Admiral to develop a product around it that adds value for the customer 
proposition and improves our underwriting result has proved elusive given the costs of the 
technology36. In 2009, Admiral ran a very small trial37 ‘the Green Road Project’ targeting 
17-18 year old drivers with a box in the car. The results showed resistance in consumer 
                                                 
33  DS email to me in reply to me asking for the thought process behind the home launch. 
34  I am a recipient of these monthly emails. 
35  See the CM minutes for 2013 stored on I drive on the Admiral servers. 
36  I was present at numerous UK-CMG meetings in 2004-5 where the technology and AVIVA’s move was 
discussed at length – and I diaried the discussion as it seemed likely I would be given the responsibility to 
explore the project further. I didn’t take up that opportunity before leaving full-time employment, 
however I currently mentor the key personnel on the project so have access to its development. 
37  See Operational Meetings minutes May through September that year for discussion of trail: minutes are 
stored in the I drive on the Admiral servers in the OPSMEET/Ops Meeting Minutes/2009. 
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behaviour but some underwriting benefits.  The technology improved so in 201138, 
Admiral installed 3000 boxes in a scheme targeting low mileage drivers. A better loss ratio 
emerged, early data showed a strong correlation with claims, and women appeared more 
willing to install but a higher volume was needed to prove loss ratio findings. By 2012 the 
objective of the next stage of testing was to identify the value drivers of telematics: 
conversion and renewal data, claims frequency and loss ratio data, by evaluating the value 
of the driving data supplied by the telematics technology and verification of the 
underwriting data supplied by the customers such as mileage, address kept, class of use. To 
test, an aggregator product Bell From Admiral (BFA) was tested on price comparison sites 
with the control groups being the other Admiral brands. It offered two types of technology: 
a hard install to the car engine or a self install version. Between July 2012 and January 
2013, 28,700 policies had been sold. The learning included consumer resistance and that 
significantly better loss ratios have not yet eventuated. However, the value in verification 
of declared data and predictive nature of the driving data have been sufficient for Admiral 
to launch LittleBox in March 2013 in broadcast media where the consumer response to 
direct marketing can be tested and to pilot a self-installed test through the Bell brand. By 
the end of 2013, 65,000 policies had been sold and telematics products represented 4.5% of 
2013’s total sales. In January 2014, another version of the telematics product using mobile 
phone technology was launched. These tests are still ongoing with data and processes 
being reviewed quarterly but it’s a good example of change from the secondary data 
sources. 
The idea that Admiral is successful not only by implementing innovative change but also 
sees adaptive change as important to its success emerged from the primary data. There are 
examples throughout all the interviews of the participants talking about improvements they 
have been personally involved with. If you look at departmental videos, at presentations 
given within departments, at themes to be covered at away days and speak to the staff they 
readily articulate the mantra ‘Be the Best’ which was expressed in the interview data as 
‘strive at all levels to be the best (SL 10/06/10)’. This cultural tenet leads to an attitude 
where staff are ‘more than happy to try different ideas (JM 22/06/10)’. Minutes from the 
                                                 
38  The evidence for the rest of this section can be found in a presentation to the Board on Telematics given 
March 2013 and supplied by COO. 
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Operational meetings39 show how change at an operational level is continual within the 
business with results of tests been discussed, with announcements of changes within 
departments, with issues and ideas for change been thrown around. As the COO explains: 
‘[Head of Gladiator], astonishing in terms of constant reinvention of an area ... Claims is 
another great area where people are trying new things all the time. That’s evidence rather 
than why but I think it’s because people... it must be lower down the organization people 
have a desire to improve and feel able to try and come up with the improvements (DS 
24/06/10)’. In the 2013 staff survey,40 in response to the a prompt for the staff to question 
the status quo with regards to ‘silly rules’, bureaucracy and things they may see as barriers 
for customers and efficient, effective processes, 116 ideas were proffered supporting the 
ideas expressed in the interview data that ‘everyone is encouraged to make a difference 
(SLg 10/06/10)’.  
5.5.2.3 Summarising evidence for the ‘embrace change’ theme 
The theme ‘embrace change’ emerged as a theme from the interview data. Like the 
recruitment and indoctrination theme and many of the themes here, there is a strong link 
between this theme and the theme of culture (see Section 5.5.15). One of the codes was 
‘culture of change’ in that many of the participants believe that there is a culture of change 
in the business expressed by the COO as: ‘making them interested, like success, making 
them not scared, like testing and half arsed being acceptable (DS 24/06/10)’. 
The secondary data gave examples of change drawn from secondary sources. Just reading 
through minutes of the Operations and Coffee Morning we can see how many changes are 
in progress in the company every month. This is a firm that “embraces change”. 
5.5.3 Development of ‘learning environment’ theme 
Many of the participants used the word ‘learning’ as you can see from the detailed coding 
of the data for this theme to be found in Appendix A.4 on page A-327. This idea was 
exemplified early in the email discussion forums when the Head of People Services 
                                                 
39  These meetings are held monthly to discuss operational issues across the business. Agendas and minutes 
are stored in the I drive on the Admiral servers in the OPSMEET/Ops Meeting Minutes folders for each 
year. 
40  All the comments from staff surveys are circulated each January by the Communications team to all the 
senior managers in UK and outside the UK. I am a recipient of this data. This particular document was 
attached in an email from Justin Beddows dated 22 March 2013. 
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commented that he thought a key to success was through ‘empowerment of staff to try new 
ideas and not criticise if mistakes are made, but rather learn from them (CA 08/06/10)’.  
5.5.3.1 Evidence from the primary data 
The initial codes from the email forums were around a learning culture, test and control, 
implied learning and examples of mechanisms were given. The current CFO observed that 
there is ‘a strong culture of test and learn (KC, 08/06/10)’ and the marketing director 
described an environment where ‘feedback is useful rather than critical. Also I think 
admitting to your mistakes and that no-one's perfect, but you can learn from things, is 
important (CB 14/06/10)’.  
From the interview data, the idea that there is a learning culture within this firm was 
enriched with examples of how learning takes place, how that affects the measures, the 
importance of staff having curiosity and a desire to experiment and the importance of a “no 
blame” mind set. 
The theme can be summarised in the CEO’s words: ‘we are constantly learning and 
improving what we do but it’s evolutionary not revolutionary (HE 22/06/10)’. 
Fundamental to this theme from all the datasets is the idea of “test and control” which was 
axiomatic to the ‘embrace change’ theme but also was included in the development of this 
theme.  This is a methodology that a number of the founders had experience in with their 
backgrounds in direct marketing. It was ‘imported’ into the very early days of the firm as a 
way of mitigating risk. As Appendix A.3 on page A-324 charted the development of the 
change theme, the data there demonstrates how the participants describe the ‘”test and 
control” process used to introduce change into the business but I summarise it in a course I 
developed for all new Admiral managers as a ‘way of introducing a change in a small, 
tightly measured way (a “test” group) and compare the results against a “control” group 
who have not been subjected to the change.’41 Testing is a very pervasive mode of thinking 
amongst the interviewees (and indeed the overall firm judging from written records of 
meetings). It is a way of mitigating risk but still be action-orientated and maximise 
learning in a short space of time.  This is expressed by the COO who says: ‘one of the best 
                                                 
41  See Slide 31: Foundations Feb 2006.ppt, a powerpoint presentation delivered to all new Admiral 
managers as part of the Admiral Academy programme. 
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maxims of Henry’s is “the perfect is the enemy of the good”. And that means that you can 
do half arsed changes which either turn out to be a waste of time or turn out to be the germ 
of something valuable that you then push forward (DS 24/06/10)’.  
Like the ‘embrace change’ theme, there were specific descriptions of what I coded as a 
“learning culture” enabling organizational learning within the firm. From the data, it has a 
number of elements: transparency and “no blame” and the idea that people are not 
‘attached to a particular way of doing things (CH 10/06/10)’. Although culture is 
developed separately as a theme (see Section 5.5.15), the notion that ‘experimentation has 
always been at the heart (AP 23/06/10)’ and that ‘feedback is useful rather than critical … 
admitting to your mistakes and that no-one's perfect, but you can learn from things, is 
important (CB 14/06/10)’ describes a learning culture that the participants believe is 
fundamental to the way Admiral has established itself as an organization that learns from 
its actions and thus its success. 
5.5.3.2 Supporting evidence from the secondary data 
At Admiral, minutes of meetings, at both strategic and departmental level, contain 
references to ‘testing’, ‘pilots’, ‘trials’, ‘test and control groups’ or ‘Champion and 
Challenger’.  Just a sample of the minutes from the Operations Meetings in the Q1 of 
201342 reveals 12 discussions about new or existing tests and 8 reviews of tests in progress 
with actions for moving forward. From the minutes of the Operations Meeting held on the 
21st March 201343 there is an update from the Littlebox product test: 
‘This was launched on 24th Feb on site without any marketing support; at 
this time they were receiving 500 quotes daily which converted into 25 sales.  
They went live on the TV on the 13th and saw the quotes increase to 1000, so 
looks like TV has had a positive impact.  The test will run for 3 months direct 
site with no plans for aggregator’. 
From this we can see that the marketing department learned that a small test TV campaign 
would generate leads and as a consequence Littlebox was expanded to a TV campaign in 
the north-west on the 3rd April 2013. In Section 5.5.2.2 the learning from the telematics 
                                                 
42  See I drive on Admiral servers, Ops Meeting/Ops Meeting Minutes/2013 folder: files 01.January 2013, 
02.February 2013 and 03.March 2013. 
43  See I drive on Admiral servers: Ops Meeting/Ops Meeting Minutes/2013/03.March 2013.docx 
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project that became Littlebox was summarised. In a summary of a Board presentation in 
March 2013 it was clearly stated ‘we will launch a TV trial in the Admiral LittleBox brand’ 
(Slide 25) and ‘this month will also see the launch of our first sizeable self-install pilot’ 
(Slide 26) after outlining the telematics project to date under the heading ‘Progress and 
learnings to date’ (Slide 2). So even at Board level the language of test and control is in 
evidence. In the 2009 Annual Report44 the Chairman writes:  
‘Our Board has spent a lot of time during 2009 discussing the learning that 
we should take from the events of the last 18 months’ (p. 5) 
So the concept and language of learning prevails even at the highest levels of the 
organization both internally and externally.  
An example of learning within the UK-CMG can be found in a memo sent by email to the 
group from the COO on the 28/01/13. Late in 2012 it was decided that the current UK-
CMG – most of whom have either been promoted from within or have been in situ since 
launch (see Table 4.5 page 4-103) would undergo the same new business induction 
training that all new recruits for the sales department go through. This memo refers to 
actions from a conversation at the previous CMG meeting45 where the group discussed 
their experiences: their “learning” from that exercise.  This raised a number of questions 
and hence actions upon the group to try and improve the sales process for the customer. 
For example, an extract below of the COO’s email documents one of the action points as 
follows: 
‘Ancillaries (“Trainee” lead = AH) 
I am told that work is in progress on the correct way of handling ancillaries.  
This work has included work on testing giving CCR’s more freedom on how 
and when to “sell” ancillaries (obligation to mention all, incorporation within 
quote rather than leaving until the end, etc.). 
In my meeting with Chris & Brian, we also talked about: 
-  Testing changing the ethos towards a more customer-friendly benefit-led 
approach, rather than a more superficial “slipping them in” approach. 
                                                 
44  Copies of annual reports can be found on the website www.admiralgroup.co.uk. 
45  See I drive on Admiral servers: Coffee Morning Minutes/CM AM 2012/11 – Dec/Coffee AM 191212.docx 
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-  Supplying CCR’s with a much wider range of facts that they can use to 
support the sale of ancillaries, reducing the excessive constriction currently 
being faced by too wide a definition of “opinion”. 
I’m assuming Alistair is taking this forward separately with Chris & Brian.  I 
am assuming also that he’s liaising with Mark, who is leading the breaches & 
wordings work.’ 
This is interesting because in the February Operations meeting46 the minutes record under 
NB Update:  
‘NB have decided to get rid of any aggressive sale tactics and instead sell 
through quality and level of service.  There will be no hard sell.  Targets have 
gone and they have changed the incentives so they are based on quality of 
service.  With ANC; they will have soft introduction of the ANCs as the call 
progresses and then mention them again at the close of the call.  That way it 
will come as less of a shock to the customer then.’ 
This provides clear evidence of learning from the UK-CMG being implemented at the 
operational level within three weeks of the COO emailed memo and a month after the 
discussion at the Dec 2012 CMG meeting. 
In the interview data, there are many references to the senior managers being close to the 
business, in turn setting an example to staff ‘people don't take discussion of ideas or issues 
personally and they know we will discuss the minutiae and the macro (AR 04/06/10 ii)’. 
Re-emphasising learning as a fundamental tenet for the business requires managers even at 
the top of the organization to set the tone. An example of this, in discussing a promotion 
Confused.com was considering rolling out the CEO commented at the Board meeting47 of 
the 13/03/13: ‘Clearly there is learning going on but is there an opportunity to make our 
learning more effective?’. 
Many of the cultural elements in the primary data are difficult to evidence directly from the 
secondary data available. The interview data talks about open and transparent 
communication.  A proxy for this might be the response to two questions asked in the UK 
                                                 
46  See I drive on Admiral servers: Ops Meeting/Ops Meeting Minutes/2013/02. February 2013.docx 
47  Not minuted – this is a verbatim quote from the meeting at which I was present that the CEO has allowed 
me to use. 
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wide 2013 Best Company To Work For Survey 2012/201348 (Admiral came 11th in 2013) 
where for positively phrased questions 7 represents the highest score, 1 the lowest: 
‘My manager shares important knowledge and information with me’ 6.033 
‘I feel my manager talks openly and honestly with me’   6.167 
The interview data refers to a “no blame” culture. A result of this is that people have to talk 
openly about their failures and when the Head of the US company got up at the 2012 MAD 
Day on the topic of “Lessons Learned” he wryly noted49 that: ‘in any other company, 
getting up and talking about where you made mistakes in front of your peers is suicide’. 
But it is not only the participants that feel there is a “no blame” culture. In a survey 
conducted in October 2011 by The Great Place To Work Institute50 90% of the staff who 
responded agreed that ‘management recognises honest mistakes as part of doing business’ 
and one employee response to the open-ended question ‘Is there anything unique or 
unusual about this company that makes it a great place to work?’ in the same survey was: 
‘honesty is a huge thing here, especially giving straight answers to questions’. 
Other elements of the culture of learning coded from the interview data are picked up 
throughout this chapter as other themes are developed from the data.  
5.5.3.3 Summarising evidence for the ‘Learning Environment’ theme 
The theme ‘learning environment emerged as both a code and a theme from the interview 
data. AGAIN, like many of the themes here, there is a strong link between this theme and 
the theme of culture (see Section 5.5.15) and this has been partially explored in this section 
as it relates specifically to the creation of a culture conducive to learning.  
Examples of both learning and evidence for some of the elements of the learning culture 
were also drawn from secondary sources.  
                                                 
48  The survey forms part of the Best Companies to Work For ranking published by the Sunday Times. The 
results were based on the response from 3,829 surveys – a response rate of 78.2% 
49  I attend MAD and this is a verbatim quote from AR’s speech for which he granted me permission to use. 
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5.5.4 Development of ‘people matter’ theme 
In his first interview, the former CFO and a founder of the company told me ‘It’s always 
been about people (AP 23/06/11)’. That ‘people matter’ to this firm was a very strong 
theme to emerge from the email data as can be seen in Figure 5-5 and in Figure 5-6, 75% 
of the UK interviewees and 71% of their non-UK colleagues mentioned at least once the 
importance of people to this business: ‘The constant drive to make Admiral a great 
workplace is real (SC 08/06/10)’. The interview data continued to reveal the importance of 
this theme as can be seen in the full coding tables in Appendix A.5 on page A-329. 
5.5.4.1 Evidence from the primary data 
The proto-theme emerged from the email discussion set of codes: Listening/ Respect & 
fairness/ Inclusiveness/ Alignment/ Alignment mechanism/ Lack of 'politics'/ Happiness/ 
Fun/ Communication/ Empowerment/ Opportunities/ 4 Corner stones/ Work environment.  
All of these codes were used in the interview data set too but were nuanced by further 
coding as seen in the following table. 
 
Table 5-8: Codes from the email and interview data that encompass the ‘People Matter’ 
theme. See Appendix A.5 for details. 
With over 104 contributions to this proto-theme over all the datasets, this is a firm whose 
senior management have ‘the genuine belief that “people who enjoy what they do, do it 
better”  (CA 08/06/10)’. This is one of the CEO’s maxims and is quoted widely throughout 
the company: in its annual reports, its corporate website, its entries for the Great Place to 
                                                                                                                                                    
50  From a random sample of 643 staff, 450 responded to this survey conducted by the GPTW Institute in 
2011.  The survey and results are used by Admiral to benchmark itself year on year and to compare itself 
to its peers in the UK and Europe. 
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Work cultural audits, even in videos made by the staff for the Top 10 Best Department 
competition in 2010 as shown in following figure. 
  
Figure 5-10: The CEO’s maxim “People who like what they do, do it better” is widespread 
throughout the company’s communications, both internal and external. 
From the primary-data coding, this theme covers not just a way of dealing with people by 
communicating and listening and treating them with respect and fairness but also ensuring 
they are happy and have fun at work and that there is a pleasant working environment that 
allows them opportunities for personal development. The interview data has examples of 
mechanisms and rationale for this type of approach within the Admiral context.  
The evidence points to a company who doesn’t think of its staff as “human resource”. The 
current People Services Manager in his interview (CA 11/11/10) summarises his view as: 
‘I don’t like [the term] human resources. ...Well, it just sounds like resource not people. I 
know people are a resource but it just makes it sound so impersonal, doesn’t it?’ From the 
data, that sentiment would appear to be true of the senior management as a whole.  
10% of the responses in this dataset referred to the wide share ownership within the firm. 
In explaining the elements of Admiral’s culture, the CEO states a fundamental tenet of the 
business and that is: ‘we want people to feel like they own part of the company, the best 
way to do that is to give them part of the company to own (HE 22/06/10)’. The CEO began 
this at launch in 1993 by giving each of the senior managers a percentage of the fledgling 
company. Throughout the structural changes of the firm: through the management buy-out 
in 1999 and the stock exchange listing in 2004, that share ownership was preserved and 
widened to everyone in the company thanks to the efforts of the executive team. As the 
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former CFO says: ‘we had to fight for that, we want to give part of our share to a much 
wider base, and that is not normal (AP 23/06/10)’.  
At the IPO in September 2004, every member of staff received some money and some 
shares in the newly created Admiral Plc. Twice every year, providing the company reports 
meeting or bettering its half yearly forecasts, all the staff, across seven countries, receive 
an allocation of shares tax-free which, should they stay for three years, start to “vest” and 
can be sold through the company’s brokerage system. Managers receive additional 
allocations as part of their remuneration packages. The data talks about being 
‘extraordinarily aligned about a collective goal for the business (CH 10/06/10)’ and of the 
‘profit sharing culture (CN 03/06/10)’.  Many of the interviewees articulate their belief 
that alignment and the profit sharing are linked and echo the view of the CEO and that of 
the former CFO: ‘that’s a fundamental belief that if staff have ownership then they work 
better for the business by feeling part of it and actually save you money (AP 11/11/10)’. 
5.5.4.2 Supporting evidence from the secondary data  
Two main sources of secondary data can evidence that the belief that ‘people matter’ is 
widespread throughout the company not just amongst the participants in this research. 
These sources are: (1) the Annual staff survey data available from 1999 to 2013. The 
survey is available for all staff to complete every December and the results circulated in 
February/March; and (2) the Best Companies to Work For 2011-2013 surveys. Best 
Companies have been responsible for the survey organisation, analysing results and 
compiling the ranking of best companies to work for that appears in the Sunday Times 
each year. Admiral has ranked in that list every year since 2001. A random sample of staff 
was selected from the payroll system to complete the survey each year 2001 to 2011. In 
2012 and 2013 all staff were surveyed. Only the 2011 to 2013 data has been made 
available.  
Firstly, from the annual staff survey conducted by the Communications Department at 
Admiral, selected questions can evidence a ‘people matter’ ethos at the company beyond 
the interviewed senior managers. Between 70 and 85% of all staff across all sites complete 
the survey each year. The results are shown in the next table where for each year the 
percentage of staff responding positively to that question is shown. 
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Table 5-9:  Results 1999-2013 for selected questions from the Admiral staff survey 
conducted in December. 
Taken as a whole, these questions present a company that over time has demonstrated to its 
staff that ‘people matter’.  Although there is some variation from year to year, overall there 
is a rising trend for staff to respond positively to any given question demonstrating the 
success of improvements each individual department makes as a consequence of their 
survey results each year. In 2003 there was a consistent drop across all areas in the survey. 
At the time, the senior management team put this down to the uncertainty over the sale or 
otherwise of the company51.  
Since 2001, Admiral has partaken in an annual external survey conducted by Best 
Companies and although only recent data was available for this study, the fact that Admiral 
has ranked every year should indicate that it performs consistently across the question set. 
Admiral’s management use this survey as an external benchmark each year.  Not all 
companies enter year on year, and Admiral’s ranking can vary from year to year but 
management are interested in trends shown in individual questions and are keen to 
maintain their standing as one of the best companies to work for in the UK.  
Again, I have chosen questions that can act as proxies for the concept of ‘people matters’ 
within the business and the results from 2011 to 2013 are shown in the next table. The 
maximum score possible is 7 and a score of 7 represents strong agreement with all 
positively phrased questions and strong disagreement with all negatively phrased 
questions. 4 represents a neutral response. 
                                                 
51  Admiral’s IPO at the London Stock Exchange in September 2004 was by necessity kept from the staff 
until the intention to float was confirmed in summer 2004. From 1999 at the time of the management buy-
out it was known that Admiral’s venture capital partner would seek to divest within five years. This often 
means a trade sale and there was some nervousness amongst staff that this might happen. 
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Table 5-10: Results 2011 -2013 for selected questions from the Best Companies survey. 
It seems from these responses, that the staff believes that managers demonstrate a caring 
ethos and that caring for each other extends from management down to team level. That 
managers feel a sense of family is clear from the primary data used to develop the theme 
‘Stability of management’ in Section 5.5.14. From the coding in Appendix A.5 on page A-
329 you can see the references coded as ‘feels like family’ and that the staff share this 
feeling is apparent from the above data supported by comments taken from presentations 
filmed for The Top 10 Departments competition in 2010. For example: 
‘I love working for Gladiator because of the family atmosphere’ (Gladiator 
video: 00.57) 
‘We are, as stupid as it sounds, like a big family. We work and support each 
other through the good and bad’ (Swansea Outbound, 09:31) 
Additional evidence can be found in the survey conducted in October 2011 by The Great 
Place To Work Institute. Two employee responses to the open-ended question ‘Is there 
anything unique or unusual about this company that makes it a great place to work?’ were: 
‘It feels like a family business, we are all close friends here who help out 
each other in work and at home.’ 
‘I enjoy coming into work as I know how great my team are and how we all 
act like family. I can ask any questions if im stuck and my manager is 
always there to make sure that I am ok and happy with my work.’ 
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5.5.4.3 Summarising evidence for the ‘People Matter’ theme 
In summary there is evidence from both primary and secondary data sources to support 
‘People matter’ as a proto-theme when looking at what makes this company successful in 
its environment and the CEO’s aim of ‘trying to set up a company that … did care for … 
its staff (HE 22/06/10)’ has been largely effective.  
5.5.5 Development of ‘management style’ theme 
The email data set contained many examples of management style in action and examples 
of mechanisms or processes and at this stage of data analysis it wasn’t clear whether 
management style was simply an aspect of the culture or warranted being a theme in its 
own right. However during the interviews the idea of management style being key to this 
firm’s success crystallized warranting 49 coding mentions throughout both data sets. The 
theme was named ‘management’ rather than ‘leadership’ because ‘management’ is the 
term used by the respondents. 
5.5.5.1  Evidence from the primary data 
 The detail of the development of this as a theme in its own right can be seen in the full 
coding tables in Appendix A.6 on page A-333. There are fewer codes underlying this 
theme as seen in the next table: 
 
Table 5-11: Codes from the email and interview data that encompass the ‘management 
style’ theme. See Appendix A.6 for details. 
But fewer codes doesn’t detract from the richness of understanding of this company’s 
management style as the data is full of examples and mechanisms used by the respondents 
around their own management style and techniques to illustrate why they think the 
company is successful.  
There is no doubt from the evidence that the belief that ‘people matter’ influences the 
firm’s management style summed up by the CEO as ‘stay in touch with all the people in 
the organization (HE 22/06/10)’. Many of the contributions reflect the ‘7 Principles’ which 
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form the basis for all management training in the company and appear as cards on 
managers desks and on the walls. The ‘7 Principles’ were articulated by the CEO in the 
late 90’s when he was asked what a managers role encompassed in the company and his 
principles have been used in training ever since. The principles are: 
1. Put yourself in the place of the people you manage; 
2. Remember your targets, but keep in mind that very few of them can be met without 
the efforts of those you are managing; 
3. Get out of your chair; 
4. Never forget how important you are to the people you manage; 
5. Pitch in and help. Don’t do everything, but don’t automatically delegate; 
6. Communicate, communicate, communicate. Feedback, feedback, feedback; 
7. Leave your ego at the door when you come in each morning. 
 
Essentially it’s about actions demonstrating ‘accessible management at every level. 
Managers sit amongst their team and are not remote from their day to day needs and 
feedback (NWK 10/06/2010)’ and it’s behavioural: ‘it’s almost a way of interacting with 
people that makes them believe in you, believe that you would do it if you had to and that 
you value their input (JM 22/06/10)’. It’s very much about leading by example. The Head 
of Communications commented ‘it comes from the top (LS 12/11/10)’ with the Head of 
Confused.com telling me that he follows the other senior managers example, particularly 
the CEO in that ‘I try to do the same, walk the floor every day and say hello to everybody 
(NWK 03/02/11)’. The current CFO in explaining why he thinks Admiral is different from 
other companies he has worked for told me ‘there is this tremendous knowledge of the 
detail of the business which is very unusual and so is the way in which management think 
and work which is very practical and very hands on, very testing (KC 03/02/11)’.  
Reading the excerpts from the interviews and emails that have been coded to this theme 
(see Appendix A.6 on page A-333) and recoding the text to the 7 Principles above it is 
interesting to note that 71% of the participants talked about at least one aspect of the 7 
principles. This recoding analysis is represented in the following graph. 
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Figure 5-11: Showing how many times each respondent referred to at least one aspect of 
the 7 Principles. 
It is not perhaps surprising that the CEO and author of the Principles has 18 mentions of at 
least one aspect of the Principles in his interview and although he didn’t specifically talk 
about ‘pitching in’ (No 5) or ‘lack of ego’ (No 7) in the extracts coded for the 
‘management style’ theme both aspects featured in the rest of his interview. For example 
when he’s talking about recruitment he tells me ‘how they just answer that simple question 
of “tell me about yourself” is a really big reply to the question I have, is how ego driven 
are they? (HE 22/06/10)’ and later adds ‘anybody who says “no, not really, that’s beneath 
me” they are not part of the culture, they don’t hire them (HE 22/06/10)’. With the 
exception of AP, JM, GR and SC all these respondents are leaders of large groups of 
people and one would expect some mention of the Principles to be articulated. I find it 
interesting that the fact that even for those hired post-IPO: KC, NWK, FG, DL, EB, AR 
and CH are as inculcated with the Principles as those with longer tenure. As a senior 
manager myself I feel satisfied that the indoctrination process of our newer managers has 
obviously been effective. 
One surprising omission from this list was that of the COO. In his interview he recognizes 
the importance of people and the culture but comments: ‘I would be intellectually very 
keen to maintain it and renew it but quite anxious that I’m not necessarily that well 
equipped to know how … so I’m sort of thinking the importance is you need people in the 
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organization that can fight for the culture (DS 24/06/10)’. He also stated at the start of this 
interview that ‘I think I will probably end up talking, first of all, about some of the things 
that I haven’t seen flying around on the email as much. So, it might be slightly skewed in 
that respect (DS 42/06/10)’. Additionally, DS is an NT Myers-Briggs combination which 
would lead me to conclude that his strengths are not naturally orientated towards thinking 
about people although it is clear from his comments that he appreciates the importance of 
those aspects to Admiral’s success. 
From the primary data the following word cloud describes the management style at 
Admiral. These descriptors mesh well with the ‘people matter’ theme as they describe a 
style of managing that respects the values articulated by a company who believe that 
people do matter. 
 
Figure 5-12: Word cloud constructed from interview and email data-sets phrases or 
adjectives describing the management style at Admiral. The larger and 
bolder the text the more participants used that phrase.  
5.5.5.2 Supporting evidence from the secondary data  
THE CEO’s 7 Principles exist widely in training materials throughout the Admiral 
Academy (run by GR one of the interviewees) and all new managers received formalized 
training in these principles and laminated cards for their desks listing the principles.  The 
CEO also talks to groups of managers on what the 7 Principles mean and there is data 
available from his presentations. For example: from the Cardiff Operations Managers in 
2004, to all managers based in Seville 2009, to all senior managers in the Group September 
2013 and most recently to all the managers in the US insurance company Elephant.com in 
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April 2014. So, as an articulation of the management style, it is used throughout the 
company. But is there other evidence? 
Three main sources of numeric secondary data can partially evidence the management 
style that the managers describe. These sources are: (1) the Annual staff survey data 
available from 1999 to 2013 as described in Section 5.5.4.2 where it was also used; (2) the 
Best Companies to Work For 2011-2013 survey also described in Section 5.5.4.2; and (3) 
GPTW Institute data 2011 to 2013. The Great Place to Work® Institute conducts research 
and recognizes leading workplaces in more than 45 countries on six continents. It has 
published national and international best companies lists since 2000 and Admiral began 
benchmarking in 2001 with the GPTW Institute. It has placed every year of the benchmark 
and since 2007 Admiral has featured every year in the top 10. Random samples of staff are 
selected from the payroll system each year to complete the Trust Index survey which 
comprises 66% of the ranking algorithm and the Communications Department complete 
the Cultural Audit which comprises the reminder of the ranking algorithm. This is 
discussed further in Section 5.5.15 where the ‘culture enables’ theme is developed from the 
primary data and evidenced in the secondary data. The Admiral European countries have 
also started to benchmark themselves in the European lists run by the GPTW Institute and 
as a consequence, Admiral has featured in the Great Place to Work Best Workplaces in 
Europe list since 2008 coming 4th in 2012 and 2nd in 2013 as the European ventures have 
improved their results. 
Firstly, from the annual staff survey conducted by the Communications Department at 
Admiral, selected questions can evidence elements of the ‘management style’ in use. 
However one could argue that the effects of the management style can also be evidenced 
and these were used in Table 5-9 on page 5-151 and formed part of the evidence chain for 
the ‘people matter’ theme. Between 70 and 85% of all staff across all sites complete the 
survey each year. The results are shown in the next table where for each year the 
percentage of staff responding positively to that question is shown.  
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Table 5-12: Results 1999-2013 for selected questions from the Admiral staff survey 
conducted in December. 
As mentioned when looking at this data in Section 5.5.4.2, in 2003 there was a consistent 
drop across all areas in the survey where the senior management team attributed this to the 
uncertainty over the sale or otherwise of the company.  
These questions only evidence the communication elements of the 7 principles although 
the last two questions which first appeared in the survey in 2012 indicate that currently the 
staff approve of the management style.  
However using the data from the annual external survey conducted by Best Companies that 
was used to evidence the ‘people matter theme’ in Table 5-10 on page 5-152 and matching 
the wording of the survey question to the adjectives used in the wordcloud in Figure 5-12 
provides a proxy for a number of the elements of the management style evinced in the 
primary data. This mapping is shown below. 
Although only recent data was available for this study, the fact that Admiral has ranked 
every year since 2001 should indicate that it performs consistently across the question set. 
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Table 5-13:  Results 2011 -2013 for selected questions from the Best Companies survey 
conducted each year mapped against adjectives used to describe the 
management style taken from the primary data. 
This data supports the communication aspects of the management style but also lends 
credence that the staff are experiencing the style espoused by the managers in reality 
particularly with regards to an open transparent accessible style with the manager role 
more as role models, mentor and coach providing support rather than as wielders of formal 
authority (as described by Mintzberg, 1975). 
Additional evidence for management style can be found in the survey conducted by the 
GPTW Institute.  
‘There is a very relaxed attitude; you are expected to get work done efficiently 
and to a high standard, but that doesn't mean you can't enjoy your time in 
work. I regularly get to see and speak to my managers and senior managers, 
and they make a real effort to have a presence in our department’ Anonymous 
member of staff 52  
This quote is taken from their 2012 feedback report listing responses to the open-ended 
questions GPTW ask employees. This quote supports the idea that the management style is 
relaxed and yet the employees realize that they must work to high expectations. 
                                                 
52  Quote taken from the Employee Comments Report produced after the Admiral survey in the 2012 UK’s 
Best Workplaces Programme conducted by GPTW Institute. 
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The GPTW Institute have developed a model which defines ‘a great workplace as one 
where employees trust the people they work for, have pride in the work they do, and enjoy 
the people they work with’  (GPTW Graphical Scores Report, Admiral Group Plc, 2011: 
3)53. The GPTW model© measures these three relationships but it is the relationship 
between employees and management that is of interest here. This is a 64-instrument survey 
designed to see how a company fits the model and produces a benchmark for comparison 
each year. The model54 examines trust as a key component of the employee’s relationship 
with management. The drivers of trust in this model are: (1) credibility whose dimensions 
concern two-way communication, competence and integrity; (2) fairness whose 
dimensions include equality, impartiality and justice; and lastly (3) respect whose 
dimensions of support, collaboration and caring. Dimensions of credibility and respect 
emerged from the primary data. By using Admiral’s performance against this model I am 
arguing that the management style must be conducive to building a relationship with 
management that scores Admiral as a ‘Great Place To Work’. 
 
Table 5-14: Results from the GPTW Institute Trust Index 2011 -2013. 
Like the Best Companies data, only recent data was available for this study, but the fact 
that Admiral has ranked every year since 2001 should indicate that it performs consistently 
across the question set. It also outperforms the Top 25 Large Companies in the UK 
benchmark indicating that perhaps these three dimensions of the model are part of 
Admiral’s success story. This can be seen in the table overleaf. 
                                                 
53  Report made available by the Communications Department. 
54  See the model on  http://www.greatplacetowork.net/our-approach/what-is-a-great-workplace: Accessed 
17/02/14, 4:16pm. 
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Table 5-15: Comparing Admiral’s results for the statement ‘Taking everything into 
account I would say this is a great place to work’ versus the average in its 
Top 25 Large companies cohort from the GPTW results 2011-2013. 
The last source of evidence is in the ‘core competencies’ referred to by GR in his interview 
(24/06/10). These are used by the Academy to help train managers and use to recruit new 
managers within the company.  GR was the only interviewer to refer to them when 
specifically asked about management training but they do exist and GR made the most 
recent iteration available for this study. The role of each hierarchical layer is defined 
within this competency framework and the departmental managers competencies are listed 
in Table 5-16 under three key competency headings. 
The competencies are articulated and documented internally by the People Services 
Department so it is not surprising that we find similar language used in the competencies 
as used by the managers themselves as indicated in the wordcloud constructed from the 
primary data in Figure 5-12. Table 5-16 lists the competencies for the department 
managers (who form part of the UK CMG the majority of whom provide the primary data) 
as well as the expectation of the roles at each level of the company. Each competency has 
relevant words highlighted in the matching colours of words or sentiments expressed in the 
wordcloud in Figure 5-12.  
From this analysis there is evidence of a relationship between the way managers describe 
their style and the competencies delivered down through the management hierarchy. Not 
surprising given the source of the competencies but together with the external survey data 
from the employees there appears to be a synergy in the espoused theory (primary data 
descriptions of management style) and the ‘theory –in-use’ (Argyris & Schon, 1974) 
experienced by the employees. Although it is hard to directly compare the evidence from 
the secondary data there is a compelling story here of the management style evinced by the 
managers creating an environment that reflects that style. 
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Informal conversations with CA, Head of People Services and JM, the former occupant of 
that role, show that although competencies have only being formalised and revised in the 
last decade, prior to that they believe the management style has not changed and has been 
open and transparent and energising and above all effective in creating a place where 
people want to work since the launch days. 
 
Table 5-16:  Role expectations and core competencies for departmental managers 
highlighted where matches can be found with language used in the primary 
data interviews. 
5.5.5.3 Summarising evidence for the ‘Management Style’ Proto-theme 
Management style has emerged as a theme from the primary data separate from the ‘people 
matter’ theme but the style revealed in the primary data is contingent upon a belief that 
‘people matter’. The secondary evidence supports the espoused style by revealing that the 
way of working at Admiral as experienced by the employees is likely based on the 
espoused style and that this is a company whose founding value to ‘stay in touch with all 
the people in the organization (HE 22/06/10)’ has effected its style of management which 
is recognised by external benchmarking to being a contributory factor of a ‘great 
workplace’.  
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5.5.6 Development of ‘a balancing act’ theme 
From the email data set, this emerged as a theme where the respondents talked about 
balancing two quite different positions for example ‘the minutiae and the macro (AR 
04/06/10 (ii))’ or ‘our culture is relaxed and informal, but we measure everything (LS 
22/06/10)’. There was even a use of the word “paradox” in this data set: 
‘I think there is a bit of a paradox about us – we are very relaxed about most 
things to do with the working environment and how we manage staff – dress 
code, flexitime in some departments, flat structure, no hierarchies, fun, etc – 
and yet we’re anything but relaxed about the actual business – results, details, 
the method of how we do things – we are relentless in pursuing better ways of 
doing things and better results CB 23/06/10’. 
The theme developed further from the interview data and although one of the smaller 
themes with only 30 contributions (6 of which were prompted in a stand alone interview: 
AP 11/11/10) it has emerged as an element of the firm’s success. 
5.5.6.1 Evidence from the primary data 
The balancing acts that emerged from the email discussion set of codes were: a balance 
between freedom and control, between action and inaction and between fun and control. 
All of these codes were used in the interview data set too but were nuanced by further 
coding as seen in the following table. 
 
Table 5-17: Codes from the email and interview data that encompass the ‘A balancing 
act’ theme. See Appendix A.7 for details. 
The word “balance” was used occasionally. In the interview with the CEO he told me that 
he believed a founding value of the firm was ‘a balance between work and home (HE 
22/06/10)’. But, for the most part, respondents would compare two different aspects of 
their experience at Admiral as two opposing positions where balance was maintained. For 
example a phrase from the current People Services Manager was coded as ‘balance fun & 
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control’. He was illustrating for me the fact that this is a firm who takes its business very 
seriously and yet has fun ‘so, I have got first-hand experience of people coming in and 
taking a look around and thinking, they must be thinking “how are these people making 
money? You’ve got a group of people shoving donuts in their mouth for God’s sake, is this 
a serious organisation or what!” (CA 11/11/10)’. This balance between a relaxed fun 
culture and a serious approach to numbers and performance figured prominently in the 
data. As did the apparent dichotomy of managers that really understand the detail of the 
business with a more casual decision making process and focus on the big picture 
strategically: ‘There is, in my mind, a strange juxtaposition of very detail oriented data 
analysis in a lot of areas of the business at a surprisingly micro level and it’s easy to forget 
now because I’ve been here so long …  but then you have got this process of decision 
making which actually is free of a lot of data and information, it is based on a 
conversation and a bit of a debate (KC 03/02/11)’.  
It struck me, in reviewing the reportage memos after the first interviews, that I was seeing 
paradoxical comparisons. The Oxford Dictionary55 definition of a “paradox” includes the 
statement ‘1.2 A person or thing that combines contradictory features or qualities (Oxford 
Dictionary)’. The interviews would talk about “fun” yet being “super results orientated”, 
about “being tight” and yet everyone receives share allocations, about having “autonomy” 
and yet “tight control”. To try and resolve this thinking I scheduled an interview with the 
ex-Finance Director specifically to talk about these seeming paradoxes at work within the 
firm. This interview (AP 11/11/10) and a later one with the current Finance Director (KC 
03/02/11) can be summed up as ‘I don’t find that a paradox … they’re balancing acts (AP 
11/11/10)’. Specifics questioning around the paradoxes observed from the data essentially 
were resolved: it would appear that the participants don’t particularly see what they do as 
paradoxical but as balancing priorities between two equally important elements of the 
business. This is represented by Table 5-18.  
Hence the theme of ‘a balancing act’ emerged from the primary data as an element of 
Admiral’s success. 
                                                 
55  http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/paradox. Accessed 01/04/14 at 16:08. 
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Table 5-18: Detailing the resolution of apparent paradoxes from the data through 
specific questioning 
5.5.6.2 Supporting evidence from the secondary data  
This is a difficult theme to triangulate from secondary data as balancing competing 
elements is intrinsic to the management team and something innate that they “do” rather 
than rationalise and action. It certainly is neither a topic of conversation in minutes of 
meetings nor in more informal email communication. 
One could argue that the financial success of the company and the success of the company 
as a Great Place to Work in external benchmarking indicates that balance must exist 
between the desire to make profits and the desire to keep people happy. 
However there are some clues in external benchmarking data that the company undergoes. 
Firstly, there is evidence that the workforce as a whole is positive (a score between 5 and 
6) about the work-life balance that exists in the firm mentioned in the CEO’s interview as a 
founding value (see quote on page 5-163). This is shown in the following table. 
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Table 5-19: Results 2011 -2013 for question about work-life balance from the Best 
Companies survey conducted each year. Scores range from 1 (the lowest) to 
7 (the highest) and 4 is a neutral position. 
Other supporting evidence comes from the employee comments to the open-ended 
question asked in the survey conducted by the GPTW Institute. These quotes are taken 
from their 2012 feedback report listing the anonymous responses to the open-ended 
questions.  
‘It is a truly a unique place to work. The work is challenging but you are 
encouraged to have fun as well so there is a good balance of hard work and 
having a laugh which helps reduce stress in the work place’ 
‘there is a great balance of work/home life’ 
‘Admiral is able to balance running a very effective company and making sure 
its workforce are happy and having fun’ 
These are examples from the 14 answers (4% of total answers) that included the word 
”balance” and is suggestive of a company that at least has balance between the focus on 
results and creating a great place to work as recognized by the staff themselves. 
5.5.6.3 Summarising evidence for the ‘a balancing act’ theme 
Although there is not the wealth of supporting secondary data for this theme, this theme 
represents an example of “axial coding” using grounded theory terminology (Corbin & 
Strauss, 2008) where it is defined as ‘cross-cutting or relating concepts to one another’ (p. 
195). It is also a good example of Zachariadis et al. (2013) retroductive methodology for 
critical realists where retroduction of the raw data yields insights into implicit actions by 
managers may yield a theme that can be construed as dynamic capability.  
5.5.7 Development of ‘attention to detail’ theme 
From the email data set, this emerged as a proto theme, as did ‘numbers matter’ (see next 
section) and it wasn’t until the analysis of the interview data set that it became clear that 
these two were separate themes albeit related to each other. The phrase ‘attention to detail’ 
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emerged meaning ‘stay close to the business’ separate from the focus on numbers: one tool 
by which the managers stay close to their business. 
5.5.7.1 Evidence from the primary data 
Appendix A.8 shows the full coding tables that make up this theme but the underlying 
codes are represented in the next table. 
 
Table 5-20: Codes from the email and interview data that encompass the ‘attention to 
detail’ theme. See Appendix A.8 for details. 
This theme includes examples of how the participants pay attention to detail themselves: 
how they measure everything ‘if it moves measure it (AP 11/11/10)’; perform their own 
analysis and recognise patterns ‘we’re able to see when problems crop up very early 
because the numbers all have their own patterns (HE 22/06/10)’; and specifically pay 
attention to cost. This frugality is cultural and starts at the very top of the organization but 
represents ‘a foundational commitment to lower cost (AR 04/04/10 (i))’: through hiring 
new managers ‘they [senior appointees] come and join us, hopefully, at a reasonable price 
(LS 12/11/10)’ to the Cardiff location ‘the Cardiff location is a big element of this "low 
cost" approach (CC 03/06/10)’ and ‘a very strong focus on cost control and "find the 
cheapest or simplest way" to do something, or just do without (KC 08/06/10)’.  The current 
Finance Director also noted in his interview that: ‘the degree of frugality as Andrew would 
like to call it, is far higher than anywhere else I’ve worked (KC 03/02/11)’. 
In Section 5.5.1, in the development of the ‘recruitment and indoctrination’ theme, the 
practice of promoting from within or ensuring all new senior managers undergo basic level 
training was discussed as key to Admiral’s success. There is a feeling amongst the 
participants that such a background allows a manager to ‘know the business inside out, 
including knowing our customers, from having worked in it from the ground up 
(CB14/06/10)’. This, with the expectation that managers do practice the mantra ‘which is 
understand your business; keep close to it (AP 23/06/10)’ and still maintain a balance 
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between that familiarity with the minutiae and ‘being able to operate on a bigger scale (AP 
23/06/10)’, emerged as a quite separate theme from the data as important to Admiral’s 
success. 
5.5.7.2 Supporting evidence from the secondary data  
Like ‘a balancing act’, this is a difficult theme to triangulate from secondary data as this 
behaviour is intrinsic to the management team and to the culture of the business. 
There is secondary evidence in the conversations and presentations of the participants in 
other forums in the company.  For example the CEO often talks about staying close to the 
business exhorting the international and UK managers at their annual 2012 meeting to 
‘stay close to your business, your staff and your customers’56. Backing up his words, the 
CEO meets every single new employee to give them this message57, and often gives 
examples during meetings with his managers to illustrate this principle: for example his 
production of the media spend by competitors over time spread-sheet or his retention 
report that he circulates monthly, having put the numbers together himself, for as he notes 
in his interview: ‘we’re able to see when problems crop up very early because the numbers 
all have their own patterns (HE 22/06/10)’. He also gave this example at his MAD lecture 
in September 201358:  
‘Silly rules and things that are hard to justify—we do that on a regular basis 
now, and that’s an incredible meeting. You know, try doing that. And this year 
for the first time at the staff general meeting, we challenged all the staff to tell 
us what they thought in an email and had about 400 replies, every one of which 
had a manager that responded to it. And it was a great success because I read 
every one of the 400, and although some were saying the same things, I don’t 
think there was a single one that wasn’t interesting, that wasn’t raising 
something that was important to our business and an interesting question or a 
comment about what we do; proving to me that the staff really do care and they 
really do know what’s going on’. 
Until recently, HE reminded me in his interview that he read customer comment forms 
every week. 
                                                 
56  Verbatim quote taken from his speech at MAD Sept 2012. Permission granted to use. 
57  See HE’s Welcome speech: found on I drive on Admirals servers under /global/Henry’s Welcome 
Talks/Henry Welcome Talk (2013 Full Year Results) updated.ppt 
58  HE allowed me to tape his speech and this quote is taken from the transcript. 
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The Chairman of the company in an address to the same MAD in September 2013 
reminded them ‘I am frequently asked by people what makes Admiral so successful and I 
say there is no one thing … [but] … with our senior management close to the business’59. 
This excerpt from his speech indicates that he recognises that this attention to detail plays a 
part in the Admiral success story. 
At the MAD in 2012, the CEO asked the international managing directors to speak on 
various topics.  The director of Conte, Admiral’s Italian insurance subsidiary’, was asked 
to speak to ‘What is our competitive advantage?’. Amongst the elements she raised was 
‘staying close to the business, especially our customers’60.  
And lastly a quote from the open-ended question asked in the survey conducted by the 
GPTW Institute taken from their 2012 feedback report: 
‘The managers and the CEO regularly keep in contact to maintain a close 
working relationship between management and other members of staff 
(Anonymous member of staff)’ 
These quotes, out of the interview context, show that the attention to detail is seen as key 
to success and that it is demonstrated at the very highest level of the firm. 
The last piece of triangulation data to support this was an analysis of my email inbox in 
January - March 2013. Each piece of formalised correspondence sent to the UK-CMG was 
categorised and counted to show in one quarter the level of detail about the business that 
the senior staff are expected to master along with their own areas. For example as a Board 
member I would expect to get the monthly financial reports from the subsidiaries but in 
addition as a member of the UK-CMG I received a number of emails to help me stay 
abreast of the business as a whole. This analysis is reproduced in the following table. 
                                                 
59  Alistair Lyons is the non-executive Chairman of the Group and provided me with a transcript of his 
speech with permission to use in this study. 
60  I attend the MAD. Verbatim quote from her talk for which she gave me permission to use. 
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Table 5-21: Number of emails sent to UK-CMG (as only recipients) between January and 
March 2013 
These emails show that the group is kept up-to-date with the key drivers of the business: 
claims and underwriting in line with the general business results plus in touch with new 
product developments: in this quarter the household numbers (launched December 2012), 
and two test products. There are also a goodly number of emails around People Services, 
communications and aspects of our culture. The analysis did not include the daily updates 
from the Ministry of Fun that are sent to the whole company. Several examples of how the 
participants pay attention to the detail can be found in the primary data (see Appendix 
A.8).  
5.5.7.3 Summarising evidence for the ‘attention to detail’ theme 
The data points to a group of managers who believe that they are close to the business and 
believe this is a success factor for the firm. This belief is not just expressed in the interview 
data but is supported by secondary sources.  
5.5.8 Development of ‘numbers matter’ theme 
As mentioned in the last section, this emerged early as a proto theme and it wasn’t until the 
analysis of the interview data set that it became clear that ‘attention to detail’ and ‘numbers 
matter’ warranted being separate themes despite the relationship between the two concepts.  
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This is a firm that believes ‘if it moves, measure it (AP 11/11/10)’ and this belief in 
quantitative data as a tool to manage important elements of the business stretches from 
obvious numerical data such as financial performance and telephony statistics, 
sophisticated statistical pricing techniques and quantitative measurement of marketing but 
also to survey data for staff opinion and feelings and ‘even the stuff in my department 
which people say you can’t measure, we still find a way of measuring it (LS 12/11/10)’. 
5.5.8.1 Evidence from the primary data 
From the ‘recruitment and introduction’ theme in Section 5.5.1 there is evidence that this is 
a firm who recruits ‘highly intelligent people who could number crunch (GR 24/06/10)’. 
So there is a propensity and comfort level with quantitative data.  As one participant told 
me ‘we spend hours on the numbers (LS 12/11/10)’. 
The proto-theme emerged from the email discussion set of codes: Measure 
everything/Numerate/Rational/Analytical. All of these codes were used in the interview 
data set too but were nuanced by further coding as seen in the following table. 
 
Table 5-22: Codes from the email and interview data that encompass the ‘numbers 
matter’ theme. See Appendix A.9 for details. 
This theme and ‘attention to detail’ both are roughly the same frequency of underlying 
codes: 48 to 55 respectively although Table 5-22 shows how few codes actually make up 
this theme. The theme ranges from actual measurements ‘with all the measures available 
… looks at numbers constantly (AR 04/06/10)’ to using those numbers ‘we do what the 
numbers point to (NWK 10/06/10)’ and the belief that ‘numbers create the solution (CH 
10/06/10)’.  
A quote from the CEO’s interview sums up this theme as it emerged from the primary 
data: 
‘Numerate, measure, we measure virtually everything and we watch how it 
all falls together and we’re able to see when problems crop up very early 
because the numbers all have their own patterns and the minute a number 
deviates from the pattern we’re all over it like an old suit (HE 22/06/10)’ 
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This is a firm that believes that ‘numbers matter’. 
5.5.8.2 Supporting evidence from the secondary data  
Beyond the wealth of financial and performance reporting that is the hallmark of any 
successful firm, this is a firm that measures everything.  When the company was preparing 
for it’s IPO in 2004, the Global Offer Listing Particulars (p. 1)61 listed a number of 
competitive strengths which included: (1) ‘low cost direct distribution’ a description 
including both cutting edge sales technology (combining telesales, outbound dialling and 
the internet) but more importantly for successful enterprise Admiral’s marketing efficiency 
in its peer group yielding lower acquisition costs (see Chapter 1) and (2) ‘extensive data 
collection and utilisation’ describing Admiral’s pricing capability allowing risk selection 
at an appropriate price.  
These could be considered two of Admirals core operational (as defined by Helfat and 
Winter (2011)) capabilities and both rely heavily on numbers and an analytical capability 
of those numbers and application to the business. Along with operational costs, 
remembering that a focus on ‘low cost’ is part of the ‘attention to detail’ theme in the 
previous sub-section, having one of the lowest acquisition costs in the market allows 
Admiral to maintain the lowest expense ratio of its peer group (see Figure 1-4 on page 1-
15 for data to support this statement). The other element of the combined ratio measure 
used to gauge success in the market (again see Chapter 1) is linked to pricing capability. 
The ability to charge the appropriate premium for any given risk feeds through into a 
superior loss ratio (again see Chapter 1 for supporting evidence for this statement) which is 
the ratio of claims paid out to premiums taken and the premium is determined by pricing. 
Any profits are determined by the gap between total premium written in any year plus 
investment income and the combined ratio of claims and operational expenses (again in 
Chapter 1, see Figure 1.4). 
Pricing is a heavily statistical process where data from every policy sold and renewed is 
collected and can be analysed by rating factor. Admiral had 25 rating factors to determine 
                                                 
61  Hard copy distributed to all shareholders in 2004. Admiral executive managers and sponsors Merrill 
Lynch International and Citigroup prepared this document. The document was produced in accordance 
with the listing rules of the UK Listing Authority made under Section 74 of the UK Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 and was available prior to flotation for analysts and potential investors 
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price in 1993 and now has between 50 and 70 depending on the source of the information. 
For example, aggregators ask more questions allowing more information to be available 
for rating. Rating is an analytical process looking for predictive data for claims. Asking the 
head of the underwriting team at Admiral UK to comment on Admiral’s pricing advantage, 
measured by superior loss ratios in the market (see Chapter 1) he noted that:  
‘if asked,  what the main reasons are for our pricing advantage then we tend to 
talk about data (more of it and better quality), the company being very data 
driven (test and learn approach, pricing analysis key to cross-department 
decisions) and simply the way we do our analysis (DS [current COO still] very 
involved, common sense and intuition more important than statistical expertise 
etc.)’62 
Supporting this, one analyst report published in August 201163 notes ‘much of the key to 
Admiral’s success lies in the pricing department … An entrepreneurial and innovative 
approach is taken, maximising the use of data (more questions, more data, more 
disaggregation) and accentuating common sense over a black-box actuarial approach’.  
Marketing efficiency is about knowing exactly how many quotes can be expected from any 
given marketing activity at an expected cost based on past performance. It links with the 
conversion rates to sales which are determined by pricing and to the throughput ability 
determined by telesales agents and/or capacity of web servers. It is very fine grained 
analysis so for example testing will establish the metrics of any given activity and can 
distinguish between say a 10x1 ad run in a given newspaper with a 10x3 ad in the same 
paper or a 10x1 in another paper, or a 10 second ad versus a 20 second ad on a particular 
TV channel. Cost is not the only lever. The type of customer responding to any particular 
ad in any given medium is also key and relates to pricing and hence to the overall risk 
selection for the firm. 
However, the primary data raised the point that this is a firm that also measures a whole 
range of softer variables such as capturing peoples opinions and beliefs about their work 
and environment. It achieves this through surveys. There are four main surveys done 
although ad hoc surveys can be conducted on the intranet at any time to get an answer to a 
                                                 
62  Email from RC sent to me asking him to comment on pricing dated 07/04/14 22:16:15 GMT+0.00. 
63  Autonomous (2011). ‘Admiral: Keeping faith in a hard market’, Available from Investor Relations at 
Admiral. 
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question. These are (1) monthly surveys to take a snapshot of important cultural elements 
in the business where the actual number of people surveyed varies by department chosen 
that month but the survey questions remain the same with typically a 70% response rate64; 
(2) the annual survey which has run since 1995 but in its present form since 1999 which 
measures all the important cultural elements in the business; (3) the GPTW Institute 
conduct an external benchmarking survey resulting in a cultural assessment and an 
employee trust index; (4) The Sunday Times 100 Best Companies to Work for in the UK 
survey again resulting in a cultural assessment of the firm. These surveys have all been 
heavily used as secondary data in this thesis and as such the reader, by this point, should be 
familiar with the types of question asked and the results achieved. 
5.5.8.3 Summarising evidence for the ‘numbers matter’ theme 
Not only do the interview participants believe this is a firm where ‘numbers matter’, 
recruitment practices (see Section 5.5.1) and use and production of data within the 
company evidence this belief.  
5.5.9 Development of ‘structure helps’ theme 
The initial proto-theme developed around the idea that being a  ‘lean/flexible organization 
is a great advantage for us’.65 
5.5.9.1 Evidence from the primary data 
This is one of the smaller themes with only 14 contributions. These all revolved around a 
flat structure enabling flexibility and speed. Appendix A.10 shows the full coding table 
that make up this theme but essentially another quote from the Managing Director of Conte 
(see footnote below) summed up this aspect of the theme as  
‘A lean and flexible organisational structure: It’s our ability to avoid 
unessential overhead. It’s our ability to test ideas and prove them rather than 
                                                 
64  The member of staff in the Communications Team responsible for these monthly surveys responded by 
email to my request for information on 11 April 2014 12:01:22 GMT +01.00. She gave an example that 
in March 2014, 7 departments: a total of 438 people were surveyed with a 74% response rate that month. 
65  This quote is taken from an email discussion with the international managers on our resources and 
capabilities in January 2011 that I moderated as a development exercise for those managers. They gave 
me permission to use the discussion as a resource for my thesis. The contributor here was the Managing 
Director of Conte, the Italian insurance business. 
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carry-on long approval processes or long analysis or look for unanimous 
consensus. It’s our ability to avoid that bureaucracy slow down our business as 
usual. It’s our ability to prevent managers to use decision power as status in 
the company. It’s our ability to create trust that can facilitate decision making 
and implementation.’  
So the idea that a flat hierarchical structure ‘there are only 6 levels in sales between the 
CCR and Henry [CEO] (BM 15/06/10)’ enables the flexibility the participants had 
pinpointed as a key success factor and enables speed of response from decision to 
implementation emerged from the data. 
There was also some discussion on the looseness of the structure and the fluidity at the top 
levels being an advantage to the company as knowledge is shared. For example: the current 
COO, DS, has also headed up marketing, pricing and claims in the years since launch; the 
current CFO, KC, volunteered to run Confused in 2011 and then the US insurer 
Elephant.com from 2012 to date of writing whilst maintaining his CFO role; CB, who was 
Head of Marketing at the time of the interview was moved to head up the launch of the 
Household project in 2011 and now is the Head of IT (having being recruited into Claims 
when she first joined).  This has implications for the recruitment process of senior team 
with one interviewee telling me ‘I explain that to people when they come here. “Your job 
will not be so prescribed that you will know exactly what you’re doing because the next 
week you may be given something completely different so you have to be flexible, be able 
to change, be able to think on your feet” (LS 12/11/10)’. 
5.5.9.2 Supporting evidence from the secondary data  
 Unlike the other themes, this theme was nuanced by the secondary data on the idea that 
‘structure helps’. From the launch in 1993 through to the Global Listing Particulars 
published in 2004 to Analyst Reports from 2004 to 2014 it is clear that ‘structure helps’ 
this business through it’s capital structure. 
The idea for this enhancement to the theme came from a development session with the 
international managing directors that I moderated, in my role as mentor, over email in 
January 2011 (see footnote 65). The topic of discussion was the Group’s resources and 
capabilities as the participants saw them and a number of them mentioned Admiral’s 
unusual capital structure (along with the advantages of a flat hierarchy as evidenced 
above). 
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In 1993 the company launched under the aegis of Syndicate 253 at Lloyd of London, an 
institution that typically underwrites non-general classes of insurance such as marine, 
aviation, war, catastrophe etc. To write UK motor insurance, whilst not unheard of at 
Lloyds, selling direct to the public was a first. The company was set up with a distinctive 
proposition and a unique accounting structure that allowed it to amortise its start-up costs 
over three years benefiting each year of account and enhancing its attractiveness to capital 
providers to the Syndicate. 
In 1999, prior to a management buy-out (MBO), a new innovative capital structure was put 
into place to make the company more attractive to potential venture capital partners and 
survives today although the number and identity of the partners change from time to time.  
Admiral has put into place underwriting agreements with co-insurers and reinsurers to 
mitigate the risk of underwriting. The proportion has ranged from 35% retained by 
Admiral in 2000 to 25% at the IPO in 2004 to 28% in 2010 to 26% in 201366. These 
contracts also have profit commission clauses in them dependent on loss ratios and 
premiums written in any year. This commission can yield substantial risk-free (for 
Admiral) income. As the current Head of the US aggregator explains it: ‘it is our 
willingness to give away potentially higher returns for certainty of a limited to negligible 
downside’67 that makes this unique capital structuring an important element of this theme. 
The 2013 Annual Report68 describes these arrangements as:  
‘The Group has entered into certain co-insurance contracts under which 
insurance risks are shared on a proportional basis, with the co-insurer taking 
a specific percentage of premium written and being responsible for the same 
proportion of each claim … Under the terms of these agreements the co-
insurers reimburse the Group for the same proportionate share of the costs of 
acquiring and administering the business (p. 79).’ 
In terms of secondary data to support the theme as it emerged from the primary data, 
support can be found in a number of statements made in the 2013 Annual Report or in 
external players commenting on the nature of the organizational structure. 
                                                 
66  Figures taken from the appropriate Annual Reports: Accessed from http://www.admiralgroup.co.uk. 
67  See Footnote 65 for details of source of data but contributor here is the former Head of the US insurer 
and now current Head of the US Aggregator. 
68  Admiral Group Plc Annual Report and Accounts 2013: Accessed from 
http://www.admiralgroup.co.uk/pdf/annualreports/2013.pdf, 06/04/14: 16:07. 
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From the Chairman’s introduction (see Footnote 68, p. 36): ‘we also believe that good 
governance should be proportionate and that individual responsibility and accountability 
should not be lost within a mulit-layered committee structure that distances senior 
management from the day-to-day reality of operational activity’. 
From an analyst’s report (see Footnote 63, p. 10): ‘we see little evidence that Admiral is 
transforming itself into a cumbersome bureaucracy as it takes on more policies and more 
premium’. 
From the Chairman’s address to the International Managers meeting in September 201369: 
‘[we] have structures for business review and decision making that at times seem at odds 
with our flexible, responsive and non-bureaucratic way of doing things’. 
These statements suggest that the company presents itself externally as a lean and flexible 
organization.  
5.5.9.3 Summarising evidence for the ‘structure helps’ theme 
The literature has suggested that compared to trust: price and authority are relatively 
ineffective when dealing with knowledge-based assets and predict that high-trust 
institutional forms will develop (Adler, 2001). The evidence presented thus far in this case-
study indicates that this is a firm whose competitive advantage is knowledge based and 
scores highly on the Trust Index measured by the GPTW Institute. As trust has increased 
in importance in understanding modern firms, the relationship to flattening of hierarchies 
has been noted (Heisig & Littek, 1995). The idea that hierarchy is connected to 
organizational legitimacy (for a full review of this literature see Redmond, 2013) and that 
egos of top managers (Redmond, 2013) use hierarchy to fix relations and ranks within the 
organization is contradicted by the evidence in this firm at this stage of its development. 
There is an evidence that the senior managers in this firm do not use hierarchy as a tool for 
legitimacy (see coding for ‘lack of ego’ in the ‘culture enables’ theme data tables in 
Appendix A.16).  On the evidence from the primary and secondary data: managers in this 
firm believe that their lean and flexible structure is part of their success.  
                                                 
69  The Chairman kindly forwarded me a copy of his speech to the International Managers Forum for use in 
this study. 
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5.5.10 Development of ‘team building’ theme 
This theme did not emerge from the email data-set but emerged from the interviews 
particularly with a discussion at the first interview around team dynamics and team 
building.  
5.5.10.1 Evidence from the primary data 
This is one of the smaller themes with only 17 contributions with only one from a 
retrospective re-coding of the email data-set. There were 11 separate codes identified from 
the data as summarised in the following table. 
 
Table 5-23: Codes from the email and interview data that encompass the ‘team building’ 
theme. See Appendix A.11 for details 
11 of the 17 contributions came from interviews with people from the People Services 
department where much of the recruitment and training focus is on teams at all levels in 
the company below the senior management team which is a ‘team that get on well together 
and feel comfortable in each others company (SC 08/06/10)’. Looking at the participants 
contextual data in Table 4.5 on page 4-103, one can see that this is a group of people who 
in have worked together to deliver success and even a measure such as simple length of 
tenure will help this group build trust and respect in the corporate culture already 
evidenced thus far. 
A number of contributions built on the idea that teams at all levels are self-aware ‘we play 
to our strengths, we know each other, we know each other well (GR 24/06/10)’ and work 
to the strengths of their individual members ‘areas of skill and relative skills and the sum 
is much bigger than the individual parts (DS 24/06/10)’ and indeed are constructed to 
provide a balance of skills ‘I think as a company we are very well aware of the dynamics of 
teams … plan a team, starting with key people I think and then fill the gaps … you need all 
those different people (JM 22/06/10)’. 
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The current Head of People Services noted that teams are everywhere: both formal teams 
but ‘then there are lots of informal teams, really, people you’ve … it’s not a structured 
team but, if you like, groups of people who you’ve built a relationship over the years that 
you go to for advice and support (CA 11/11/10)’. 
Far from simply identifying that ‘team building’ was key to success, a number of 
contributions also gave a rationale for teams that reflect on other themes that emerged. For 
example on innovation the former CFO told me ‘being forced to be round the table with 
other people and pitch in, I think we’ve always got better ideas or ideas that have been 
refined because of team work (AP 11/11/10)’. On decision making there is more 
‘discussing and agreeing together rather than “I’ll tell you what to do” or “ you go do it 
because it’s your area” (KC 03/02/11)’ and on implementing change ‘the dynamics of a 
team can make such a difference (JM 22/06/10)’. 
As for the processes designed to bring teams together which is also described as ‘team 
building’ by the industry grown up to promote such events: a number of comments were 
made that these events needed to serve a purpose and that ‘throwing money at something 
isn’t the answer … you can do team building in much simpler ways (JM 22/06/10)’. The 
interview with the Head of the Admiral Academy shed light on many of the processes the 
firm uses to develop teams and team spirit within the firm. See the contributions made 
specifically by GR in the coding tables in Appendix A.11. 
5.5.10.2 Supporting evidence from the secondary data  
The vocabulary of ‘teams’ is very apparent when reviewing the way the company talks 
about itself in internal and external documents. For example, externally, the 2013 Annual 
Report (see Footnote 68) uses the word team to describe departments and specific groups 
of individuals using the word ‘team ’25’ times. Internally people use the word department 
and team interchangeably often using ‘team’ to describe their immediate cohort and with 
116 unprompted mentions in the 2012 GPTW Employee Response report it is clear that the 
word ‘team’ is part of the Admiral lexicon. 
 In the primary data tables (Appendix A.11) reference was made to the Academy’s use of 
the MBTI to help team building: with the emphasis on individuals becoming aware of their 
own strengths and limitations but being able to respect difference between individuals. The 
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programmes run are aimed both at individual managers but also at teams. In 2005, the 
entire management team at all levels completed MBTI training (their results contribute to 
the data shown in Table 5-5 and Table 5-6) and that year an externally moderated event 
based on team building using the MBTI was offered to the UK MAD (all 268 managers).  
The MBTI is used by ‘89 of Fortune 100 companies to maximise individual and team 
effectiveness from entry to executive levels’70 and in the UK the OPP website claims it 
helps ‘organisations unlock potential in individuals and teams’71. OPP have certified from 
one trainer in 2006 to X in 2014 Y staff from the Admiral Academy to deliver MBTI 
training. This is evidence that the firm takes team building seriously. 
Another source of evidence that ‘team building’ is an important element of Admiral’s 
success comes from the Best Companies results where ‘My Team’ is one of the 8 factors 
used in the overall result. The statements with which the employees must give a score 
where 1 is the lowest and 7 the highest give an indication of how the employees feel about 
their teams in action and the overall ‘team spirit’ which is a factor in highly performing 
teams albeit ill-defined in the literature (Silva et al., 2014) although it seems to revolve 
around a shared and cohesive culture (Bolman & Deal, 1992). The statements presented in 
the survey are: (1) My team is fun to work with; (2) I feel a strong sense of family in my 
team; (3) Working in this team gives me a buzz; (4) People in our team don’t care much 
for one another; and (5) People in my team go out of their way to help me. The graph 
overleaf shows the team spirit factor results over the last three years: 
 
 
                                                 
70  Quote taken from https://www.cpp.com/products/mbti/index.aspx: Accessed 07/04/14 16:45. 
71  Quote taken from http://www.opp.com: Accessed 07/04/14 16:47. 
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Figure 5-13: Results 2011 -2013 for statements asked about ‘My Team’ from the Best 
Companies survey conducted each year. Scores range from 1 (the lowest) to 
7 (the highest) and 4 is a neutral position. 
Although the data is only available for the most recent years, it seems reasonable to infer 
similar scores in previous years as Admiral has featured in the Best Companies to Work 
for in the UK since 2001. Although not directly supportive of the theme ‘team building’ it 
suggests that Admiral can build teams where the team members are very positive about 
that team and its inclusion as a factor in ‘Best Companies’ indicates that its emergence as a 
theme from the interviews talking about success is consistent with Best Companies ethos. 
Other supporting evidence comes from employees comments to the open-ended question 
asked in the survey conducted by the GPTW Institute. These quotes are taken from their 
2012 feedback report listing the anonymous responses to the open-ended questions:  
‘Managers often treat people as equals both in a professional and personal 
capacity and view everybodys role in the team as equally essential’; 
‘I like the great sense of team spirit here’; 
‘The team culture here is second to none’; 
‘We go out of our way to make all new starters feel welcome and part of the 
team from day one’; 
‘I just enjoy coming to work knowing I get on well with all my team’.  
Again these comments point to a firm that creates the sense of ‘team’ at a foundational 
level. 
5.5.10.3 Summarising evidence for the ‘team building’ theme 
The transcripts reveal that ‘team building’ is believed to be an element of Admiral’s 
success. The ability to create teams that have a shared culture and drive and that appreciate 
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the diversity of membership to create teams that are greater than the sum of their parts is a 
theme of success in the literature also. The secondary data shows that the concept of ‘team’ 
is embedded within the organizational psyche and that the ‘team spirit’ experienced by the 
employees supports the primary data evidence of shared culture and team ethos.  
5.5.11 Development of ‘external market intelligence’ theme 
This theme can be summarised by a contribution from one of the newer members of the 
UK management team who explained to me that ‘we listen to the market, we have 
antennae everywhere and can react pretty well (NWK 03/02/11)’. 
5.5.11.1 Evidence from the primary data 
This is one of the smaller themes with only 13 contributions that again developed initially 
from the interview data set with only one contribution from a retrospective re-coding of the 
email data-set. There were 11 separate codes identified from the data these 13 
contributions as each contribution nuanced the concept. These codes are summarised in the 
following table. 
 
Table 5-24: Codes from the email and interview data that encompass the ‘external market 
intelligence’ theme. See Appendix A.12 for details 
One of the codes used in developing this theme was ‘sensing’ taken directly from Teece’s 
2007 work on explicating dynamic capability where the capacity to ‘sense and shape 
opportunities and threats’ (p. 1319) is key. In the context of the coding it describes a ‘trait’ 
that is innate in the management team ‘It’s always been that the managers have been 
aware (JM 22/06/10)’. It is seen ‘as fundamental. If you are going to grow a business … 
you’ve got to understand the bigger market place. So you’ve got to look outside for data 
(AP 11/11/10)’. It is part of the decision making process because ‘you’ve got those 
[internal] metrics and you can translate what’s happening in the market place (AP 
11/11/10)’. The ex-CFO went on to give an example of this:  
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‘we’re in a position – or the group is in a position at the moment – where it has 
grown incredibly rapidly. That’s foreseen ... i.e. prices rapidly rising and that 
will be a time of extreme growth for us because of the way we’re positioned. 
So, you’re looking at the outside market, it’s got to move, it’s got to move, 
prices have got to move and when they do start it will be rapid and we will 
follow with rapid growth (AP 11/11/10)’  
So although there were fewer contributions than other themes, ‘external market 
intelligence’ emerged from the data as important to Admiral’s success. 
5.5.11.2 Supporting evidence from the secondary data  
Reading the thesis thus far should give the reader a feel for the extensive use of external 
data by the company as much of the secondary data and the data used to build the 
argument that Admiral is a successful firm in Chapter 1 originates externally. A list of 
what has been used externally is presented in the next table: 
 
Table 5-25: Listing sources of external data and use to which they are put within Admiral 
Almost the whole market subscribes to this same external data (other than the GPTW and 
Best Companies data) which begs the question how this can be a source of competitive 
advantage but I think the answer lies in quotes from the UK Head of Underwriting quote in 
full on page 173: ‘simply the way we do our analysis’.  
From Table 5-25 we can see that external data is important for benchmarking marketing 
and acquisition strategies, for benchmarking people management strategies, for mapping 
underwriting cycles which allow growth in turnover and indicate when levers need to be 
turned to maintain profits at times where the company is not chasing turnover. Google data 
is used hourly to determine spend and effectiveness. 
CHAPTER 5: EVIDENCE OF DYNAMIC CAPABILITY WITHIN ADMIRAL PLC 
  Page  5-184 
One key part of the benchmarking puzzle over price movements in the market has come 
with the advent and growth of the aggregators. Whilst not strictly an external source of 
data, Admiral does use their daily conversion rate and the number of times they appear top 
on a daily basis from Confused data72 to gauge their competitiveness in the market. 
Networking is also a good source of external intelligence. External factors such as 
networking are a recurrent theme of the knowledge-based view in the literature (see N. J. 
Foss, Lyngsie, & Zahra, 2013; Catherine L. Wang & Ahmed, 2003 for review). The 
company is a member of the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and attends functions 
and conferences. Individuals are members of groups that can be sources of information. A 
recent example is from a person who is heading up a newly formed telematics team whom 
I am mentoring. She sent me an email73 quoting a contact of hers from Merrill Lynch with 
interesting information on suppliers in the market about whom we’d had a conversation the 
previous week: ‘it looks like the Telematics stakes just got raised. I love HIMEX as I 
mentioned on the phone last week and it appears RAC and Ingenie have gobbled them up 
via Allianz’. This piece of information has changed her testing strategy for the next 
development of telematics for Admiral. 
Like networking, subscriptions to external publications and websites can also be a source 
of information. The company doesn’t keep a centralised database of what comes into the 
building but personally I am on a distribution list for the following publications:  
 
Table 5-26: List of publications including me on their distribution list at Admiral 
Like the networks to which I belong, these publications can be a source of ideas: for 
example reading about a new company in Marketing Week in 1998 that was promoting 
                                                 
72  Just to note that this is data that is made available to all Confused partners, Admiral does not see anyone 
else’s data only its own. 
73  Email received from JG 07/04/14 09:57:48 GMT +01:00. 
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advertising on the back door of service station toilets led me to call them to arrange a trial 
campaign for our new Diamond (insurance for women) brand that featured as part of our 
media mix until it became too expensive and hence inefficient in 2001. 
Finally the company accesses analyst reports where applicable and scrutinises company 
reports and DTI data from the competitors to gauge their strategy from their P&L and 
corporate communications.  
5.5.11.3 Summarising evidence for the ‘external market intelligence’ theme 
Not only do the managers believe that ‘external market intelligence’ is a success factor in 
this firm, the secondary data illustrates how such external data has been used to effect 
within the firm.  
5.5.12 Development of ‘strategic decision making’ theme 
The idea that Admiral’s decision making might be a key influence emerged as a proto-
theme during the email discussion when it was noted that: ‘top management is involved, so 
inputs from the very top of the organization can arrive for all sorts of decisions’ as a 
success factor and yet balanced by the view from the interview data set that ‘[managers] 
do have autonomy because you have to have it to get on with your job’. The participants 
are all senior managers in the organization and yet they all accept that there are:  
‘a small number of people making some of the big strategic decisions seems in 
some ways less empowering to others but  I think the empowerment comes 
through having set the direction, prepared to let the rest of the management get 
on with it. To be very quick with “this is the way we want to go” because, 
“why?”, bang, “this is roughly what you’ve got to do, get on with it, guys.” 
It’s the best of both worlds. (AP 23/06/10)’. 
So as the interviews continued the theme became more nuanced towards ‘strategic decision 
making’. 
5.5.12.1 Evidence from the primary data 
There were a number of elements of ‘strategic decision making’ that emerged from the 
primary data summarised by the codes used in the following table. 
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Table 5-27: Codes from the email and interview data that encompass the ‘strategic 
decision making’ theme. See Appendix A.13 for details 
The executive directors past and present contributed to the development of this theme 
specifically with regards to the dynamics of how decisions were made. ‘There are a lot of 
decisions that get made in terms of big decisions about direction in a surprisingly casual 
way’ which is ‘not obvious and it does rely heavily on personal chemistry’ (both quotes 
KC 03/02/11). The key decision makers also talked about this personal chemistry that 
seems to foster speed and decisiveness after a decision ‘based on intuition, judgement and 
robust debate (KC 03/02/11)’. It is the interaction between the top three executives who 
are described as the optimist, pessimist and pragmatist (see DS 24/06/10) plus the level of 
knowledge they have of the detail of the business (see Section 5.5.7 on ‘attention to detail’) 
and the external market intelligence they possess (see Section 5.5.11) and the trust they 
have developed between them (see quotes from AP 23/06/10 and 11/11/10 in Appendix 
A.13) which create the context for decision making in this firm.  
The executive team provide the strategic direction but there is an expectation that the next 
tier of managers is responsible for the implementation of that direction. They are expected 
to use their ‘ability to answer back and challenge (AP 23/06/10)’. They are also expected 
to be autonomous in the decision making that is more operational in nature using their 
various networks to seek help, inform, communicate but the data indicates that this lower 
level decision making is more team based where ‘there’s a nice sense of getting to the hub, 
the nub of the problem and then trying to find a solution to the problem in the way that 
discussions occur in the teams or whatever, as opposed to reporting to people what you 
are doing (KC 03/02/11)’.  
Regarding the role of the Board there is a sense from the primary data that ‘the strategy is 
defined by [CEO], [CFO] and [COO] running through the Board for agreement (CA 
11/11/10)’. The primary data didn’t allow for specific questioning on the role of the Board 
but there are secondary sources (see below) that indicate that the interaction between the 
Board and its executive team is not as simple as the last quote leads us to believe. 
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5.5.12.2 Supporting evidence from the secondary data  
The operation of the Board is formalized as you would expect for a company listed on the 
stock exchange and minutes of the meetings are very dry and factual and don’t really give 
an insight into the elements of ‘strategic decision making’ that emerged from the 
interviews. From the 2013 Annual Report74 the Chairman states (p. 36), on behalf of the 
Board, that ‘we believe that having a sound corporate governance framework enables 
effective and efficient decision making’ and later in the Governance Report (p. 40) the role 
of the Board is defined including the statement ‘the Board is the principal decision making 
forum for the group … delegating authority to the Executive team’. The view of decision 
making that emerged from the primary data needs to be reconciled with the view presented 
in formal governance statements of the company. 
The data I am using to reconcile these positions comes from interview data with the 
Executive Team for another study where the subject being explored is how strategic 
change comes about in this firm. There were three main interviews conducted with the 
CEO, the COO and the ex-CFO. I covered off the areas for this additional study with the 
current CFO in his interview for this research – hence the number of contributions his 
interview made to the development of this theme. Speaking to the same people as those in 
the primary interview is bound to produce supporting evidence for the view of ‘strategic 
decision making’ that emerged. However these interviews were gathered for a separate 
study, hence the appellation “secondary data” and allow comparison of the process from 
three separate viewpoints revealing the interactions of the Executive team adding richness 
to the understanding of this theme and support for the emerging theme from the primary 
data. They also reveal more of the nature of the relationship between the Board and the 
Executive team and how that has developed over time. 
The decision to run the new brands (a separate decision) as separate entities within the 
business was made when Admiral was in it’s early years (1996 for a launch in 1997) and 
still part of Syndicate 253 within Lloyds of London and no Board per se was in place. The 
CEO told me: ‘one of the things, though, that I ... really wanted to do, was set them up as 
individual entities with their own managing director, their own sales force, their own 
                                                 
74  Admiral Group Plc Annual Report and Accounts 2013: Accessed from 
http://www.admiralgroup.co.uk/pdf/annualreports/2013.pdf, 14/04/14: 14:43. 
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customer service force, their own renewals force; to create, to keep that small company 
feel in what was becoming an ever bigger organisation and I think that worked rather well 
(HE 01/02/11)’. The COO remembering this same decision said:  
‘Henry was a champion of the MD as sort of something truly like an MD and I 
would have been at a different position which was the MD was merely a 
figurehead and a head of operations but I think we went with the separate 
structures because Henry was a believer in small is beautiful, delegation of 
power, opportunities to innovate separately and all that sort of stuff, which I 
think is quite right and very logical and certainly the separation in terms of 
motivation was very valuable (DS 01/02/11)’.  
Whereas the ex-CFO commented ‘yes, and I argued the opposite (AP 02/02/11)’ having 
told me in one of the primary data interviews which touched on this as ‘you take fairly 
robust views, sometimes you agree to disagree (AP 23/06/10)’. So in these three quotes we 
see how discussion and differing viewpoints reach consensus. 
The next table compares the views of the Executive directors on three sample strategic 
decisions taken over a span in the company’s history. The context of these three decisions 
is explained here:  
1. The demise of the Gladiator brand. Gladiator was a motor broker set up in 1994 by 
the firm as a way of utilising the percentage of leads generated that did not convert as 
Admiral policies.  It was a way of generating income ancillary to the main motor 
underwriting that could offset marketing costs for the Admiral brand. It was set up 
under the aegis of a newly recruited manager who had been specifically recruited for 
his broking experience and run as a separate entity within the firm as it had its own 
systems, relationships and regulatory regime. From the interviews with the Executive 
Team they report the triggers for its closure being both low morale amongst the staff 
and disappointing annual survey results plus the financials were on a downward 
slope. 
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2. The Initial Public Offering (IPO) in 2004 followed the Management Buyout (MBO) 
in 1999. At the time of the MBO it was accepted that the venture capitalist (VC) 
partner, Barclays Private Equity, would want an exit in 4-5 years but whether that 
was to be a trade-sale or an IPO was a strategic decision to be taken. 
3. In 2010 after three years, the German start-up Admiral Direkt was divested from the 
Group in a trade sale. The data shown in Table 5-28 shows this was a difficult 
decision. 
The data in Table 5-28 overleaf shows that for the most part the Executive team are taking 
the key decisions. The influence of the Board can be seen in the IPO decision as the non-
executive Chairman and VC Board representative clearly had advice for the CEO (and 
experience of the IPO process). The decision to close Admiral Direkt was clearly an 
emotive one for the CEO and it is interesting that the Board did take that decision but the 
data clearly shows that was because the team couldn’t agree. Listening to the recordings of 
these interviews the CEO’s very factual statement about this German decision, at odds 
with his co-Directors opinion of his position, was delivered almost in a monotone. This is 
very noticeable as the rest of the interview he is very animated and passionate.  Reading 
the context of this decision from the other excerpts, here is a man who did feel passionately 
about the German project despite knowing the detail of the operation but has accepted the 
logic and rational decision that was made. 
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Table 5-28: Takes excerpts from the interviews with the Executive Directors (past and 
present) on three strategic decisions and allows comparison of views. 
But what is the role of the Board? Clearly from the primary data, the management team 
feel it’s more of a ratifying body but I think the evidence from these later interviews show 
that it is more than that. Certainly there is a lot of trust between long-serving members of 
the Board and whilst the CEO told me ‘I report to the Board (HE 01/02/11)’, from Table 
5-28 there is evidence that in at least two of these decisions he has sought and taken advice 
CHAPTER 5: EVIDENCE OF DYNAMIC CAPABILITY WITHIN ADMIRAL PLC 
  Page  5-191 
from Board members. The ex-CFO remembers the VC after the MBO influencing the 
internet decision ‘the only significant change in direction, which was a good one, was that 
Owen Clark pushed us to be more internet and we talked about Elephant and what have 
you and that was after the MBO and probably left to our own devices we wouldn’t have 
been as quick at it. He did give us a kick in that direction (AP 02/02/11)’. 
That decision-making is the province of the Executive team seems clear. From the primary 
data interview with the current CFO I was told: ‘I would argue that the European decisions 
were done and dusted, sorted, decided, long before they got anywhere near the board (KC 
03/02/11)’.  The Board presentations had been honed over many months (speaking to the 
managers that prepared them) and went to the Board along with a recommendation for or 
against. The order in which the European expansion happened was ‘a bit opportunistic. We 
were looking, it could have been Spain, at the time it could have been Italy. We liked Spain 
a lot, we didn’t like France, for instance, they were on our list, the list was five countries 
but we knew the US and France were going to be bottom of the list and the other three it 
sort of depended on who [people recruited to run those businesses] we found. (HE 
01/02/11)’. Both France and the US have recently launched: the US in 2010 and France in 
2011 and it seems the Executive team do recommend to the Board the course of action 
with the COO telling me: ‘I don't think we should have launched in the States. I’ve never 
thought we should launch in the States and... interesting one, difficult one. It was a very 
difficult one because, actually, the business plan went to the board at a meeting that Henry 
wasn’t at, which was a very difficult one because I ... which it shouldn’t have, actually, it 
was inappropriate really but... I guess I abstained (DS 01/02/11)’ and the US operation 
became a reality. 
In an email conversation75 between the former and current Company Secretaries and the 
current Head of Finance the view of Board involvement became clearer as did how 
strategic decision-making had evolved over time. Prior to the MBO: ‘strategy was totally 
driven by Henry, David and Andrew … I would be brought in when they needed 
financial/modelling on any ideas they were looking at.  We had a 5 year detailed financial 
model that we would often play about with, changing premium rates, loss ratio 
assumptions, ancillary growth etc to model quick growth vs slow growth, the impact of 
                                                 
75  Emails sent between myself asking for more information and SC, GJ (both participants in UK email 
forums to create the email data-set and MW 29/04/12 and 01/05/14. Permission to use was given. 
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Munich Re's share of business - units vs margin etc (email from SC 20/04/14 09:44:09 
GMT+0.1:00)’. After the MBO, Owen Clarke, the representative from Barclays Capital 
(the venture capital partners) contributed to the strategic decision-making in the view of 
SC and ‘the Board were only involved as a group when Henry/David had come to a 
conclusion on what they wanted to do - although Owen's support will have been sought 
prior to the meetings. (email from SC as per earlier)’.  Post IPO, the Head of Finance told 
me76 ‘There are of course other discussions which take place outside board meetings and 
in a very small group – HE, DS being the two main contributors – but supported by others 
where relevant – e.g. the price comparison fund idea, researching the loans market.  The 
way those things work tends to be discussions that start outside the board, but get taken to 
the board for discussion and approval if required’.  In addition the current company 
secretary who is present at those post-IPO Boards was able to share77: ‘The potential 
project would then usually be raised with Alastair [the Chairman] when he comes to 
Cardiff on one of his normal monthly visits and he would provide his input. They then may 
or may not decide to raise the matter at the next Board. If it is raised to Board level then 
the Board typically have several goes at considering the proposal ... there would be fairly 
rigorous challenge and debate from the non-executives with everyone given the chance to 
provide their input’. So the Board does play and advisory and sounding board for strategic 
decisions and does ratify decisions recommended by the business.  
 
As to what is the source of decisions, we know from the development of the theme 
‘numbers matter’ that numbers play a very important part in decision making within the 
firm but addressing ‘the informality’ and ‘hunches’ codes that occurred in the primary 
data, we have a clarification from the COO in his secondary data interview:  
You’ve got big, strategic things like Elephant and Confused and Multicar and 
maybe household and things like that where that’s not driven, particularly, by 
numbers. It may be, in a sense, driven by numbers because you are sort of 
informed by the fact that you know your marginal costs on advertising is 
significantly higher than your average cost and that’s a problem if you want to 
grow ad infinitum but it’s not like “ooh” alarm bells are ringing. It’s just the 
others are always going to be snapping at your heels and if you say we’ve got 
the formula, as in a sense we did in Confused of course, we’ve got the formula, 
                                                 
76  Email from GJ 30/04/14 21:06:16 GMT +01:00. 
77  Email from MW 01/05/14 16:52:19 GMT+01:00 
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we’re all right, then you are suddenly not all right and you are suddenly not all 
right in a way that you can’t address overnight. So, you have to be always 
finding the next thing but it’s not so much... that’s just a general belief in 
innovation and change and pre-empting other people’s change and driving the 
whole market and changing. (DS 01/02/11)’. 
The final piece of the theme as it emerged from the primary data that needs triangulating is 
the idea that decision making, other than at the strategic level is devolved throughout the 
company and that people feel empowered to make decisions and feel they can contribute to 
decisions-making wherever it occurs in the hierarchy. 
An external marketing consultant once remarked to me that ‘Admiral is imbued with a 
democratic spirit’78 and it emerged in the primary data where the ex-CFO explained:  
‘we do have democratic spirit because although the direction is set, ... it’s an 
organization which allows somebody then to argue back and say “I think that’s 
complete bloody rubbish, you’ve got that wrong, you haven’t got the right 
idea”. So, it doesn’t stop somebody answering back. It’s not bang! This is the 
way we’ve decided, do it come what may; over the top chaps...” (AP 
23/06/10)’.  
This view is reflected in the Best Companies and GPTW surveys that have been conducted 
over the years. Using questions about “speaking up” and “responsibility” as proxies for 
this “democratic spirit” or “empowerment” we see the following results as shown in the 
next table providing supporting evidence that the staff of Admiral feel that they are 
empowered and are listened to when decisions need to be made and support this idea of 
participation that emerged from the primary data. 
                                                 
78  A personal communication from R. Titford, Managing Director of Further Thought who has given me 
permission to use this quote from September 2009. 
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Table 5-29: Showing answers to questions from the Best Companies (BC) surveys 2011-
2013 and Great Places to Work (GPTW) surveys 2011-2013 where question 
acts as proxies for “democratic spirit” and “empowerment” at Admiral. The 
BC questions are score 1-7 where 7 is most favourable and 4 is neutral and 
the GPTW scores are a % of respondents replying favourably. 
5.5.12.3 Summarising evidence for the ‘strategic decision making’ theme 
‘Strategic decision making’ emerged from the primary data as an aspect of Admiral’s 
success. Further exploration, within the secondary data, allowed a deeper understanding of 
the process and support for the theme although you could argue that the data used hasn’t 
triangulated this theme rather than enhanced understanding of this theme. Triangulation 
data was available for the aspects of the theme that look at a participatory type of 
management and a ‘democratic spirit’ and supported this element of the theme as it 
emerged from the primary data.  
5.5.13 Development of ‘mission’ theme 
This theme emerged originally in the early interviews as ‘clarity of purpose’: ‘the people 
who took us forward were very clear about where we were going (JM 22/06/10)’.  
5.5.13.1 Evidence from the primary data 
Once the proto-theme was revisited after all the interviews had been coded it seemed that 
codes that had been used for the ‘recruitment and indoctrination’ theme could also be used 
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to nuance this theme. The codes used are summarised in the following table and represent 
a mix of conceptual notions around having ‘the organization sort of collectively pointed in 
a direction (DS 24/06/10)’ and mechanisms for alignment that the firm uses such as share 
schemes and the commitment to communication plus the indoctrination opportunities of 
mentoring and training.  
 
Table 5-30: Codes from the email and interview data that encompass the ‘mission’ theme. 
See Appendix A.14 for details 
A mission statement is not formalised in this business and yet ‘we are extraordinarily 
aligned about a collective goal for the business (CH 10/06/10)’ and there is a real sense 
that ‘this is our company and when it does well, we do well (JM 22/06/11)’. There is no 
mantra used in this instance at senior level although ‘Be the Best’ features in presentations 
from operational managers and their teams79 but the interviews give a real sense of a group 
of managers who understand where they’re going and believe the staff think that they ‘can 
make a difference to the bottom line and therefore to the success of our business (SL 
10/06/10)’.  The Head of Communications summed up this ‘mission’ as ‘We want to be, as 
Henry says, the most profitable, sustainable business out there (LS 12/11/10)’.  
The ‘alignment mechanisms’ coding all had a flavour of ‘everyone is encouraged to make 
a difference, we really listen to everyone working here and act on their suggestions. This is 
powerful in ensuring everyone feels part of our success and generally more comfortable 
with change (SLg 10/06/10)’ tempered with the indoctrination coding ‘every new person is 
brainwashed into what we do (NWK 10/06/10)’. 
5.5.13.2 Supporting evidence from the secondary data  
Support for the management belief that the staff believe the managers have direction and 
that they understand that direction to the extent that feel they can contribute to the 
‘mission’ can be found in the two externally conducted surveys by Best Companies and 
GPTW Institute as shown in the following table. 
CHAPTER 5: EVIDENCE OF DYNAMIC CAPABILITY WITHIN ADMIRAL PLC 
  Page  5-196 
 
Table 5-31: Showing answers to questions from the Best Companies (BC) surveys 2011-
2013 and Great Places to Work (GPTW) surveys 2011-2013 where question 
acts as proxies for organizational alignment and understanding of the 
‘mission at Admiral. The BC questions are score 1-7 where 7 is most 
favourable and 4 is neutral and the GPTW scores are a % of respondents 
replying favourably.  
From Table 5-31 we can see that the staff agree positively with statements that indicate 
they understand the ‘mission’ and are both excited by it and feel they contribute which 
supports the ideas from the primary data and from the GPTW Employee Comments in 
2012 we see further evidence such as: (1)‘we all share common goals’; and (2) ‘the 
company share scheme definitely cultivates a feeling that we’re all working to a unified 
goal’; and finally (3) ‘by giving everyone shares it makes employees feel like part of the 
bigger picture and makes people realise that no matter what level they work at their input 
to the business is important’.  
The latest Annual Report80 talks about (p. 12-13) other common goals that the firm adheres 
to namely (1) the customer and that emerged as a proto-theme absorbed into the overall 
‘culture enables’ theme (see Section 5.5.15); (2) a GREAT place to work that appeared as 
coding in both the ‘people matter’ and ‘culture enables’ (see Sections 5.5.4 and 5.5.15) 
themes; (3) a profit focus that has been summarised as part of this theme; (4) risk aversion 
alluded to in both the ‘embrace change’ and ‘learning environment themes (see Sections 
5.5.2 and 5.5.3); and lastly (5) dividends mentioned in a number of the employee 
                                                                                                                                                    
79  As found in the Top 10 department presentations in 2010. See p. 5-213 for more detail of this data source. 
80  Admiral Group Plc Annual Report and Accounts 2013: Accessed from 
http://www.admiralgroup.co.uk/pdf/annualreports/2013.pdf, 15/04/14: 16:24. 
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comments from the GPTW 2012 survey but not as code elsewhere although it is implied by 
share ownership which involves dividend pay-outs. 
5.5.13.3 Summarising evidence for the ‘mission’ theme 
The alignment towards common goals that are not formally articulated but appear to be 
well understood throughout the company has emerged as a key to the success of this firm.  
5.5.14 Development of ‘stability of management’ theme 
The CEO in the latest Annual Report81 comments (p. 11) at the conclusion of his statement 
‘I’m pleased to say that the aforementioned, well-wrinkled executives are still here, still 
ambitious and, hopefully, still talented and intelligent’. 
5.5.14.1 Evidence from the primary data 
From the email data-set, the proto-theme coding on ‘stability of management’ was 4% of 
total codes generated for both the UK and non-UK datasets as shown in Figure 5-5 on page 
5-121 but Figure 5-6 demonstrates the patent importance of the ‘stability of management’ 
to the non-UK respondents. The codes that emerged from this data-set were around 
founder stability, management stability, the benefits of length of service and the distinct 
notion that working in the company ‘feels like family’. During the analysis these were two 
separate proto-themes but the ‘family’ codes that were related to stability nuanced this 
theme and the remainder added understanding to the ‘culture enables’ theme in Section 
5.5.15. 
The interview data produced codes that also fell into these two strands of thinking: stability 
and family as shown in the following table:  
 
                                                 
81  Admiral Group Plc Annual Report and Accounts 2013: Accessed from 
http://www.admiralgroup.co.uk/pdf/annualreports/2013.pdf, 15/04/14: 17:07. 
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Table 5-32: Codes from the email and interview data that encompass the ‘stability of 
management’ theme. See Appendix A.15 for details 
Developing the ‘stability/consistency’ strand, the participants talk about an ‘upper 
management still in place that make every single people in the company part of an 
adventure (DL 03/06/10)’ and ‘still having more than 20% of the original starting staff 
means a history and a legacy that is held onto (AR 04/06/10)’. The advantages seem clear 
to the participants who credit the stability in the ability for teamwork amongst the 
management because they are ‘not scared to ask questions and ask for help/advice when 
necessary (SC 08/06/10)’ as well as eliminating ‘a lot of unneeded effort during transitions 
(AR 04/06/10)’. It also allows for the ability to ‘have the row, have the debate there and 
then, make the decision, move on and don’t dwell on it … relatively few recriminations (AP 
23/06/10)’.  
And it’s not just the founder stability, stability in senior positions also helps because ‘it is 
very difficult to get the messages down as the company gets bigger and the senior 
managers sort of lose contact with the shop floor a bit. But it helps that the operations 
managers and many of the team managers have come through over the years ... I think the 
messages filter down that way (JM 22/06/10)’. 
Regarding the ‘family’ element of this theme ‘there is a core of fierce loyalty to the group, 
which I believe is inspired by senior management … there is a subconscious feeling that if 
you are loyal to Admiral, Admiral will be loyal/good to you which I think produces a 
disproportionate effort from people and is often described in our surveys as a real 
“family” feeling (CB 14/06/10)’ and leads to everyone feeling ‘part of a family (LS 
12/11/10)’. This ‘feeling of belonging and the willingness to talk in lifts and to talk at 
friendly forums and to make points and things like that to suggest things and to listen, that 
is very valuable (DS 24/06/10)’.  
The interview with a member of the Merril Lynch team had an opinion on the benefits of 
‘stability of management’ to the firm saying: 
‘If you can have a team of people who can work together that long and be, 
presumably, broadly in agreement about strategic direction and consistently 
implement and execute the strategy then that is a huge positive. You look at the 
average tenure of a CEO of a FTSE 100 company, I would imagine you could 
measure it, usually in months. That may be a little bit unfair but certainly two 
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or three years you would think would be the standard period. Clearly Admiral 
has a lot of longevity amongst the main board of directors. So, I think that is 
key. (JG 10/11/10)’ 
5.5.14.2 Supporting evidence from the secondary data  
The ‘stability’ observed in the primary data is a fact. A simple perusal of the date the 
participants were first employed with the company in Table 4.5 on page 4-103 
demonstrates this fact for senior management and inspection of the people services record 
reveal that 16 of the original 57 starters at launch in 1992 are still associated with the 
company. 6 out of 8 Operations Managers in UK have been with the company more that 10 
years. 3 out of 6 team managers in call centre departments in UK have been with the 
company more than 10 years. 1 out of 5 staff in UK have been with us more than 10 years 
and 0.4 out of 5 staff more than 15 years, numbers82 set against a background of increasing 
staff numbers year on year since launch in the UK. 
The benefits of that stability that emerged from the primary data should be familiar to the 
reader as they have been evidenced elsewhere in this chapter as aspects of other themes 
have been triangulated with secondary data. Triangulating for this theme can thus be 
referenced to other Sections as listed below: 
 
Table 5-33: References benefits of stability emerging from the primary data to other 
theme development in this study. 
Both the externally conducted surveys by Best Companies and GPTW Institute specifically 
ask a question about family as shown in the next table overleaf. 
                                                 
82  Numbers made available from the People Services Department on request. 
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Table 5-34: Showing answers to questions from the Best Companies (BC) surveys 2011-
2013 and Great Places to Work (GPTW) surveys 2011-2013 on questions 
directly about “feeling like family”. The BC questions are score 1-7 where 7 
is most favourable and 4 is neutral and the GPTW scores are a % of 
respondents replying favourably.  
From this table we can see that staff agrees strongly with a statement that talks about the 
sense of family in the firm supporting the primary data finding. Furthermore, in the GPTW 
survey, the free-format answers to the question “Is there anything unique or unusual about 
this company that makes it a great place to work?” saw 20 unprompted mentions of 
“family” in the 2011 employee responses and 30 in 2012 so it is a key aspect of the culture 
in this firm which is expounded upon in the next sub-section. 
5.5.14.3 Summarising evidence for the ‘stability of management’ theme 
The importance and influence of the founders to the firm emerged strongly from the 
primary data and their ability to create a work environment where ‘people matter’ has 
meant that there is stability in the management levels of the company providing continuity. 
However the fact that there is a group of people who have been working together for so 
long has meant that trust has developed and this has been a key to enabling many of the 
other themes to act as success factors so the stability of the team is a factor in this firms 
success. .  
5.5.15 Development of ‘culture enables’ theme 
This theme is the largest to emerge by far: with 178 contributions that were directly coded 
to this theme. Having read the previous sections in this chapter, the reader should be aware 
of the number of references to culture that were not directly coded to this theme such as the 
culture that enables change (Section 5.5.2) and creates a learning environment (Section 
5.5.3) or the culture that must exist in a company where people matter (Section 5.5.4). One 
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could argue that the behaviours to pay attention to detail and to use numbers also has its 
roots in the culture as it is part of the way this firm does business. So it appears from the 
data thus far that the culture of this firm has enabled its success. Deal and Kennedy (1982: 
4) co-opted an informal definition of organizational culture as  ‘the way we do things 
round here’. This definition has since been adopted into the literature studying 
organizational culture. Offering his views on organizational culture, the CEO told me in 
his interview that ‘it’s got to be something the managers and then the people within the 
organization do live as opposed to sit there and have to read about and write it down (HE 
22/06/10)’. The data thus far suggests that his ambition has been met. 
5.5.15.1 Evidence from the primary data 
A ‘culture’ proto-theme emerged early from the email data-set and strongly featured in the 
interviews. Once the open coding was complete, the axial coding suggested that four proto-
themes: that of culture, pride and passion, lack of ego and customer focus could all be 
incorporated into one theme ‘culture enables’ describing many of the ideas emerging from 
the primary data (see Figure 5-2, Figure 5-3 and Figure 5-4 on pages 5-111 to 5-113).  
Being the largest theme, it comprised 69 separate codes. This was not a conversation about 
the culture of this firm but many aspects of the company’s culture emerged. The codes are 
summarised in the next table. 
 
Table 5-35: Codes from the email and interview data that encompass the ‘culture 
enables’ theme. See Appendix A.16 for details 
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There is a sense from the primary data that here is a company who believes ‘we actually do 
culture rather than talk about culture (CA 11/11/10)’ and the data is full of examples of 
mechanisms that the company uses to actively manage it’s culture such as the 7 principles 
‘it’s a good way to maintain the culture (LS 15/06/10)’ and ‘just everything is about 
communication (LS 12/11/10)’ and the Ministry of Fun ‘to make sure these things are 
happening all the time (CA11/11/10)’ and the role of the managers is to make sure ‘we’re 
checking on all those things, constantly, and reminding people, and we’re leading by 
example (LS 12/11/10)’.  
Much of the coding describes aspects of the culture summarised by the CFO as: ‘OK, I’m 
in the pub talking to a mate, what’s it like at Admiral? It’s quirky, it’s friendly, it’s casual, 
it’s detailed, it’s testing, it’s challenging, it’s creative, it’s striving to improve all the time, 
it’s very team based, it’s passionate, it’s got a strong sense of identity, successful, there’s 
no egos, it cares about people, it’s very equal, it’s fun. It’s a lot of fun  (KC 03/02/11)’.  
There is a belief in the data that these values and traits lie in the founders philosophies – 
particularly that of the CEO. The COO states that the CEO is ‘very sensitive to the cultural 
issues and created something in terms of openness and warmth and recognition and stuff 
like that which is an extension of his personality (DS 24/06/10)’ whilst accepting that ‘I 
would be intellectually very keen to maintain it and renew it but quite anxious that I’m not 
necessarily that well equipped to know how ... so I’m sort of thinking the importance is you 
need people in the organization that can fight for the culture (DS 24/06/10)’. However, the 
COO’s beliefs in equality and the value of numbers and having ‘a set of values around 
openness, around a reasonable life work balance, around not knifing each other in the 
back as a way of getting forward, around tolerance, around trying to make, caring about 
whether it’s a good place to work (DS 24/06/10)’ indicate that he too has had an influence 
on the culture. As the ex-People Services manager explained: on joining the company (she 
too is a founder but started in the call centre): ‘one of the first things I noticed when I 
arrived there was only five or six senior managers here at the time … and they were all 
very ordinary and they were all very open and that friendliness set the tone for the rest of 
the company (JM 22/06/10)’. 
The idea that a ‘lack of egos in management across the business (KC 08/06/10)’ is part of 
this culture first emerged as a requisite for the learning environment in this firm (see 
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Section 5.5.3) and it is a fundamental aspect of the culture. The CEO told me ‘I tried to 
make sure that our foundation was built on openness and discussion and truthfulness as 
opposed to a lot of deception and hypocrisy ... all of these were founding values (HE 
22/06/10)’. And it translates into the culture in a way that enables change and learning and 
the management style. ‘It’s ego isn’t it, say “I’m the marketing guy, I understand all this, 
you don’t understand that” that’s not an answer here. The answer is “lets talk about this 
campaign and what it is doing”’. But although ‘ego is not valued for its own sake here, it 
doesn’t mean to say there aren’t egos about. It’s also a tradition of pulling egos down to 
make sure they keep grounded. What is egg roulette all about? It’s about pulling 
managers’ ego down, you know, you sit in front of a lot of staff and you play egg roulette 
and it doesn’t matter who you are you may well end up with a broken egg all over your 
hair. (both quotes AP 23/06/10)’. 
A ‘culture where the customer is central to all activity (SC 08/06/10)’ is espoused by many 
firms and, although was not mentioned by many participants, is evident in the culture and 
was a founding value as the CEO explained ‘I was trying to set up a company that … did 
care for its customers’. The company has always sought customer feedback with the CEO 
responding personally in the early days to many complaints about poor service and he feels 
that great service is a factor in Admiral’s success: ‘It certainly helps because it helps a lot 
on renewals, this is a very price sensitive business, people will shop routinely and it’s 
something they have to buy, not that they necessarily want to buy and therefore they will 
move, very often, if the price is much lower elsewhere. So, service does a lot in terms of 
keeping people from shopping; changing the threshold at which they will move (HE 
22/06/10)’. Positive affirmation of service can be seen in team awards and circulation of 
comment forms where customers have thanked staff members by name. The training 
department and Team Managers concentrate on rapport building and doing extra for the 
customer in the service departments. As the CEO states: ‘We ask our people to make sure 
that the customer is satisfied and he is. Have we done everything we could for that 
particular customer? And we do it in a friendly way (HE 22/06/10)’. 
The foundations of the culture are described internally as the  “4 Pillars: communication, 
equality, reward and fun” and this is mentioned directly in the primary data. Where culture 
is discussed explicitly in the primary data, there is widespread agreement about these four 
elements with various interpretations of what they mean to the participating manager.  
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There are a number of mentions of what is coded as “tribalism” defined as ‘how they do 
interpret those values we are quite happy for them to do it their own way (CA 11/11/10)’. 
This is a tacit element of how the culture works in this firm. Outsiders will understand the 
element of “fun” but ‘various departments have their own idea of fun (JM 22/06/10)’ and 
even at team level ‘if they want to do something different from the team next door that’s 
fine, whatever suits (CA 11/11/10)’. So although the culture has the same foundational 
attributes it is interpreted differently throughout the company and there is a belief that for 
the culture to work it must contain points of difference in order to appeal to all.  
There are examples of where “tribalism” has been unhelpful to the firm for example in 
Gladiator Motor or in Confused.com during 2009-2011 but, as it is measured in surveys 
and from staff feedback, action to realign the core principles is undertaken, again evident 
from the primary data. For example the CFO told me in our interview: ‘Confused has 
created a culture of being too spendthrift and not being focused enough on the detail and 
not working together well enough as a team, being too siloed, there’s too much blame, and 
fear of doing things because you will be blamed (KC 03/02/11)’. The Board83 had noted 
the poor survey results in 2009 and the CFO had been charged with working with the then 
Head of Confused to see if results could be improved. When it was clear in 2010 that the 
problems were still there and that the “culture had turned toxic”, the Head of 
Confused.com was managed out of the business and the CFO took direct control and saw 
his job as ‘bringing that empowerment back into the organisation, very important and 
making people realise that they can do these things. ... Giving them back the confidence to 
recognise that they can do it and actually their answer is as good if not better than the so 
called professional expensive answer. So, that’s a large part of what I’m doing (KC 
03/02/11)’. Confused’s result have steadily improved since 2011 reaffirming that the 
CFO’s job to realign the culture back to the Admiral basics has been successful.  
In the ‘recruitment and indoctrination’ theme (see Section 5.5.1) the data suggested that 
this is a firm that ‘brings people into the organization that share the basic values (HE 
22/06/10)’ and, although they are not written down, there is a sense from the participants 
that ‘its part of your psyche … its there, in the DNA (AP 23/06/10)’. The data suggests that 
this has translated into a vibrant corporate culture that is recognised by many externally as 
                                                 
83  Of which I am a member. These discussions took place informally and were not minuted. 
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unique to Admiral (see secondary data evidence) and as the CFO, who joined in 2005, told 
me: ‘once you get used to it you realise that’s just the way life is and people are passionate 
about stuff (KC 03/02/11)’. 
5.5.15.2 Drawing out elements of the culture from the primary data to 
demonstrate how culture ‘enables’ success at Admiral. 
Talking about success with the participating senior managers across the Group has elicited 
a number of themes presented here in this chapter. The last theme was named ‘culture 
enables’ and if frequency of contributions to this theme is anything to go by, culture is an 
important part of Admiral’s success story. But how does it ‘enable’ that success? 
To answer this question, all the data excerpts from which the themes emerged in this 
chapter, were recoded with specific regard to what they told me about the elements of 
Admiral’s culture in the opinion of the participants. From this exercise new “themes” 
emerged: those elements of the culture.  The primary data’s ‘4 Pillars’ was a starting point 
for the coding but this exercise revealed not just these four cornerstones but the building-
blocks of the foundation on which the culture has developed.  
The 26 attributes that emerged are summarised in the following table. An example of one 
of the 25 data tables created can be found in Appendix A.17 for the element ‘no blame’. 
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Table 5-36:  The elements of Admiral culture that emerged from recoding the primary 
data with a specific cultural lens. The meanings ascribed to each attribute 
come directly from the data and are used throughout the rest of this thesis. 
As can be seen, the ‘4 Pillars’ appear here: reward, communicate, equality and fun but 
other elements emerged also and the frequency of coding is represented in the graph in 
Figure 5-14. All of the elements in this graph emerged from the data but with the exception 
of ‘equality’, none of the ‘4 Pillars’ got over 40 mentions. In the minds of the participants 
the true foundation of the culture lies in the belief that everyone has a claim to equality; 
that if it moves, you measure it; that everyone must pay attention to the business and the 
people they manage and that people matter. Fundamental to this is the trust these people 
have in each other and believe the company as a whole is built on trust.  
 
Figure 5-14: Mapping frequency of coding contributing to the emergent elements of 
Admiral’s culture after recoding the primary data excerpts. 
The other elements of the culture are also in the mix when it comes to ‘enabling’ success in 
this firm. An analysis of the mix of these attributes as they apply to each theme lends 
insights to this ‘enabling’ role. An example is shown in the next table for how the cultural 
attributes ‘enable’ the learning environment theme and a further example can be seen in 
Appendix A.18 for the ‘embrace change’ theme. 
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Table 5-37: Showing how the theme ‘learning environment’ was recoded for the cultural 
elements that constitute Admiral’s culture. The rows shaded in pale green 
represent data excerpts that contribute to other themes in addition to this 
theme. 
In Section 5.5.3 where the theme ‘learning environment’ was developed, I noted ‘the idea 
that there is a learning culture within this firm’ (p. 5-143). This exercise in recoding 
allowed greater insight into that learning culture which by definition ‘enables’ learning 
within this firm. Table 5-37 shows that the cultural elements that make up the subset 
‘learning culture’ are primarily the belief that ‘everything is a learning opportunity’ 
particularly when it takes place in a ‘no blame’ environment. Learning can only happen 
when one ‘pays attention’ and ‘communicating’ with everyone as would be expected 
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where there is ‘democratic spirit’ and an expectation of transparency in such an ‘open’ 
environment. The vehicle for learning is often experimental with the test and control 
change process in place in this firm, an aspect of the mantra that ‘the perfect is the enemy 
of the good’. The expectation is that change is initiated and with the ethos of ‘if it moves 
measure it’ in place, numbers are produced which may cause ‘challenge’ to the initial 
thinking and learning to occur but even where results are expected that is still learning. 
Given that this is a firm whose culture encourages its staff to ‘colour outside the lines’ it is 
essential that learning from the very initial stage of any change is fostered. 
A similar analysis of each of the themes in this chapter reveals that the Admiral culture 
does ‘enable’ its success. These findings are based solely on the primary data and for the 
purposes of rigour should be triangulated from secondary data sources. 
5.5.15.3 Supporting evidence from the secondary data  
In 2011, Alex Edmans writing in the Journal of Financial Economics argued that a value 
weighted portfolio of the “100 Best Companies to Work For in America”, a list produced 
by the GPTW Institute in the US, earned an ‘annual four-factor alpha of 3.5% from 1984 
to 2009, and 2.1% above industry benchmarks’ (p. 621). Study of this firm’s performance 
and regular ranking in the “100 Best Companies to Work For in the UK” and indeed the 
“Great Places to Work” both in the UK and in Europe has been used already throughout 
the sections of this chapter and provides some support for Edman’s assertions in the UK 
context. Edman’s work further suggests that in the US employee satisfaction is a factor in 
value creation and chimes with Admiral’s mantra ‘people who like what they do, do it 
better’ (see Section 5.5.4) or as explained on the front page of the 2013 Annual Report84 
‘happy staff … happy customers, happy customers … increased profits, increased profits 
… happy shareholders’.  
Relevant to this case, the GPTW Institute produce UK and European lists of the best 
companies. Their website85 tells us that ‘the primary criteria for list inclusion is whether a 
company's employees themselves say their organization is a great workplace. Two-thirds 
                                                 
84  Admiral Group Plc Annual Report and Accounts 2013: Accessed from 
http://www.admiralgroup.co.uk/pdf/annualreports/2013.pdf, 19/04/14: 20:17. 
85  http://www.greatplacetowork.net/our-approach/faq. Accessed 04/05/14: 14:17. 
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of the scoring of each company is based on employees' responses to a randomly distributed 
employee survey, which is taken anonymously and is a representative sample of each 
company's population. The remaining third is based on our analysis of the company's 
programs and practices compared with other applicants’. This thesis has used the GPTW 
Trust Index data gathered from the employee survey extensively. We know from this data 
that Admiral scores higher than the average benchmark in the various dimensions. A great 
work place is one where the employees have trust in the people they work for, pride in 
what they do, and enjoy the people they work with86. Admiral has featured in their UK 
lists every year since the lists were first published in 2001. The GPTW dimensions reflect 
the attributes emerging from the primary data and Admiral appearing in their lists provides 
evidence that not only do the participating managers believe their culture is key and have 
an implicit understanding of its attributes but that employees views also reflect a culture 
that makes Admiral “a great place to work”. 
The results of the Cultural Audit are not available separately from GPTW but their website 
articulates the framework they use for examining company culture87. They talk about ‘the 
key to this framework lies within the interaction between managers, supervisors and their 
employees: frontline management sets the tone and disseminates cultural values 
throughout the organizational ranks’ and this supports the coding of this theme from the 
primary data. Additionally the areas the GPTW framework covers supports some of the 
attributes of Admiral’s culture that emerged as shown in the following table: 
 
Table 5-38: The GPTW framework 9 practice areas mapped against the 26 attributes that 
emerged in the primary data. 
                                                 
86  Taken from http://www.greatplacetowork.net/our-approach/what-is-a-great-workplace. Accessed 
04/05/14: 14:20. 
87 See http://www.greatplacetowork.net/publications-and-events/blogs-and-news/1626-a-framework-for-
examining-workplace-culture-area-1-inspiring. Accessed 04/05/14: 14:39. 
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However the other attributes that are not necessarily essential to making ‘a great place to 
work’ are essential for Admiral to operate in its challenging and competitive markets (see 
Chapter 1). 
This is a company that claims to have a superior customer service. It gets its fair share of 
complaints but in 2013 it won two awards voted for by consumers: Direct Insurer of the 
Year at the Insurance Times Awards and Best Motor Insurance Provider at the Personal 
Finance Awards, awards that lend credence to its claims. 
One gets a sense of many of the elements that make up the culture from the primary data 
from reading interviews with the CEO, from press releases around the annual or half-year 
results or from the company’s Annual Reports. For example, in announcing 2013’s results, 
the CEO described it as ‘the year of the baked potato. It was a good solid year, something 
on the plate that is appreciated but doesn’t really grab the spotlight’ (p.10). It’s fairly 
unusual for a set of results for a FTSE-100 company to be described in this way. But there 
is a precedent. In the first Annual Report after the IPO, the CEO statement (p. 5)88 posed 
the question ‘Have you ever had one of those days where everything seems to go right? 
You know, a day where there’s hardly any traffic getting to the office and all the lights are 
green, a day where someone comes to your office for a meeting and brings you a really 
nice coffee, a day where the rain stops just when you come out of the building, a day where 
you tell the kids dinner’s ready and they immediately turn off the telly and go to the table, 
a day where … well, you get the picture: a day where everything seems to go spot on 
right?’. In the 2010 Annual Report, the CEO described the results (p. 7) as ‘a snowball 
going like a freight train. Downhill. Wow’. Similar exuberant language and ‘off-the-wall’ 
metaphors dominate his statements in the Annual Reports 2004 through to 2013. This is 
evidence that the CEO is living the culture: he is breaking down status barriers, being 
creative, displaying a sense of humour: all elements of the culture identified from the 
primary data. It helps to reinforce the idea that this company is different (and proud of it) 
to the external stakeholders. The interview with a member of the Merril Lynch team that 
helped with the IPO told me ‘I know this because I’ve been to some of these presentations 
[to the analysts]. You do sense that there is something slightly... I mean, it’s the 
proprietorial nature of that sense of achievement that comes through (JG 10/11/10)’. 
                                                 
88  All the Admiral Group Plc Annual Report and Accounts documents used in this section were accessed 
from http://www.admiralgroup.co.uk, 02/05/14. 
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The Chairman of the Board when giving a speech to a gathering of the international 
managers in Cardiff in 2013 told them: ‘That is why when I walk into an Admiral office, 
whether it be Cardiff, Paris, or Rome I know I am in Admiral because of the general 
atmosphere – the buzz about the place; what’s on the walls and the desks; what people are 
wearing (or not!); the way people behave; the way they interact with each other and their 
customers’ (see Footnote 59) shows that he recognises that the Admiral culture is a point 
of difference between the companies he is involved with. 
It is difficult to find external data to triangulate the attributes of the culture but one can 
map many of the attributes identified in the primary data to how the employees view the 
culture in their own words. Every year a Top 10 Departments competition is run and in 
2010 all the departments had to make a presentation answering the question ‘What does 
the Admiral Group culture mean to you and how does your department ensure that the 
culture is embraced by all members of staff?’ The presentations are filmed and the films 
were made available to me as secondary data. A summary of five departments appears in 
Table 5-39 on page 5-214 where key elements of the presentation are identified and 
mapped to a subset of the primary data attributes. Regarding the concept of ‘tribalism’ that 
emerged as a code, despite the fact that each film focused on different elements of the 
culture and central departments were a little less exuberant than the service, customer-
facing departments, a quote from the Cardiff Sales presentation (10:43) sums up the 
concept as ‘there is constant emphasis on the Admiral culture, we just fit it to what we do 
as a department’. 
The data presented thus far has not supported all of the attributes, by their nature only 
implicitly understood by the company. However every person who joins the company 
completes a form in their first few days entitled ‘I Want to Work For a Company that ….’. 
The forms for the founders and the senior managers employed since the IPO have been 
made available for this thesis and reading them is illuminating as to the source of the 
attributes being in the founders motivations for starting the company and in the psyche of 
the subsequent joiners. Pertinent quotes can be found above in Table 5-40 on page 5-215. 
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Table 5-39: Summary of presentations filmed for the 2010 Top 10 Departments 
competition mapping salient excerpts back to the attributes of the culture 
identified from the primary data. 
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Table 5-40:  Maps excerpts from the ‘I want to Work for a Company that…’ forms 
completed by founders still associated with the company and recently 
recruited senior managers against the cultural attributes identified from the 
primary data. 
Above all this is a company ‘that is not ashamed to promote a company ethos; a corporate 
culture; a shared goal (DS ‘I want to Work For’). 
In conclusion, the secondary data has supported the notions on culture that have emerged 
from the primary data. 
 
5.5.15.4 Summarising evidence for the ‘culture enables’ theme 
Perhaps it is not surprising that culture has emerged as a contributory factor to this firm’s 
success as the literature talks about it being the vehicle for channeling human behaviour 
(Trice & Beyer, 1993). It is mooted in the literature that internal social contexts shape 
strategic renewal and the development of capabilities (Capron & Mitchell, 2009) and this 
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is a company where culture is not “tacit” and there has been deliberate action on the part of 
the founders to create the culture that emerges from the primary data. The fact that it 
‘enables’ the other themes presented here whilst not presented in the secondary data can be 
supported in the literature on organizational culture. ‘Corporate culture provides the glue 
that reflects the norms and ideals of the firm and guides employees behaviours. It is the 
corporation’s “personality”. Once shared values become part of the rubric of the firm’s 
culture, they serve as psychological rudders that guide employees’ behaviours’ (Joyce & 
Slocum, 2012: 186). 
5.6 Data Analysis: Examining how capabilities in this company have 
evolved over time from the primary data 
Part of the research question involves looking at how this firm’s capabilities have evolved 
over time as the company has emerged from its start-up phase in 1993 through its SME 
stage to being a large UK company through to its nascent MNE status today with over 
6000 employees worldwide. Size is not just a key factor but ownership too can elicit 
change in an organization and this company has moved from being part of a Lloyds of 
London syndicate, through to an MBO in 1999 followed by public ownership after an IPO 
in 2004. 
The interview data was recoded to look specifically at references to changes over time. 
Sometimes I specifically asked a participant about how things had evolved especially 
where they were “founder” employees. But a picture emerged from the data of a company 
whose essentials have remained unchanged, although it is clear that as the structures, size 
and ownership have changed, one can see routines and processes changing and operational 
capabilities evolving or new operational capabilities being developed. 
The codes that emerged to tell this story were: 
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Table 5-41: Codes from interview data that encompass the ‘differences over time’ theme. 
See Appendix A.19 for details. 
This is a company that has been concerned at a senior level with the problems of growth: ‘I 
worry that as we grow it becomes so diluted that we don’t focus on it as much (LS 
12/1/1/10)’ and yet ‘I think we’ve done surprisingly well at maintaining the humanity and 
the culture of the company as it has grown (DS 24/06/10)’ despite the fact that ‘I think one 
of the things that we have found with the new people we took on is that, yes they fitted, yes 
they were nice people who could interact well on a personal level with people, but they had 
different experiences, they had different skills, different ideas, so took things on (JM 
22/06/10)’. But this achievement has been in the context where ‘having more than 20% of 
the original starting staff means a history and legacy that is held onto.  Having the same, 
effective leadership eliminates a lot of unneeded effort during transitions (AR 04/06/10)’. 
Examples are given in the interviews of how recruitment and induction processes have 
changed over time. The business has had a number of structural changes and individuals 
have moved around the business. In Section 5.5.12, the interviews revealed how decision-
making has evolved with the caveat that ‘even today, it’s quite odd for a FTSE 100 
company to have such quick management decision making. Probably a little slower 
because of the governance today requires a lot more documentation but it’s still pretty 
quick and certainly implementation, once decisions are made, yes, it’s still pretty quick 
(AP 23/06/10)’. There is evidence that the senior members resist bureaucracy and 
formalization for the sake of it, incorporating elements needed to satisfy regulatory 
requirements or if they are useful in running the business ‘“oh, we’re so big now, we’re a 
FTSE 100 we must become more corporate.” Why? That’s what made us different, that’s 
what made us successful (LS 12/10/11)’. 
The test and control method of implementing change has remained the same from launch 
where it was frequently used in the first year to test marketing creative to today where 
changes to the website are tested on 10% of the volume initially as are changes to the 
rating algorithm or improvements to the claims process. 
However this is a company that has learned and implemented changes to improve its 
business.  This can be seen in looking at how the operational capabilities of the firm have 
evolved. For example: in pricing, in Section 5.5.8.2, the process on Day One involved 25 
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rating tables whereas today 50-70 are used although the pricing strategy remains the same.  
In marketing, the detailed metrics used to track efficiency have changed as the internet has 
shifted to being the dominant distribution channel.  In 2000 the marketing mix was 
primarily broadcast media and response rates and cost per quote generated (CPQ) were key 
measurements89. Today the marketing mix is both broadcast (for brand equity) and online 
media and although response rates are still tracked and CPQ is still a key measure, 
performance across paid search and natural search plus funnel rates through the web-site 
are key90 as are measures generated from brand research and share of voice measures. 
Operationally, Admiral has moved from a largely off-line media mix to one that is 
primarily on-line and this shift represents learning and application there-of to the 
marketing operational capability. However the foundational tenets of risk-aversion and ‘the 
perfect is the enemy of the good’ and learning remain the same. As the Head of Marketing 
in 2010 told me91 ‘ its not that we do thing’s differently – its just all a matter of scale. With 
more people we get a lot more testing and learning done in all the areas of the business’.  
Managing people is also an operational capability and although the principles remain the 
same i.e. a foundational commitment to the idea that people matter in the business, the 
routines and processes change as regulation requires, as size requires, as new approaches to 
recruitment and training and coaching are tried and tested. Similarly one might consider 
Admiral to have an operational capability in team building. See Section 5.5.10 for details.  
The following table overleaf lists all the themes from this Chapter and marks the 1993 and 
2013 positions from primary and secondary data and expounded in the text. 
Table 5-42 demonstrates that the general consensus about the important elements/themes: 
the approach to change, risk, learning, people, the culture – ‘I don’t think there’s been a 
huge evolution (DS 24/06/10)’. Success has bred a commitment to do doing things the way 
they have always been done. Culturally, looking at the statements of the founders and the 
senior team when they joined the company (see Table 5-40) these traits and desires are still 
apparent in the culture today (see Section 5.5.15).  
                                                 
89  Taken from marketing reports in my files. I was Marketing Director from 1998 to 2002.  
90  In my new role as International Marketing Director I am responsible for the KPI’s and these measures 
feature on the 2014 reporting packs. 
91  Personal communication. 
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Looking at data from the Best Companies and GPTW Institute surveys that have been used 
extensively as secondary data, the ethos of managing people has been the same from 2000 
to today and the internal Admiral staff survey results from 1999 to today tell a similar 
story. The company is a very different entity today than it was at launch but the 
fundamental elements of the culture and the success factors emerged from the primary data 
remain the same. 
 
Table 5-42: Changes in the themes generated by the data from 1993 to 2013 
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5.7 Have we found dynamic capability? 
In the Introduction to this chapter, the foundational definitions for dynamic capability were 
reviewed in Table 5-1. That summary is reproduced here: 
 
As was noted in Chapter 2, the dynamic capabilities view has been criticised (Ambrosini & 
Bowman, 2009; Barreto, 2010; Di Stefano et al., 2010 amongst others) as ‘rather vague 
and elusive’ (Kraatz & Zajac, 2001: 653). Looking at the summary of the primary 
influential studies in the field above shows that the different focus taken varies from paper 
to paper. This research requires that Admiral demonstrates dynamic capability and as 
explained earlier in this chapter, with “dynamic capability” not in the lexicon of the 
business it was hoped that the discussions around the Admiral’s success would yield 
themes that met the definitions for dynamic capability. 
The next table takes each theme as it emerged from the data and maps it against the 
definitions in Table 5-1. 
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Table 5-43:  Maps the themes that emerged around Admiral’s success to the main 
influential writers on dynamic capabilities. 
This mapping reveals only two themes: ‘structure helps’ and ‘stability of management’ to 
not meet any of the criteria for dynamic capability in the influential literature in this field. 
However the remaining 13 themes satisfy at least two of the criteria and for the purposes of 
answering the research question will be considered as dynamic capability. 
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CHAPTER 6:  REVIEWING THE EXTANT LITERATURE ON THE THEMES 
TO EMERGE IN THIS CASE-STUDY ON ADMIRAL PLC 
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter deals with a key element of grounded theory: exploring the contrast between 
the emergent concepts from the data with the extant literature (Charmaz, 2006; Corbin & 
Strauss, 2008). Eisenhardt (1989a) also lists this step in her exposition of case study 
methodology. She argues that this stage helps to focus answering the research question and 
in this particular instance, help sharpen the definition of where a contribution can be made  
to the dynamic capability literature.  
From Chapter 5, a number of themes emerged from the data collected that when compared 
to the foundational elements of dynamic capability as defined by the literature (and 
summarised in Table 5.1 on page 5-108 revealed Admiral to have dynamic capability as it 
is currently envisaged in existing theory. Removing those themes that displayed no 
attributes of dynamic capability as it is currently defined, the dynamic capability at 
Admiral Plc can be summarised in a modified version of Table 5-43 as per Table 6.1. 
 
Table 6-1: Dynamic capability at Admiral Plc mapped against the definitions provided 
by the main influential writers on dynamic capabilities. 
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The dynamic capability identified can be categorised as being an ability (Zahra et al., 
2006), a routine (Winter, 2003; Zollo & Winter, 2002), a process (Eisenhardt & Martin, 
2000; Helfat et al., 2007; Teece et al., 1997), specifically practiced as a managerial skill 
(Teece, 2007), or some combination thereof. This vagueness may not have been a 
deficiency since Winter (1995: 149) observed it leaves ‘ample room for pragmatic 
adjustment as new problems are met’ and yet there are calls for the construct to be better 
developed in the worry that empirical work may be misdirected (Barreto, 2010; Easterby-
Smith et al., 2009). 
The rest of this chapter examines how each of the capabilities identified in Table 6.1 are 
dealt with in the extant literature but specifically as they have been described in the data 
hence grounding the emergent themes in the wider literature. For each theme, links are 
made, where possible, to the dynamic capability literature. However, without exception, 
each theme also finds resonance, often more resonance, in other literature domains whether 
that be: organizational behaviour, psychology, human relations, knowledge management or 
the wider strategic management literatures. Those literatures are also reviewed here but 
only as they pertain directly to data collected for this case-study. This has developed into a 
major exercise and has played a significant role in the retroductive reasoning presented in 
Chapter 7 hence warrants a separate chapter in this thesis.  
6.2 Support in the literature for the dynamic capability ‘recruitment and 
indoctrination’ 
As a dynamic capability, there is little study thus far of either recruitment or indoctrination. 
The literature that does talk about recruitment is mainly in the knowledge management 
arena following the idea that an organization can reconstitute its knowledge base through 
recruiting new workers, first expressed by Kogut and Zander (1992) in their influential 
work on the knowledge of a firm (see Table 2-1 on page 2-33). The notion that intellectual 
human capital can give rise to firm-level heterogeneity is well established (Rothaermel & 
Hess, 2007) and certainly recruitment is posited as a way of building new dynamic 
capability in a firm and proficiency in recruiting can be an operational capability 
(Rothaermel & Hess, 2007). However the evidence in this case is of a firm who is not 
recruiting radically different skills or knowledge but of a company whose recruitment 
policies revolve around person-organization fit (P-O or P-E). On the whole this is not a 
firm seeking recruitment of specialists: resources from strategic factor markets (Barney, 
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1986b). There are exceptions of course, for example Admiral’s recent employment of 
trained lawyers to support a new initiative in the business anticipating the changes to 
selling legal ancillaries recommended by the private members bill introduced by Jack 
Straw in 201192 but for the most part people are recruited for a cultural fit rather than a 
skill set.  
We see in Feldman and Pentland (2003) examples of a firm’s recruitment process and 
additionally Ambrosini et al. (2009) argue that the patterned elements of the process can be 
candidates for dynamic capability in a firm. 
However in the wider literature, specifically that of human resources, the notion that 
organizations should devote substantial attention to attracting and selecting the best talent 
is prevalent as is the idea that ideally firm’s should match recruits to their organization 
(Chatman, 1991) and achieve a P-O fit for best results. This idea of “fit” with the 
organizational climate was advanced in the early 80’s (for example Richard E Boyatzis, 
1982; Joyce & Slocum, 1984), with Boyatzis stating that the best performance would occur 
when the person’s capability or talent is consistent with the needs of the job and the 
organizational environment. More recently it has been argued that such “fit” is a way of 
‘building competitive advantage’ (Joyce & Slocum, 2012: 184). This notion of “fit” was 
well represented in the interview data and clearly this is a company that sets store 
recruiting for person-organization (P-O) fit and supports Chatman’s thesis that “fit” gives 
rise to ‘pervasive influences on individual behaviours and attitudes’ (1991, p. 459).  
“Fit” is also a well-theorised construct in the psychology literature (see Lievens, 
Decaesteker, Coetsier, & Geirnaert, 2001 for a review) and is a central concept in the 
organizational behaviour literature (Edwards, 2008). Edward’s review of the extensive 
person-environment (P-E) fit literature (over 13,000 citations p. 217) concludes that most 
of the theories invite the same conclusion: that P-E fit leads to positive outcomes and any 
misfit is detrimental. 
There is also literature that points to a relationship between poor P-E fit and turnover and 
this loss of intellectual capital (Vandenberghe, 1999).  
                                                 
92  See http://www.insuranceage.co.uk/insurance-age/news-analysis/2141547/straw-vows-continue-pushing-
on-motor-insurance-premiums. Accessed 19/05/14: 12:23. 
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The evidence from this case suggests that “fit” encompasses elements of intelligence, 
emotional intelligence and personality traits that have become embedded in the culture 
itself. These traits serve to reinforce the underlying culture that enables so much of the 
business 
For example, in a conversation with Chris Argyris (Argyris & Crossan, 2003: 45), he says 
‘in a world where minds are hired, learning becomes central’ but bemoaned in 1998 (R. 
M. Fulmer & Keys, 1998: 22) that ‘people do not know how to learn’. The practice in 
Admiral of hiring people who are curious and willing to learn is symptomatic of a learning 
organization and may represent an attempt to overcome Argyris’s complaint. Combining 
this with hiring numerically able people who “fit” supports Gardner’s contention (1983) 
that although IQ is important it doesn’t mean you can learn and so you need the right 
environment and possess the necessary social, personal and emotional skills all of which 
are reflected in the concept of  “fit” emerging from the data. 
The dynamic capability perspective highlights ‘that coordination is a central economic 
problem’ (Augier & Teece, 2009: 415) and coordinating and adapting to changing markets 
(R. M. Cyert & March, 1963) is a fundamental element of a firm’s dynamic capabilities 
(Augier & Teece, 2009). “Indoctrination” is one way of achieving coordination. Studies in 
the military note how leadership implicitly emphasizes cultural indoctrination (Hutchinson, 
2013) but there is no direct link in the literature between “indoctrination” and dynamic 
capability. 
In the early 70’s it was postulated that the behaviour of individuals could be influenced by 
cultural indoctrination (Alchian & Demsetz, 1973) and Mintzberg (1980: 325) talked about 
training and indoctrination as ‘a design parameter by which skills and knowledge are 
standardized’. Furthermore, he postulated that coordination in firms is to a large part 
successful by its degree of indoctrination ‘representing a pull towards a sense of mission’ 
(p. 339).  
However, the more recent theoretical concept of “sensegiving” has pertinence here. It is a 
term first coined by Gioia and Chittipedi (1991: 442) as ‘a process of attempting to 
influence the sensemaking and meaning construction of others towards a preferred 
redefinition of organizational reality’. Gioia and Chittipedi’s study revealed the key role 
CHAPTER 6: REVIEWING THE EXTANT LITERATURE 
  Page  6-226 
that leader sensegiving plays in effecting major change and one gets a sense of this from 
the interview data in this case study. So sensegiving is not only important in firms but is 
also a prevalent activity not just amongst leaders but also middle managers and other 
stakeholders (Maitlis & Lawrence, 2007). Its function is to shape meaning (Pratt, 2000) 
along with the sensemaking processes to lead to ‘a collective interpretation of decisions 
and then to action’ (Narayanan, Zane, & Kemmerer, 2011: 307). Narayanan et al. (2011: 
340) also talk about sensegiving as one of the processes of strategic cognition and argue 
that they help to explain the heterogeneity of decisions made in organizations ‘consistent 
with the dynamic capability view’. However sensegiving whilst well developed as a 
theoretical construct awaits empirical research (Narayanan et al., 2011). There is evidence 
that sensegiving is vital in entrepreneurial contexts (Cornelissen, Clarke, & Cienki, 2012), 
in improving team performance (Randall, Resick, & DeChurch, 2011) and in change 
implementation (Fiss & Zajac, 2006). It has been suggested that it allows ambiguity and 
“vagueness” around a central vision which empowers thinking and action (Gioia, Nag, & 
Corley, 2012; Rouleau, 2005). There is no doubt that much of the interview data finds 
resonance in this literature albeit not directly connected to dynamic capability. 
6.3 Support in the literature for the dynamic capability ‘embrace change’ 
Change as a success factor has been a common theme in a very rich literature spanning 
decades. Successful change management is widely accepted as vital for success in todays 
highly competitive and dynamic markets (Burnes, 2004; Burnes & Jackson, 2011; By, 
2005; Luecke, 2003; Pettigrew & Whipp, 1993 amongst others). Firms that ‘engage in 
radical innovation enjoy supranormal returns’ (O'Connor, 2008: 314). However Balogun 
and Hope Hailey (2004) report that 70% of all change initiatives fail. Admiral has been 
remarkably successful at change but it’s process, it’s approach to change must differ from 
the companies Balogun and Hope Hailey report. As the COO explains, it ‘relates to the 
testing thing. If you’re running a number of horses you’ve got... some of them stick and you 
push them forward, so in other organizations if they bet their bank on something that 
doesn’t happen, where do you go? Well you’re back to status quo until you think of your 
next big one, so that’s relevant (DS 24/06/10)’. 
An early version of this proto-theme was named ‘change is constant’ and this is reflected 
in more recent literature on change. Burnes (2004) comments that change is constant in 
organizations both at the operational and strategic levels and goes on to argue that 
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organizational change cannot be separated from organizational strategy. The relevant 
literature on change from previous decades (see Tsoukas & Chia, 2002 for a review of this 
literature) was engaged in a discourse dominated by questions of stability punctuated by 
episodes of change and yet as early as 1946, Bergson (1946: 131) noted that: 
 ‘We say change exists, that everything changes, that change is the very law of 
things: Yes, we say it and we repeat it; but those are only words, and we 
reason and philosophise as though change did not exist.’ 
Even earlier in 1909, in his Hibbert lectures, William James expressed dissatisfaction with 
the ruling paradigm in philosophy that was rooted in the Platonic and Aristotelian belief 
that ‘fixity is a nobler and worthier thing than change’ (James, 1996: 237). So the evidence 
from these interviews that change in this organization is continuous is more in line with 
Tsoukas and Chia’s perspective where ‘change is always potentially there if we only care 
to look for it’ (Tsoukas & Chia, 2002: 568) that starts from the premise that change is 
inherent and pervasive within organizations and built on work from Orlikowski (1993), 
Weick (1998) and Feldman (2000). 
Although culture emerged as a theme from the data in its own right there were specific 
references to a culture of change at Admiral that enables successful innovation and 
continuous change (see Chapter 5 and Appendix A). Organizational culture has been cited 
as a fundamental variable in determining the success of change initiatives (Bate, Khan, & 
Pye, 2000; Curry, 1992; Latta, 2009; Wilkins & Dyer Jr., 1988) and Bate, Khan and Pye 
(2000: 209) note that culture is both a catalyst and a product of change. The academic 
literature is rich in the latter area but little has been written about culture as an enabler of 
change (see for example Armenakis, Harris, & Feild, 1999; Burke & Litwin, 1992; Galpin, 
1996; Isabella, 1990) although the fact that culture can inhibit change and is key to change 
resistance is much more widely researched (for example Armenakis et al., 1999; Burnes & 
Jackson, 2011; Galpin, 1996; Kotter, 1995). Put simply, Burnes and Jackson (2011) argue 
that lack of alignment between the value system of the change and of the staff involved is 
the main contributing factor to why change initiatives fail. The previous sub-section talks 
about sensegiving (indoctrination) and intimates why change may be more successful at 
Admiral. See Armenakis and Bedeian (1999)for a fuller review of literature in this area and 
Section 6.14 where the ‘culture enables’ dynamic capability is explored further in the 
literature. 
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A number of the initial codes for this theme revolved around innovation. From the data 
presented in Chapter 5, the participants clearly believe they are innovative company and 
studying the innovative initiatives within their market, as discussed in Chapter 1.3.4, 
shows this belief is not misplaced.  As the former CFO expresses it: ‘What off the wall 
thing might we try to move it on to the next level (AP 23/06/10)’?  
That innovative activity is vital for success was an idea first expressed by Schumpeter 
(1943: 84): ‘it is not [price] comparison which counts but the competition from the new 
commodity, the new source of supply, the new type of organization’. It is widely accepted 
that innovation is key to the economic performance of firms (van der Panne, van Beers, & 
Kleinknecht, 2003) and a considerable literature has emerged in the last thirty years around 
innovation within firms. Van der Panne et al’s 2003 literature review on the factors for 
success or failure of innovation noted ‘firm culture, experience with innovation, the 
multidisciplinary character of the R&D team and explicit recognition of the collective 
character of the innovation process’ (van der Panne et al., 2003: 309) were consistently 
identified in the literature as having a positive impact on the success of an innovation. The 
enabling character of Admiral’s culture was revealed at length in Chapter 5 and discussed 
further in Section 6.14 starting on page 6-260 
The history of Admiral innovating within the UK insurance market since launch in 1993 
was evidenced earlier and shows the firm has experience with successful innovation but 
the other factors mentioned in van der Panne et al’s review are less relevant here: 
1. Admiral has no R&D function.  The former CFO makes the observation that the 
next hunch is from ‘a small number who have some trust amongst each other that 
they can throw out odd ideas (AP 11/11/10)’ and the COO enumerates the success 
of Admiral’s innovation as ‘the closeness to the business of the senior managers so 
that they are reasonably able to make good calls on what might be a successful 
innovation. Then the second is the willingness to run a number of different 
innovations, some of which inevitably fail .., and then the third one is the ability to 
just get the organization sort of collectively pointed in a direction. That’s a lot 
about continuity of management; it’s a lot about simplicity of business model; and 
… if you are going to point in a direction you can move reasonably effectively and 
reasonably quickly (DS 24/06/10)’. 
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2. The innovation change process at Admiral is often (but not exclusively) about 
putting together a cross-functional team who have matrix reporting lines to the 
head of the team and their usual departmental reporting which seems to satisfy the 
collective aspect referred to by van der Panne et al. (2003). 
Lastly, concerning relevant literature, from the interview text there are references to 
‘hunches’ and an action orientation: ‘It was always “right, what can we do now then” (AP 
23/06/10)’? In the literature these activities seem to be described as sensing and seizing. 
Augier and Teece (2009: 412) state that when ‘firms are dynamically competitive, 
management will be active at sensing and seizing opportunities.’ Teece in his later writing 
on dynamic capability (Augier & Teece, 2008, 2009; Katkalo et al., 2010; Teece, 2007) 
argues that sensing and seizing and transforming are attributes that firms possess that 
enable them to evolve and these activities became a cornerstone for his later evolution of 
the dynamic capability construct.  
Change lies at the heart of the development of the dynamic capability construct in that they 
were hypothesized to ‘enable companies to adapt to change by the modification of its 
operational capabilities’ (Arend & Bromiley, 2009: 75) and yet there are very few 
references to the organizational capacity for change itself being a dynamic capability. 
Judge and Blocker (2008) contend that this capacity for change is an antecedent to 
strategic ambidexterity and as such a dynamic capability. This development was preceded 
by Worley and Lawler III (2006: 19) who argued that in today’s environment, firms need 
to ‘transform themselves into organizations that are “built to change”’ but this hasn’t been 
explored as a dynamic capability in the strategic management literature. However this case 
study has revealed the capacity to change as a dynamic capability. 
6.4 Support in the literature for the dynamic capability ‘learning 
environment’ 
Senge coined the phrase “learning organization” which he defines (1990: 14) as an 
organization that is continually expanding its capacity to create its future. Garratt (1999: 
203) echoes this by stating that ‘it is crucial that the capability of both individuals and 
organisations to learn regularly and rigorously from their work is encouraged so that they 
may adapt rapidly and continuously to their changing environments’. 
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Drew and Smith (1995) comment that ‘the learning organization’ should be viewed as a 
metaphor which Wang and Ahmed (2003) say involves practices such as the establishment 
of a learning culture, collaborative team working, empowerment and involvement. This 
case presented both primary and secondary data throughout Chapter 5 that would indicate 
that such practices and ethos exist within Admiral supporting the assertion that 
organizational learning occurs. 
In organizations, it is the learning context: its structure, processes, culture etc. that affect 
the ability for learning (Catherine L. Wang & Ahmed, 2003). Fiol and Lyles (1985: 803) 
define organizational learning as ‘the process of improving actions through better 
knowledge and understanding’ and they point to 4 contextual factors for learning to occur: 
the corporate culture, strategy that allows for flexibility, organizational structure and the 
external environment. Wang & Ahmed’s review of the literature lists factors for learning to 
occur as flat, cross-functional teams, open communication environments, flexibility, 
employee commitment and absorptive capacity. Again, the data supports the contention 
that Admiral has the right environment for organizational learning to occur. 
Argyris and Schon (1978) were influential in moving the research domain from the more 
rational, systems view of organizational learning (as exemplified by R. M. Cyert & March, 
1963; Levitt & March, 1988) to the idea of individuals as agents of organizational learning. 
Today, the idea that a learning organization evolves as its people learn is the dominant 
paradigm in the literature (Honey & Mumford, 1992; Marquardt & Reynolds, 1994; 
Moffett, McAdam, & Parkinson, 2003; Ryan & Prybutok, 2001; Scarbrough, Swan, & 
Preston, 1999; Senge, 1990; Swan et al., 2010; Tannenbaum, 1997). It follows then that a 
learning organization should enable opportunities for personal development for it staff 
(Scarbrough et al., 1999) but more than that, the organization needs the ability to 
synthesize this individual and project learning at an organizational level (Matlay, 2000; 
Swan et al., 2010).  In surveys run by the GPTW Institute93 in 2011, 2012, and 2013, 88% , 
89% and 88% respectively of respondents agreed with the statement ‘I am offered training 
or development to further myself professionally’. This chimes with the number of people 
formally trained each year in both their own departments and the Admiral Academy. 
                                                 
93  See Chapter 5 for details of the GPTW survey and its methodology. 
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Informal development through coaching and initiatives such as the Port of Call94 also 
provides personal development opportunities. In response to the open-ended question ‘is 
there anything unique or unusual about this company that makes it a great place to work?’ 
the following anonymous employee comments were made: 
 
Table 6-2: Response to the open-ended question ‘Is there anything unique or unusual 
about this company that makes it a great place to work?’ from survey 
conducted in October 2011 by The Great Place To Work Institute. 
This commitment to personal development stems from the idea that ‘people matter’ in this 
company as discussed in Chapter 5.5.4 and in the next sub-section representing another 
example of how the data findings are inter-related. 
One of the prevalent codes: “test and control” is just a control loop and from the interview 
data you can see that results are looked at, debated, next actions decided. As AP 
(23/06/2010) explains ‘Great let’s get on with it. Or, does it partly work? Does it need a 
little bit of change? Yes. Bang! It’s changed. Or, no, it doesn’t work; right throw it away, 
on to the next idea.’  And AP’s point ‘Does it need a little bit of change’ questions not just 
the change itself but sometimes the very foundations of the firm’s business. As other 
participants told me: 'We don’t get attached to a particular way of doing things (CH 
03/06/10)’ and ‘we know that our own people have no prejudices about how things 
"should" be done (CB 14/06/10)’.  This is an example of double loop learning, a term first 
coined by Argyris and Schon (1974) and related to Bateson’s concepts (1974) of first and 
second-order learning. Argyris (1958, 1972) and Argyris and Schon (1976, 1977) argued 
that double-loop learning was the more effective path to decision making within an 
organization.  It can be summarised in Figure 6-1.  
                                                 
94  Port of Call is a program where by a member of staff can ask to spend some time in another department. 
For example in 2012 788 people availed themselves of the opportunity to visit another department. 
Figures provided by RH in email to me dated 21/05/13: 13:41/ 
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Argyris defined organizational learning very simply in his 1976 (p. 365) paper as  
‘Learning here is defined as the detection and correction of errors, and error 
as any feature of knowledge or of knowing that makes action ineffective’. 
In summary, Argyris (p.372) talks about an ideal collegial environment in the absence of 
negative behaviours and where there is no unequal distribution of power or influence or 
information in an environment.  He also talks about the benefit of having adequate time for 
debate.  
 
Figure 6-1: An illustration of how single and double loop learning occur within an 
organization (adapted from Argyris and Schon, 1974) 
There is evidence from Admiral to support Argyris’ ideal. The participants believe that 
they do not operate in a ‘'data is power' or 'blame' culture’ (CH 10/06/10)’ and that over 
time ‘the culture, became the culture of no blame, that people were learning, everybody 
was in the same boat (JM 22/06/10)’. The idea that there is a “democratic spirit” emerged 
(see Chapter 5.5.12 and 5.5.15.2) as part of the culture and also in the decision making 
delegated below the executive directors. 
Having time for debate is less well supported in the data although the sheer volume of 
numbers this company produces and uses in its senior meetings implies that numbers can 
short-circuit some of the time needed for debate amongst a group that is highly 
numerically able for as one participant puts it: ‘we do what the numbers are pointing to 
(NWK 10/06/10)’. 
Another idea that emerged from the data was that of a learning or “no blame” culture. 
There is a wealth of literature of the elements needed in an organizational culture that is 
conducive to both organizational learning and knowledge management: two fields that 
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have pretty well merged in the literature (Scarbrough, Robertson, Swan, & Nicolini, 2007) 
although others recognize organizational learning as a foundation for the KBV (Eisenhardt 
& Santos, 2002: 141). The KBV whose antecedents were discussed in Chapter 2 
(particularly Table 2-1 on page 2-33) has formed a fruitful field within the wider RBV. 
Like organisational learning, influential writers in the 1990’s (Grant, 1996; Nonaka & 
Takeuchi, 1995; Pettigrew, 1990a; Winter, 1998) came to agree that knowledge 
management is also people based. Newell et al (2002) and Moffett et al (2003) stressed the 
importance of employee participation in change to contribute their knowledge and 
experience to a project whilst learning from the implementation. Chong and Choi (2005) 
go further and claim in their review of the literature that knowledge management is 
essentially a cultural phenomenon. 
According to Chase (1997) in a comparative survey of 500 companies, 80% of respondents 
reported that culture hindered knowledge management within their organizations. Chase 
went onto conclude that culture ‘must be nurtured in order for knowledge management 
implementation success’ (p. 46). Table 6-3 shows the descriptions some writers have used 
to describe the necessary elements of a learning culture: 
 
Table 6-3: Descriptions of the organizational culture necessary for successful 
organizational learning and knowledge management from the literature 
The evidence from Admiral data presented throughout Chapter 5 strongly supports an 
assertion that Admiral’s culture not only enables change but also learning, meeting all the 
criteria listed in Table 6-3. 
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Another strand of this expansive literature having relevance to the Admiral case concerns 
the concepts of exploitation and exploration first introduced by James March (1991). In 
essence, March opened up the relationship between the exploration of new possibilities 
with the exploitation of old certainties in organizational learning (p. 71).  This has been the 
basis for an expansive literature in the last decade, focusing on the ambidexterity of 
organizational strategies in these areas (see Lavie, Stettner, & Tushman, 2010 for a review 
of this literature).  Ambidexterity is another way of talking about a ‘balancing act’ between 
the two types of strategy, another link between the themes from the data. Specifically in 
relation to this case study, Miller’s (1996) typology of organizational learning where he 
associates learning modes to an organizational contexts is of interest given the evidence of 
how change and learning occur within the business. Admiral exhibits a number of these 
typologies: for example (1) synthetic learning i.e. Marketing taking what they know about 
drivers of response in mass media to the internet and generating new distribution 
capabilities and (2) institutional learning which is about Senge’s (1990) ‘vision building’ 
and indoctrination which were evidenced in Chapter 5.5.13 and 5.5.2. However it is the 
idea of testing new and radical innovations in a small way to mitigate risk and the process 
of ‘test and control’ associated with more adaptive changes emerging from the interviews 
that are most commonly deployed in the business.  Miller associates ‘exploration’ with his 
‘experimental’ typology coded from the data as ‘testing’ and ‘exploitation’ with his 
‘structural’ typology, coded as ‘test and control’.  
The findings from this case-study appear consistent with many of the theoretical constructs 
in the organizational learning and knowledge management literature but how is learning 
and knowledge portrayed in the dynamic capability literature? Eisenhardt and Santos 
(2002: 142) argued that dynamic capabilities can be considered foundational to 
knowledge-based thinking and many writers have looked at knowledge management as a 
dynamic capability (Cepeda & Vera, 2007; Easterby-Smith & Prieto, 2008; Helfat et al., 
2007; Jansen, Vera, & Crossan, 2009; McKelvie & Davidsson, 2009; Pandza & Thorpe, 
2009; Romme et al., 2010; Zollo & Winter, 2002 amongst others). See Chapter 2.4.3.1 for 
a fuller literature review but most theorists agree that learning underpins and enables 
dynamic capability. Teece et al.’s seminal paper (1997) viewed dynamic capability as path 
dependent and most authors agree that this dependency is grounded in knowledge 
(Ambrosini et al., 2009). However, there are few empirical examples of how the specifics 
work. This may be due in large part to the essentially “tacit” nature of knowledge. The 
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distinction between explicit and tacit knowledge was first articulated by Polanyi (1962, 
1966) and recognized early as a potential strategic resource in firms (Grant, 1996; Kogut & 
Zander, 1992). Grant (1996: 111) noted that ‘explicit knowledge is revealed by its 
communication. This ease of communication is its fundamental property. Indeed 
information has traditionally been viewed by economists as being a public good-once 
created it can be consumed by additional users at close to zero marginal cost. Tacit 
knowledge is revealed through its application’.  
Tacit knowledge is not amenable to quantitative modeling and it is likely that only 
qualitative study can reveal it in action. This study shows how the “test and control” 
mechanism employed in this business creates explicit knowledge in the firm. The data 
explores at length this aspect forming part of the ‘learning environment’ but also reveals 
the traits and behaviours making up the tacit dimension of this environment. These traits 
have created a culture of “no-blame” and one that is conducive to learning at an individual 
and collective level. The learning that takes place can be deemed dynamic capability as it 
informs the firm’s strategic decision making and the subsequent mobilization of resources 
to create new capabilities and new strategic positions.  
Lastly, the dynamic capabilities literature views absorptive capacity as a dynamic 
capability (Kor & Mesko, 2013; Pacheco-de-Almeida & Zemsky, 2007; Roberts, Galluch, 
Dinger, & Grover, 2012; Sun & Anderson, 2012; Volberda, Foss, & Lyles, 2010; Zahra & 
George, 2002). Absorptive capacity is a construct first introduced in Cohen and 
Levinthal’s influential papers (1989, 1990, 1994) defining it as ‘the ability of a firm to 
recognize the value of new, external information, assimilate it and apply it to commercial 
ends is critical to its innovative capabilities (W. M. Cohen & Levinthal, 1990: 128) in turn 
dependent upon the individual absorptive capacities of individuals within the organization 
– see Figure 6-2. An example from the data can be found in the development of 
Confused.com, where seeing the way the internet was changing the way people researched 
purchases and buying behaviours was translated into the launch of a price comparison 
business that was instrumental in a paradigmatic change for the distribution of insurance in 
the UK. Cohen and Levinthal (1994: 244) also argue that absorptive capacity ‘not only 
permits firms to exploit new, valuable developments, but also to envision better their 
emergence’ and thus “fortune favours the prepared firm”. So a firm’s absorptive capacity 
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can help it compete by helping with the timing of resource development for exploiting new 
opportunities (Pacheco-de-Almeida & Zemsky, 2007).  
 
Figure 6-2: Demonstrating the components of absorptive capacity in context of building 
on prior knowledge and organizational outcomes (adapted from Roberts et 
al. (2012: 628) 
 This construct became the core of an intensive research endeavour and a review in 2006 
(Lane, Koka, & Pathak, 2006) showed 40.1% of the 289 papers reviewed viewed the 
construct as a capability, 14.5% as a resource and 3.8% as both (p. 840). The review also 
noted that the construct was largely identified with the knowledge base within the firm and 
has a largely recursive relationship in that ‘increased learning … enhances the 
organization’s knowledge base … which further increases its absorptive capacity and, 
thus, facilitates more learning in that domain’ (p. 848). More recent reviews of the area 
(Roberts et al., 2012; Volberda et al., 2010) point to the problem that ‘confusion surrounds 
how absorptive capacity should be conceptualised’ (Roberts et al., 2012: 625) as ‘scholars 
have leveraged Cohen and Levinthal’s original work … in several ways’ (p. 627) and 
although Cohen and Levinthal’s 1990 definition explicitly refers to knowledge through 
external sources there is wide recognition of the need for creating knowledge internally 
(Volberda et al., 2010) and the process whereby external knowledge is assimilated and 
feeds into strategic internal decision-making. Just using Cohen and Levinthal’s original 
conception of the construct we can see how it applies to the data in this case. 
Zahra and George’s work (2002; 2006) argued that the “potential capacity” element of 
absorptive comprising knowledge acquisition and assimilation capabilities (2002: 185) was 
dynamic capability as it ‘provides firms with the strategic flexibility ad the degrees of 
freedom to adapt and evolve in high-velocity environments’ (2002:185) and formed a key 
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plank of their influential paper contributing to the dynamic capability literature (Zahra et 
al., 2006) emphasizing the role of learning as dynamic capability in organizations. 
Admiral’s absorptive capacity is thematically linked to both the ‘attention to details, 
‘external market intelligence’ and ‘strategic decision making’ themes that emerged from 
the data as it is created by the former two and its outcomes appear as the latter. This is 
discussed later in this chapter. 
For fuller reviews of the absorptive capacity literature see Lane et al. (2006),  Volberda et 
al. (2010) and Roberts et al. (2012). 
6.5 Support in the literature for the dynamic capability ‘people matter’ 
‘Despite managers’ claims that their organization’s human capital is their “most 
important asset,” few can confidently state the financial value of that resource or quantify 
in financial terms how changes in management practices, culture, or workforce 
composition affect the value of that resource’ (I. S. Fulmer & Ployhart, 2014: 161).  
Admiral, in common with many of the firms referred to in this quote, claims that ‘what is 
the principle reason for our success: the answer is a simple one – our people’95 but it 
works very hard to keep that resource and the external benchmarking by Best Companies 
and the GPTW Institute since 2001 has revealed the company place in the Top 50 
published lists of the best places to work by both surveys and in the last 8 years 
consistently in the Top 10.  The current Head of People Services revealed96 that he 
believes ‘good people are our finest asset and so if there’s a possibility that we could lose 
someone we should really do all we can to keep them’ and in further demonstration that 
Admiral does actually believe the cliché, the CEO’s mantra quoted in Chapter 5 ‘people 
who like what they do, do it better’ is also delivered to other audiences as ‘ happy people 
give you a better result on the bottom line’97. 
                                                 
95  Quote taken from the Chairman’s Statement: Annual Report 2010 p. 6. Accessed from 
http://www.admiralgroup.co.uk/pdf/annualreports/2010/sources/index.htm. 20/05/14: 17:11. 
96  See Footnote 98. 
97  Taken from CEO speech to the Friday Club (a meeting of operations managers) in Sep 2005. 
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Although there is a large research tradition around the importance of human resources to a 
firm, there is a view that strategic management research ‘overlooks dynamic capabilities 
generated from the ”humanistic side” of organizational life’ (Wooten & Crane, 2004: 
848). The link between dynamic capability and this humanistic aspect to organizational life 
is still sparse in the literature. There are very broad references recognizing the importance 
of human resources in the dynamic capability literature such as ‘dynamic capabilities such 
as human resource capabilities’ (Singh, Oberoi, & Ahuja, 2013: 1442) or using dynamic 
capabilities to look at balancing capabilities between the tensions of global and local 
adaptation of HRM systems (Festing & Eidems, 2011) but very little exploration of how 
the humanistic side can add value to an enterprise using the dynamic capability framework. 
Scholarly thought regarding the importance of human capital has a long tradition (Ployhart 
& Moliterno, 2011: 127) and the most recent theory suggests that competitive advantage 
‘has less to do with whether human capital resources are generic or specific but instead 
occurs because nearly all human capital resources combinations are complex, firm-
specific, and lack strategic (or efficient) factor markets’ (Ployhart, Nyberg, Reilly, & 
Maltarich, 2014: 371) There is a convergence of the human resource capital (HCR) 
literature and that of strategic human resource management (SHRM) as this more complex 
multilevel theory of human capital resource combination emerges (Nyberg, Moliterno, 
Hale Jr, & Lepak, 2014). The view of HCR as a valuable resource (Barney & Wright, 
1998; Kraaijenbrink, 2011) is firmly rooted in the RBV and indeed formed a key part of 
Penrose’s work (1959). Whilst SHRM is heavily influenced by the RBV it focused more 
on the organizational practices that leverage human resources (for example Wright et al., 
2001; Wright, McMahan, & McWilliams, 1994). In their review of the RBV, 
Kraaijenbrink et al. (2010) argue that a weakness of the RBV is that it underemphasizes 
human involvement in assessing and creating value (p. 359) and Helfat et al. (2007: 23) 
further state that organizations ‘create great value by assembling particular constellations 
of assets inside an enterprise’. That those assets include people is generally accepted in the 
literature, for example Ployhart and Moliterno (2011: 131) contend that the emergence of 
human capital is just such an “assembling”. Their paper postulates that development of 
individual human capital, defined as ‘created from the emergence of individuals’ 
knowledge, skills, abilities and other characteristics’ (p. 128) may well be a dynamic 
capability. 
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Similarly, writing in 2001, Wright et al. (p. 713) noted the ‘centrality of HR issues to the 
understanding and development of dynamic capabilities’ but much of this literature is 
focused on this human, social and intellectual capital developing within the firm (for 
example de Biazzi, 2012; Kraaijenbrink, 2011; Nyberg et al., 2014; Ployhart et al., 2014; 
Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005; Tzabbar & Kehoe, 2014; C. Y.-P. Wang, Jaw, & Tsai, 
2012). There is also a strand of research linking people specifically to organizational 
learning capabilities (for example Kang, Snell, & Swart, 2012; Minbaeva, 2013; 
Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005). 
The ‘I Want to Work for a Company’ forms, that contributed to the secondary data in 
Chapter 5, reveal a moral imperative amongst the founding staff members to treat people 
well and the current Head of People Services told me recently in an email ‘we want to 
make a positive impact on people’s wellbeing and lives’98.  Additionally, there is little 
doubt from the data on the recognition that the concomitant intellectual capital arising 
within Admiral contributes to the bottom line and there are efforts made to keep people 
happy and employed within the firm even when they don’t prove suitable for the original 
job they were trained for but “fit” the company otherwise (see Footnote 3 for numbers of 
Port of Call which are generated by staff either interested in other areas of the company or 
looking for another job internally). The former Head of People Services explained it as: 
call centre work makes up the majority of roles at Admiral. Call centre roles are widely 
available in South Wales and are, not to put too fine a point on it, boring. Attrition is 
traditionally extremely high in this field and recruitment can be difficult. It's therefore 
important that we attract and retain staff. Making the company a great place to work helps 
create our reputation as a good employer and attracts staff. Keeping the staff happy once 
they have joined us dissuades them from changing companies and allows us to retain 
experienced skilled people. It is important that we stay ahead of the competition, who have 
quickly learned that they need to do more for their staff’ and later on she told me ‘we work 
hard to keep good people because we don’t just lose a number off the headcount, we lose 
experience and we lose potential … years of investment’99. There is some support in the 
literature for the idea that “happy people contribute more to the bottom line” in Santora 
                                                 
98  CA responded to a follow up query I had on the way Admiral views its human capital. This quote is taken 
from CA’s email response dated 30/05/14 09:06:08 GMT +01.00. 
99  Both quotes taken from JM’s email response dated 06/06/14 13:12:42 GMT +01.00 to a follow up query I 
had on the way Admiral views its human capital. 
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and Esposito (2011) who found that positive moods in leaders had a strong correlation to 
improved team performance and there is evidence that having a people orientation 
influences employee attitudes, their attachment to the firm and job satisfaction (Beatty, 
1988). 
Another strand of interest in the wider literature related to ‘people matter’ although it has 
not yet featured in the dynamic capabilities literature might be that of (Ferris, Perrewé, & 
Douglas, 2002) “emotional intelligence” (EI). First claimed as the ‘sine qua non of 
leadership’ (Goleman, 1998: 93), academic perspectives remain ‘more qualified and 
controversial’ (Walter et al., 2011: 45). There are a number of definitions but using ‘an 
array of dispositions, competencies, and perceptions related to the effective management 
of emotions’ (Walter et al., 2011: 46) which is grounded in Goleman’s original conception 
and is very broad capturing ‘almost everything except cognitive ability’ (Ferris et al., 2002: 
56). Although empirical evidence doesn’t support all the claims of EI, it does suggest that 
EI plays a role in effective job performance and successful leadership (Walter, Humphrey, 
& Cole, 2012) and proponents of EI believe that teaching leaders “emotional 
competencies” can raise their performance levels (Richard E Boyatzis, 2011). 
See Walter et al. (2011) for a review of the EI literature but the implication from the data is 
that this is a firm who probably has a degree of emotional intelligence given that this was 
such an important theme to emerge from the data because Admiral takes care to 
promote/hire people who are ‘the type of person that can be good with people (JM 
22/06/10)’. 
This idea that “people matter” has emerged as dynamic capability within Admiral and 
whilst the literature recognizes the importance of both ‘the relationships by individuals to 
effectively perform knowledge generating activities’ and the importance for a firm to 
‘identify actors who can positively influence their organization’s knowledge outcomes’ 
(both quotes from Grigoriou & Rothaermel, 2014: 586), the literature is more occupied 
with how firms leverage their human capital for competitive advantage, recently cast 
within the dynamic capability framework. The Admiral case provides an empirical 
example of a firm “leveraging it’s human capital” (C. Y.-P. Wang et al., 2012) by creating 
a “great place to work” for its staff thus reducing turnover and thus reducing the costs 
associated with recruitment and training at the same time preserving the social capital that 
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is embodied by the culture and the intellectual capital that represents the organization’s 
learning and preserving levels of experience in handling customer service and claims so 
that customers talk to knowledgeable case handlers who can solve problems without 
recourse to having to speak to several different members of staff100.  
6.6 Support in the literature for the dynamic capability ‘management style’ 
There is reference in the literature of a relationship between a leadership style encouraging 
trust enabling dynamic capabilities in firms (Chakravarthy & Gargiulo, 1998; Salvato, 
2003) as part of a wider literature around trust as an essential dimension of management 
(see for example Adler, 2001; Ashleigh, Higgs, & Dulewicz, 2012; Ghoshal & Bartlett, 
1994; Heisig & Littek, 1995; Hunt, 2005). That trust can deliver the enabling conditions in 
which problem-solving, engagement, innovation and knowledge-sharing will thrive (Dietz 
& Hartog, 2006) has been accepted into the professional literature for HR professionals 
(for example CIPD, 2012; CIPD, 2014) and forms the basis for the GPTW Institute’s 
measuring instruments of a “Great Place to Work”. 
This aspect of Admiral’s management style is well supported both from the primary data 
and the secondary data (sourced from the GPTW Institute). It’s emergence from the data as 
dynamic capability provides empirical support for those earlier links in the dynamic 
capability literature. However there is a separate branch of literature developed around the 
dynamic managerial capability construct first postulated by Adner and Helfat (2003) to 
underpin the finding of heterogeneity in managerial decisions and firm performance. 
Helfat et al. (2007) feel that this is an area lacking in research output but since 2007 there 
have been efforts in this area and, other than trust, the other specific aspects of 
management (or leadership) style present in the dynamic managerial capability literature 
are summarised below. 
                                                 
100  This latter point is raised in conversations amongst the UK-CMG when turnover or recruitment is a topic 
under discussion. 
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Table 6-4: Matching the literature on specific aspects of managerial style as dynamic 
capability to the evidence of the Admiral data.  
This table demonstrates that for the most part the data from this case study supports 
findings or tenor of the dynamic capability literature in this area of management style. 
Dynamic capability apart, management style is a comprehensive literature in its own right 
(see Cogliser & Brigham, 2004 for a review) although the management style is more akin 
to what the literature describes as “participative management” (Kanter, 1982). So how is 
the data from this case study relevant to that literature? 
Well firstly, like Adner and Helfat, Priem, Lyon, and Dess (1999: 935) also concluded that 
‘top managers do indeed “matter” to firm outcomes’.  In high velocity market 
environments, such as the one in which Admiral operates, Hmieleski and Ensley (2007) 
found that start-ups with homogenous teams performed best with empowering leaders. The 
homogeneity of the Admiral top management team was noted in Chapter 5.5.1.2 and the 
elements of the culture that contribute to empowerment such as (1) power sharing: 
Admiral’s “democratic spirit” and it’s culture of communicating and listening); (2) 
motivation support encompassing Admiral’s culture around “people matter”; and (3) 
development support: in both encouraging personal learning and the coaching and 
mentoring roles of managers (see Amundsen & Martinson, 2014 for a review) emerge 
strongly from both the primary and secondary data. Empowerment emerged as a research 
interest in the 1980’s initially as a tool to promote productivity (Bartunek & Spreitzer, 
2006) and now encompasses ideas around managing highly skilled “knowledge” workers 
in today’s volatile market conditions (Amundsen & Martinson, 2014). At its core, 
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empowering leadership enables employees by ‘motivating through enhancing personal 
efficacy’ (Conger & Kanungo, 1988: 473) and is generally defined as ‘behaviours that 
share power with subordinates’ (Vecchio, Justin, & Pearce, 2010: 531). At it’s heart, 
Admiral’s management style, as evinced by both interviewees and employees in the 
GPTW benchmark studies, is empowering leadership despite the fact that strategic 
decisions are directed from the top, the detail of the implementation is left to empowered 
teams to deliver. For a review of the empowerment literature see Amundsen and Martinson 
(2014) and also Maynard, Gilson, and Mathieu (2012). 
Internally, the management style is often referred to as “servant leadership”101 and this too 
has links to a wealth of literature. After Robert Greenleaf’s (1977/2002) notable 
philosophical essays on servant leadership, Kofman and Senge (1993:17) first noted that 
learning organizations are ‘built by communities of servant leaders’ and here we see 
another link between the themes that emerged from the Admiral data-set: learning 
environment and management style supported by the literature. More recently it has been 
proposed that servant leadership promotes increased collaboration and creativity amongst 
employees (Neubert, Kacmar, Carlson, Chonko, & Roberts, 2008): both are codes that 
appear in the ‘team building’ and ‘embrace change’ themes in the case study. Greenleaf’s 
concept of “servant leadership” (Greenleaf, 1977/2002) has four dimensions of moral 
authority: (1) subordination of ego, a concept that is strongly represented in the data as 
‘lack of ego’; (2) to find meaning, again represented in the data-set through ‘mission’;  (3) 
ends and means are inseparable reflecting the Kantian position (Bhaskar, 1998b) that the 
means used to accomplish the ends are as important as the means. This is interpreted by 
Greenleaf as understanding and respecting consequences and could be interpreted with 
Admiral data as being respectful and being honest with people who ultimately are the 
means by which a business accomplishes its goals; (4) caring for others which features 
strongly in the ‘people matters’ and ‘management style’ themes to emerge from the data. 
So, servant leadership is ‘demonstrated by empowering and developing people; by 
expressing humility, authenticity, interpersonal acceptance, and stewardship; and by 
providing direction’ (van Dierendonck, 2011: 1228). Management friendliness also 
features as being correlated with servant leadership in a recent study (Hunter et al., 2013) 
that again matches findings from both the primary and secondary data and features as a 
                                                 
101  Title of an address given by CEO to all senior managers in 2005 and now part of the teaching 
programme for all new managers in the Admiral Academy. 
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code in a number of the themes (see Appendix A). It is a relatively recent but buoyant 
interest within the research community as a leadership style that contributes to 
heterogeneity within markets (see for example Jones, 2012a, 2012b; McCuddy & Cavin, 
2009; Rai & Prakash, 2012; Sun, 2013). 
Admiral’s management style is very much a reflection of a belief that ‘people matter’ and 
how that has translated to the Admiral culture. The style is an aspect of how ‘culture 
enables’ entrepreneurial action within this company. The concept of managerial 
entrepreneurship is defined as the ‘process of entrepreneurial knowledge management … 
and encompasses the firms ability to implement and renew the resource configuration’ 
(Chadwick & Dabu, 2009: 264). This chimes with the construct of dynamic managerial 
capability as envisaged by Teece (2007) and others (Adner & Helfat, 2003; Augier & 
Teece, 2009; Helfat et al., 2007). 
6.7 Support in the literature for the dynamic capability ‘a balancing act’ 
‘Organizational life contains paradoxical situations’ (Beech, Burns, de Caestecker, 
MacIntosh, & MacLean, 2004: 1313) and one can argue that a capability of management 
must entail managing ‘the simultaneous presence of contradictory, even mutually exclusive 
elements’ (Cameron & Quinn, 1988:2). Furthermore, there is a school of thought that 
argues that such contradictions are inherent and can enable high performance if harnessed 
(W. K. Smith & Lewis, 2011) and can inspire creative insights (Beech et al., 2004; Poole 
& Van de Ven, 1989).   
However, the emergence of “paradox” from the data was an interpretation on my part after 
listening to interviewees taking about what seemed to be contradictions. For example: 
decision-making using an ultra-rationality and also using intuition; of autonomy yet tight-
control; of having fun yet being very results-driven. Poole and Van de Ven (1989: 566) 
suggest that managers have ‘to accept the paradox and learn to live with it’ and yet in this 
case, when confronted with these tensions juxtaposed, the participants do not see them as 
paradoxical. It is clear from their explanations that there is implicit recognition that 
balance is required between two opposing tensions from which one might infer there is a 
management capability in maintaining the ‘balancing act’ between two opposing positions. 
This acceptance encourages Admiral to “live with” paradox (Clegg, da Cunha, & Cunha, 
2002; Lewis, 2000).  
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See W. K. Smith and Lewis (2011) for a full review of this literature but they suggest that 
dynamic capabilities themselves (p. 383) have tension as routines seek stability and clarity 
whilst enabling dynamic flexible outcomes. Paradox per se is not a feature of the dynamic 
capability literature but recently the idea of balance: particularly balancing capabilities has 
been of interest (Festing & Eidems, 2011; Fourné, Jansen, & Mom, 2014) with Fourné et 
al. postulating that strategic ability may be a meta capability to deploy and balance other 
dynamic capabilities.  
The capability to balance opposing tensions does feature in more recent dynamic capability 
literature over and above this ability to balance between capabilities and Corbett et al. 
(2011) argue that a balanced mind-set for senior managers is required to develop dynamic 
capabilities within a firm and thus must be a dynamic managerial capability. However the 
bulk of the research interest has been concerned with the ambidexterity of firms. 
Ambidexterity was suggested as a dynamic capability by O'Reilly and Tushman (2008) 
who advise that it ‘is a specific capability embodied in senior leadership’s learning and 
expressed through their ability to reconfigure existing organizational assets and 
competencies in a repeatable way to adapt to changing circumstances’ (p. 200). This 
suggests that it may be a dynamic managerial capability and is supported by the evidence 
in this case.  
Eisenhardt et al. (2010) also focused on leaders balancing the ‘fundamental tension 
between efficiency and flexibility’ through ‘cognitively sophisticated, single solutions 
rather than by simply holding contradictions’ ( both quotes p. 1263). The concept of 
“simple rules” (Eisenhardt, 2013; Eisenhardt & Sull, 2001) as heuristics for management 
teams has been theorized as a way for firms to manage the complexities of strategy and 
Eisenhardt et al. (2010) propose them as a way to balance opposing tensions.  If we take 
one dichotomous pair to emerge from the data such as “have fun” V. “results orientation” 
as a tension between two rules that also seemed to have emerged from the data albeit 
identified as dynamic capability: ‘people matter’ and ‘numbers matter’. One might argue 
that the balance between the two is achieved through emphasising one rule or the other if 
the balance is broken. For example when Confused results were suffering, there was a 
tightening of the fun elements of the workplace but it went too far and the staff survey 
results worsened. It became clear that the then Head of Confused was unable to maintain 
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that balance and he left the company and the resultant structural and management changes 
brought the “fun V results” dichotomy back into equilibrium. 
There is direct reference made that Admiral ‘is all a bit vague (KC 03/02/11)’. This 
ambiguity is one way in the ‘culture enables’ the flexibility required to maintain balance 
between the dichotomies that exist in the business. Addallah and Langley (2014) recognize 
this flexibility as also playing an enabling role as ‘participants engage in their respective 
interpretations of strategy’ (p.235) and Gioia et al. (2012) argue that vagueness can 
improve strategic change initiatives. 
There is an extensive literature in the human resources field on the work life balance 
(Brough & Kalliath, 2009), that ‘was a founding value (HE 22/06/10)’ of this firm. After 
first being advocated by Kanter (1977/1993) through to an empirical study that appears to 
demonstrate that a culture support of work live balance leads to positive organizational 
outcomes (Cegarra-Leiva, Sánchez-Vidal, & Cegarra-Navarro, 2012), the topic has being 
of interest not just to academics (see Chang, McDonald, & Butrton, 2010 for a review) but 
to practitioners, with a recent European study concluding that work life balance is one of 
the top three challenges facing HR (BostonConsultingGroup & EAPM, 2007).There is 
even interest in the correlation between work-life practices and ethical behaviour in the 
workplace (Verschoor, 2007). However other than it being a human resource management 
practice, it doesn’t feature in the dynamic capability literature. 
Another dichotomy that emerged from the data concerns the feeling of autonomy balanced 
by a tight control culture and yet the data describes an “empowered” or “participative” 
culture that enables change to be initiated at middle management levels driven by 
managers or employees. However, it is this tight control ‘all based on metrics and no 
manager in this organisation knows how to live any other way so that is fundamental (AP 
11/11/10)’ that facilitates this empowerment. There is nothing in the dynamic capability 
literature specifically about balancing between these two aspects of an organization 
however in his diatribe against the interpretation of empowerment by organizations, Elliott 
Jaques argued strongly that empowerment is impossible without trust, accountability, 
support and knowledge (Jaques, 1994) with Kanter (1982) noting that the failure of 
participative management often lies in the emphasis given to the word “participation” 
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rather than “management”. The data reflects that Admiral has implemented an empowering 
culture that reflects Jaques’ caveats. 
In summary, the dynamic capability literature has only recently started to explore 
‘balancing acts’ as dynamic capability but one can see how it has emerged from the data in 
this case and how integral it is both as a management capability and as part of the culture 
to enable change in this firm. 
6.8 Support in the literature for the dynamic capability ‘attention to detail’ 
The name of this dynamic capability came from in vivo coding as a number of participants 
talked about ‘attention to detail’ as key to Admiral’s success. However in the literature, 
“attention to detail” (ATD) is a construct defined as ‘systematic, precise, reliable, and 
carefully attentive’ (Goldsmith, 1989: 37). It is generally presented in the literature as one 
of the cognitive styles associated with innovation (Miron-Spektor, Erez, & Naveh, 2011). 
The balance between ATD and creativity is either presented as a trade-off (Naveh & Erez, 
2004) with the implication that adherence to rules (ATD) increases as innovation decreases 
(M. J. Benner & Tushman, 2002) or that they co-exist and there is a need (capability) to 
manage the balance (Adler, Goldoftas, & Levine, 1999; Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998; Miron, 
Erez, & Naveh, 2004). However the attention to detail construct emerging from the data 
has more in common with the “sensing” construct (Jung, 1923) in the psychology literature 
specifically as used in the MBTI indicator described in Section 5.5.1.2 on page 5-134. 
From the data presented there, senior management homogeneity was pronounced with the 
Sensing-iNutitive dichotomous pair at 15.6% to 84.3%. With all the interviewees falling 
into this “N” group it is unlikely that they mean ‘attention to detail’ as defined by the ATD 
construct in the literature. 
The nearest theoretical construct to match the meaning that emerged from the data is that 
of “managerial cognition”. The role of managers in the organizational capabilities 
conversation in the 1990’s is conspicuously absent (for example reviewed in Chapter 2 the 
work of Barney, 1991a; Collis, 1994; N. J. Foss, 2003). This began to change as 
researchers turned to managerial agency in understanding how capabilities are wielded (for 
example Gary & Wood, 2011; Gavetti, 2005; Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008; Porac, Thomas, 
Wilson, Paton, & Kanfer, 1989; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). Even the seminal work of Teece 
et al. (1997) on dynamic capability was cast in the prevailing economic conversation and 
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yet has become decidedly more weighted towards the role of managers in the dynamic 
capability framework (Augier & Teece, 2009; Teece, 2007). This has led to a rise in 
research concerned with ‘the cognition of managers and the interpretative processes in 
which they engage’ (Eggers & Kaplan, 2013: 296): more particularly in light of the 
development and deployment of capabilities. See Eggers and Kaplan (2013) for a review 
of the intellectual history of cognition and capabilities as management cognition concepts 
have been diffused into many different managerial fields of research (Kaplan, 2011). 
Managerial cognition refers to ‘managerial beliefs and mental models that serve as a basis 
for decision making’ (Adner & Helfat, 2003: 1021). The Carnegie writers argued that the 
cognitive base for decisions encompasses knowledge and assumptions (R. M. Cyert & 
March, 1963; March & Simon, 1958). This cognitive base, in the context of a firm’s value 
systems, forms the basis for decision-making (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) and has also 
been described as the “dominant logic” within a firm (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986, 1995). 
Gavetti’s work (Gavetti, 2005; Gavetti & Rivkin, 2007; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000) has been 
instrumental in thinking about the relationship between managerial cognition and the 
routines that make up dynamic capability in a firm arguing that cognition plays a major 
role in the sensing, interpreting, encoding, and use of previous experience to create new 
routines. That some firm’s fail to evolve is down to rigidity (Leonard-Barton, 1992) or 
inertia (Kogut & Zander, 1992) and ‘the roots of this inertia lie in the wiring of human 
cognition to acquire tacit procedural knowledge as the basis of interaction with other 
individuals’ (Kogut & Zander, 1996: 515). The case data reflects a management team who 
have been recruited with curiosity as a desirable trait and thus arguably don’t suffer from  
this inertia, actively seeking out new opportunities, knowledge and learning bolstered by  
paying attention to the business. 
The emergence of ‘attention to detail’ describing management cognition from this case as a 
dynamic capability reflects earlier work from Eggers and Kaplan (2009) where they argued 
that managerial cognition should be considered a dynamic managerial capability, as indeed 
theorised by Adner and Helfat (2003).  
Mindfulness is also a construct developed in the psychological literature that seems to be 
related to this theme of ‘attention to detail’ that emerged from the data conceived, as it is, 
as ‘involving attentiveness and the ability to respond flexibly to contextual cues’ (Argote, 
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2006: 501) along with the element of reflection (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2006). Weick and 
Sutcliffe (2006) argue that it is the quality of the attention that affects outcomes and it has 
been articulated as a micro-foundation for dynamic capability (also see this paper for a 
review of the mindfulness literature Gärtner, 2011) and specifically as an element of a 
learning dynamic capability(Romme et al., 2010). 
As with much of the discussion thus far, the literature supports relationships that have 
emerged from the data. In this case (see Figure 5.2 on page 5-111), ‘attention to detail’ 
enables the ‘learning environment’ and there are multiple references in the data to learning 
from this attention to detail. Most of these references talk about the ‘test and control’ 
feedback loop that underlies much of the innovation and change in this firm. Paying 
attention to the patterns that emerge from these loops allows managers to determine what 
is working or failing or where adaptation is required and thus the organization “learns” 
about the initiative. 
Recently, Kor and Mesko (2013) developed theory around how dynamic managerial 
capabilities, including cognition, create and develop a firm’s absorptive capacity. A brief 
review of this literature appears earlier in this chapter, in Section 6.4 and again 
demonstrates a link that exists in the data between the themes ‘learning environment’ and 
‘attention to detail’ with links made in the literature. 
In this case, the data shows that attention is paid to numbers and patterns within the firm 
and externally but also to people: how they feel and how they respond within a very 
empathetic management style. And it is this attention to detail that allows organizational 
plans to be built and implemented that enable the “evolutionary fitness” of this firm as 
defined by Helfat et al. (2007: 7) and the conceptual construct that they propose to  
measure the performance of dynamic capabilities. This aspect is further discussed later in 
this chapter.  
6.9 Support in the literature for the dynamic capability ‘numbers matter’ 
The rational perspective in strategic management literature dominated much of the field in 
the 70’s and 80’s (see Chapter 2 for the literature review) where firms were perceived to 
pursue economic advantage through decision-making and analytic actions guided by 
logical preferences and bounded rationality. The language of this perspective did emerge 
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as codes within this theme: logical, analytical, rational and numerate. All of these were 
perceived as desirable traits of individuals that “fit” the organization and so ties in with the 
‘recruitment and indoctrination’ theme. There can be no doubt from the evidence presented 
in Chapter 5 that this is an organization that balances these traits with more creative 
behaviours and thinking often a balance present in individuals with an NT in their MBTI 
(Hirsh & Kummerow, 1990). Certainly, creativity these days is posited as a helpful trait for 
decision making in today’s ambiguous and high velocity environments (Ogilvie, 1998). 
The dynamic capabilities literature is silent on rationality or using numbers or an affinity 
for numbers as a dynamic capability. 
In the wider literature, numbers have are shown to have a role in mediating the paradoxes 
of governance (Michaud, 2014) and there is an acceptance that they are necessary to craft 
rationality in organizations (Cabantous, Gond, & Johnson-Cramer, 2010). There is an area 
in the literature termed “calculative practices” referring to management accounting and 
performance orientated measures. With regards to management accounting, which forms 
the basis for the bulk of management reporting used by all Admiral managers102 that 
formed part of the secondary data, Miller (2001: 379) wrote that it enabled ‘new ways of 
acting upon and influencing the actions of individuals’ and the data from this case has 
demonstrated the extent to which the management accounts and other measures are used to 
direct decision-making at all levels within this firm.   
However, there is also a small but growing literature in the area of human resource 
practices where “calculative practices” are aimed at an efficient use of human resources 
(Gooderham, Nordhaug, & Ringdal, 1999) and often contrasted and presented as a 
dichotomy with “collaborative practices” that are aimed at promoting mutual goals 
(Gooderham et al., 1999). This dichotomy is not illustrative of the Admiral case where 
both exist and are used extensively. The “collaborative practices” in this organization are 
embodied in the culture and the sense of mission in the business, both of which emerged as 
themes. The calculative practices exist because ‘numbers matter’ and managers pay 
‘attention to detail’. Much of the learning in this business, particularly around change 
comes from reviewing measures in the test and control feedback loops put in place to 
                                                 
102  In addition, each departmental manager will then see their own specific accounting and performance 
measures. 
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control that change. So ‘numbers matter’ links to many of the other themes and was 
identified as a foundational relationship to the other themes during the axial and selective 
stages of the grounded theory method that was followed (Corbin & Strauss, 2008) – see 
Figure 5-2 on page 5-111. The literature suggests that firm size has an impact on 
calculative practices (Gooderham et al., 1999) but the Admiral experience is that increased 
regulation and the requirements of being a company listed on the Stock Exchange have 
driven additional reporting to the substantial management reporting and culture of 
‘numbers’ that has always existed within Admiral. Experience has been the main driver to 
changes in this reporting rather than size. Additionally the literature suggests that in the 
European context, at least, calculative practices contribute positively to performance and 
statistically that relationship doesn’t exist with collaborative practices (Gooderham, Parry, 
& Ringdal, 2008) although, as discussed earlier, this is a firm that believes it’s 
collaborative practices contribute to it’s superior performance.  
6.10 Support in the literature for the dynamic capability ‘team building’ 
The dynamic capability and dynamic management capability literature speak to the 
influence of top management teams as a source of capability and in developing capability 
in firms (for example Eisenhardt, 2013; Helfat et al., 2007; Kor & Mesko, 2013; J. A. 
Martin, 2011) and this literature is discussed later in this chapter in the section on ‘strategic 
decision making’. However a number of recent studies have identified ‘team building’ as a 
dynamic capability in the software industry (Li, Chang, Chen, & Jiang, 2010), in product 
innovation (Im, Montoya, & Workman, 2013) and in a case study at Nissan (Vinh & 
Witcher, 2008): all empirical studies supporting the emergence of ‘team building’ from the 
data in this case. 
The wider literature on teams is extensive as teams have been widely ‘accepted as the 
basic building blocks of modern-day organizations’ (Mathieu, Tannenbaum, Donsbach, & 
Alliger, 2014). Research has shown that our social brains are hardwired to recognise when 
a situation requires team effort and this triggers motivational and cognitive abilities that aid 
team participation (Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006). 
By the 1990’s there was a myriad of articles on designing teams, cross-functional teams, 
executive teams and team based organizations, on conflict and collaboration, on 
cohesiveness, cognition and norms and how to control and motivate teams. The literature 
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came with a myriad of foci: from an economic organizational design viewpoint and as a 
human resource strategy to stimulate employee commitment to a way to facilitate 
creativity and innovation. For a review of this literature 1990-1996 see S. G. Cohen and 
Bailey (1997). The psychology literature too has been interested in the psychological facets 
of teamwork: behavioural, attitudinal and emotional variables. See Rasmussen and 
Jeppesen (2006) for a review of this literature. 
Cohen and Bailey’s influential review of the area recommended five key areas for future 
research namely: (1) group cognition, affect and mood; (2) group potency and collective 
self-efficacy; (3) virtual and global teams; (4) environmental and institutional factors; and 
(5) time. A review of the team literature from 1997 to 2007 by Mathieu, Maynard, Rapp & 
Gilson mapped progress of the field to Cohen and Bailey’s (1997) agenda and noted 
substantial progress in all areas. They also noted that modern organizational designs are far 
more complex than their predecessors (Mathieu et al., 2008: 462) and recommend future 
research efforts embrace this complexity. From the psychological perspective a more 
recent review notes that team construction and management are a prerequisite for 
performance (S. J. Armstrong, Cools, & Sadler-Smith, 2012) and also note that there is a 
paucity of studies on how social interaction and cooperation/collaboration influence team 
building. 
N. J. Foss and Lindenberg (2012) argue that teams should again be central to 
understanding the emerging nature of firms and note that such a study should incorporate 
the human dimension. 
That ‘team building’ emerges as a dynamic capability supports other findings from 
empirical studies in the field and most of the data found that Admiral teams ‘feel 
comfortable in each other’s company (SC 08/06/10)’ and collectively Admiral believe that 
it’s teams reflect that the ‘sum is much bigger than the individual parts (DS 22/06/10)’. 
The underlying attributes of the Admiral culture such as “challenge”, “communication”, 
“democratic spirit”, “friendly” “no blame” and “trust” must enable team performance as 
these are attributes identified in the literature as key to team effectiveness (Rasmussen & 
Jeppesen, 2006). The theme of ‘a balancing act’ may also be related to this theme in the 
literature as it has been recently argued that team spirit is built around paradoxes of egoism 
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and conflict, results and relationships and that a healthy balance between these contributes 
to effectiveness of team spirit (Silva et al., 2014).  
6.11 Support in the literature for the dynamic capability ‘external market   
intelligence’ 
In Chapter 2 we discussed how the introduction of IO economics in the 80’s swung the 
focus of strategic management research from Chandler’s (1962) contingency perspective 
which emphasized the fit between strategy and structure and the internal perspective of 
Learned et al. (1965) which focused on matching internal strengths and weaknesses to 
external threats and opportunities. The 70’s had seen a shift to a more analytical and 
economics-based perspective and the move to an ‘external’ orientation was complete by 
the 1980’s and remained predominant until the rise of the resource-based view in the 90’s 
(Barney, 1991a; Hoskisson et al., 1999). However even the RBV was centred around 
finding how firm’s deployed their resources for competitive advantage in their markets so 
understanding a firm’s position in that market remained fundamental to this stream of 
literature. 
External market intelligence lies at the heart of the definition of dynamic capability from 
two of the seminal papers: Teece et al. (1997: 510) developed the ‘‘dynamic capabilities’ 
approach in order to stress exploiting existing internal and external firm-specific 
competences to address changing environments’ and Eisenhardt and Martin (2000: 1112) 
theorise that ‘dynamic capabilities also rely more on real-time information, cross-
functional relationships and intensive communication among those involved in the process 
and with the external market’. Helfat et al. (2007: 7) stress, in their measurement of the 
effectiveness of dynamic capability, its “evolutionary fitness”  which ‘depends on how well 
the dynamic capabilities of an organization match the context in which the operation 
operates’. 
 External knowledge also lies at the core of the “absorptive capacity” construct discussed 
in Section 6.4 and that literature has identified absorptive capacity as a dynamic capability 
(see the previous discussion for references here). Absorptive capacity logic suggests that a 
firm needs some level of related internal knowledge to recognize and build on external 
market intelligence but Menon and Pfeffer (2003) found that external knowledge is often 
favoured over internal knowledge when the target information poses status threats 
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internally. However there is no evidence to suggest this holds true in the data collected in 
this firm. 
The exploration/exploitation literature also briefly discussed in Section 6.4 is another facet 
of the dynamic capability literature that has at its core external knowledge gathering in the 
exploration stages. Like absorptive capacity, exploration and exploitation are also at the 
heart of the theme ‘learning environment’ and it makes sense that part of the learning in 
this firm is around ‘external market intelligence’.  
Organizational research on the processes whereby firms recognise opportunities is 
relatively light, although more is known about the factors that influence a manager’s 
perception of environmental signals (Dalton, 2005: 369). It was Baron (2006) that first 
proposed a cognitive framework of pattern recognition may explain why some individuals 
see opportunities and ‘connect the dots’ (p. 104) but not others. These cognitive processes 
which make mental connections may be facilitated by prior knowledge (Gregoire, Barr, & 
Shepherd, 2010) but the data suggests that in this firm, it is all about the ‘learning 
environment’ having that ‘attention to detail’ to the numbers, the people and the ‘external 
intelligence’. 
Thus the literature on ‘external market intelligence’ whether it be a dynamic capability as 
and of itself (for example Capron & Mitchell, 2009; Kor & Mesko, 2013; Pacheco-de-
Almeida & Zemsky, 2007; Sun & Anderson, 2012; Zahra & George, 2002)or feeds into the 
development of dynamic capability (for example Adner & Helfat, 2003; Ambrosini et al., 
2009; Barrales-Molina, Beitez-Amado, & Perez-Arostegui, 2010; Eriksson, 2014; Schilke, 
2014) is extensive. 
6.12 Support in the literature for the dynamic capability ‘strategic decision-
making’ 
Not surprisingly, the process of strategic decision-making (SDM), is a vast literature and 
the rational perspective is ‘the cornerstone of much of the thinking about strategy process’ 
(Chakravarthy & White, 2002: 187). Much of this rational decision-making literature is 
grounded in Simon’s (1945/1976) notion of bounded rational behaviour, although Kay 
(2010: 1207) argues strongly that Simon’s original conception painted a picture ‘of 
“decision” as both “process” and “ complex system” sat uncomfortably with the 
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traditional economics perspective’ who emphasized the rational choice behaviour. A 
review of this rational decision-making literature can be found in Chakravarthy and White 
(2002: 187-190) and Schwenk (1995) or Schoemaker (1993) provide reviews of other 
theoretical perspectives in SDM. 
The object of this review is to link the literature specifically with the data and in the data 
the executive directors are presented as a “top management team” (TMT) who are able to 
have ‘robust discussions AP (23/06/10)’ that are ‘helped by a degree of trust (AP 
11/11/10)’ which reflects Eisenhardt’s (2013: 805) recent work that found ‘teams are 
effective in making strategic decisions when they are fast’ highly conflictual, and still get 
along’. If we accept that SDM is a dynamic capability, as first identified by Eisenhardt and 
Martin (2000), and indeed is a dynamic managerial capability, as suggested by Helfat et al. 
(2007) and Augier and Teece (2009), then the literature suggests that ‘dynamic managerial 
capabilities are driven by managerial cognition, which consists of the belief systems and 
mental models that managers us for decision making’ (Kor & Mesko, 2013: 234). This is 
described in the literature as the managers’ dominant logic: ‘the way in which managers 
conceptualize the business and make critical resource allocation decisions’ (Prahalad & 
Bettis, 1986: 490) and the managers’ dominant logic is created ‘as founders and managers, 
more specifically their cognitive models, interact with a particular business and firm 
environment’ (Kor & Mesko, 2013: 235).  
The data suggests that this is a firm whose dominant logic has developed in such a manner. 
The literature also suggests that the development of a dominant logic facilitates the 
mobilization of capabilities (Sirmon, Hitt, & Ireland, 2007) but warns that the inevitable 
path-dependency can create rigidities (Leonard-Barton, 1992). Managerial 
entrepreneurship can mitigate these rigidities through a process called “continuous 
morphing” (Rindova & Kotha, 2001) of organizational form and the data demonstrates that 
this is a company that has fluid structures: ‘I explain that to people when they come here. 
“Your job will not be so prescribed that you will know exactly what you’re doing because 
the next week you may be given something completely different so you have to be flexible, 
be able to change, be able to think on your feet”  LS(12/11/10)’.  
In this conceptualization, dominant logic acts as a filter for managers to cope with a 
environment that is ‘information-rich but interpretation-poor’ (Prahalad & Bettis, 1995: 6) 
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and as such is a ‘fundamental aspect of organizational intelligence’ (p. 7). Prahalad and 
Bettis use the analogy of the dominant logic as a “genetic factor” which chimes with the 
way this firm talks about it’s “DNA” and the data suggests that this “DNA” is articulated 
through the culture. They also argue that this dominant logic is an emergent property, one 
that in this case has it’s origins in the founders and perpetuated through the culture, and 
through this argument we see links to the complexity literature which is discussed later in 
this Chapter. 
Kunc and Morecroft (2010: 1164) argue that the absorption of SDM processes into the 
dynamic capability framework makes it difficult to pinpoint the origins of heterogeneity in 
firm performance. This case, however, suggests that heterogeneity can be found in this 
firm in the way decision-making is related to the other dynamic capabilities but 
particularly in  ‘the degree of detailed knowledge that the senior managers know about 
their business (KC 03/02/11)’, the speed and the test and control mechanisms that nuance 
the SDM capability.  Argyris (1976) proposed his double-loops model as the basis for 
more effective decision-making and in their test and control methodology, this firm 
illustrates a link between this double loop learning and decision making in practice. 
Creativity and intuition also plays their part in this heterogeneity as the data reveals.  The 
management team believe they are “creative” and the track record of innovation in the firm 
would indicate this to be so (see Chapter 1). See Reiter-Palmon and Illies (2004) for a 
review of creative problem-solving. The literature also explores creativity in SDM with 
Ogilvie (1998: 49 both quotes) explaining that ‘confronted with rapidly changing, 
ambiguous environments, senior managers report that creative problem solving and the 
generation of new ideas are among the most important and valued traits in their workers’. 
He also notes that ‘creativity is important because taking creative action provides decision 
makers information that is different, and perhaps more helpful, than that educed from 
typical analytical methods’.  
A related construct: that of intuition in decision-making also emerged from the data. Dane 
and Pratt (2007: 33) define intuition as ‘affectively charged judgments that arise through 
rapid, non-conscious, and holistic associations’ and postulate that its roots lie in not only 
domain knowledge but also in both implicit and explicit learning. Use of intuition appears 
to be greater in unstable environments and this thesis has made the argument that Admiral 
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operates in a highly unstable environment (Khatri & Ng, 2000) and requires personality 
traits of being vigilant: ‘abundantly alert and deeply curious’ (Day & Schoemaker, 2008: 
43), again supported in the data.  
Interviewees talk about decision-making on a ‘hunch’ although in the business there is ‘a 
strange juxtaposition of very detail orientated data analysis and … a process of decision-
making which is actually free of data and information, it is based on a conversation and a 
bit of a debate (KC 03/02/11)’.  Dane and Pratt (2007) certainly use the terminology of 
“hunch” when describing intuitive action. Both C. C. Miller and Ireland (2005) and Akinci 
and Sadler-Smith (2012) provide reviews of this literature but part of the secondary data 
collected were the MBTI for all the senior managers and it was noted in Chapter 5.5.1.2 
that there is a bias towards the iNtuitive type in this senior management group: to the 
extent that all the senior managers exhibit an iNtuitive preference. There is a balance in the 
group between Thinking and Feeling and this is reflected in the executive team. Hough and 
Ogilvie (2005) found that NT executives, such as found in Admiral, use intuition to make 
cognitive leaps based on detailed information. They also noted that decisions made by 
NT’s crafted higher quality decisions. However the positivity bias observed in NT 
individuals (stressing the opportunity coupled with low attention to threat) (Stumpf & 
Dunbar, 1991) appears to be balanced in this firm by the ‘attention to detail’, normally 
listed as a Sensing characteristic but iNtuitives are equally capable. As it forms part of the 
dominant logic in the firm, iNtuitives are happy to use the detail – particularly for the 
pattern recognition iNtuitives prefer. S. J. Armstrong et al. (2012) in their review of the 
role of cognitive styles in strategic management review some of this MBTI data as it 
applies to decision-making and comment that iNtuitives take a more ‘gestalt approach’ (p. 
246) which fits the data rather than the “procedural rationality” described by Dean and 
Sharfman (1996) which is the extent to which a decision relies on the collection and 
analysis of information.  
Another link between themes and literature can be found in the idea that leadership 
practices that enable strategic agility: fast-paced adaptable decision making such as we see 
in this case can be linked to the ability to manage paradoxes and achieve a balance 
between contradictions (Lewis, Andriopoulos, & Smith, 2014). The literature also talks 
about homogenous and heterogeneous TMT with the observation that start ups with 
heterogeneous TMT perform best with directive leaders and those with homogeneous 
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teams perform best under empowering leaders (Hmieleski & Ensley, 2007) with Admiral 
falling into the latter category. 
Empirical studies have shown that entrepreneurial individuals tend to be more positive 
generally and tied to their emotions creating a more positive work climate (Baron et al., 
2012; Hmieleski & Baron, 2009). Listening to the interviews and the positivity that exudes 
from the recordings and in the language may explain some of the positive aspects of 
Admiral’s culture. The literature reveals that in positive work climates there is evidence of 
biased recall of information and a greater impulsiveness (Baron et al., 2012) but Baron and 
Hmieleski’s work suggests there are limits and that successful entrepreneurs regulate their 
“dispositional positive effect” (DPE). In this firm, a proclivity for  ‘attention to detail’ and 
‘numbers matter’ may be tools by which the negative effects of DPE are mitigated in 
decision-making at all levels. 
With all the theory and discussion around decision-making in the literature it would appear 
from the data that Admiral’s process is more akin to the portrayal of strategy formulation 
in the strategic cognition literature as a complex activity consisting of scanning, 
sensemaking and strategic decision-making (see a review by Narayanan et al., 2011: 309-
310). With regards to the data: scanning relates to paying attention in ‘attention to detail’ 
theme as it is characterized by having an internal and external focus (Garg, Walters, & 
Priem, 2003), the sensemaking discussion that takes place involves ‘building consensus in 
interpretation’ (Narayanan et al., 2011: 316) and of course the decision-making process is 
described in earlier discussion. 
The last point that materializes from the data that can be found in the literature is this 
concept of vagueness and ambiguity that is referred to by several of the participants. 
Addallah and Langley (2014) tell us that ambiguity can help build consensus and 
commitment to a decision and enables the implementation. They also point out that the 
downsides can be contradiction and overextension but in this firm the communication at all 
levels and the clarity of the mission (discussed next section) can bottom out problems 
when they occur. Similarly, Gioia et al. (2012) claim that vagueness can help alignment 
during strategic change and additionally lead to deeper exploration of a problem and 
Plambeck and Weber (2010) argue that it is the conceptualization of new configurations 
that arise from such ambiguity that creates heterogeneity of resources in an industry. 
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Plambeck and Weber’s paper specifically looks at CEO ambivalency and the senior 
managers all accept that the CEO plays “devil’s advocate”. The current CFO told me: ‘I 
have lots of lovely chats with Henry now where I’ll go “I think it should be white” and 
he’ll go “I think black, actually, we should be doing black here”. And I think “I thought 
we said white” and then I explain all the 60 reasons why white is the right answer and he 
goes for 58 reasons why black is the right answer and then the next day he’ll go “you 
know what, white’s good, we’ll go with white” (KC 03/02/11)’. From a personal standpoint 
this practice encourages you to really think out why you’re a recommending something 
and challenges that thinking so better decision-making ensues. 
So, is SDM a dynamic capability or do other dynamic capabilities enable SDM (Kay, 
2010: 1205). The data seems to indicate that it is both and that there is a more complex 
relationship in that ‘the nature and content of strategic decisions are likely to influence 
(and in turn be influenced by) the dynamic capabilities that support them’ (Kay, 2010: 
1214).  
6.13 Support in the literature for the dynamic capability ‘mission’ 
Campbell and Yeung (1991: 13) define a mission in terms of a framework that consists of 
four elements: (1) purpose tells us why the company exists; (2) strategy telling us about the 
company’s competitive positioning and distinctive competencies; (3) behaviour standards 
are the policies and behaviours that underpin the distinctive competence and value system; 
and (4) values which tell us what the company believes in and where there is a match with 
employee value a “sense of mission” can be created. In the late 80’s and early 90’s 
companies were exhorted to write effective mission statements as a tool to cope with 
increasing environmental complexity largely as a result of Drucker’s influential writing 
(1973). By 1989 59% of CEO’s103 surveyed reported they had not developed a mission 
statement (David, 1989). This was lamented by proponents of the mission statement 
(Campbell & Yeung, 1991; David, 1989; Ireland & Hitt, 1992 amongst others) and yet in 
many firms, mission statements were felt to be meaningless: divorced from strategy and 
performance (Bartman & Baetz, 1998). The founders of Admiral in 1993104 ascribed to this 
                                                 
103  Survey was of Business Weeks 1000 firms. 
104  I pushed the idea of developing a statement in 1994 but the general feeling around the group then was as 
described here. 
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view and it was felt that alignment and passion and commitment, in fact what Campbell 
and Yeung (1991) describe as the emotional bond that constitutes their “sense of mission”, 
could be achieved through the development of the organizational culture. This view is 
reflected in the data as is the belief that hiring people with the same values would create 
this commitment and that ‘every new person is brain washed into what we do (NWK 
22/06/10)’ reinforcing this passion for making the business a success. 
A similar argument was given against developing a formalized vision that ‘articulates a 
view of a realistic, credible, attractive future for the organization’ (Bennis & Nanus, 
1985). The feeling from the founders was that mission and vision statements quickly go 
out of date and a foundational commitment to sensing and seizing opportunities in line 
with a commitment to being the best company we could, would be enough. 
Culture is discussed next but at it’s core is the commitment to creating an open 
communications climate that enables the alignment and focus and indoctrination that are 
key to this firm’s sense of mission. Although not formally articulated, the data showed that 
the staff strongly agreed with statements about understanding and being motivated by the 
“mission”. Alignment is achieved through the culture and also by the wide share 
ownership in the company: shares that create real value for the staff each year that the 
company meets its profit targets ‘it binds in this sense of “we’re all in this together and we 
all get a share” (AP 23/06/10)’. “Brainwashing” or indoctrination literature was discussed 
in Section 6.2 of this chapter but it too formed part of the coding for this theme. 
6.14 Support in the literature for the dynamic capability ‘culture enables’ 
6.14.1 Looking at culture as a whole in the literature 
Culture, like many of the themes to emerge from this case-study, has many different 
theoretical conceptualizations and no single definition. As quoted in Chapter 5, Deal and 
Kennedy (1982) used the informal definition ‘the way we do things around here’. Barney 
(1986a: 657), summarising the literature, tells us that culture is ‘typically defined as a 
complex set of values, beliefs, assumptions and symbols’. It defines the informal, 
behavioural aspect of organizational context (Denison, 1996) and is developed as the firm 
learns to cope with the twin problems of direction and flexibility (Schein, 1996). 
Organizations reflect the values of their members (O'Reilly, Chatman, & Caldwell, 1991) 
and can explain action in and around organizations (Gehman, Treviño, & Garud, 2013). In 
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fact Schein describes culture as ‘both a “here and now” dynamic phenomenon and a 
coercive background structure that influences us in multiple ways’ (2010: 3).  
Firms with strong cultures became of interest to researchers in the 80’s and many of these 
firms were exemplified as examples of excellence (Collins & Porras, 1994; Peters & 
Waterman, 1982) and this idea of a relationship between strong culture and success 
(Denison, 1984) was adopted into the practitioner mind-set. As a practitioner, a few books 
crossed over from the academic audience to that of managers such as Alvesson (2001), 
Cameron and Quinn (2006), Handy (1993) and Schein (2010). 
The link between culture and firm performance has been touched on by researchers (for 
example Denison, 1984; Gordon & DiTomaso, 1992; Wilkins & Ouchi, 1983) but whether 
that performance is due to a culture that encourages customer satisfaction (Gillespie, 
Denison, Haaland, Smerek, & Neale, 2008), a culture of innovation (Caldwell & O'Reilly, 
2003), a learning culture (Catherine L. Wang & Ahmed, 2003) or down to a culture of 
change (Bate et al., 2000) it seems clear that there is a theoretical link between culture and 
performance, a link expressed by the management team of this firm. The literature also 
talks about culture as a form of social control with O'Reilly and Chatman (1996) 
suggesting that normative order can act as a social control system and as a means by which 
tacit knowledge can be explicated enhancing the socialization of a team (Brockmann & 
Anthony, 2002). 
In their influential work on upper echelons, Hambrick and Mason (1984) note that a TMT 
influences the ways these individuals view their business, and the data from this firm 
suggests that both the TMT and the senior managers are very involved day-to-day in 
“living the culture” and communicating those values on a daily basis. In a further link 
between culture and management style: a consensus style of management is seen as a good 
predictor of success (Baruch & Gebbie, 1998) and furthermore a “culture of success” is 
proactive, supportive, and group oriented (Baruch & Gebbie, 1998). This assertion is 
supported by the data in this case. Additionally the data talks to the creation of a learning 
culture seen as key to knowledge management for competitive advantage. In fact, Kofman 
and Senge (1993: 7) described firms as needing to build “communities of commitment”:  
‘Communities committed to creating learning environments rather than follow recipes for 
success. Communities that embrace pragmatism and idealism, that address themselves to 
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critical problems while sharing a vision as generators of rich lives rather than as ends in 
themselves’. 
The literature on organizational culture from both the management and psychology 
perspective is huge with over 4,600 articles published between 1980 and 2011 (Hartnell, 
Ou, & Kinicki, 2011). For a brief history see Ehrhart, Schneider, and Macey (2014: 117-
144) and for a fuller review of the field see K. Weber and Dacin (2011).  
However, the theme that emerged from the data was about how culture enables activity 
within this firm. And certainly in the last decade the study of culture has shifted to how it 
enables other areas of academic interest, many of which have also been theorised as 
dynamic capability. For example: learning (see S. D. N. Cook & Yanow, 1993 for a 
review), innovation (see Büschgens, Bausch, & Balkin, 2013 for a review), ambidexterity 
(see Catherine L Wang & Rafiq, 2014 for a review), change (see Latta, 2009 for a review) 
and entrepreneurship (see Hayton & Cacciotti, 2013 for a review) are all areas in the 
literature also reflected in this case study. Recent research has confirmed that open 
communication, collective rewards and a culture of cooperation encourages and nurtures 
an organization’s absorptive capacity (Khoja & Maranville, 2010). These are just examples 
of a substantial literature. In reading this expansive literature on organizational culture, it is 
not surprising that culture emerged firstly as a resource and later as a dynamic capability, 
although in this latter guise mostly in the area of change cultures and learning cultures 
(Vogel & Guttel, 2013). 
Barney, writing in 1986 on reviewing the relationship between culture and performance 
argued that ‘a firms culture can be a source of sustainable competitive advantage if that 
culture is valuable, rare and imperfectly imitable’ (Barney, 1986a: 663). This precedes his 
seminal work on the RBV but uses the same lexicon and so organizational culture can be 
considered a resource from the RBV perspective. However a view of culture as a “toolkit” 
from which resources such as symbols, rituals, stories etc. can be used ‘in varying 
configurations to solve different kinds of problems’ (Swidler, 1986: 273) became 
influential in the sociology of culture (DiMaggio, 1997) and again spawned a large body of 
work (Rindova, Dalpiaz, & Ravasi, 2011) exploring how individuals use cultural resources 
(Harrison & Corley, 2011). A culturally informed RBV can help explain how ‘cultural 
elements in the firm’s institutional context may create or destroy value’ (Maurer, Bansal, 
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& Crossan, 2011: 432). In this case study, the data clearly demonstrates that the 
management team believe that their organizational culture enables their approach to 
change and learning and creates a “happy” environment contributing directly to the bottom 
line (supporting claims made by Avolio, Howell, & Sosik, 1999). The impact of a positive 
emotional environment has been shown to affect exploitation of market opportunities 
positively (A. L. George, 1972) and as happy people stay with a company longer there is a 
reduction in the loss of the human capital that constitutes ‘the central resource in 
knowledge intensive companies’(Dess & Sauerwald, 2014: 1) and this reduction 
contributes directly to Admiral’s bottom line. 
 Fiol (1991), writing in the same issue that Barney’s 1991 seminal work on the RBV 
appeared, reframed the discussion of culture as a resource by focusing on the ‘critical 
beliefs and behaviours that are at the very core of managing cognitive processes for 
sustained advantage’ (p. 191) and moved the thinking about resources as a source of 
competitive advantage to that of organizational identity which essentially answers the 
questions “who are we” (Albert & Whetten, 1985), that of itself is a productive stream of 
research. Fiol (2001) argues that an organization has a relatively homogenous 
organizational identity and focused on its cognitive core. The data presented in this case 
reveals cognitive elements to this firm’s culture and demonstrates homogeneity at the top 
team level and thus, one could argue, as externally represented and yet there is evidence 
that sub-cultures or “tribalism” exists at departmental and site level. This is picked up later 
in this section. 
There is an overlap in the organizational culture and identity literatures (Ashforth, Rogers, 
& Corley, 2011; Whetten, 2006) and culture is identified as a source of identity (Ravasi & 
Schultz, 2006). Corley (2004) observed that higher levels of the hierarchy tend to see 
identity in light of the organization's strategy whereas lower aspects of the hierarchy see it 
in relation to the organization's culture.  
Despite the academic interest in measuring and diagnosing organizational culture (see 
Denison, Nieminen, & Kotrba, 2014 for a review) a definitive theory on how 
organizational culture can contribute to sustained competitive advantage has not been 
advanced and perhaps this is in part due to the tools used for diagnosis. Writing in 1996, 
Schein  bemoans the fact that ‘our failure to take culture seriously enough stems from our 
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methods of inquiry, which puts a greater premium on abstractions’ (p. 229). This is 
equally an issue for practitioners with Alvesson (2001: 1) noting that ‘even in those cases 
where top managers have a strong awareness of the significance of culture, there is often a 
lack of deeper understanding of how people and organizations function in terms of 
culture’. However, this case reveals a management team that is both fully aware of the 
significance of the culture it has created and takes steps, both formally and informally, to 
manage the culture. Kor & Mesko (2013) identify management of the culture as a dynamic 
managerial capability (although identified by Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1994 as a key task of 
management). 
Hofstede’s empirical body of work on national cultures (1980, 1983, 1991) is often used in 
the literature looking at organizational culture. However, Hofstede himself has warned that 
his framework should not be applied at an individual level (Hofstede, 1980) and accepted 
his conceptualization of cultural dimensions at the organizational level is ‘far too limited’ 
(Brookes, Croucher, Fenton-O'Creevy, & Gooderham, 2011:70) to claim universality but it 
has been argued that ‘one  might reasonably infer’ (Kirkman, Lowe, & Gibson, 2006: 298) 
his framework applies to organizations and teams and as such occupies much of the 
literature on organizational culture – this despite numerous criticisms that his dimensions 
over-simplify culture (Gooderham & Nordhaug, 2003; McSweeney, 2002). However this 
case study has found much richer descriptions of culture than Hofstede’s framework that is 
essentially quantitative in origin. 
The last theme to emerge from the data that has relevance to the literature is that of sub-
cultures or ‘tribalism’. This concept has been identified in the literature (namely Denison 
& Mishra, 1995; Hofstede, 1998b; Schein, 1993) with Schein (p. 40) explaining that 
‘subunits of organizations are more and more likely to develop their own sub-cultures … 
because of their shared core technologies and their different learning experiences’ and 
essentially talks about the key issue for organizational effectiveness being the ability to 
develop techniques for integration of these sub-cultures. Denison and Mishra (1995: 214) 
hypothesize that “organizational culture” may exist only in this integration of sub-parts 
into the whole and this assumption that organizational culture is compositional has been 
largely absorbed into the literature (Hartnell et al., 2011) and yet the two concepts are 
considered theoretically isomorphic because of their shared, normative cues (O'Reilly & 
Chatman, 1996). Subsequent research has not explored these ideas further, other than 
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noting instances where such integration of sub-cultures is ineffective (for example Denison 
et al., 2014; Fey & Denison, 2003; Palthe & Kossek, 2003). The data here reveals that 
although sub-cultures exist and are tolerated, the overall culture acts as a normative control 
on behaviour, influencing the sub-cultures in their core values whilst the peripheral values 
and behaviours can vary. This empirical observation seems to run counter to the literature 
in this aspect. 
6.14.2 Looking at theoretical support for the cultural attributes that emerged 
from the data 
Various attributes of the culture emerged from the data. The next table outlines how the 
literature maps to those cultural attributes individually. 
Table 6-5:  Mapping examples of literature, where available, to attributes of Admiral’s 
culture (table split over pages XX to XX). 
Cultural 
Attribute 
Examples from literature 
Ambiguous Ambiguity has already being discussed earlier in this chapter see 
Section 6.7 but specifically as it relates to culture is seen as being 
a key part of successful change culture (Addallah & Langley, 
2014; Corley & Gioia, 2004; Gioia et al., 2012) and also in 
learning cultures (Robertson & Swan, 2003). 
Balance Again discussed earlier (see Section 6.7) but there is a wide 
literature particularly focussed on work-life balance and it’s 
cultural antecedents and benefits to the firm (Brough & Kalliath, 
2009; Cegarra-Leiva et al., 2012; McCarthy, Darcy, & Grady, 
2010) and there is a smaller literature around the benefits of a 
balanced mindset (Corbett et al., 2011; Eisenhardt et al., 2010; 
Fourné et al., 2014) and the data has elements of both making up 
this attribute. 
Be the best This has an element of “mission”. Also has a cognitive element as 
people who pursue this goal are often “adaptor” problem solving 
types (Kirton, 1976) and this implies learning. 
Challenge The literature talks about opportunity seekers (Baron, 1998; 
Hayek, 2012; Keh, Foo, & Lim, 2002) and a need for 
achievement (Rauch & Frese, 2007) but the data refers to people 
who enjoy challenge and the organizational psychology literature 
links this aspect of culture to the MBTI: specifically being a trait 
of iNtuitives (S. J. Armstrong et al., 2012; Hirsh & Kummerow, 
1990). 
Colour 
outside the 
Innovation is a another huge area of research but related 
specifically to culture, see Büschgens et al. (2013) for a review. 
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lines 
Communicate, 
communicate, 
communicate 
Mintzberg (1991) noted managers can spend 78% of their time 
communicating and, as long ago as 1961, Jack Gibb suggested 
that people feel better about themselves and can speak freely in 
an open supportive environment. Benefits of an open 
communications climate were highly influential in the decades 
that followed in change literature (for example Kanter, 1983), 
knowledge management (for example Patil & Kant, 2012), 
successful teams  (for example A. Pentland, 2012), motivation 
(for example Burton, Pathak, & Zigli, 1976) etc. Communication 
skills are considered fundamental to organizational life (Beech & 
MacIntosh, 2012b: 7) and communication in turn enables many 
other aspects of this culture. 
Customer 
orientation 
Whilst the cultural influences on customer orientation is of 
interest to marketing and relationship management research, there 
is some interest in the link between customer orientation and 
successful businesses (Tyler & Gnyawali, 2009) and it is 
generally accepted that any strategy to deliver a customer 
orientation must involves the organizations cultural dynamics 
(Halliday, 2002). 
Democratic 
spirit 
This firm does not offer organizational democracy as articulated 
in the literature (Kerr, 2004) but it is more akin to concepts of 
participative management culture and empowering culture: both 
strands of strategic management research. It was postulated in the 
80’s that firms with participative cultures performed better 
(Denison, 1984) and empowerment literature is related to 
innovation and creativity (for example Pieterse, van Knippenberg, 
Schippers, & Stam, 2010), to TQM (for example Sigler & 
Pearson, 2000), team performance (for example Lorinova, 
Pearsall, & Sims Jr, 2012) and change (for example Cattermole, 
Johnson, & Roberts, 2013), all foci for research. Empowerment is 
‘all about attitude and persuasion’ (Takata, 1991: 271) linking it 
to communication and equality in the idea that employees feel 
that their voices are heard (Burris, Detert, & Romney, 2013). 
Equality In defining a cultural framework for analysis, Hofstede (1980) 
defined “power distance” differentiating between the degree to 
which inequalities are accepted. The point is made that power is 
fundamental to all relationships and is inherent in all 
organizations (Daniels & Greguras, 2014) and there is a wealth of 
research around it, see Daniels and Greguras (2014) for a review 
of this substantial  literature. But this is a firm that seeks to 
minimise that power distance whilst accepting that inequalities do 
exist: managers making the strategic decisions, are paid more. 
Yet the feeling of “equality” underlies other elements of the 
culture such as democratic spirit and it is enabled through 
‘freedom of speech’ (Haskins, 1996) and ‘having a voice’ (Burris 
et al., 2013) as well as through symbolism such as car-parking 
and furniture and dress policy and the fact the managers create 
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social interaction with the staff. 
Everything is 
a learning 
opportunity 
See Section 6.4 for a review of learning culture but this trait is 
also about the psychological aptitude of individual’s openness to 
experience encompassing curiosity, flexibility, willingness to 
learn and creativity (Mussel, Winter, Gelléri, & Schuler, 2011) 
translating into an organizational commitment to learning where 
most of the research focus appears to be. There is also a link 
between this attribute of the culture and ‘attention to detail’ or 
“mindfulness” literature described in Section 6.8 
Flexible Flexibility and ambidexterity seem related concepts in the 
literature and it is recognized that they are rooted in 
organizational culture (Catherine L Wang & Rafiq, 2014). 
Ambidexterity is certainly postulated as a dynamic capability 
(O'Reilly & Tushman, 2008) or as an antecedent to dynamic 
capability (Judge & Blocker, 2008) but from a cultural angle: 
research streams are apparent in both the organizational and 
psychology literatures. Adaptability was identified as a cultural 
trait that predicted performance (Denison & Mishra, 1995; Patil 
& Kant, 2012) and innovation (Catherine L Wang & Rafiq, 2014; 
Yilmaz & Ergun, 2008). 
Friendly Using Goffee and Jones’ (1996) framework to analyse culture, 
Admiral’s falls into the “Communal” category. Goffee and Jones 
use sociability, ‘a measure of sincere friendliness among 
members of a community’ (p. 134) and solidarity as dimensions to 
measure culture and note that ‘friends tend to share certain ideas, 
attitudes, interests, and values and usually associate on equal 
terms’ (p. 134). In their categorisation, communal cultures are 
where ‘everything feels in sync’ (p. 143). There isn’t very much 
literature expanding on this area other than the contribution 
sociability within a culture can contribute to the development of 
social capital (for example Melé, 2003; Pastoriza, Ariño, & 
Ricart, 2009). There is little literature to support the ideas that 
emerged from the data where friendliness is seen to break down 
barriers and minimise “power distance”. 
Fun Fluegge (2008: 5) has defined “fun” as ‘any social, interpersonal or 
job-related activity of either a humorous or playful nature that a 
person finds enjoyable an interesting’ and Deal and Kennedy (1999: 
234) suggest that if the “fun quotient” is high, staff will ‘pour their 
hearts and souls into what they do’. Evidence suggests that 
employee morale, creativity, performance and commitment may 
improve when work is a fun place to be (Mesmer-Magnus, Glew, & 
Viswesvaran, 2012) and there is a wealth of practitioner orientated 
literature devoted to having fun in the workplace105 (for example 
Frieberg & Frieberg, 1996; Hudson, 2001). A stream of research by 
Karl (Karl, Harland, Peluchette, & Rodie, 2010; Karl & Peluchette, 
                                                 
105  Its worth noting that Friebergs’ book NUTS about South West Airlines culture is part of the management 
library at Admiral and the CEO actively encourages senior managers to read it by presenting them with a 
copy. 
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2006b; Karl, Peluchette, Hall, & Harland, 2005; Karl, Peluchette, & 
Harland, 2007; Peluchette & Karl, 2005) shows fun at work is 
positively related to job satisfaction and for fuller review of 
literature around “fun” see Fluegge-Woolf (2014). The differences 
between departments observed at Admiral are also covered in the 
literature as “fun” is most successful when there is a match to 
different personalities (Aldag & Sherony, 2001; Karl et al., 2007). 
Use of humour to create more creative environments is well covered 
in the literature (for example Ekvall, 1991; Isaksen & Ekvall, 2010; 
Isaksen, Lauer, & Ekvall, 2000; Lang & Lee, 2010; Moon, Quigley, 
& Marr, 2012) as it’s ability to relieve workplace stress (Hudson, 
2001; Karl & Peluchette, 2006a; Lang & Lee, 2010; R. A. Martin & 
Lefcourt, 1983). There is also a suggestion that “fun” might be a 
means of normative control of staff (Fleming & Sturdy, 2011). 
 
If it moves - 
measure it 
There is little literature in the organizational culture field around 
calculative practices and use of numbers and yet this is a firm 
who would agree with the statement ‘calculative practices 
contribute to the maintenance of social order’ (Vollmer, 2003: 
353). Vollmer exhorted his fellow accountants to explore 
quantification and how calculative practices proliferate and to 
explore ‘what kinds of culture breed numeracy’ (p. 366) and 
notes from a review of the literature that numbers can solve 
problems as well as cause problems. It is not a call that has 
generated much research interest. A paper looking at how cultural 
factors may affect adoption of calculative HR practices (Brookes 
et al., 2011) has recommended this as a focus for future research. 
No blame A culture of blame has been a fruitful source of interest for 
researchers with its focus on outcomes rather than accountability 
and responsibility (Dalton, 2005) having negative connotations 
for performance. It has also interested practitioners (for example 
Conlin, 2004; Dalton, 2005; Papp, 2013; Sandberg, 2007). It is a 
particularly rich literature with “blame” identified as an 
impediment to organizational learning, see Table 6-3 for a sample 
of writers on this, and as a barrier to organizational change 
(Armenakis & Harris, 2009; Bate et al., 2000; Burnes & Jackson, 
2011). A culture of blame focuses on outcomes at the expense of 
process (Grichnik et al., 2010) leading to short termism. 
Open In early 90’s studies of creativity at work (for example Ekvall, 
1991; Jelinek & Schoonhoven, 1990) emphazised that open 
climates were more conducive to encourage creative problem 
solving. Ekvall talked about openness being trusting and 
accepting of failure. Necessary for successful change (Gärtner, 
2013), and implicit for an effective absorptive capacity (Khoja & 
Maranville, 2010) and for knowledge management generally 
(Ciganek, Mao, & Srite, 2008), open communication has been 
linked with improved performance over the last two decades 
(Berkowitz & Wren, 2013; Goffee & Jones, 1996; Hofstede, 
1998a; Patil & Kant, 2012 amongst others). There is also a link to 
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empowerment which requires a virtuous circle of trust and 
communication (Martins, Donald, & Martins, 2013). 
Passion The concept of passion as a desirable trait appears in both the 
entrepreneurial and human relations spheres of management 
research and in the psychology literature. Passion goes beyond 
the employee engagement of the motivation literature where 
engagement is described as ‘a heightened emotional connection 
to a job and organization that goes beyond satisfaction’ 
(Gubman, 2004: 43) but ‘passion is more like love’ (p. 44). 
Increasing engagement creates stability, reduces retention and 
increases profitability (Attridge, 2009 and see this paper for a 
review of the engagement literature). Passion is a topic of interest 
in the business literature where it is seen as an essential element 
of great leadership (Buckingham & Coffman, 1999; Gubman, 
2003) and in academia as an important aspect of an organizations 
“affective” culture (Smollan & Sayers, 2009) particularly in the 
entrepreneurial sphere (for example Cardon, Wincent, Singh, & 
Drnovsek, 2009; Chen, Yao, & Kotha, 2009; De Clercq, Honig, 
& Martin, 2013). However the idea that not all passion is good 
passion exists (Fisher, Maritz, & Lobo, 2013; Ho & Pollack, 
2014). The literature concentrates more on the entrepreneur rather 
than looking at passion as a function of the organization (Cardon, 
2008) and how it relates to other aspects of organizational culture 
has not been researched widely. 
Pay attention In Section 6.8 of this chapter, this element of the culture 
expressed as a dynamic capability in the data fell more into the 
purview of the literature on managerial cognition and 
mindfulness and there is literature relating these two constructs to 
organizational culture. Culture and cognition affect each other 
and ultimately employee attitudes and behaviours (Peterson & 
Wood, 2009) and it is recognised that culture influences cognitive 
processes such as the acquisition, retention and analysis of 
information and learning (Steers, Sachez-Runde, & Nardon, 
2012). Gavetti (2012) offers a view of superior performance that 
‘some firms are endowed with better ways of representing the 
world around them than others’  (Brandenburger & Vinokurova, 
2012: 286). With regards to mindfulness, there is research to 
show that it enhances a readiness to change (Gärtner, 2013) and 
at a collective level is the result of cultures, like Admiral, 
characterised by learning, open communication, supportive 
management and participatory decision making (also Gärtner, 
2013). 
People matter Ahlstrom (2010) argues that if organizations provide a good 
working environment, employees will generate innovations that 
can lead to growth. As long ago as 1980, Ouchi postulated that 
organizations that build attachment with their employees see 
reinforced ties and alignment of purpose. But questions are raised 
as to whether caring organizations profit more or profitable 
organizations care more (Delios, 2010). Scholars have started to 
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look at ‘what organizing might be like if care and compassion 
were to move to the forefront’ (Rynes, Bartunek, Dutton, & 
Margolis, 2012: 518) and how to create climates and cultures that 
embody an ethic of care (Lawrence & Maitlis, 2012) and the 
facilitating concept of authentic leadership (Walumbwa, Avolio, 
Gardner, Wernsing, & Peterson, 2008) which has related 
literature in leadership and cultural ethics and morals (Pastoriza et 
al., 2009; Peus, 2011). These related ideas of caring, humanizing, 
ethical and moral obligations of organizations translate into a 
practitioner literature around creating a “great workplace” 
(Goffee & Jones, 2013 amongst others). 
Pride Pride has been recognised as vital to success (Bruch & Ghoshal, 
2003; Peters & Waterman, 1982) but is mostly unexplored in the 
literature (Gouthier & Rhein, 2011). Pride in ones work is 
considered a positive emotion and contributes to organizational 
energy pushing a firm into the “passion zone” where companies 
‘display an urgency that makes them more productive’ (Bruch & 
Ghoshal, 2003:47) and there is a link made between 
transformational leadership styles being more energetic 
(Schippers & Hogenes, 2011). 
Recognition The human relations school that developed in reaction to the 
scientific management movement (for example F. Taylor, 1947) 
emphasized the subjective dimensions in managing people based 
around Mayo’s assertion (1933) that people are activated by a 
“logic of sentiment”. Key to this school was the development of 
the “motivation-hygiene theory” that stated recognition as being 
one of the intrinsic factors that strongly determined job 
satisfaction (Herzberg, 1966). Buchanan (1974) found that 
recognition was associated with greater commitment in firms and 
it has become a factor explored extensively in the motivation 
literature of human relations, of management and of psychology 
and most recently in the POS and social exchange literature 
where recognition along with trust and inclusion are found to be 
antecedents of perceived organizational support (POS) (Bagger & 
Li, 2014; Eisenberger et al., 2014; Wayne, Shore, Bommer, & 
Tetrick, 2002).  
Risk adverse In the literature (for example Frijns, Gilbert, Lehnert, & Tourani-
Radi, 2013) the meaning of being risk adverse is often associated 
with Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance (1980) but this is not the 
same construct that emerged from the Admiral data where clearly 
the organization takes risk but management control or mitigate 
that risk. The literature suggests that regarding risk ‘leaders must 
perform a delicate balancing act’  (Schoemaker & Tetlock, 2012: 
5) but the literature often equates an enhanced risk perception 
with less propensity to take risk (Sitkin & Weingart, 1995) and 
linking entrepreneurs (Pines, Dvir, & Sadeh, 2012) and 
innovators (Jassawalla & Sashittal, 2002; Soken & Barnes, 2014) 
to a greater propensity to take risk. The link between a propensity 
for risk with a propensity for controlling that risk is not covered 
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in the literature. 
Self-
deprecation 
Being modest, argues Vlachoutsicos (2011) allows you to create a 
sense of mutual dependence which underlies open 
communication, empowerment, a democratic spirit etc. Lack of 
ego is a key trait in hiring policies in this firm. In the psychology 
literature, ego is one of the three constructs in Sigmund Freud’s 
structural model of the psyche (Freud, 1923/2010) and separates 
out what is real. The individual managers demonstrate ego, in the 
Freudian sense, as it includes defensive, perceptual, intellectual-
cognitive and executive functions. They also display ambition 
which can create ‘innovation, efficiency, and opportunity for 
oneself and others’ (Bruhn & Lowrey, 2012: 137) and the trait 
expressed in the data is a control mechanism for untrammelled 
ambition particularly in redirecting energy for the more negative 
aspects of ambition i.e. more power, status and money  (L. Wang 
& Murnighan, 2011) into more collective ambitions for the firm 
by which personal ambitions can be satisfied. 
Spend every 
penny wisely 
“Corporate frugality” is defined ‘an enduring corporate trait of 
consistent, disciplined management of spending to achieve long 
term strategic objectives and sustainable profits’ (Anderson & 
Lillis, 2011: 1352) but as a cultural phenomenon it is not further 
theorised in the literature nor is its possible contribution to 
organizational success highlighted in the literature in the way that 
the management in this case-study believe it to be. 
The perfect is 
the enemy of 
the good 
As the call to create cultures of continuous improvement and 
innovation in firms resonated from the theoretical to practice, the 
emphasis on continuous experimentation grew (Barrett, 1995) 
and it became a fundamental concern in the 
exploration/exploitation strand of the learning literature (for 
example Lavie et al., 2010). The other aspect of this attribute as it 
emerged from the data is the “action-orientation” of the 
organizational behaviour literature accepted as the “readiness to 
take action” often contrasted with state-orientation the 
“propensity to stagnate” (Weinzimmer, Michel, & Franczak, 
2011). O'Reilly et al. (1991) in their influential paper created a 
variable called “outcome orientations” as a cultural attribute and 
suggest that individuals with high needs for achievement prefer 
cultures that demonstrate an outcome orientation (p. 1990). 
Trust Trust has already been touched in this review particularly in the 
benefits of engendering trust in the management style (see 
Section 6.6) but also in the delivery of several attributes of the 
culture such as open communication and lack of blame. In the 
literature: trust is essential in enabling organizational learning 
(Swift & Hwang, 2013), creating psychological empowerment 
(Chan, Taylor, & Markham, 2008) and generally in enhancing a 
firm’s performance (Heavey, Halliday, Gilbert, & Murphy, 2011; 
Salamon & Robinson, 2008). 
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6.14.3 Summarizing the culture literature and introducing the notion of 
“sensemaking” 
This is a very wide literature centred both in the Organizational Behaviour and Psychology 
fields. The concepts that arose from the data are widely supported in this wider literature 
on culture although not as a dynamic capability. The idea that culture enables resources to 
be developed, manipulated and deployed for performance gain is supported in the literature 
and has strong links to the knowledge management, change, leadership and human 
relations literatures. The “second wave” of cultural research over the last 10 years means 
that culture is ‘more often treated as constitutive of a wide range of social processes’ (K. 
Weber & Dacin, 2011: 287) and the research often ‘”endogenizes” these other forces as 
themselves culturally constructed’ (also p. 287): a view that came out of this case data, the 
idea that culture enables many of the activities within this firm. This second wave looks at 
culture ‘in a more agentic way’ (K. Weber & Dacin, 2011: 288) removing the notion of 
culture as a constraint and explore more how cultural materials as a pragmatic resource. 
See K. Weber and Dacin (2011) for a review of how the conceptual frames have changed. 
Sensegiving, defined as the deliberate attempt to shape the interpretations of others (Gioia 
& Chittipedi, 1991), was discussed in Section 6.2 as a theoretical lens in which to view the 
indoctrination processes that emerged from the data. Weick (1995: 4/5) described 
sensemaking as a way of constructing meaning from ambiguous, uncertain stimuli by 
placing them into a mental framework. Ravasi and Schultz (2006: 433) suggested that 
culture plays a role ‘in informing and supporting sensemaking and sensegiving processes’ 
in other words providing the framework by which meaning can be constructed although 
earlier thinking suggested that culture is a manifestation of an individual’s sensemaking 
structures and processes (Harris, 1994). The data illustrates that after initial 
‘indoctrination’ where new recruits are introduced to the shared values and meanings 
embedded in the culture, the culture itself through its widespread influence then acts as the 
filter for staff to search for meaning and acting as the lens i.e. the dominant logic by which 
information is received and parsed in the business.  
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6.15 How does the extant literature inform this case-study? 
 
Table 6-6:  Maps each “dynamic capability’ to emerge from the data against categories 
of extant literature. Where there is more than one sub-field within a category 
and where the literature is pertinent to that “dynamic capability”, the cell is 
shaded darker than where the extant literature is only in one sub-field. Cells 
shaded lightest are where there is some but not a whole body of extant 
literature. 
Table 6-6 indicates that many of the dynamic capabilities identified from the data are 
supported in the dynamic capabilities literature albeit, with the exception of ‘Learning 
environment’ and ‘Management style’, relatively lightly in that literature. However this 
summary of the extant literature does reveal that all of the themes that emerged are present 
in the wider literature to a much greater extent.  
Is this because the dynamic capabilities framework is posited as something new in the field 
of strategic management so there is an unwillingness to make these links to the wider 
literature and contribute to the debate in strategic management research?  Using very broad 
definitions of dynamic capability garnered from the most influential writers on dynamic 
capability, this case appears to demonstrate dynamic capability but it would appear from 
this review that using a different analytical lens may have generated other explanations of 
superior competitive advantage forming the basis of other literatures. This idea will be 
explored in the next chapter as we attempt to answer the research question and think about 
how this case-study may contribute to the literature.  
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CHAPTER 7:  ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
7.1 Restating the research question 
Can a study of Admiral Plc further open the “black box” and help evaluate dynamic 
capability theory? Specifically: 
1. Are dynamic capabilities, as defined in the literature, observable in this firm?  
2. What are the sources of dynamic capability in this firm? 
3. Can this case shed light on how dynamic capability is operationalized and how that 
contributes to the firm’s success? 
4.  How has dynamic capability evolved as the company moved from an entrepreneurial 
start-up to an MNE? 
5. What can be learned about managerial dynamic capability and its contribution to 
“entrepreneurial fit”? 
6. Can this case-study contribute to some of the debates in the literature such as the 
existence of a capability hierarchy, the nature of dynamic capability, its 
heterogeneity or otherwise? 
The research objectives are: 
1. Using the definitions in the literature identify the elements of dynamic capability 
within this firm. 
2. Use historical data and interviews with the founders to examine the sources of 
dynamic capability within this firm and evidence it’s evolution from 1992 through to 
2013. 
3. Use the data to investigate some of the debates in the literature around dynamic 
capability. 
4. Expand existing dynamic capability theory to explain the findings. 
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7.2 Introduction  
The aim of this study in essence is to explore how the dynamic capabilities identified from 
the data can contribute to the existing theory around dynamic capabilities. Specifically in 
this chapter we use the data to explore the research questions as this case study thematic 
development revealed examples of resource configurations and routines that can be 
considered dynamic capability. On the basis of that discussion we can identify where this 
research can contribute to knowledge of dynamic capabilities. 
In the last chapter, an extensive range of literature was reviewed and summarized as it 
related to the themes that emerged from the data in Chapter 5. This literature review 
covered both the themes as dynamic capability and in the wider context of management 
research. Table 6-6 on page 6-273 reveals that all the themes are part of a continuing 
conversation in the wider literature: often in an extensive wider literature and that most of 
them have been touched on in the dynamic capabilities literature.  Earlier in the literature 
we identified several calls for more empirical development of dynamic capabilities (for 
example Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009; Barreto, 2010; Di Stefano et al., 2010) the dynamic 
capabilities literature has now a grounding of empirical findings but most of this work is 
cast as “how dynamic capabilities contribute to some aspect of a firm’s success”. None of 
it explains how dynamic capabilities actually work (Arend & Bromiley, 2009; Barrales-
Molina, Bustinza, & Gutiérrez-Gutiérrez, 2013; Williamson, 1999) and there is a 
substantial criticism of the construct (see Arend & Bromiley, 2009 for details) to the point 
where Winter (2003: 991) comments that ‘while some see dynamic capabilities as the key 
to competitive advantage ... others seem to doubt that there actually are such things’. 
There is a recognition amongst scholars in the field that empirical dynamic capabilities 
research is needed to answer these fundamental theoretical questions of formation, 
operationalization, evolution (Arend & Bromiley, 2009) and it is hoped that this research 
will contribute to this understanding by opening up the “elusive black-box” that is a 
description of the dynamic capability construct (Pavlou & El Sawy, 2011). This in-depth 
qualitative case-study was designed to elicit understanding of a construct that the literature 
views as invisible (Itami, 1987), tacit (Dierickx & Cool, 1989a), difficult to observe 
(Simonin, 1999) and causally ambiguous (Williamson, 1999). 
After considering some definitions, this chapter considers the research questions in Section 
7.1, in turn looking at how the data fits the extant literature on dynamic capabilities and 
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discussing that fit and its relation to some of the debates in the literature. The last research 
objective is analysing dynamic capability as an explanatory framework in light of the 
findings and hypothesising how these results could be generalized and the implications 
thereof. 
7.3 Definitions 
Given that the dynamic capability view is still young in its conceptualization (Barreto, 
2010) and this thesis has utilized successive and distinct definitions from the seminal 
writers in the field (see Table 5.1 on page 5-108) it is important to specify definitions of 
the relevant terms in this chapter. 
Organizational capacity: The Oxford Dictionary defines capacity as ‘the ability or power 
to do or understand something’. There is a cognitive aspect to this definition and the use of 
the word “capacity” in organizational literature is used interchangeably with “ability”. 
Having the capacity to do or understand something at organizational level does not imply 
that it is routinized or repeatable although it can become so (see Arend, 2014). 
Organizational capabilities: Using Winter’s (2003: 991) definition as ‘an organizational 
capability is a high-level routine (or collection of routines) that, together with its 
implementing input flows, confers upon an organization’s management a set of decision 
options for producing significant outputs of a particular type’. This definition does include 
the concept of repeatable and reliable performance of an activity in contrast to “ad hoc” 
activity that is neither practiced nor patterned (Dosi, Nelson, & Winter, 2000; Winter, 
2003).  
Operational capabilities (OCs): Most writers use Winter’s definition where OC’s are those 
capabilities that enable a firm to make a living in the present (Winter, 2003: 992). It is 
important too to note Winter’s admonishment that operational capability is ‘locally 
defined’ (p. 992) to a particular firm’s context although others recommend analysis of DCs 
with a systems-wide perspective (Pitelis & Teece, 2010). In this study, we follow Kay’s 
(2010: 1211) recommendation that ‘both operating and dynamic capabilities are best 
defined not in terms of what they are, but in terms of what they do, and what they do 
depends on context’.  
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Dynamic capabilities (DCs): At their simplest, dynamic capabilities enable ‘a firm to alter 
how it currently makes a living’ (Helfat & Winter, 2011: 1244) a capability important in 
dynamic environments whether they be highly dynamic (Teece et al., 1997) or moderately 
so (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). This definition includes the ability to alter OCs and/or 
resources. It encompasses both the routinized ‘path dependent’ view of DCs (Eisenhardt & 
Martin, 2000; Helfat et al., 2007; Teece et al., 1997; Winter, 2003; Zollo & Winter, 2002) 
as well as the view that DCs can be abilities (Zahra et al., 2006) or managerial skills 
(Teece, 2007). Recent work from Arend (2014) uses the assumption that dynamic 
capability can be both routinized and “less routinized” an assumption borne out in this 
case-study. 
7.4 Are dynamic capabilities, as defined in the literature, observable in this 
firm?  
Galunic and Eisenhardt (2001) argue that the existence of dynamic capabilities is often 
assumed without specifying their exact components, a feature of much of the dynamic 
capability literature reviewed in this study. However, using the definitions of dynamic 
capability from the literature and comparing them to the themes that emerged from the data 
it would appear that that the firm studied here does employ dynamic capability. 
The dynamic capability that emerged from the data emerged as traits (a propensity for 
empathy for example), intellectual abilities (numerical ability is GMAT tested at senior 
management level for example), routines/processes (for example the test and control 
process or the routines at the induction of new staff), managerial skills (for example the 
ability to motivate employees). Hence, to discuss the nature of dynamic capability in this 
firm we need to make sense of this data. This has been done by re-analysing the themes 
that emerged, categorising them and looking at the relationships between them.  
Organizational capability, as a concept, is in the practitioner lexicon using the 
interpretation that it is ‘our ability to’ perform (using terminology from MacIntosh & 
MacLean, 2014). Thus, drawing from a number of discussions around Admiral’s 
capabilities and re-examining the primary and data sources the firm’s capabilities can be 
described as in the next table. 
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Table 7-1:  Identification of organizational capability106 from primary and secondary 
data sources using the definition given in Section 7.3 
Looking at this list we can now categorise the list of capabilities as to whether they are 
operational or dynamic capabilities using the definitions in Section 7.3 and comparing that 
against the themes that emerged as dynamic capability. 
                                                 
106  Additional data drawn from an email conversation 15/01/11 to 01/03/11 with the UK and international 
managers as part of their mentoring program which I facilitated and a conversation driven by MM, the 
MD for Conte, the Italian offshoot of Admiral at the 2012 International MAD. Participants gave 
permission to use data for this study. 
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Table 7-2: Classifying organizational capability as operational or dynamic in the local 
context of this firm (Kay, 2010) and matching that capability to the themes that emerged 
from the data as elements of this firm’s success. The OC’s are highlighted.
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This analysis used the capability hierarchy concept of Winter (2003) who based his 
argument for the existence of a hierarchy on the work of Collis (1994). Collis used the 
logic of differential calculus to distinguish between levels of capability and proposed a 
hierarchy with a hypothetically infinite number of levels of capability distinguishing 
between zero-level, first- and second-order capabilities. This framework has not been 
widely adopted (Prieto & Easterby-Smith, 2006) and it is Winter’s conception of 
operational capabilities as “how you earn your living” and the relationship to dynamic 
capabilities “how you change your operational capabilities” that is more common (for 
example Cepeda & Vera, 2007).  
Using this conceptual framework the 
data has been categorized using the 
following interpretation of that hierarchy.   
This categorization and analysis of the relationships with the existing themes identified the 
operational capabilities. In the context of this firm, the OCs are: a pricing capability, a 
marketing capability, the ability to flex the business model, staying close to the customers, 
the distribution capability and effective claims management. This analysis also started the 
process of understanding the nature of dynamic capability within this firm as some of the 
themes to emerge from the data can be categorized as first-order or second-order DCs.  
Before testing whether the hierarchy framework applies across all the themes, it is worth 
considering how the different constituent elements from the dynamic capability definitions 
apply to the data. This analysis can be seen in Table 7-3 overleaf. Essentially it summarises 
any relationship between the themes. A version of this, using the data, was the basis for 
Figure 5.2 on page 5-111. Each relationship is categorized as to whether it is a trait or skill 
(as featured in the definitions of Teece, 2007; Zahra et al., 2006), a driver or initiator of 
action, a process or routine that represents a ‘patterned activity’ (Winter, 2003: 992) 
enabling ‘repeated and reliable performance of an activity’ (Helfat & Winter, 2011: 1244) 
or an ad hoc activity that is ‘not highly patterned or not repetitious’ (Winter, 2003: 993). 
The driver category (or mantra or initiator) emerged from the data analysis but doesn’t pre-
exist in the dynamic capabilities literature. 
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Table 7-3: Analysing the relationship in the data between the themes forming Admiral’s dynamic 
capability and categorising the relationship as to whether it is a trait or skill, a driver or initiator, 
a formalized process or an ad hoc process. 
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Processes or routines feature in the majority of definitions for dynamic capability 
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Helfat et al., 2007; Teece et al., 1997; Winter, 2003; Zollo & 
Winter, 2002) and are distinguished from Winter’s ad hoc behaviour under the assumption 
that ‘a capability enables repeated and reliable performance’  (Helfat & Winter, 2011: 
1244). However organizations possess capacity for behaviour that may not have been 
routinized and this is particularly true of entrepreneurial companies in their early stages 
(Arend, 2014) and thus was included as a category in this analysis. 
Table 7-3 reveals that each theme has one or more elements of a trait, driver and/or process 
in their relationships with other themes. For example whilst Recruitment and 
indoctrination is a process, its function is to find and ‘brainwash’ people with desirable 
traits such as sense of curiosity, numeric ability, ability to pay attention, have the same 
values etc. Similarly ‘Management style’ is articulated as a process but the relationship 
with people is driven by the mantra ‘people who like what they do, do it better’ which 
requires managers with the ability to handle balancing acts, can pay attention and can 
“live” the cultural values.  
Categorising those themes that are essentially processes using Winter’s capability 
hierarchy reveals that not all the themes can be comfortably accommodated by his 
framework. One could class ‘Recruitment and indoctrination’ as a first-order DC that 
works directly on the people resource of the firm through hiring for “fit”. What Admiral 
appears to have developed is a set of practices that seek to indoctrinate new staff with 
desired traits, behaviours and desired cognitive orientation(s) or mindset. There are clear 
indications through, for example, explicit training in values or in intelligence tests or in the 
promotion process, that efforts are being made to take founder traits and embed these in (a) 
a wider community of organizational members and (b) in all new staff to ensure cultural 
cohesion over time as well as during expansion of staff headcount. However, other 
process-orientated themes don’t sit well in this hierarchy.  
For example ‘Learning environment’ has first order elements such as the test and control 
process that directly influence operational capabilities but generally through the medium of 
the change process. This is itself can be classified as a first-order DC as it is responsible 
for actually implementing ideas or decisions which can affect the resource i.e. the IPO 
fundamentally changed the capital resource, or affect the operational capability for 
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example the change to price comparison as the main marketing channels refreshed the 
marketing capability. However the ‘Learning environment’ also has elements that connect 
to other first-order DC (such as ‘Embrace change’) or to second-order DC such as 
‘Strategic decision making’. Based on the analysis presented above, Winter’s visualisation 
of a capability hierarchy doesn’t hold true in the case of Admiral. The literature offers an 
alternative relationship between OCs and DCs. For example operating capabilities can 
affect dynamic capabilities by ‘influencing the knowledge that is available for the latter to 
undertake future reconfigurations of the former’ (Newey & Zahra, 2009: 97). Their study 
was limited to the pharmaceutical industry but appears to be at work in this firm also. For 
example, Admiral’s pricing operational capability involves a process of statistical analysis 
the results of which fuel test and control processes, identified in Table 7.2 as first order 
DC. Part of the test and control process in this instance is to test changes in pricing against 
a control group that ultimately improves the pricing capability. 
If Winter’s hierarchy does not appear to hold true in this case, it is nonetheless possible to 
account for a different sort of hierarchy. For example the traits and abilities of the 
managers are expressed as mantras and cultural attributes which influence ad hoc 
behaviour and ultimately underlie the creation of routines to achieve activity that reflects 
the values of this company. The term “mantra” comes from the data but seems to have the 
qualities of a “rule” from the literature. Let’s develop this argument. 
One could argue that ‘the common understanding of dynamic capabilities as producers of 
strategic and organizational change’ (Helfat et al., 2007: 37) and in some of the 
definitions an explicit linking between dynamic capabilities and organizational routines 
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Winter, 2003; Zahra et al., 2006; Zollo & Winter, 2002) are 
two ideas imported, largely unchallenged, into the burgeoning secondary literature on 
dynamic capability. 
Organizational routines in the literature have been widely acknowledged as the means by 
which firms organize and act (R. M. Cyert & March, 1963; March & Simon, 1958; Miner, 
2006; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Thompson, 1967) and have also been envisioned as 
instruments of change (Feldman & Pentland, 2003). The notion of routines has become a 
central plank in much of the dynamic capabilities research and yet it is another example of 
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a construct itself subject to contested definition or partial interpretation (Felin & Foss, 
2009; Salvato & Rerup, 2011). 
One of the key questions that arose during this study was “what are the origins of the 
dynamic capability in this firm”? That question applies equally to the processes/routines 
we see identified in Table 7-3. It is a question that has been largely side-stepped in the 
literature: ‘at present the origin of routines and capabilities is as vague as their existence’ 
(Felin & Foss, 2005: 445). It would appear from this study that many of the processes that 
make up the dynamic capability in this firm have their origins in the operation of a very 
small set of very simple, deep seated rules initially labelled as mantras in this analysis. 
As early as 2000, Eisenhardt and Martin suggested that in high-velocity environments 
dynamic capabilities were more likely to be effective through the wielding of simple 
strategic rules. Eisenhardt and Sull (2001) talked about successful companies succeeding 
through the operation of ‘a few straightforward, hard-and-fast rules that define direction 
without confining it’ (p. 107). Later in the same article they speculate that these rules 
develop and grow out of experience and in start-ups the repository of that experience is 
often senior managers. This view of rules has a sense of the “deep structure” from the 
complexity literature (see MacIntosh & MacLean, 1999 and further discussion in Section 
7.5). Attempting to bring the divergent views of dynamic capabilities based on the work of 
Teece et al (1997) and Eisenhardt and Martin (2000), Peteraf et al. (2013) conclude that in 
high-velocity markets dynamic capabilities are simple rules and processes. The data in this 
study appears to support this conjecture empirically. 
The concept of simple rules has progressed to heuristics (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2014) 
and Bingham and Eisenhardt (in press) are careful to articulate their views of simple rules 
as focusing on strategic processes rather than strategy itself clarifying an interpretation 
made by Vuori and Vuori (2014).  Bingham and Eisenhardt (2011) proposed a theoretical 
framework that indicated that firms learn heuristics and postulate that over time as a firms 
gains in experience, it will develop an ‘increasingly strategic portfolio of heuristics’ (p. 
1438). As they note: this contrasts with the literature on routines in the strategy literature 
essentially arguing that routines are learned from process experience and represents a 
repository of learning within a firm (see Nelson and Winter, 1982 for the origins of this 
literature and Felin and Foss, 2009 for a review of the literature). Heuristics 
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are a cognitive bypass emerging when information, time and processing capability are at a 
premium (A. Newell & Simon, 1972). The Bingham and Eisenhardt work links the 
learning and knowledge literatures briefly reviewed in Chapter 6 with the cognition 
literature on heuristics. Typically this literature frames heuristics as ‘biased, poor 
substitutions for computations that are too challenging to perform … and emphasizes 
errors’ (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011: 1458): a view adopted by the strategy literature 
using heuristics as the explanation for irrational behaviour and failure (Bingham & 
Eisenhardt, 2014). Bingham and Eisenhardt’s insight that ‘heuristics may be a more 
‘rational’ strategy than analytically complex and information-intensive approaches in 
unpredictable markets’ (p. 1461) is not without challenge (Vuori & Vuori, 2014) but 
certainly fits the data from this case-study. 
Empirical evidence from Bingham, Eisenhardt, and Furr (2007) suggests that heuristics 
relate to the evolution of a high performing process and hence firm capability and that 
firms with more opportunity-capture heuristics have higher performing processes. They 
conceptualize performance as “opportunity capture” (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2014). ‘In 
sum, simple rules positively influence performance by enabling effective opportunity 
capture—i.e., they (1) balance efficiency and flexibility via improvisation; (2) are easy to 
remember, communicate, and update; and (3) can be surprisingly effective when 
experience is limited and information is correlated’ (in press). This body of work from 
Bingham and Eisenhardt and others (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011, 2014; Bingham et al., 
2007; Eisenhardt et al., 2010; Eisenhardt & Sull, 2001; Sull & Eisenhardt, 2012) talks 
about categories of organizational heuristics which form a portfolio summarized in the 
next table. This portfolio is learned over time as experience accumulates and this 
perspective focuses on the content of the knowledge gained and argues that this knowledge 
does not require codified form, a different view from the received wisdom of the 
knowledge management literature (Zollo & Winter, 2002). 
 
Table 7-4:  Categorizing heuristics and noting specific developmental order. Based on 
Bingham and Eisenhardt (2011)
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The rules that have emerged from the data would all seem to fall into the procedural 
category. Reading data excerpts throughout Chapter 5 and in Appendix B provides 
illustrations for these rules. From Table 7-3 one could summarize the procedural heuristics 
in this firm that drive execution and action are: 
• People who like what they do, do it better. This rule drives the management 
style, aspects of the culture which both enable innovation, speed, change and 
learning within the firm. 
• If it moves measure it. This rule encompasses the idea that numbers matter to this 
firm and form the basis for learning through the test and control process, through 
the staff surveys etc. 
• Pay attention. This rule captures the idea that managers are close to the business 
so influence the management style, learning is achieved by analysis and 
interpretation of measurements gathered and understanding the external markets in 
which the firm operates. 
• Be the best. This rule drives the adaptive innovation of process and service that is 
present throughout the business. People take pride in the firm and are constantly 
striving to improve their performance and the service that is offered to the 
customer. 
• Look for what’s next. This rule captures the dissatisfaction the participants 
expressed with the status quo. The data revealed the firm is always on a quest to 
find ways to use new technology to improve their offering or to improve their 
competitive position. There is a risk that this rule might drive change for changes 
sake but there is little evidence of this. 
• Communicate communicate communicate. This rule sums up the approach to be 
open and establishes the trust the staff have in each other and in the company. 
• Embrace change. This rule expresses the expectation that every person in the 
company will embrace change and challenge themselves to move beyond their 
comfort zones. 
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• Admiral is different and lets keep it that way. This rule, the wording of which 
features as a heading in every presentation of half-yearly and yearly results107, 
reveals that innovation is core to the business. 
• Have fun making money. This rule is explicitly used throughout the company and 
cropped up in a number of the Top 10 Departments videos used as secondary data 
in Chapter 5 and demonstrates the ethos of the culture in a nutshell. 
• Learn from everything. This rule mandates that learning is everyone’s 
responsibility and to look for opportunities to learn. 
• Balance in all things. This is rule can be summed up from the CEO’s response to 
an audience question at the staff general meeting when he was asked what his 
secret for success was. He replied ‘make sure you get out for lunch every day’.  
• Spend every dollar as if it’s your own. This rule expresses the frugality that runs 
through this business. 
According to Bingham and Eisenhardt’s proposed heuristic framework, the firm should 
have selection heuristics but these did not emerge initially from the data set. However on 
reviewing these rules with some of the participants and discussing this, they suggested that 
there were two very important “mantras” used in the early days of the firm and they are 
still used but have become part of the tacit fabric of the firm. The first can be found in the 
original business plan (p. 6) produced in December 1991 and is ‘We do not believe that 
there are bad risks, only bad premiums’. This rule drove the initial strategy that remains 
today of underwriting in market segments traditionally ignored by most insurers. It is a rule 
that is still in place in the newer offshoots of the insurance company with the original Head 
of Elephant in the USA telling me ‘we are aiming to underwrite the same non standard 
markets in the US that you do here in the UK (AR personal communication 26/04/12)’. The 
second rule suggested by the participants, as a driver of their decision-making is ‘Go 
where the others aren’t’. Talking about this, there was some discussion as to whether this 
was just a restatement of the first selection rule evolved from a purely underwriting 
perspective to a wider perspective to encompass other activities such as marketing or 
                                                 
107  See the PDF presentations from 2008 to 2014 on the Admiral Group website: 
http://www.admiralgroup.co.uk/investor/presentations/index.php. 
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development of new products and services. No consensus was reached but it is presented 
here as a second rule and one could argue it has morphed into the rule ‘Admiral is different 
and let’s keep it that way’. 
Another “mantra” that came from the data that might be considered a temporal heuristic 
was ‘The perfect is the enemy of the good’.  The data suggests that this idea underlies the 
speed of change in this firm: ‘we do it in a small way, as small a way as we think we can 
get away with, basically, to do enough to see if it’s going to work but not gamble too much 
KC 03/02/11’. This allows the firm to start many small initiatives quickly and the learning 
that is achieved allows successful initiatives to grow very fast. 
Lastly in a discussion about prioritisation in this follow up meeting there was definitely a 
feeling that this is still largely an ad hoc process although pressures on IT resource have 
resulted in some formalization. The participants were unanimous in agreeing that this 
nascent formalization is not yet meeting the requirement of the business. During the 
interviews, a number of them had inferred that ‘Start small, think big’ influenced both by 
the cost frugality inherent to the firm and the temporal heuristic ‘The perfect is the enemy 
of the good’.  This thinking means that often priorities aren’t an issue as ‘you’re running a 
number of horses you’ve got... some of them stick and you push them forward DS 
24/06/10’. 
So while the literature points to simple rules being essential for success in high-velocity 
markets and develop from exposure to experience, the data suggests that these rules codify 
traits, behaviours and cognitive styles of the founders and senior managers of this firm. In 
addition to creating the context for strategic action, these rules are reflected in cultural 
practices which are subject to managerial sensemaking and sensegiving in turn imbedding 
the founder traits in the wider population of the firm. Additionally, in this firm, it appears 
that the rules are functionalized through the organizational culture and that they drive 
action by creating the context for processes to be developed and executed. Over time these 
processes can become routinized.  
This view of the data contrasts with mainstream dynamic capability research despite the 
direction Eisenhardt (with Bingham) has moved but it is early days. However in this case-
study, Eisenhardt’s work has enabled an opening up of the “black-box” whereas just using 
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the more typical frameworks to understand dynamic capability as per Table 6.1 on page 6-
222 resulted in a list of dynamic capabilities that were not heterogeneous per se, although 
one could argue that the detail constituting these capabilities is unique to this firm and thus 
conferring heterogeneity. The concepts of traits and processes and skills are present in the 
data and although subsequent categorisation using Winter’s capability hierarchy identified 
relationships between OCs and DC’s, it was of no use in organizing the remaining data. 
But by using the notion of using rules and heuristics we get a better organizing framework 
for this study.  
The rules retroactively deduced from thinking about the data in context of the literature are 
summarised in the next table: 
 
Table 7-5: Summarising the simple rules of this firm. Each rule is categorised *using 
Bingham and Eisenhardt’s (2011) heuristic framework and then matched to 
the emergent themes from the data that matched the literature definitions of 
dynamic capability. 
In tabulating the analysis in this way we can see how all the rules are present in the culture 
and thus can be viewed as being functionalized through the culture of the firm. Similarly 
we can see the importance of recruiting people who have the underlying traits to fit 
comfortably within this organizational culture and the on-going indoctrination processes to 
ensure there is no deviation from these rules. If, as the RBV tells us, firms must develop 
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heterogeneity on the path to sustained competitive advantage then the first rule 
demonstrates why Admiral is different in its market. 
Having established an analysis of data from the Admiral case-study where aspects of the 
firm have been mapped against extant definitions of dynamic capability, the next stage in 
the process is to look at the sources of these rules and how they are operationalized. Before 
concluding, this study will cycle back to the dynamic capability concept after the rules 
framework has been expanded to understand its origins and actions.  
7.5 What are the antecedents to rule generation in this firm? 
Scholars seeking to understand the origin of dynamic capabilities have struggled to 
articulate specific capabilities and locate their source within the firm (Morris, Hammond, 
& Snell, 2014). However using a rules perspective we can look at the origin of rules within 
the firm. 
In this case-study, the rules governing the routines and processes in the business are deep 
seated: for the most part implicitly understood rather than explicitly articulated, although 
there are exceptions. One finds in the literature on complexity theory the concept of deep 
structure:  specifically a dissipative structures interpretation in which ‘order can emerge 
from chaos through the interaction of rules, deep structures, and organizational processes’ 
(MacIntosh & MacLean, 1999: 302). Drazin and Sandelands (1992) argued that the 
generative rules in a firm constitute a deep structure (p. 235) explicitly linking deep 
structure to rules in the literature.  
In Drazin and Sandeland’s paper, the authors contend deep structure consists of ‘the rules 
that govern the actions and interactions of individuals’ and that these rules are important 
because they ‘generate the observable patterns of interaction over time that make up the 
organizing process.’ (1992: p. 237). Such rules in organizations effectively ‘comprise the 
organizing principles and the business logic’ (MacIntosh & MacLean, 1999: 303). In their 
most recent book, MacIntosh and MacLean (2014) detail more about how they see these 
‘rules of thumb’ for business and organization woven together using the metaphor of 
organizational DNA: a metaphor that captures ideas of rules as templates for action and 
forming the deep structure of the firm. Key to the concept is that because these 
generational rules implicitly underlie individual action there can be difficulty in diagnosing 
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them and Drazin and Sandeland point out that organizational actors ‘are typically unaware 
of the rules governing their actions’ (1992, p.238). Many authors have argued that 
reductionism is not a viable approach to studying a complex system such as an 
organization (for example Kay, 2010; Pitelis & Teece, 2010; Prahalad & Bettis, 1995). 
Epistemologically, ‘knowledge of the constituents is not a knowledge of the whole or major 
parts’ (Prahalad & Bettis, 1995: 11). I do not propose to look at rules as emergent 
properties of complex systems in this thesis although it does link the two literatures on 
rules for further research. It is interesting that Prahalad and Bettis consider their construct 
of “dominant logic” to be an emergent property of a complex adaptive systems (Prahalad 
& Bettis, 1995).  
The rules that comprise deep structure produce observable actions (Drazin & Sandelands, 
1992) and recurrent patterns in these actions are ‘the way things are done in the firm, or 
what might be referred to as its routines’ (Teece et al., 1997: 518). Now we can start to see 
a link from the complexity literature using a rules perspective to the simple rules and 
heuristics work of Bingham and Eisenhardt. The rules that comprise deep structure 
produce observable actions (Drazin & Sandelands, 1992) and recurrent patterns in these 
actions are ‘the way things are done in the firm, or what might be referred to as its 
routines’ (Teece et al., 1997: 518). Now we can start to see a link from the complexity 
literature using a rules perspective to the simple rules and heuristics work of Bingham and 
Eisenhardt. It also represents an alternative solution to Peteraf et al.’s (2013) “elephant in 
the room” where the contradictory conceptualizations of dynamic capabilities from Teece 
et al. (1997) and Eisenhardt & Martin (2000) are examined. Peteraf et al. conclude that 
rules are “lower-order dynamic capabilities” in highly volatile environments. But I am 
arguing here that since Teece et al.’s conceptualization of dynamic capabilities is built 
upon the premise of processes (equated to routines on p. 518), and thus implicitly with 
enacted rules and Eisenhardt & Martin explicitly relate dynamic capabilities to rules, then 
the concept of rules transcends distinctions between evolutionary economics and 
complexity theory so the difference between the two conceptualizations evaporates. 
The idea that decision making uses a satisficing strategy or cognitive heuristic was 
introduced by Simon (1956). His later work (Simon, 1979) influenced Prahalad and Bettis 
(1986) in their original conceptualization of the dominant logic construct. Research linking 
dynamic capabilities to the dominant logic literature has recently been published (de 
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Waard, Volberda, & Soeters, 2012; Kor & Mesko, 2013). Kor and Mesko argue that 
dynamic managerial capabilities shape a firm’s dominant logic to achieve evolutionary fit 
(Helfat et al., 2007) whilst de Waard, Volberda and Soeters find that a dominant logic 
invested in Teece’s managerial capabilities (2007) offer firms the ability to innovate and 
compete in volatile environments. Prahalad and Bettis envisioned dominant logic as the 
cultural norms and beliefs that the company espouses initiated by the cognitive orientation 
of the senior management team. These ideas resonate with the data in this case-study but 
Bingham and Eisenhardt don’t articulate a link with their work on heuristics and yet if 
dominant logic is an articulation of the fundamental strategic beliefs, assumptions and 
intentions of senior management (Lampel & Shamsie, 2000) used to enable managers ‘to 
see their way through a bewildering flow of information to make decisions’ (Kor & Mesko, 
2013) how is this different from Bingham and Eisenhardt’s articulation as ‘cognitive short-
cuts that enable individuals to simplify cognitive processing, conserve attention and decide 
more quickly’ (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2014: in press). 
Bingham and Eisenhardt’s empirical work (2011) suggests that heuristics develop as firms 
explicitly learn from their process experience, an observation made also by Laamanen and 
Wallin (2009). Kor and Mesko’s work suggests that the dominant logic for a firm is 
‘created as founders and managers, more specifically their cognitive models interact with 
a particular business and firm environment’ (2013: 235).  
The data from this study suggests that it is the traits and predispositions of the founders 
and senior managers to certain behaviours that have given rise to these rules. Going back 
to the data one can draw out a list of the traits that the participants felt are important in 
recruiting for “fit” in Admiral. Comparing this list of traits to the rules in the firm gives us 
a basis for this assertion that these traits are the genesis for the rules in this firm. This 
comparison is illustrated in the next table. 
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Table 7-6: Analysing if individual traits mentioned in the data underlie the articulation 
of rules in this firm. 
Let’s take two examples of how this analysis leads to the observation that traits underlie 
rules in this firm. 
Firstly, Admiral’s focus on an individual’s intelligence (IQ) in managerial ranks emerged 
as part of the ‘Recruitment and indoctrination’ theme.  Intelligence is highly valued in the 
organization and recruitment actively seeks candidates for management positions who 
satisfy rigorous intelligence testing (GMAT for senior managers, internal testing for lower 
positions). This intelligence is expressed in the culture through the attributes of being 
analytical, and numerate. These traits are the backbone of a number of the rules: they allow 
change to be measured and modified and for that change to be started quickly and 
perfected over time; they are a means whereby individuals and thus the organization 
learns; allow external influences to be evaluated; premiums to reflect the risk they pose 
and underlie the cost frugality throughout the business. 
Secondly, all managers must demonstrate a high degree of social and emotional 
intelligence. Psychologist Daniel Gorman in his 1998 article for Harvard Business Review 
first identified ‘emotional intelligence’ as a driver of business performance. He writes 
when discussing his findings:  
‘To be sure, intellect was a driver of outstanding performance. Cognitive skills 
such as big-picture thinking and long-term vision were particularly important. 
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But when I calculated the ratio of technical skills, IQ and emotional 
intelligence as ingredients of excellent performance, emotional intelligence 
proved to be twice as important as the others for jobs at all levels. Moreover 
my analysis showed that emotional intelligence played an increasingly 
important role at the highest levels of the company…’ (p. 94). 
Mayer (2004), who was co-credited with originally defining the term ‘emotional 
intelligence’ in the early 1990’s, later warned: ‘of course, emotional intelligence isn't the 
only way to attain success as a leader: A brilliant strategist who can maximize profits may 
be able to hire and keep talented employees even if he or she doesn't have strong personal 
connections with them’ (p. 28). 
Goleman (1998) includes the characteristics of self-awareness, self-regulation, motivation, 
empathy and social skill in his definition of emotional intelligence. Its relevance to 
business has continued to spark debate with many researchers (Richard E Boyatzis, 2004; 
Richard E Boyatzis, Smith, Van Oosten, & Woolford, 2013; Goffee, 2004; Goffee & 
Jones, 2013; Goleman & Boyatzis, 2008 amongst others) believing that emotional 
intelligence can be learned but only by people with an aptitude for it. This idea has been 
taken further by Goleman and Boyatzis (2008)who suggest that individuals (with aptitude) 
can improve their social circuitry (p. 78) in their most recent work in defining social 
intelligence with a biological underpinning. This work suggests that ‘effective leadership is 
about having powerful social circuits in the brain’ (p. 76) but the emphasis in their work is 
on reinforcement rather than learning new skills. In the theme ‘Recruitment and 
indoctrination’ we saw this is a firm that actively promotes people or seeks external 
candidates who demonstrate these interpersonal skills at a high level. 
This attribute of emotional intelligence is at the root of the rules specifically about people: 
about communicating with them as a means of developing and maintaining trust, 
motivating and empowering people; paying attention to people and the way they feel, need 
recognition and development; and is at the core of the rule ‘People who like what they do, 
do it better’. Similarly the attributes of being caring, sincere and tolerant are at play in this 
rule. 
The literature suggests that prior experience forms the basis of organizational capability 
(Helfat & Lieberman, 2002) and that even start-ups possess historical roots through the 
experiences that founders and early members of staff bring to the firm (Eggers & Kaplan, 
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2013). But, it has been argued that the founders’ past experience can constrain choices and 
that diversity of experience can lessen these constraints (Fern, Cardinal, & O'Neill, 2012). 
In this case-study, many of the founders knew and had worked with each other previously 
in the insurance industry or were specifically employed for that experience. I argued, from 
the MBTI data, that the group (and subsequent senior management team) are more 
homogenous than diverse (see Section 5.5.1.2). However, the team do by and large possess 
traits such as curiosity and a preference for innovative thinking (as measured by the MBTI 
indicator – see Section 5.5.1.2) which one could argue overcomes the constraints of their 
experience and the propensity to mitigate risk with new strategies is a helpful constraint for 
ultimate success. 
In entrepreneurial firms, if the rules that drive action within the business have their genesis 
in founder traits and cognitive style then one obvious consequence is that there are 
implications for firms at the point where they take on a successor CEO. Studies have 
shown that founder CEO firms ‘differ systematically from successor-CEO firms with 
respect to firm valuation, investment behavior, and stock market performance’ 
(Fahlenbrach, 2009: 439). This case has revealed that if the rules and subsequent culture 
are largely part of the tacit knowledge of the firm then there is a risk that it is diluted as 
founders depart the company. 
In the absence of other profiling data for this case, the MBTI data tells us, that given the 
individuals who founded the company and the senior managers they have recruited, that 
the organization will reflect their characteristics and be: (1) more extroverted and thus 
action orientated; (2) more innovative and more accepting of change; (3) equally focused 
on people and logical rationality; (4) although very committed in decision making enough 
risk mitigation occurs so that decisions are rarely set in stone (using MBTI literature 
Bradley-Geist & Landis, 2012; Y. Cohen, Ornoy, & Keren, 2013; Hirsh & Kummerow, 
1990; Kendall, 1998; Myers, 1976; Myers & McCaulley, 1985; Roush & Atwater, 1992; 
Stumpf & Dunbar, 1991). These observations from an MBTI analysis support the 
interview data and underpin the retroductive reasoning in this thesis that the rules represent 
a codification of the underlying personality traits of the founders.  
In their comprehensive review of the role of cognitive styles in management research, S. J. 
Armstrong et al. (2012: 239) note that a ‘number of industrial and organizational 
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psychologists consider cognitive styles to be a fundamental factor determining individual 
and organizational behaviour’ and although they note that newer theories differentiate 
cognitive styles from abilities and personality traits, there are connections made to the 
mainstream psychology literature (for example Hodgkinson & Healey, 2008; Hodgkinson 
et al., 2009; Hodgkinson & Sparrow, 2002). It is also worth nothing that S. J. Armstrong et 
al. (2012) observe that MBTI was used in 25% of the studies they reviewed so it is an 
established instrument for studies in this area. Furthermore Hodgkinson and Healey (2011) 
explore the psychological foundations of dynamic capabilities and argue that Teece’s 
(2007) framework of managerial capability requires that firms harness the cognitive and 
emotional capacities of individuals and groups (p. 1510) where affect and emotion are 
integral to reasoning, learning, decision making and action  (LeDoux, 2000). S. J. 
Armstrong et al. (2012) also reported that differences in cognitive style have been reported 
in the cognition literature between entrepreneurs and the general population of managers: a 
fact supported by the observation in Chapter 5 where the Admiral MBTI data was 
compared to the wider UK population of managers in Section 5.5.1.2. 
In addition to the research in cognition from a psychological perspective, researchers have 
become interested in the cognitive drivers of dynamic capabilities (Barr, Stimpert, & Huff, 
1992; Gavetti, 2005; Laamanen & Wallin, 2009; Prahalad & Bettis, 1995; Tripsas & 
Gavetti, 2000) with Gavetti (2005) underlining the importance of this cognitive direction 
stating that ‘research on capabilities needs microfoundations that capture more fully what 
we know about cognition and action in organizations’ (p. 599). 
The microfoundations project began in the economics literature of the 1970’s (Debreu, 
1974; Sconnenschein, 1972) where there were calls for macroeconomic models to have 
proper microeconomics foundations so models could be consistent with how individuals 
act (Farmer, 2008 amongst others). It is a flawed area of research not least because of 
difficulties in formalising the “representative agent” (Meeusen, 2011) and that the 
assumptions made at the micro-level give no guidance to macro-level analysis (Rizvi, 
1994).  
Within strategic management, microfoundations were seen as an attempt to move the 
resource based and dynamic capabilities research forward by opening up the “black box” 
of the organization (Abell et al., 2008; Barney et al., 2011; Felin & Foss, 2006; Felin et al., 
CHAPTER 7:  ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
    Page  7-297
2012; N. J. Foss, 2011; Teece, 2007 amongst others). Criticizing this work, Hodgson 
(2012) noted that current efforts (1) ignore the failure of the project in the economics 
sphere; (2) retains ambiguities in that the language of the key proponents in the strategic 
management literature: Nicolai Foss, Teppo Felin and Peter Abell, revolves around 
individuals but does not explicitly talk about interactions between those individuals where 
the sum is more than its parts and ‘order and pattern matter’ (Kay, 2010: 1214); (3) 
rhetoric is unclear and inconsistent. So whilst the microfoundations project is ‘largely an 
unfulfilled promise’ (N. J. Foss, 2011:1413) it proceeds ‘to grapple with important 
questions of theory development, operationalization, aggregation ,empirical measurement, 
data collections, and statistical implementation’ (N. J. Foss & Pedersen, 2014) from a 
positivistic ontology.  
However the language of microfoundations and the idea that individuals and their 
interactions underlie strategic issues has become increasingly influential in strategic 
management research. For example the “microfoundations of performance” (Eisenhardt et 
al., 2010), the “microfoundations of routines and capabilities” (Felin et al., 2012; Winter, 
2013), the “microfoundations of knowledge” (Felin & Hesterly, 2007; Heimeriks et al., 
2012; Turvani, 2001) and of particular interest to this thesis: the “microfoundations of 
dynamic capabilities” (Augier & Teece, 2009; Gavetti, 2005; Hodgkinson & Healey, 2009; 
Teece, 2007). Whilst Augier and Teece argue the importance of managerial dynamic 
capabilities as the microfoundation for dynamic capability, Gavetti’s (2005) influential call 
to understand cognition as a microfoundation for capability development has influenced 
the research streams using routines as the ultimate mechanism for learning as a dynamic 
capability (for example Felin et al., 2012; Friesl & Larty, 2013; Heimeriks et al., 2012; 
Laamanen & Wallin, 2009; Nag & Gioia, 2012). 
The findings here that it is the underlying personality of the founding individuals and 
senior managers that is the source of the rules that drive action in this firm fits within this 
literature. 
But in this firm how are these rules operationalized? And how does that contribute to 
successful performance? 
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7.6 How are the rules operationalized and how does that contribute to the 
firm’s success? 
On the basis of the analysis presented in Table 7.5 it appears that within this firm, the rules 
have been functionalized within the organizational culture providing the context for action 
and decision-making. K. Weber (2005: 228) described culture as supplying ‘actors with 
the means – the tools- for solving practical problems and for navigating their 
environment’ and that is what we see in this firm. Interestingly Weber also talks about a 
form of rule within the culture arguing that: ‘if there is logical coherence in culture, it 
pertains to the level of grammar-like semiotic codes that constitute elements of a toolkit, 
but not to the more pragmatic assemblage of resources in the toolkit itself’ (p. 228). 
Weber’s account of toolkit analysis is interesting but it is his notion of ‘embedded agency’ 
(p. 250) where culture is treated as a resource for individuals that is of relevance here: the 
idea of “cultural capital” (K. Weber & Dacin, 2011: 290). 
K. Weber and Dacin (2011: 287) make the point that ‘many core processes in 
organizations and markets, from the competitive rivalry in markets to the practice of 
strategy making and individuals’ role behavior, can be understood from a cultural 
perspective’. This analysis put organizational culture at the heart of this firm’s success. It 
indicates that a set of simple rules guide action in this firm: processes from idea generation 
through to implementation. Weber and Dacin also point out that the literature talks about 
culture, not just as a resource, but also as a constraint. This cycles back to the idea that core 
capabilities can become “core rigidities” (Leonard-Barton, 1992) if they no longer ensure 
environmental “fit” (Helfat et al., 2007). However this case-study has found no evidence 
for culture as a constraint. Furthermore the strategic capability seems to be more about 
embedded behaviours and practices rather than tangible resources.  This is congruous with 
the four dimensions of core capability that were identified by Leonard-Barton (1992)  i.e. 
‘(1) employee knowledge and skills and embedded in (2) technical systems. The 
processes of knowledge creation and control are guided by (3) managerial systems. 
The fourth dimension is (4) the values and norms associated with the various types of 
embodied and embedded knowledge and with the processes of knowledge creation 
and control’ (p. 113). 
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In Chapter 6, Section 6.14, the extant literature on culture was reviewed. Writers have 
proposed a number of frameworks with varying dimensions and attributes reviewed in 
detail by Trice and Beyer (1993 amongst others). Weber and Dacin (2011) characterize 
this first wave of interest in the cultural phenomenon as an interest in ‘collective meaning 
systems’ (p. 287) drawing on approaches in anthropology and sociology but attempting to 
systematically understand the contribution culture makes to organizational life through 
‘analysis of cultural systems (deep logical structure of culture)’ (K. Weber, 2005: 231). 
More recent research, the “second wave”, is less interested in culture as a constraint and as 
an imposition by the organization upon constituent members and more focused on ‘how 
individuals and organizations access and deploy diverse cultural materials’ (K. Weber & 
Dacin, 2011: 289).  
This case study is not an exploration of organizational culture per se and cannot 
retrospectively use many of the prescriptive frameworks from the literature such as 
Cameron and Quinn’s “Competing Values Framework” (Cameron & Quinn, 2006) or 
Weber’s “toolkit” (K. Weber, 2005), although the data could be retro-fitted to look at 
Schein’s cultural elements' framework, comprising artefacts, espoused beliefs/values and 
underlying assumptions (Schein, 2010). However the data has revealed the deep structure 
of this firm’s organizational culture in the form of attributes that represent the traits and 
values looked for in recruitment that have, over time, been expressed through a number of 
simple rules but may contribute to the “second wave” of cultural research in that its is an 
empirical example of organizational culture being used as a resource to drive innovation: 
both adaptive and radical, change, strategic decision-making, leadership style and 
operational routines throughout the business. 
An analysis of the traits of the individuals within the business expressed as attributes of the 
organizational culture can be found in the next table. The extant literature for each attribute 
was briefly reviewed in Chapter 6: see Section 6.14.2 but this analysis relates those 
attributes to the traits considered important in this business from the interviews. 
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Table 7-7: Mapping the traits identified in Table 7.6 against the defining attributes of 
the culture that emerged from the data in Table 5.34 on page 5-200. 
This table shows that each cultural element has a reliance on individuals possessing one or 
more of the traits that constitute “fit” in this firm. We also see that the articulation of the 
attributes from the data includes some of the rules that have been hypothesized within 
Admiral and those that don’t explicitly match can be matched using a similar analysis in 
Table 7.8. In this next table, any exact match between rule and attribute is highlighted with 
a triple tick. The single tick represents that there is an association between the cultural 
element and the rule and we can see that each rule is reliant on a number of attributes to 
function as a source of action and learning within the business. 
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Table 7-8:  Matching each rule to the organizational culture attributes required to create 
context for that rule. The highlighted triple tick represents that the attribute 
is a match – is fundamental – to the rule. Single ticks represent a lesser but 
still important association of attribute to rule. 
This table demonstrates that overall the culture is a contributory factor to making Admiral 
different – an observation supported by the Great Places to Work benchmarking described 
in Chapter 5. The table also gives a clue as to how each rule is operationalized. 
For example, take the rule ‘The perfect is the enemy of the good’. This is a call to action 
sooner rather than later. It implies that there can be ambiguity around the implementation 
provided that measurements are set up and attended to so that early piloting and learning 
from an initial idea can provide a springboard for refining. It says that there must be a 
balance between action and planning/reviewing but that the measurements and small 
changes can help mitigate risk and to be successful all such actions and learning should be 
openly communicated in a no blame environment. Table 7-8 summarizes how the rules are 
operationalized. 
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Another way in which the rules are operationalized is through the process of 
indoctrination, a theme that emerged from the data. When described as “sensegiving”, it 
creates and reinforces the culture and the culture in turn provides the context for 
“sensemaking”. This literature was touched on in Chapter 6.2 where it was observed that 
the data found resonance in this literature. 
Sensegiving has been found to be both a prevalent and important leadership activity in 
organizations in times of both change and stability (Maitlis & Lawrence, 2007) and Maitlis 
and Lawrence found that it is both in rhetoric used and the existing routines and processes 
that enable sensegiving. Repetition in story-telling is a key form of sensegiving (Dailey & 
Browning, 2014) and certainly reading the transcripts one can see that certain narratives 
about launch, about key changes, about Admiral’s place in the market have similarities 
between the different participants. Similarly past research on collective sensemaking 
emphasizes conversational practices (Stigliani & Ravasi, 2012) which is consistent with 
the prevailing view of sensemaking as ‘an issue of language, talk, and communication’ 
(Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfield, 2005: 409). Communication is one of the simple rules in 
this company and it stands to reason that it plays an important role in the way the other 
rules are propagated throughout the organization and drive action through the routines and 
processes. 
In the organizational routines literature, with its roots in evolutionary economics, routines 
are seen as patterns of action (Becker, 2004) and despite the widespread use of the 
construct, proponents have admitted definitional difficulties (M. D. Cohen et al., 1996; M. 
D. Cohen, Levinthal, & Warglien, 2014; Feldman & Pentland, 2003; Reynaud, 2005) 
although most definitions focus on order, repetition, interdependence and patterns (Felin & 
Foss, 2009). Routines are often used as the building blocks in the dynamic capabilities 
literature (Teece et al., 1997; Winter, 2003; Zollo & Winter, 2002) and yet Bingham and 
Eisenhardt’s heuristic approach makes the following distinction: ‘routines provide a very 
detailed, often quasi-automatic response to particular problems … whereas heuristics 
provide a common structure for a range of similar problems, but supply few details 
regarding specific solutions to address them’ (2011: 1439). In this case, routines do not 
represent the operationalization of the rules. They represent patterns of activity that have 
been built in the context of the rules but the rules as heuristics are not prescriptive and if a 
problem cannot be dealt with by a specific routine then the rule provides the context for 
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new or different actions. This articulation is different from Becker’s assertion that routines 
can also be understood as cognitive patterns in which case ‘routines would then be 
understood as rules’ (2004: 645) and overcomes the problem that the rules construct being 
articulated here is vulnerable to the rigidities that can arise with routines (Schreyögg & 
Kliesch-Eberl, 2007). This case-study seems to imply that, in this firm at least, the 
constructs are quite different. 
But are there any links to the firm’s success – other than the participants believe that such a 
link exists? 
The relationship between organizational culture and performance is widely postulated in 
the literature (see Chapter 6.14.1) with many companies attributing their success to 
effective culture management (Flamholtz, 2001) but the relationship ‘remains elusive even 
though researchers have studied it for some time’ (Chatman, Caldwell, O'Reilly, & Doerr, 
2014: 785). The starting point for this thesis was dynamic capability and Barney (1986) 
suggested that there was a relationship between culture and sustained competitive 
advantage. Underlying this view in the literature is the idea that strong-culture firms 
promote greater alignment and thus attainment (for example Bezrukova, Thatcher, Jehn, & 
Spell, 2012; Flamholtz, 2001; Kotter & Heskett, 1992; Tushman & O'Reilly, 2002) whilst 
others, Sørensen (2002), for example, hypothesize that stronger cultures can yield 
advantage in more stable environments but such social conformity can degrade 
performance in volatile environments. If anything, this thesis gives us empirical evidence 
to refute Sørensen’s argument as it is in the strength of culture that this firm believes it’s 
success in it’s volatile market lies. However one of the key attributes/trait in this firm is 
flexibility/adaptability and this finding correlates with recent work by Chatman et al. 
(2014) who suggest a conceptual advance from Sørensen’s work in that strong cultures 
where the norm content intensely emphasizes adaptability contributes to better 
performance, even in highly dynamic environments. 
What evidence exists in this firm for a relationship with improved performance? Table 7.9 
lists all the rules at play in Admiral and looks for evidence that the rule has affected 
performance. In Chapter 1, the case was made for the claim that Admiral is a highly 
successful firm operating in a near perfect market. The market also operates in a well-
defined cycle of profitability that transcends the wider economic climate. Admiral 
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consistently outperforms its competitors measured as the market average so whilst this 
analysis is not intended as direct causal proof the financial performance data against this 
market background clearly shows positive contributions to the profit and loss accounts for 
the examples shown in Table 7.9. Examples are shown for a number of the rules and these 
examples also show how the rules have influenced the firm’s operational capabilities, for 
example the marketing, distribution or pricing capabilities identified in Table 7.2.  
 
Table 7-9: Lists the underlying rules at Admiral and where appropriate gives examples 
of how that rule has contributed positively to Admiral’s profit and loss 
accounts or to other key indicators of performance. 
However a number of rules operate as drivers of action or coordination and affect 
performance indirectly. For example the drive ‘To be the best’ initiates many adaptive 
changes to routines and processes within the business in a drive for continuous 
improvement in service or efficiency. Similarly ‘If it moves, measure it’ is a rule that 
creates the context for every action taken: it is the means by which risk is mitigated, by 
which learning occurs, by providing a rational basis for decision making whether that be to 
drive a decision or to support an intuition. The rules that increase coordination can be 
argued to enhance performance indirectly for example by enabling teams to implement 
change effectively or create an environment conducive to innovative thought and this 
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observation is supported in the literature for firms with strong cultures (Murphy, Cooke, & 
Lopez, 2013). 
7.7 How have the rules and organizational culture evolved over time as the 
company has grown from an entrepreneurial start-up to an MNE? 
As explained in Section 7.4, Bingham and Eisenhardt’ (2011) work on rational heuristics 
found that firms learn specific types of unique heuristics ‘in a developmental order of 
increasing cognitive sophistication’ (p. 1438) and the data reveals this firm did develop its 
repertoire of rules over a reasonably short time frame – certainly over the first five 
years108. It began with the selection rules (identified in Table 7.5) and the other rules 
developed as experience and the founders traits and behaviours became codified.  
The expectation from the literature (reviewed in Chapter 2) was that we would see 
evidence of how dynamic capability in Admiral has evolved over time.  Teece et al. (1997) 
in their seminal work assumed that the creation and evolution of dynamic capabilities are 
embedded in organizational processes in an assumption consistent with an evolutionary 
economics perspective. Evolutionary economics underpinned both Barney’s articulation of 
the RBV (Barney, 1991a) and Teece et al.’s assertion that the heterogeneity of dynamic 
capabilities is conferred, in part, by their path dependencies. In their influential paper, 
Mahoney and Pandian (1992: 369) concluded that ‘sustainable advantage is thus a history 
(path) dependent process’.  
Evolution has been a major theme of many of the dynamic capability studies reviewed by 
Wang and Ahmed (2007) and Di Stefano et al. (2010). Additionally, key theorists in the 
field (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Zollo & Winter, 2002) theorised that to work in rapidly 
changing environments, dynamic capability itself must evolve to meet the challenges 
posed by maximising what Helfat et. al. (2007) call ‘evolutionary fitness’: acting upon 
resources and operational capabilities to better reconfigure the organization for the current 
context of its operating environment. Teece (2007) called to the dynamic capabilities 
community to embrace the microfoundations project from the RBV so that scholars can 
better understand the management task needed ‘to sustain the evolutionary and 
                                                 
108  Reading accounts of the strategic decision making behind the launch of the brands in 1997 one can see 
all the rules at work. These accounts were collected in interviews with the executive directors and used as 
secondary data in Chapter 5.5.12.2. 
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entrepreneurial fitness of the business enterprise’ (p. 1322). In her introduction to the SMJ 
Special Issue on The Evolution of Firm’s Capabilities Helfat (2000) stated that all the 
articles ‘examine the ways in which firm capabilities emerge, develop, and change over 
time, and the resulting effects on firm performance’ (p.955). So “evolution” has been a 
theme of the dynamic capabilities literature. 
However, this view hasn’t been unchallenged. Research suggests that dynamic capabilities 
are actually “stable phenomena” (Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009: 34) interacting upon 
another stable phenomenon – the resource base of the firm so that “dynamism” relates to 
“how the resource base is changed in a dynamic environment by the use of dynamic 
capabilities” (Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009: 34).  
Ignoring the dynamic capability construct but thinking about the organizational capabilities 
that have been identified by the participants in this firm, this case-study reveals that the 
capabilities have evolved over time: pricing has improved; distribution has moved from 
primarily call-centre based to internet based; marketing has moved from a mix of broadcast 
media to primarily price-comparison; the claims process has changed fundamentally. All 
this evolution has been driven by adaptive or innovative change as the firm gains in 
experience, moving from a novice to a more expert practitioner all under the aegis of a set 
of simple rules enabled by the cultural context.  
‘Differences over time’ emerged as a theme from the data and was summarized in Table 5-
42 on page 5-219. The data suggests that the rules and culture form part of the deep 
structure of this organization. What is telling is that, other than the initial development of 
these simple rules and the concomitant culture, the deep structure of this firm has remained 
remarkably stable. One might argue that 20 years in not a long enough time-frame to see 
the change that would drive evolution. However when you consider that in this time-frame 
the company has grown from an entrepreneurial start-up to an MNE, the market has moved 
from a primarily broker distribution model to a direct model: moving from the phones to 
the internet and now through price-comparison, change has been a feature of the past 20 
years with a stable set of rules and yet the firm remains “evolutionary fit” as the evolution 
has occurred at the routine and capability level. 
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7.8 What can be learned about managerial agency in this firm? 
Broadly speaking, the leadership within a company is a critical component for financial 
success (Davis & Useem, 2002). Within the primarily economics-based strategic 
management literature, managerial agency falls within the “black-box” although agency 
theory, as articulated originally by Jensen and Meckling (1976) where firms are viewed as 
a nexus of contracts, has contributed to analysis of managerial behaviour through analysis 
of incentives determining the relationships of agents (managers) to principals 
(shareholders) (Grant, 2002: 86) in an extensive literature on corporate governance and 
control. See Hoskisson et al. (1999) for a review of the place of agency theory in strategic 
management. But in general, ‘economic theory lacks a role for management’ (Augier & 
Teece, 2009: 417) and even the economic luminary Coase (1988: 38) has noted that 
‘economists have tended to neglect the main activity of the firm, running a business’. 
However in this thesis the term “agency” is used more in line with Giddens (1984) who 
argued that the possibility of agency lies in the human potential to choose actions 
deliberately and to implement them effectively even despite the established rules and 
prevailing powers. Giddens noted that organizations are effective instruments of collective 
agency expressing his view that  ‘the concept of agency should be regarded as more 
fundamental than that of the “individual”’ (Giddens, 1985: 168). In synthesizing Gidden’s 
arguments, Whittington (1992: 705) draws out two senses of agency: (1) in the recognition 
of the complexity of social structural rules and resources and (2) the firm’s shared 
assumptions and behaviours create context and act as a resource in organizational 
activities. It is in this sense that I use the term “managerial agency” as in this thesis I have 
moved away from the language of dynamic capabilities.  
The dynamic capabilities literature acknowledges that managers are at the centre of 
dynamic capability generation (Adner & Helfat, 2003; Augier & Teece, 2009; Barrales-
Molina et al., 2013; Zahra et al., 2006) with Augier and Teece acknowledging that 
dynamic capability has a broader behavioural foundation than many other theories of the 
firm (Augier & Teece, 2009: 417).  
In this thesis, the case has been made for the role of managers being the source of the rules 
and the culture of this firm but the descriptions of dynamic managerial capability are very 
close to new terminology of “managerial agency” used here. Dynamic managerial 
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capabilities (DMC) are those ‘with which managers build, integrate, and reconfigure 
organizational resources and competences’ (Adner & Helfat, 2003: 1012). In Adner and 
Helfat’s articulation of the construct, DMC are rooted in there underlying factors: (1) 
managerial human capital; (2) managerial social capital; and (3) managerial cognition. 
With respect to the data and applying it to these three underpinnings we see: (1) the skills 
both in people management and in intellectual capacity; (2) power and influence exerted 
through a commitment to cultural attributes of “democratic spirit” and “equality” through 
the rule ‘Communicate, communicate, communicate’ with an emphasis on building high 
functioning teams; and (3) the cognitive basis has been discussed earlier in this chapter. 
Thus do I argue that the statement that “managerial agency” is analogous to DMC. 
Teece’s influential work on DMC began when he published a call (Teece, 2007) to look at 
the microfoundations of dynamic capabilities in an attempt to move the field forward. In 
that paper he re-envisioned dynamic capability as the capacity (1) to sense and shape 
opportunities and threats, (2) to seize opportunities and (3) to maintain competitiveness (p. 
1319). Firms, he argued, with these strong underpinnings were “intensely entrepreneurial” 
and by 2009 he was arguing for a more robust role for management (Augier & Teece, 
2009), advocating that the entrepreneur/manager function in the dynamic capabilities 
framework introduces novelty and seeks new combinations and endeavours to promote and 
shape learning (Teece, 2009). Furthermore, he stated that the leadership function senses 
new opportunities and leads the organization forward to seize them. These roles are the 
essence of what has been termed “entrepreneurial fitness” (Teece, 2009) and most recently 
he draws together the economic underpinnings of his dynamic capability framework with 
entrepreneurial management and transformational leadership into a capabilities theory for 
MNE (Teece, 2014). 
Again, with regard to the data in this case-study, there is evidence that managerial agency 
within Admiral involves: (1) sensing in the external market intelligence and intuitive 
cognitive traits possessed by the senior management team; (2) seizing in the capacity for 
swift change in the organization driven by the rule ‘The perfect is the enemy of the good’ 
and mitigating risk through a ‘test and control’ routine; and (3) maintaining competiveness 
through both adaptive and radical innovation. This analysis supplies a further argument to 
support the contention that the DMC construct is a subset of the notion of “managerial 
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agency” introduced here. Managerial agency and the importance of leaders and managers 
within the firm also encompasses a large literature on leadership which was reviewed in 
Chapter 6.6 on page 6-241. This wider literature enriches the idea of DMC although one 
could argue that both the Adner and Helfat and the Augier and Teece constructs use 
language sufficiently overarching that might be considered to encompass this wider 
literature but these links are not explicit in the dynamic capabilities literature. The data in 
this case is not adequately understood using the DMC framework as there is evidence to 
support findings in the broader literature but it is clear empirically that managerial agency 
is key to the success of this firm. 
7.9 Summarizing the discussion 
From this case-study discussion, I struggle to find the benefit in using dynamic capability 
as an explanatory framework for successful change, for competing in dynamic 
environments with ‘logical consistency, conceptual clarity and empirical rigour’ (Arend & 
Bromiley, 2009: 75). In fact Arend and Bromiley criticise the dynamic capabilities 
approach for underutilizing existing organizational theory by the focus on direct 
associations between change and performance (p. 81) particularly in regard to concepts 
such as absorptive capacity, learning and change management. The extant literature review 
in Chapter 6 reflected this view. 
One can find evidence of dynamic capabilities if one looks for them using the theoretical 
definitions but the mechanisms by which dynamic capabilities lead to performance 
outcomes are still an unresolved issue in empirical research (most recently Eriksson, 
2014). Could this be because to find such outcomes one needs a different ontological 
perspective, needing high-quality qualitative research to open up the “black-box”? Could 
this be due to the fact that the concept of dynamic capability is, under the surface, an 
insufficient explanatory device? 
Initially, I was interested in finding out why Admiral remains a consistent high-performer 
in a highly volatile market. It seemed as if the answer might lie in the firm’s dynamic 
capabilities and hence the research question was formulated to explore dynamic capability 
in this firm. However the discussion in this chapter argues it to be an insufficient 
explanatory framework to answer the initial problem, and the extant literature on the rules 
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perspective and managerial agency has provided a more sufficient scaffold to answer the 
question. 
Essentially, in this firm, a group of entrepreneurs have come together with a simple idea to 
market insurance direct to a group previously ignored by traditional insurers thus 
addressing a gap in the market. These individuals have common values and attitudes that 
over time have become codified into a set of simple rules and a strong concomitant culture 
providing for a context for the recursive activities of action and learning as the company 
seeks to compete in a highly volatile market. These rules and cultural attributes form the 
basis of the firm’s deep structure that has remained stable despite the growth of the firm 
from a start-up in 1993 to its current MNE status. This stability is due possibly to the 
continuing presence of so many of the original start-up team and/or to the process of 
recruiting new managers and employees for “fit” and the constant indoctrination of the 
core values throughout the business. Through managerial agency, these rules and culture 
provide the framework for the development of routines and where those routines become a 
rigidity, there is still the context for problem solving which may, or may not, become the 
basis for new or improved routines. The company remains competitive through a series of 
adaptive and radical innovations that once again are enabled by the deep structure of the 
firm. 
This research has needed to look outwith the dynamic capabilities framework in order to 
organize and explain the data findings but it can contribute to the dynamic capability 
stream of literature by providing empirical support for Teece’s under developed concept of 
“entrepreneurial fitness” with the implication that firms where the founders and senior 
managers possess a match of traits to their environment and business purpose then 
entrepreneurial fitness is achieved through managerial agency and the creation of rules and 
a culture that enable a firm to act entrepreneurially. Additionally, the data was organized 
hierarchically with operational capabilities at zero level but differing from Winter’s 
hierarchy in that the evolution of those capabilities is through routines and ad hoc action in 
the context of rules that embody founders/senior management traits and behaviours. The 
dynamic capability observed in this firm has not evolved, contrary to the expectation from 
the literature, but that may be due to the twenty year time frame and/or the fact that the 
founders are still influential in this firm and evolution might be triggered when the 
founding team departs but that requires further study to investigate. 
CHAPTER 7:  ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
    Page  7-311
Lastly, we see in Peteraf et al. (2013) an attempt to bring the diverging conversation 
between Teece et al.’s articulation of the dynamic capabilities construct and Eisenhardt and 
Martin’s explication of dynamic capabilities together, two highly influential but, in parts, 
contradictory conceptualizations. Peteraf et al. conclude that one approach to reconciliation 
is looking at dynamic capabilities as best practices in moderately dynamic markets and as 
simple rules and processes in high velocity markets. This thesis offers a different means of 
drawing together Peteraf et al.’s “elephant in the room” problem by arguing that the 
concept of rules transcends distinctions between evolutionary economics and complexity 
theory so the difference between the two conceptualizations evaporates. So by using a 
rules perspective where routines are the enactments of rules, then since Teece et al.’s 
conceptualization of dynamic capabilities is built upon the premise of processes (equated 
to routines on p. 518), and thus implicitly with enacted rules, and Eisenhardt & Martin 
explicitly relate dynamic capabilities to rules then this perspective has bridged the gap 
between the two conceptualizations.  
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CHAPTER 8:  THESIS CONTRIBUTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
8.1 Introduction 
The initial purpose of this study was to evaluate dynamic capability theory through an in-
depth empirical case, opening up the “black box” within a highly successful FTSE 100 
company operating in a volatile market. In this final chapter, we review the success in 
meeting the original aims and look at how the research contributes to theory. The quality 
of the research is critically assessed and the implications of some of the inevitable 
limitations associated with the methodological choices and practical considerations are 
examined. 
8.2 Findings of this study 
One of the last steps in ensuring validity in qualitative research conducted from a critical 
realist perspective is looking at the generalizability of the findings to make ‘sense of the 
particular persons or situations studied, but also shows how the same process, in different 
situations, can lead to different results’ (Maxwell, 1992: 293). 
At the end of Chapter 7, I summarised the findings from this research in a manner 
consistent with the first part of Maxwell’s definition of generalizability. To generalize the 
findings outwith the situation studied we can say: Dynamic capabilities theory postulates 
that firms habitualise ways of reconfiguring and deploying their so-called zero-order or 
operational capabilities.  This is particularly pertinent in high velocity markets where the 
pace and scale of change are exaggerated.  This study examines an entrepreneurial firm 
from start-up through several stages of significant change.  This firm retained high levels 
of founder involvement and, over time, behavioural traits from these founders become 
embedded as a set of rules that create structure and enable the firm to compete by creating 
the context for action.  These embedded rules appear to enable the transition from founder 
behaviours to both routinized and ad-hoc organisational practices that represent the firm’s 
capacity to improvise, respond and seize opportunities as market conditions alter. The rules 
embody a codification of the cognitive aspects, such as traits and behaviours, of the 
founders and are operationalized in the organizational culture of the firm.  Whilst this 
study works retroductively to generate insight, one can hypothesize that in circumstances 
where founders do not possess traits which relate to the sensing and seizing themes within 
dynamic capabilities then the transition from traits to routinized practices are more likely 
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to produce rigidities and ultimately liabilities if significant organisational change is 
encountered. 
The research raised questions about how well the dynamic capability theory works as an 
explanatory framework. This study seems to indicate that potentially it is a superfluous 
construct as currently envisaged, as the capability in this firm can be equally as well 
explained by the substantial literatures in change management, organizational learning, 
culture, strategic decision making etc. Much of the existing empirical research has 
embraced the construct and found evidence of “dynamic capability”.  But the aim of 
grounded theory is to ensure that any explanation fits all the findings and in the research 
reported here, it was apparent that existing dynamic capability theory was inadequate to 
encompass all the findings. The critical realist perspective adopted suggests that generative 
mechanisms and causal powers drive the analytical process and the case examined here 
suggests that the dynamic capability construct is synonymous with that of the dynamic 
managerial construct. Therefore, dynamic capability, if it exists, is more akin to an 
umbrella term for the processes and routines that come into play through managerial 
agency in order to create, extend, or modify its resource base (Helfat et al., 2007) and one 
must question it’s value in explaining competitive advantage.  
However the dynamic capability conversation has moved on recently. Peteraf et al. (2013), 
in a paper trying to reconcile the contradictory elements between Teece et al.’s influential 
1997 paper with Eisenhardt and Martins equally influential 2000 paper, conclude that in 
high velocity environments there may be a hierarchy of dynamic capabilities at work, 
using the phrase ‘a higher order capability – one that continuously manages to create 
lower order simple rules and processes’ (Peteraf et al., 2013: 1406) where rules are seen as 
lower-order dynamic capabilities in the high velocity context. This is interesting in that it is 
the first attempt other than from Eisenhardt to marry the concept of dynamic capability and 
rules. But Eisenhardt has also moved the conversation on rules forward (Bingham & 
Eisenhardt, 2011, 2014; Bingham et al., 2007) and links it to dynamic capabilities 
(Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011) by arguing that “simplification cycling” defined as ‘honing 
a small, yet high quality, portfolio of heuristics’ (p. 1459) is likely to be a dynamic 
capability.  
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Bingham and Eisenhardt’s theorising on heuristics is empirically based on six 
entrepreneurial firms in the IT industry. The Admiral case-study produced slightly 
different results, although their heuristic framework formed the scaffold for understanding 
how the data explained success in this firm. There is no evidence in this firm of  
“simplification cycling”. In fact the rules are remarkably stable but that may be due to the 
stability of the management team or the fact it is a different industry. However there is 
strong evidence that rules have formed over time and that they guide “opportunity-capture” 
within the firm as Bingham and Eisenhardt describe. Given this perspective, I am not sure 
that dynamic capability forms a useful construct in this high velocity environment. 
Bingham and Eisenhardt’s statement that simplification cycling must be a dynamic 
capability is made on the basis of Eisenhardt and Martin’s earlier theorising and is 
“presented” rather than argued in the later paper.  
What if dynamic capability is a superfluous construct? What if it’s rules/heuristics that are 
the driver of the routines and processes by ‘which firms achieve new resource 
configurations as markets emerge, collide, split, evolve, and die’ (Eisenhardt & Martin, 
2000: 1107)? Furthermore in this case-study, Winter’s (2003) capability hierarchy was 
found to be an inadequate explanatory framework for this data. Additionally, it is rules that 
lie at the root of action within this firm so, they are not, as Peteraf et al. conjecture “lower-
order dynamic capabilities”. The rules perspective itself is not without problems: do they 
really drive action or are they just a way of accounting linguistically for observed action? 
And yet of the two mechanisms: dynamic capabilities and rules, rules appear to be more 
straightforward theoretically in this case and perhaps should be preferred as the mechanism 
for understanding strategic action in firms in high velocity environments. 
The RBV and organizational behaviour literatures are rich in constructs and theorising that 
explain or contribute to superior performance and perhaps the rules/heuristics theorizing 
fits better here than it does with the dynamic capabilities construct which can almost be 
seen as an overarching, umbrella term to describe the contributory paths to superior 
performance described in the wider literature.  
Dynamic managerial capability can also be described in terms of expansive literatures on 
the role of cognition, leadership and top teams as reviewed in Chapter 6. This case-study 
revealed how that managerial agency is key to the rules perspective. This study shows that 
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the concept of agency is more encompassing than that of dynamic managerial capabilities 
and Teece’s (2007) vision of sensing, seizing and reconfiguring. Managerial agency is a 
term that encompasses the theorising of the dynamic managerial construct but incorporates 
how the cognitive basis is operationalized. There is a cognitive aspect reflected in the rules 
and culture which create the context for leadership actions and the roles of sense-making 
and sense-giving to sustain the organizational culture and create the framework for 
innovation, learning and change. It is through managerial agency that rules are created, the 
culture sustained and that “entrepreneurial fitness” is achieved.  
Rules based upon the cognitive functions of the founding leadership of a firm by definition 
satisfy the VRIN characteristics of the RBV upon which SCA rests (Barney, 1991a). 
Building on Bingham and Eisenhardt’s theorising, in high velocity environments it appears 
the ability to compete and to create and renew the capabilities of the firm in which 
competitive advantage is based, relies on a set of simple rules that allow the firm to capture 
opportunities for advantage. These findings are in direct contradiction to the dynamic 
capability literature so rather than “advancing” theory this thesis has demonstrated that 
rules and their underlying traits are a mechanism where by the creation, sustenance and 
adaptation of operational capabilities can be traced directly to the actions taken in response 
to or in anticipation of environmental changes, actions taken in the context of the 
organizational culture that reflects these rules and underlying traits. As such it contributes 
to the resource based theory of the firm without recourse to the dynamic capabilities 
construct. 
8.3 Philosophical challenges 
In Chapter 3, a case was made for the ontological and epistemological positioning of this 
research situating it in a post positivist paradigm using the critical realism ontology as 
espoused by Andrew Sayer (Sayer, 2000), that in turn is based on Roy Bhakasar’s 
philosophy (Bhaskar, 1978/2008, 1998b). It was to be a retroductive, longitudinal, 
exploratory case study using grounded theory principles for coding and generating analytic 
theory. The principles were derived primarily from Glaser and Strauss (1967) but allowing 
a priori identification of constructs associated with dynamic capabilities as recommended 
by Eisenhardt (1989a). The methodology drew from Corbin and Strauss (2008). See 
Chapter 4 for details on the research design and methods used. One of the challenges that 
this introduces to the research presented here is that I am adopting a different 
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epistemological and ontological position than many of the key contributors to the dynamic 
capabilities literature who approach the topic from a more rationalist and realist orientation 
via a disciplinary bias toward economics.  Optimistically, this generates the possibility of a 
constructively critical dialogue across paradigms that might enrich the theorising of an 
important concept.  It does however introduce the possibility that two discourses are in fact 
talking past each other due to paradigm incommensurability (Pfeffer & Fong, 2005). 
Chapter 5 represents the thematic analysis of the data using both primary sourced interview 
data and a wealth of supporting secondary data. The themes and subsequent retroduction of 
rules, cultural attributes and traits in Chapter 7 were discussed with the participants who 
agreed that the nascent theoretical elements were a good articulation of tacitly understood 
aspects of the firm. 
In terms of theory advancement, this qualitative research study sought to critically evaluate 
dynamic capability theory (Bluhm et al., 2011; Pratt, 2008) but it is the lack of 
standardization in qualitative research that ‘trouble’ the mainstream positivists in the 
strategic management arena (Bluhm et al., 2011: 1871) and Chapter 4 reviewed the 
recommendations for best practice for qualitative design along with Suddaby’s (2006) 
elucidation on the importance of reflexivity in grounded theory, echoing Eisenhardt’s 
(1989a) view that validity comes from having the theory-building process tied to the 
evidence explicitly.  
The research design was tightly linked to considerations for rigour and the challenge for 
this qualitative study was how to maintain epistemological rigour and validity but at the 
same time recognizing the critical realist arguments that the deepest level of influence may 
be unobservable per se and rely on the researcher’s interpretation of the data. The 
parameters for rigour came from a framework proposed by Venkatesh et al. (2013) and 
were reproduced in Table 4.2 on page 4-83. The next table here presents the evidence of 
adherence to the validity criteria suggested by Venkatesh et al. to demonstrate the rigour of 
this research. 
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Table 8-1: Actions against the validity criteria presented in Table 4.2 (Adapted from 
Venkatesh et al. (2013: 33)). 
In summary, there is a chain of evidence both from the primary and secondary sources of 
data and linked to the extant literature to support the findings. Additionally, the 
participants and wider management team at Admiral have validated the findings and so this 
research meets these validity criteria. 
Eisenhardt (1989a), although not writing from a critical realist perspective, talks of the 
importance of the “enfolding” literature. This is a piece of research that, in attempting to 
use existing dynamic capability frameworks and definitions, found contradictions and 
inconsistencies when applied to the data from this case-study. I have argued above that this 
is a piece of research that has construct and internal validity (to use Yin’s more positivist 
version of validity) and Yin (2003) suggests that single-case studies such as this should 
draw on existing theory to claim external validity and, indeed, make the generalizations 
made in Section 8.2. Part of the challenge in presenting qualitative research lies ‘in writing 
it up to communicate its insights in a credible way’ (Langley & Abdallah, 2011: 203) part 
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of which is building arguments to support or challenge findings from the extant literature. 
Eisenhardt’s assertion (p. 544) that without a grounding in theory, as well as in data, 
conflicting findings may indicate problems with internal validity or are ‘idiosyncratic to 
the specific case’ and thus a challenge to generalizability. She also comments that 
grounding a study in theory, where there is conflict, can be an opportunity, as I have found: 
‘the juxtaposition of conflicting results forces researchers into a more creative 
framebreaking mode of thinking’ as well as sharpening ‘the limits to generalizability of the 
focal research’ (both quotes Eisenhardt, 1989: 544). 
8.4 Limitations to this study 
Whilst this study seeks to contribute to the wider literature on dynamic capabilities and to 
the rules literature it must be recognized that this is a single case-study in a very specific 
context: a high performing firm during the period where it has grown from a start-up to 
MNE status in a highly volatile market in the UK. However it is also a firm where many of 
the founders and original team are still in positions of influence, so whilst the findings 
meet the conditions for a piece of qualitative research, they are also very contextualized. 
Critical realism accepts this and there is no reason why these findings can’t contribute to 
the literature with caveats around the specificity of the context but hopefully they raise the 
question about whether the findings might hold true in other contexts. At the very least, the 
case has provided an empirical challenge to dynamic capabilities theory as it is currently 
articulated. The author believes that the Bingham and Eisenhardt work similarly challenges 
the current view of dynamic capabilities, although it hasn’t been framed as explicitly as the 
findings from this study. 
Another limitation for this research is in the relationship the author has with the firm, as 
one of the founders. Whilst there are undoubted opportunities in having an insider 
perspective on opening up the “black box” there must be a potential criticism that the 
interpretation is biased. In Chapter 4, this potential was recognized and the hope was the 
rigour built into the research design would counter any bias. Another important 
justification for taking a rigorous approach is my ambition that this research contributes to 
a body of work largely written with a positivistic ontology. There is a danger that a 
conversational style of interviewing can be less about accessing the participants reality and 
more about offering a way of constructing a shared sense of experience (Cunliffe, 2002: 
136) albeit that shared experience is a source of analytical insight. Triangulation was an 
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important tool to avoid bias using, where possible, external sources of secondary data or 
data produced under Stock Exchange guidelines such as annual reports and the IPO 
prospectus which should be less open to bias in interpretation and where leading questions 
have been asked or personal diary notes used they are explicitly recognized in the thesis. 
Additionally, checking findings with the participants and wider management team and 
gaining agreement and in some cases nuancing the findings with further discussion, for 
example discussing the selection rules, mitigates personal bias although given the strength 
of cultural alignment in this firm it does not rule out firm-wide bias from everyone 
including the researcher. However the findings do find resonance in the recent literature on 
rules/heuristics helping the arguments for validity. 
From a personal perspective, I feel that I have been as independent as I can be in the use of 
primary and secondary sources, subsequent data analysis and retroductive thinking. 
Reflecting throughout the process, as recorded in memos, there were insights that took the 
research in a very different direction than the objectives of the original piece exploring 
dynamic capability. I felt I maintained a capacity to ‘make the familiar strange’ (Spindler 
& Spindler, 1982 quoted in Suddaby (2006): 635). The fact that my findings challenged 
the dynamic capability view (DCV), as documented here, bears testament to the 
independence of the analysis and that is why the original research question was left as is 
for the thesis and not retro-fitted to the findings as it supports the argument that the 
potential limitations of bias have been attenuated. 
8.5 Contributions and future directions 
There are two categories of finding from this thesis that are dependent on whether a 
dynamic capability perspective or a rules perspective is utilised. The initial objective for 
this research was to make a contribution to the dynamic capability literature. However, it 
departs from that initial intention in that it challenges how the literature is currently 
articulated. This in itself is a contribution to the theory. The post-positivist ontological 
position is a critical tradition where ‘the objectivity of science is not a matter of the 
individual scientists but rather the social result of their mutual criticism’ (Popper quoted in 
Guba (1990: 231)). As noted in Chapter 3, the thrust of Popper’s argument is that scientific 
law goes beyond what can be experienced so it can never be absolutely true and can only 
be accepted on a provisional basis until such time as it can be falsified (Bhaskar, 
1978/2008). This is a very specific case but it has shown shortcomings in the theorising 
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around dynamic capabilities for an entrepreneurial firm that has grown to be a successful 
MNE in a highly dynamic environment. 
Using the theoretical lens of dynamic capability, this thesis does make a positive 
contribution to that literature.  Employing definitions from the seminal theorists in the 
field, dynamic capability can be mapped retroductively from accounts of success given by 
the participants and thus contributes as an empirical study, in a different context, of a firm 
where dynamic capability can be found. Some of the debates in the literature can also be 
addressed with this perspective on the data. 
Firstly, using Winter’s (2003) hierarchy of capability is too simplistic to aid understanding 
the relationship between operational and dynamic capabilities. The idea that operating 
capabilities can affect dynamic capabilities by ‘influencing the knowledge that is available 
for the latter to undertake future reconfigurations of the former’ (Newey & Zahra, 2009: 
97) suggests levels of complexity to Winter’s hierarchical visualization. However an 
alternative hierarchical view did emerge from the findings. A hierarchy for strategic action 
does exist in this firm whereby Winter’s conceptualization of operational capabilities 
holds. However changes in the capability base of an organization arise as the result of 
routines and/or ad hoc processes that have arisen in context of a set of rules acting upon 
those capabilities. In turn, these rules codify traits, behaviours and cognitive styles of the 
founders and senior managers of this firm. In addition to creating the context for strategic 
action, these rules are reflected in cultural practices subject to managerial sensemaking and 
sensegiving in turn imbedding the founder traits in the wider population of the firm. 
Secondly, this thesis contributes to the dynamic managerial capability (DMC) construct 
and to the concept of “entrepreneurial fitness”. DMC were defined by Adner and Helfat 
(2003: 1012) as the capabilities by which ‘managers build, integrate, and reconfigure 
organizational resources and competences’ and subsequently by Teece (2007, 2009) and 
Augier and Teece (2009) as the capabilities that are the main factor in influencing change. 
The literature is unclear as to how dynamic managerial capability is deployed and 
operationalized in order for firms to achieve what Teece (2009, 2012, 2014) calls 
“entrepreneurial fitness” where ‘management must be entrepreneurial, sensing if not 
creating new opportunities before others do, and executing swiftly and expertly and 
collaboratively where the situation allows and requires it’ (Teece, 2009: 59). In addition to 
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these roles of sensing, seizing and reconfiguring, this thesis found the existing literature on 
leadership, cognition and top teams was needed to help clarify the role of managerial 
agency at work in this firm. There is a cognitive aspect reflected in the rules and culture 
which create the context for leadership actions and roles of sense-making and sense-giving 
to sustain the organizational culture and create the framework for innovation, learning and 
change. It is through managerial agency that rules are created, the culture sustained and 
“entrepreneurial fitness” is achieved.  
Thirdly, although there is a widely accepted view, imported from the RBV, that dynamic 
capabilities must be heterogeneous, Eisenhardt and Martin (2000: 1106) challenged this 
claiming that dynamic capabilities ‘exhibit commonalities across effective firms or what 
can be termed “best practice”’. This thesis contributes to this debate by finding dynamic 
capabilities are that are quite generic and often documented by other others in the 
empirical research stream for example learning, strategic decision making, leadership, etc. 
However the heterogeneity is only apparent in the detail of the data and in this firm lies in 
the traits and behaviours of the founders and senior managers that by definition are firm 
dependent. The paths of dependency that flow from this heterogeneity, paths that formed 
part of the original articulation of the dynamic capability construct (Teece et al., 1997) 
have been embodied first as a “dominant logic” (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986, 1995) then 
over time embedded as a set of simple rules or heuristics that form the context of strategic 
action within the firm.  
However, using a rules perspective, this thesis makes a key contribution in the utility of the 
rules perspective in understanding strategic action within this firm and its potential in a 
wider context. In this, it contributes to the recent literature (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011, 
2014; Bingham et al., 2007; Eisenhardt & Sull, 2001) developing a role for simple rules in 
competitive strategy. This theorising is relatively new and currently based on IT companies 
working in highly volatile environments but this thesis presents another empirical example 
of a firm deploying rules in a different context competing in a similarly highly dynamic 
market and as such contributes to this conversation. Using a rules perspective there are 
clear opportunities for collaborative work across discrete management research domains 
for example by explicating a link between the cognitive underpinnings of leaders with 
organizational behaviour and from there to strategic decision making and organizational 
change or how a cognitive propensity for curiosity links to absorptive capacity. These are 
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all questions that arose during data analysis of this study but parked for future study as the 
focus for this research was specifically a critical examination of the dynamic capability 
framework. 
One question that did fall under the aegis of that focus was “is one of the reasons that 
research in dynamic capability has not progressed because, like the RBV, it clings to ‘an 
inappropriately narrow neoclassical economic rationality and has thereby diminished its 
opportunities for making further progress’ (Kraaijenbrink et al., 2010: 350)”? The RBV ‘is 
explicitly reductionist’(Kraaijenbrink et al., 2010: 351) and as such stands against 
emergent theories that liken a firm to an organism with complex feed-back mechanisms at 
work. The literature on order-generating rules in the concept of conditioned emergence 
(MacIntosh & MacLean, 1999) isn’t clear on where those rules come from in the first place 
nor what is their relationship to the initial conditions described in the complexity literature. 
This research might form a springboard for further refinement of how a complexity 
perspective can contribute to understanding the role of leadership in competitive strategy 
or indeed look at the deeper structure of leadership within organizations (as called for by 
Kempster & Parry, 2011).  
Recently Peteraf et al. (2013) have proposed understanding rules as “lower-order dynamic 
capabilities” in highly volatile environments in an attempt to draw together the 
contradictory conceptualizations of dynamic capabilities of Teece et al. (1997) and 
Eisenhardt & Martin (2000).  This thesis can contribute to that debate by offering a 
perspective that allows one to step outside dynamic capability theory and using my 
argument that routines are enactments of rules, then since Teece et al.’s conceptualization 
of dynamic capabilities is built upon the premise of processes (equated to routines on p. 
518), ‘shaped by positions and paths’ (p. 524) and thus implicitly with enacted rules and 
Eisenhardt & Martin explicitly relate dynamic capabilities to rules, then one can argue that 
the concept of rules transcends distinctions between evolutionary economics and 
complexity theory so the difference between the two conceptualizations evaporates. 
The DCV has become a distinctive research domain in an attempt to address a flaw in the 
RBV about how to compete in dynamic environments and yet Bingham and Eisenhardt’s 
body of work and this research are all conducted on firms competing in these dynamic 
environments and neither appears to need the concept of dynamic capabilities in order to 
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explain strategic action. Does a rules perspective have to be shoe-horned into the dynamic 
capability debate or does it supersede that debate? Is dynamic capability simply the 
organizational capability for change as suggested by Nickerson et al. (2012: 55)? Arend 
and Bromiley (2009: 76) observed that ‘many established concepts, including absorptive 
capacity, architectural innovation, intrapreneurship, strategic fit, first-mover advantage, 
organizational learning and change management address issues similar to the DCV’. This 
research has indicated how rules can create the context for these concepts but this potential 
contribution must be the basis for further research.  
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APPENDIX A:  PRIMARY DATA CODING TABLES 
A.1 Introduction  
For the purposes of clarity within the main document, the coding tables were moved to this 
Appendix.  The email discussion forum data and the interview data were all coded and 
those codes grouped into themes. This Appendix shows the coding tables that underlie 
each emergent theme. 
A.2 ‘Recruitment and Indoctrination’ Theme 
The coding table for this theme is reproduced in the main text in Chapter 5.5.1.1 on page 
5-130. 
A.3 ‘Embrace Change’ Theme 
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This theme includes coding for two proto-themes: ‘embrace change’ and ‘speed’. 
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A.4 ‘Learning Environment’ Theme 
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A.5 ‘People Matter’ Theme 
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A.6 ‘Management Style’ Theme 
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A.7 ‘A Balancing Act’ Theme 
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A.8 ‘Attention to Detail’ Theme 
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A.9 ‘Numbers Matter’ Theme 
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A.10 ‘Structure Helps’ Theme 
 
A.11 ‘Team Building’ Theme 
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A.12 ‘External Market Intelligence’ Theme 
 
A.13 ‘Strategic Decision Making’ Theme 
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A.14 ‘Mission’ Theme 
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A.15 ‘Stability of Management’ Theme 
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A.16 ‘Culture Enables’ Theme 
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This theme includes coding for five proto-themes: ‘culture’, ‘equality’, ‘pride and passion’, 
‘lack of ego’ and ‘customer focus’. 
A.17 Example of all data recoded for cultural element ‘No blame’ 
All data from the themes presented here in the appendix was recoded using ideas from the 
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‘culture enables’ to draw out elements of Admiral’s culture from all the primary data. 
Given that 897 themed excerpts of data were reduced to 674 recoded elements I have only 
presented the recoded elements for the ‘No blame’ aspect of Admiral’s culture. The table 
presented here also shows the originating theme for the data excerpt and those shaded 
green were not included in the final count for ‘No blame’ as they were duplicated data 
excerpts originally coded for other themes as well. 
A.18 Example of How Elements of the Culture ‘Enable’ the Theme ‘Embrace 
Change’ 
Once the cultural elements emerged from the data it became clear how the culture enables 
the various themes identified. As an example, the ‘embrace change’ theme data table is 
reproduced here showing the cultural recoding. The main text of the thesis uses the 
‘learning environment’ as an example and the principle of analysis was the same but for 
the sake of the size of the overall thesis only ’Embrace change’ recoding is demonstrated 
in this Appendix. 
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The data excerpts highlighted in green also appear as a data excerpt in another theme. See 
the main text of the thesis Chapter 5.6.15 where the theme ‘Culture Enables’ is developed 
for how tables like this contributed to the theme development. 
A.19 Data Tables Revealing the Difference Over Time 
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APPENDIX B:  SUBMISSIONS TO STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT SOCIETY 
B.1   Abstract Accepted to SMS Special Conference: Prague 2012 
Title: Unblocking the conceptual log jam: Using a rules perspective to make sense of 
dynamic capability. 
Abstract: During the last two decades, research in dynamic capabilities has promised to 
unlock understanding of how competitive advantage arises in dynamic markets.  However 
to date, empirical work has by and large focused on what dynamic capabilities are. There 
has been little work demonstrating how they actually operate and contribute to competitive 
advantage other than at the conceptual level. There is a ‘log jam’ of research in this field 
which we argue can be addressed by using a rules perspective: an insight obtained from an 
inductive case-study of a successful UK financial services firm. We contend that a 
hierarchy of dynamic capability exists within a firm and at its nth level this capability 
expresses itself in the generative rules within the deep structure of the firm. 
 
B.2  Abstract Accepted to SMS Special Conference: Glasgow 2013 
Title: Using complexity theory to understand dynamic capability. 
Abstract: Complexity theory offers us an interesting perspective for better understanding 
how dynamic capability is operationalized and can contribute to competitive advantage 
within the firm. We contend that a hierarchy of dynamic capability exists within a firm and 
at its nth level this capability comprises an interacting set of simple rules that are subject to 
both positive and negative feedback. We use an inductive case study to illustrate our 
arguments but will need more data to explore the extent to which our observations are 
generalizable. 
B.3  Abstract Accepted to SMS Annual International Conference: Madrid 
2014 
Title: Competing for success: Dynamic capability at Admiral Plc – or is it? 
Abstract: This paper advances the study of dynamic capabilities by examining a 
longitudinal case study of a firm which bears the hallmarks of high performance and 
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innovation which are often thought to be attributable to dynamic capability.  Using a 
FTSE-100 company in the UK we ask, has dynamic capability contributed to the firm’s its 
success and, if so, to what extent does that capability evolve over time?  Using data from 
the launch of the firm as a start-up in 1993 through growing its status as an SME to its 
current MNE status we present evidence of dynamic capability in operation.  The UK car 
insurance market is regarded as a near-perfect market and the case demonstrates how 
Admiral has consistently out-performed its UK competitors and is opening subsidiaries of 
both its insurance and price comparison businesses in the US, in Spain, France and Italy. 
Our data opens up the “black-box” comparing theoretical constructs from the literature to 
empirical evidence from the case.  We then consider whether dynamic capability is in fact 
a superfluous explanatory framework 
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